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CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL 
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HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
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^ar^,  ^c^affrtet:  &  QUatx  ^x'n^t  <^00a^0 


XVIII 

CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION  IN  THE 
COAL  INDUSTRY  OF  AMERICA 


CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION 

IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

OF  AMERICA 


BY 


ARTHUR  E.  SUFFERN,  M.A. 

Sometime  Lecturer  in  Economics,  Columbia  University 


BOSTON   AND  NEW   YORK 
HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN   COMPANY 

1915 


COPYRIGHT,    :9I5,   BY   HART,   SCHAFFNER    *    MARX 
ALL  RIGHTS   RESERVED 

Published  February  iqis 


jbst.  Indus. 
.  Rel. 


i 


5  60^ 
A3  S7 


PREFACE 


This  series  of  books  owes  its  existence  to  the  generosity  of 

*^       Messrs.  Hart,  Schaffner  &  Marx,  of  Chicago,  who  have 

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University  of  Chicago. 
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*  i>      '  Columbia  University. 

Henry  C.  Adams, 

University  of  Michigan. 
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i ;  New  York  City. 

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^^  Harvard  University. 

^  <  ^^ 

"  I  -  -    o<?.* 

£   ^  IN8I.  WOUS.  MOj. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  describe  the  methods  of 
voluntary  settlement  of  disputes  in  the  coal  industry.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  spirit  of  cooperation  develoj^ed 
among  the  operators  and  miners  may  spread  into  other 
industries.  That  such  a  spirit  has  come  only  after  much 
strife  and  that  it  needs  to  develop  more  fully  does  not 
detract  from  the  good  results  obtained  or  from  its  power 
to  encourage  employers  and  employees  in  other  industries 
to  emulate  it.  In  order  to  put  the  relations  between  the 
contracting  parties  to  wage  agreements  on  an  equitable 
basis  the  cultivation  of  a  mutual  understanding  is  neces- 
sary. 

Both  the  operators  and  the  miners  have  shown  a  broad, 
liberal,  and  tolerant  spirit  by  the  way  in  which  they  have 
cooperated  in  furnishing  the  source  material  which  has 
made  this  study  possible.  In  this  connection  I  am  espe- 
cially indebted  to  Mr.  H.  N.  Taylor  and  Mr.  G.  L.  Scroggs, 
of  the  American  Federation  of  Coal  Operators,  to  Mr. 
W.  D.  Ryan,  former  Commissioner  of  the  Southwestern 
Coal  Operators,  and  to  many  other  representatives  of  Coal 
Operators'  associations.  On  the  side  of  the  miners  the 
unfailing  courtesy  and  generosity  of  Mr.  John  Mitchell, 
and  Miss  Elizabeth  C.  Morris,  his  secretary,  in  providing 
source  material  and  in  placing  the  facilities  of  Mr. 
Mitchell's  private  library  at  my  command,  are  gratefully 
recognized.  My  grateful  acknowledgments  are  due  to 
Mr.  Thomas  Ashton,  of  the  Miners'  Federation  of  Great 
Britain,  for  a  wealth  of  source  material  placed  at  my  dis- 
posal. I  hope  to  make  larger  use  of  it  than  space  in  this 
volume  permits. 


viii  AUTHORS  PREFACE 

An  expression  of  gratitude  can  but  vaguely  convey  my 
appreciation  of  the  coiiperation  and  helpful  criticism  of 
Professors  Henry  R.  Seager,  Edwin  H.  A.  Seligman,  and 
Kobert  E.  Chaddock,  of  Columbia  University.  The  short- 
comings of  the  work  exist  in  spite  of  their  helpfulness. 
Any  attempt  to  formulate  an  expression  of  my  appreciation 
of  my  wife's  constant  encouragement  and  cooperation  can 
only  prove  inadequate. 

Arthur  E.  Suffern. 

Columbia  Ukivebsitt, 
April  17,  1914. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .    .  xix 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  INTRODUCTION  AND  EXTENSION  OF  CONCILIA- 
TION IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD 1 

1.  Causes 1 

2.  Conditions  in  the  bituminous  field  from  the  Civil  War  to  the 

joint  movement  in  1885 5 

A.  Early  organizations 5 

a.  American  Miners'  Association 5 

b.  Miners'  and  Laborers'  Benevolent  Association  ....  7 

c.  Miners'  National  Association,  1873 7 

(1)  Effects  of  panic  of  1873 8 

(2)  Effects  of  individualism 9 

(3)  Inauguration  of  arbitration 10 

(4)  The  organization  at  its  height 12 

(5)  Trial  of  Siney  and  Parks 13 

(6)  Decline  of  the  organization 16 

B.  Events  leading  to  the  joint  conference  of  1885 16 

a.  Arbitration  in  Ohio 16 

b.  Arbitration  in  Western  Pennsylvania 17 

c.  Interstate  convention  of  1880 19 

d.  Ohio  Miners'  Amalgamated  Association 20 

e.  Arbitration  imder  state  laws  providing  for  tribimals  .     .  21 

(1)  Arbitration  in  Western  Pemisylvania 21 

(2)  Hocking  Valley  strike.  1884 23 

f.  Changes  in  the  coal  industry 24 

(1)  Enlargement  of  the  market 24 

(2)  Working  conditions 25 

3.  The  struggle  for  a  joint  agreement  from  1885  to  1898     ...  29 

A.  The  National  Federation  of  Miners  and  Mine  Laborers     .     .  29 
a.  Suggestion  of  the  interstate  joint  conference      ....  30 

B.  Interstate  joint  conference  of  1886 30 

C.  Withdrawal  of  Illinois 31 

D.  Withdrawal  of  Indiana 32 

E.  The  problem  of  the  joint  conference 33 

F.  The  formation  of  the  Unit<!d  Mine  Workers 33 

G.  The  absorption  of  the  immigrant    .    .    » 37 


CONTENTS 

n.  Efforts  to  re\nvc  the  joint  conference 38 

a.  The  "suspension"  of  1894 39 

I.  The  strike  of  1897 41 

a.  Conditions  of  work  and  wages 41 

b.  Effects  of  machinery 42 

c.  Earnings  of  capital 42 

d.  Condition  of  the  union 43 

e.  Negotiations  for  the  Joint  Conference  of  1898   ....  44 
4.  Extension  of  the  joint  movement 46 

A.  The  struggle  in  Illinois 47 

a.  Virden  and  Pana  —  importation  of  negroes 47 

B.  Iowa  and  Michigan  seek   admission  to  the  joint  confer- 

ence    49 

C.  Organization  of  the  Southwest  Field 50 

a.  The  strike  of  1899 60 

b.  Conflict  of  federal  and  state  injunctions 61 

c.  The  Reese  case 62 

d.  The  miners'  commissary 63 

e.  The  Southwestern  Interstate  Joint  Conference  ....  63 

f.  The  Southwest  Field  seeks  admission  to  the  joint  confer- 

ence of  the  Central  Field 54 

D.  Attempt  to  organize  Maryland 54 

E.  The  struggle  in  Alabama,  Tennessee,  and  Kentucky ...  66 

F.  Organization  of  the  Northwest 69 

G.  The  Colorado  struggle 60 


CHAPTER  n 

THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM 63 

1.  The  importance  of  the  problem 63 

2.  The  attempts  at  organization 66 

3.  \Miy  West  Virginia  has  remained  unorganized 71 

A.  Rural  workers  and  individualism 71 

B.  Immigration 72 

C.  Absentee  owTiership 74 

D.  The  system  of  armed  guards 75 

E.  Injunctions  and  conspiracy  laws 76 

F.  State  statutes  vs.  the  common  law 77 

4.  The  broader  aspects  of  the  problem 79 

A.  The  territorial  aspect 79 

B.  Investigation  by   the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 

1907 80 

C.  Ownership  of  coal  lands  and  stock       80 

a.  Holdings  of  Norfolk  and  Western  Railway 80 

b.  Western  Maryland  Railroad  Company  holdings     ...  81 

c.  The  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  Company      ....  81 


CONTENTS  xi 

d.  The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company 84 

e.  The  New  York  Central  and  Hudson  River  Railroad  Com- 

pany     84 

f.  Buffalo  and  Susquehanna  Railroad  Company    ....  85 

g.  Buffalo,  Rochester,  and  Pittsburg  Railway  Company      .  85 
h.  Pittsburg,  Shawmut,  and  Northern  Railroad  Company    .  85 

i.  The  Erie  Railroad  Company 86 

j.  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway  Company 86 

D.  Traffic  associations 86 

a.  The  Tidewater  Bituminous  Steam  Coal  TraflBc  Associa- 

tion       86 

b.  Ownership  of  stock  and  interlocking  directorates   ...  87 

E.  Direction  of  policy  toward  labor 91 

F.  Westmoreland  County  strike,  1910-11 91 

a.  Cause  and  spread  of  the  strike 92 

b.  Operators'  tactics 92 

c.  Refusal  to  arbitrate 94 

G.  The  strike  of  1912  in  West  Virginia 94 


CHAPTER  m 

THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA  .     ...  108 

1.  Purposes  of  the  organization 109 

2.  Units  of  organization 110 

A.  International 110 

B.  Districts 110 

C.  Subdistricts Ill 

D.  Local  unions Ill 

a.  Jurisdiction Ill 

b.  Democratic  features Ill 

c.  Local  and  individual  grievances 112 

d.  Membership 113 

e.  Finances 114 

3.  Officers 116 

A.  Qualifications 116 

B.  Duties  of  officers 116 

C.  Importance  of  organizers 118 

4.  Nomination  and  election  of  officers 119 

A.  Nominations 119 

B.  Elections 120 

a.  The  recall 121 

6.  The  International  Convention 122 

A.  Powers 122 

B.  Representation 122 

C.  Election  of  delegates 123 

D.  Special  conventions 123 


sii  CONTENTS 

6.  Strikes 124 

A.  The  referendum 124 

B.  When  strikes  are  supported 124 

7.  Interaational  finances 125 


CELVPTER  IV 

THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS 128 

Introduction 128 

a.  The  forces  which  gave  rise  to  the  associations 128 

1.  The  American  Federation  of  Coal  Operators 129 

2.  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association 134 

A.  Objects 134 

B.  Membership 135 

a.  Obligations  of  members 135 

b.  Delinquents  and  withdrawals 136 

c  Basis  of  representation  and  voting 136 

C.  OflBcers  and  their  duties 137 

a.  The  commission 137 

b.  The  executive  board 138 

(1)  Duties  of  the  board 138 

D.  The  defense  fund 140 


CIL\PTER  V 

THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE 142 

1.  The  foundations  of  the  joint  conference 142 

A.  The  "right"  of  organization  and  representation     ....  143 

B.  The  encouragement  of  good  feeling 143 

C.  Formulation  of  principles 144 

2.  The  conference  at  work 145 

A.  Membership 145 

B.  Organization  and  rules 146 

C.  The  order  of  business 148 

D.  Inviolable  contracts 152 

3.  The  formation  of  scales 153 

A.  The  scale  of  1898 153 

B.  The  renewal  of  the  scale  of  1898 155 

C.  Scale  of  1900  and  renewals 156 

a.  Illinois  grievances 157 

D.  Reduction  in  wages  in  1904 160 

E.  Failure  to  agree  in  1906 162 

F.  Reestablishment  in  1908 164 

G.  Settlement  by  states  in  1910 165 

H.  The  new  method  in  1912 166 

4.  Results  of  collective  bargaining 170 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  STATE  CONFERENCE 179 

Introduction • 179 

a.  The  task  of  the  state  conference 179 

b.  Conditions  of  the  industry  in  Illinois 180 

1.  Organization 181 

2.  The  fundamentals  settled 181 

3.  Administrative  machinery 184 

A.  Business  contracts 184 

B.  The  steps  in  conciliation 184 

C.  The  pit  committee 186 

D.  Method  of  investigating  disputes 186 

a.  The  Danville  Case 187 

b.  The  case  of  the  Athens  local  union 189 

E.  Coercion  by  fines 189 

F.  The  Monthly  Bulletin  of  Decisions 190 

4.  The  system  in  the  Southwest 191 

5.  The  system  a  growth 192 

6.  The  operators  ask  for  a  "closed  shop" 193 

A.  The  operators'  offer 194 

B.  The  need  for  the  closed  shop 194 

C.  The  legality  of  the  closed  shop 195 

7.  The  problem  before  the  public 198 

CHAPTER  VII 

CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION  IN  THE  ANTHRA- 
CITE FIELD 201 

Introduction 201 

a.  Causes  deferring  peaceful  adjustment 201 

1.  From  the  formation  of  Bates's  Union  in  1849  to  the  close  of 

the  Civil  War 202 

2.  Beginning  of  arbitration,  18G9  to  1875 203 

A.  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Association 203 

B.  The  Anthracite  Board  of  Trade 204 

C.  The  sliding  scale 205 

D.  The  Reading  Railroad  attempts  to  stop  the  struggle     .     .     .  207 

E.  Settlement  by  arbitration       209 

F.  The  break-up  of  the  union ,     .     .     .     .  210 

a.  The  inadequacy  of  arbitration 210 

b.  Concentration  of  ownership 211 

c.  Formation  of  pools 212 

d.  The  "long  strike"  in  1875 212 

e.  Period  of  the  "Molly  Maguires" 213 


xiv  CONTENTS 

f.  The  contribution  of  the  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Asso- 
ciation       214 

3.  History  of  consolidation 214 

A.  Legal  background 215 

a.  Constitutional  provisions,  1874 215 

b.  Acts  of  1874 216 

c.  Coal  land  acts  of  the  eighties  and  their  amendments     .  217 

d.  Effects  of  judicial  interpretation 218 

e.  Results  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  Investiga- 

tion of  1907 218 

f.  Acts  to  "quiet  the  title  of  real  estate" 219 

B.  Ownership  of  lands 220 

C.  Attempt  to  control  production  by  pools 221 

a.  Early  attempts 221 

b.  Combination  of  operators  and  carriers 221 

c.  The  "Morgan  Pool,"  1886 222 

d.  Effects  on  prices 223 

D.  Lease  of  Jersey  Central  by  the  Reading  Railroad,  1883      .  223 

E.  The   Jersey    Central    and    Lehigh    Valley    leases,    1890- 

1893 224 

F.  The  Temple  Iron  Company  deal,  1898 226 

G.  The  purchase  of  the  Pennsylvania  Coal  Company,  1899     .  227 
H.  Railroad  consolidation 228 

a.  The  Erie  purchases 228 

b.  The  Reading  obtains  the  Jersey  Central,  1901     .     .     .     .228 

4.  Immigration 229 

A.  Its  importance 229 

B.  Contract  labor 230 

a.  Legal  background 230 

b.  Judicial  interpretation 231 

c.  Agencies  encouraging  evasion 231 

C.  Immigration  from  Southern  Europe 232 

5.  The  labor  troubles  of  1887-88 234 

A.  The  causes 234 

B.  Rise  of  the  Knights  of  Labor  and  the  Miners'  and  Laborers' 

Amalgamated  Association 234 

a.  Inauguration  of  the  strike 235 

b.  The  Reading  Company  furnishes  the  Lehigh  operators 

with  coal 236 

c.  Extension  of  the  strike  to  the  Schuylkill  region     .     .     .  236 

d.  Findings  of  the  Congressional  Committee  of  1888      .     .  237 

e.  The  settlement  of  the  strike 239 

f .  Effects  of  immigration  on  the  strike 239 

6.  The  strike  of  1900 240 

A.  The  work  of  the  United  Mine  Workers 240 

B.  Disrupting  factors 241 

C.  Economic  pressure 241 

D.  Negotiations  for  settlement 242 


CONTENTS  XV 

E.  Settlement  of  the  strike 243 

7.  The  strike  of  1902 244 

A    Preparation  for  another  struggle 244 

B.  Negotiations  of  1902 245 

a.  Operators'  attitude  toward  a  joint  conference    ....  245 

b.  Meetings  arranged  by  the  Civic  Federation 245 

c.  The  first  offer  to  arbitrate 246 

d.  Order  for  temporary  suspension ,     ,  247 

C.  The  special  Bituminous  Convention 248 

D.  Misunderstanding  and  discontent 249 

E.  Conference  called  by  President  Roosevelt 250 

F.  The  President  appoints  a  commission 251 

G.  The  award  of  the  commission 252 

8.  Adjustments  since  1902 255 

A.  Formation  of  the  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  Board     .     .  255 
a.  Rules  of  the  board 256 

B.  The  cases  before  the  board 256 

C.  Attitude  of  both  parties  toward  the  board 257 

a.  The  operators'  position 257 

b.  The  miners'  position 258 

9.  The  negotiations  of  1912 261 

A.  Preliminary  negotiations  in  1906  and  1909 261 

B.  The  miners'  demands 261 

C.  The  joint  conference 262 

a.  The  operators'  reply 262 

b.  The  miners'  rebuttal 263 

c.  The  agreement 265 


CHAPTER  VIII 

CONCILIATION   AND   ARBITRATION   IN   THE   BRITISH 
COAL  INDUSTRY 269 

Introduction 269 

1.  The  rise  of  the  miners'  unions 270 

A.  Early  conditions 270 

B.  Formation  of  the  Miners'  Association  of  Great  Britain  and 

Ireland,  1841 271 

C.  The  Miners'  National  Union,  1863 272 

a.  Regulatory  measures 274 

D.  Formation  of  the  Miners'  Federation  of  Great  Britain,  1889  275 

2.  Methods  of  industrial  adjustment 277 

A.  Arbitration 277 

B.  The  era  of  sliding  scales 278 

C.  The  big  strikes  of  the  nineties 279 

a.  The  strike  of  1893 280 

D.  The  Royal  Commission  on  Labour 282 


xvi  CONTENTS 

E.  The  Conciliation  Act  of  1896 283 

a.  Results  under  the  Act 283 

b.  The  Court  of  Arbitration -28i 

c.  The  Industrial  Council 284 

F.  Modern  conciliation  boards  in  the  coal  industry    ....  285 
3.  The  policy  of  legal  enactment 288 

A.  Labor  representation 288 

a.  The  "Labour  Representation  Scheme" !^89 

b.  Membership  in  the  "  Labour  Party " 291 

c.  The  Steele  Case,  1907 292 

d.  The  Osborne  Case,  1909 293 

e.  Government  payment  of  Parliamentary  members,  IJll  .  294 

B.  The  eight-hour  law,  1908 295 

a.  DifBculty  of  obtaining  the  act 295 

b.  Provisions  of  the  act 297 

c.  Amendments 299 

C.  The  Minimum  Wage  Act,  1912 299 

a.  Growth  of  the  minimum  wage  deniaud 299 

b.  Abnormal  "places" 300 

c.  Preliminary  negotiations 301 

d.  The  strike  ballot 302 

e.  Intervention  by  the  government 303 

f .  The  provisions  of  the  act 304 

g.  Settlement  under  the  act 306 

h.  Effect  of  the  minimum  wage 308 

i.  Possibilities  of  the  industry  bearing  a  minimum  wage     .  309 

CHAPTER  IX 

OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTLUE 313 

1.  Relationship  between  a  conciliatory  system,  prices  of  coal,  and 

a  regulatory  policy 313 

A.  Recommendations  of  investigating  committees 315 

a.  The  committee  of  1888 315 

b.  The  committee  of  1893 316 

c.  The   Interstate   Commerce   Commission   Investigation, 

1907 317 

B.  The  common  law  remedies 319 

C.  The  inadequacy  of  decisions  based  on  laws  in  restraint  of 

trade 320 

a.  The  recent  anthracite  decision 320 

b.  The  "commodities  case" 323 

c.  United  States  vs.  Lehigh  Valley  Railroad  Company  .     .  324 

D.  The  lack  of  public  policy 325 

E.  The  work  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission    .     .     .  327 

a.  Coxe  Brothers  Case 327 

b.  The  Baird  Case 329 


CONTENTS  xxii 

c.  The  power  to  fix  maximum  rates 331 

d.  The  Commission  handicapped  by  the  courts      ....  331 

F.  The  need  for  an  accounting  system 332 

G.  The  work  of  concentrated  capital 334 

H.  The  operators  ask  for  a  commission 335 

I.  Regulatory  measures 337 

a.  The  eight-hour  day 338 

b.  A  legal  ton 338 

c.  Regulation  of  immigration 339 

d.  The  minimum  wage 339 

J.  Possible  rise  and  influence  of  a  labor  party 340 

2.  Relationship  between  a  conciliatory  system,  the  supply  of  coal, 

and  governmental  action 343 

A.  The  Canadian  Industrial  Disputes  Act 344 

(1)  Application  for  a  board 344 

(2)  Composition  of  the  board 344 

(3)  Conciliation,  investigation,  and  pubhcity 345 

(4)  Powers  of  the  board 345 

(5)  Penalties  for  strikes  and  lockouts  during  investigation    346 

(6)  Results  from  the  act 347 

B.  Conclusion 348 

APPENDIX,  STATISTICAL  TABLES 357 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 367 

INDEX 373 


INTRODUCTION 

In  making  a  study  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  in  the 
coal  industry  of  America  we  find  another  instance  of  the 
evolution  from  individual  bargaining  to  a  method  of  adjust- 
ing wages  and  settling  differences  by  conferences  between 
the  employers  and  employees.  That  such  an  evolution  has 
been  brought  about  through  response  to  changing  condi- 
tions in  transportation,  markets,  and  industrial  needs  is 
only  to  be  expected. 

But  with  the  adaptation  to  changing  needs  a  new  spirit 
has  been  born.  The  employers  and  employees  have  both 
learned  the  advantage  of  cooperation  and  organization  and 
at  the  same  time  have  gained  a  new  tolerance  each  for  the 
other.  They  have  transferred  the  settlement  of  the  wage 
controversy  from  scenes  of  force  and  violence  to  the  con- 
ference hall,  where  reason  and  intellect  are  working  out 
something  bigger  than  mere  trade  agreements.  That  prog- 
ress which  comes  as  a  result  of  the  interplay  of  group 
forces,  and  after  much  testing,  is  likely  to  be  better  and 
freer  from  vexing  conditions  than  the  innovations  which 
are  brought  about  by  attempting  to  work  out  a  hard-and- 
fast  rule  of  law.  Where  the  employer  and  worker  are 
willing  to  grant  each  other  justice  and  the  public  fair 
treatment,  we  shall  not  need  to  increase  the  complexity  of 
our  administrative  machinery.  Here  we  have  group  organ- 
ization and  interests  supplanting  individualism,  and  greater 
freedom  in  working  out  their  common  welfare  than  could 
occur  under  government  regulation.  Membership  in  a  local 
group  and  striving  together  for  group  interests  have  given 
the  parties  a  concept  of  the  meaning  of  membership  in  a 
larger  national  group  and  greater  appreciation  of  efforts 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

looking  to  the  public  welfare.  This  is  demonstrated  by  in- 
creasing deference  to  public  opinion  and  a  recognition  of 
the  necessity  of  fair  treatment  to  all  concerned.  Both  sides 
realize  that  their  actions  are  of  national  importance  as 
well  as  local,  and  that,  if  they  are  to  wear  the  badge  of 
desirable  citizens,  individual  and  group  selfishness  must 
be  subordinated. 

If  the  conciliation  movement  in  settling  labor  disputes 
had  contributed  nothing  more  than  men  of  the  kind  it  has 
brought  forward  on  both  sides,  it  would  be  worth  all  the 
effort  expended  in  building  it  up.  The  operators  in  their 
position  as  captains  of  industry  would  have  been  men  of 
prominence  anyhow,  but  the  movement  has  surely  made 
them  larger-minded  and  more  public-spirited.  In  the  bi- 
tuminous field  men  of  large  wealth,  endowed  with  the 
qualities  of  leadership,  find  it  necessary  to  adopt  demo- 
cratic methods  of  control  in  order  to  meet  the  solidarity 
of  an  opposing  organization  governed  by  democratic  prin- 
ciples. Even  in  the  anthracite  field  we  find  entrenched 
monopoly  and  autocratic  leadership  obliged  to  yield  to 
this  same  force  when  once  it  asserts  itself.  A  considera- 
tion of  what  the  conciliation  movement  has  done  for  the 
miners  conveys  some  conception  of  what  democracy  rather 
than  autocracy  in  industry  really  means  in  our  national 
life.  It  has  not  only  brought  forth  sane  and  capable  lead- 
ers, but  it  has  unified  one  of  the  most  heterogeneous  popu- 
lations in  any  industry  and,  besides  making  them  realize 
the  necessity  of  having  wise  and  efficient  leaders,  has 
shown  them  the  power  of  democracy  in  the  use  of  the 
vote. 

We  shall  first  direct  our  attention  to  the  introduction 
and  extension  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  in  the  bi- 
tuminous coal  industry  of  America.  The  emphasis  will  be 
put  upon  the  development  of  conciliation  and  arbitration 
as  a  system,  with  just  enough  of  the  historical  to  give  a 
perspective  of  its  evolution.  In  connection  with  the  exten- 


INTRODUCTION  xxi 

sion  of  the  system  we  shall  be  concerned  with  the  so-called 
"West  Virginia  Problem  "  which  threatens  to  disrupt  it. 

In  order  to  understand  the  forces  behind  the  system  we 
must  first  direct  our  attention  to  the  organization  of  both 
parties,  employers  and  employees.  We  are  then  in  a  posi- 
tion to  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  interstate  joint 
conference  of  the  central  field  and  the  importance  of  its 
methods  and  accomplishments.  After  the  general  agree- 
ment of  the  interstate  joint  conference,  which  establishes 
regulations  between  fields,  has  been  considered,  our  inter- 
est is  drawn  to  the  adjustments  that  are  made  in  the  most 
highly  developed  of  state  joint  conferences.  In  this  con- 
nection we  become  acquainted  with  the  machinery  by  which 
adjustments  are  made  under  the  agreements.  This  is  a 
quite  different  function  from  the  formulation  of  agree- 
ments. 

The  conditions  in  the  anthracite  field  then  demand  our 
attention.  This  field  has  had  such  a  different  history  that 
it  is  impossible  to  relate  it  to  the  bituminous  field.  In  fact 
there  is  no  connection  between  them  worthy  of  note  before 
1900,  and  even  from  that  time  on  the  evolution  of  the 
systems  is  different. 

In  the  course  of  the  survey  thus  made  there  are  many 
indications  that  we  are  just  approaching  some  of  the  prob- 
lems with  which  Great  Britain  has  already  dealt  in  her 
coal  industry.  So  we  turn  to  a  study  of  developments 
there  to  see  what  significance  they  may  have  for  us. 

In  conclusion  we  find  that  the  system  of  conciliation 
and  arbitration  involves  us  in  new  problems  which  have 
a  vital  relation  to  public  welfare ;  that  the  public  as  a  third 
party  must  concern  itself  with  functions  which  the  other 
two  parties  cannot  be  expected  to  perform :  in  short,  that 
the  public  must  be  alive  to  the  new  industrial,  social,  and 
political  problems  which  are  arising  from  the  evolution  of 
the  coal  industry. 


CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION 

IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

OF  AIMERICA 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  INTRODUCTION  AND  EXTENSION  OF  CON- 
CILIATION IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD 

1.  CAUSES 

The  rise  of  such  an  elaborate  system  of  settling  disputes 
and  fixing  wages  as  exists  in  the  coal  industry  calls  for  an 
explanation  of  its  causes.  Among  these  perhaps  overpro- 
duction is  the  chief  cause.  The  producers  of  coal  in  Eng- 
land felt  the  ill  effects  of  overproduction  as  early  as  the 
seventeenth  century  ^  and  it  was  early  felt  in  this  country. 
The  term  "  overproduction "  has  been  used  by  miners, 
operators,  and  economists  who  have  made  a  study  of  this 
industry  to  describe  a  set  of  concrete  conditions  which 
have  made  it  possible  for  the  industry  to  produce  an 
annual  tonnage  of  coal  much  beyond  the  ordinary  con- 
sumption. We  shall  use  the  term  in  this  sense,  and  concern 
ourselves  with  the  concrete  factors  which  have  contributed 
to  the  evolution  of  a  system  of  industrial  adjustment. 

In  periods  of  prosperity  many  mines  were  opened. 
During  years  of  depression,  instead  of  restricting  produc- 
tion to  meet  the  demand,  the  operators  extended  produc- 
tion to  a  point  where  the  sale  of  the  product  brought  a 
meager  amount  for  capital  and  barely  enabled  labor  to 
subsist.  The  underlying  motive  for  such  a  procedure  was 
the  desire  of  the  operators  to  make  even  small  profits  or 

^  Cohn,  Economic  Journal  (the  Journal  of  the  British  Economic  Asso- 
ciation, now  the  Journal  of  the  Koyal  Economic  Society),  vol.  5,  pp.  550-02. 


2        ARBITRATION   IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

to  escape  the  necessity  of  closing  their  mines  altogether 
with  consequent  deterionition  in  the  properties.  Their  in- 
ability to  withdi'aw  their  fixed  capital  from  the  coal  indus- 
try and  employ  it  in  some  other  way  gave  a  further  impetus 
to  such  a  policy.  This  state  of  affairs  was  further  aggra- 
vated by  the  lack  of  any  controlling  factor  in  the  indus- 
try which  would  offset  the  tendency  to  glut  the  market. 
That  this  capability  of  producing  (with  the  available 
facilities  in  the  industry)  far  beyond  the  demand  exists 
may  be  easily  shown  wherever  it  is  possible  to  get  a  fair 
estimate  of  daily  production  in  the  industry.  A  fair  com- 
putation of  daily  production  in  the  anthracite  field  in 
1899  was  300,000  tons.  Had  the  men  been  employed  250 
days,  which  has  very  seldom  been  approached  either  in 
the  anthracite  or  bituminous  fields,  the  annual  production 
would  have  been  75,000,000  tons.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  production  for  that  year  was  only  54,000,000  tons, 
and  the  miners  were  given  work  on  only  180  days.^  Evi- 
dently the  demand  for  coal  warranted  production  only  to 
this  extent.  Similar  conditions  can  be  shown  as  far  back 
in  the  coal  industry  as  it  is  possible  to  get  figures  which 
approach  reliability. 

Supplementary  to  overproduction  are  the  seasonal  de- 
mand for  coal  and  the  employment  of  a  surplus  of  men, 
which  come  in  as  factors  to  breed  discontent  and  neces- 
sitate a  system  of  adjustment. 

With  continued  overproduction  on  a  falling  market 
capital  insisted  on  what  it  regarded  as  legitimate  returns 
on  its  investment.  If  any  sacrifice  was  to  be  made,  labor 
was  the  first  to  feel  it  in  the  form  of  reduced  wages.  This 
process  generally  goes  on  in  industries  which  are  exploit- 
ing natural  resources  and  in  manufacturing  industries 
developed  to  the  point  where  it  is  possible  to  produce  be- 
yond the  demands  of  the  market.  The  miner  soon  came 

^  See  Wame,  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  toI.  17,  p.  20. 


CONCILIATION  IN   THE  BITUMINOUS   FIELD    3 

to  feel  that  he  should  not  be  made  to  suffer  from  adverse 
economic  pressure  over  w^hich  he  had  no  control  and  he  forth- 
with demanded  regulatory  measures  to  relieve  his  distress. 

The  immobility  of  labor,  due  to  the  isolated  environ- 
ment of  the  mining  industry  and  the  difficulty  of  moving 
to  a  new  place,  encouraged  labor  to  remain  in  its  old 
haunts  during  a  period  of  depression.  The  situation 
brought  a  fall  in  wages  and  encouraged  the  rise  of  dis- 
putes. Thus  conditions  were  favorable  for  a  contest  over 
a  recognition  of  the  rights  of  labor.  The  inadequacy  of 
individual  bargaining  was  soon  seen,  and  a  feeling  of 
solidarity  arose  among  the  men  who  felt  themselves 
oppressed  by  a  common  enemy.  What  may  have  been, 
under  individual  bargaining,  a  paternal  relationship,  in 
the  contest  for  supremacy  for  selfish  ends  and  control  of 
industrial  policy,  became  a  covert  or  open  hostility.  The 
ways  open  to  capital  in  the  contest  were  to  replace  the 
laborers,  starve  them  out,  or  compromise.  The  avenues 
open  to  the  laborer  were  to  hinder  or  thwart  replacement 
and  live  as  best  he  might  until  capital  got  ready  to  com- 
promise. 

With  the  consolidation  of  capital  and  the  ownership  of 
many  mines  it  was  possible  to  play  off  the  men  employed 
in  one  mine  against  the  men  in  another.  Mines  were  put 
on  short  time  or  closed  entirely  if  the  workers  were  dis- 
satisfied with  their  conditions,  while  the  men  in  the  pro- 
ducing mines  were  made  to  feel  that  they  could  maintain 
their  favorable  position  only  so  long  as  they  remained 
docile.  Furthermore,  it  was  the  policy  of  the  unionists  to 
share  their  work  during  a  period  of  depression  with  their 
fellows  rather  than  to  permit  them  to  be  discharged.^  The 
ability  of  capital  to  encourage  and  direct  the  flow  of  im- 
migration and  the  increasing  use  of  machinery  were  ad- 
ditional elements  that  tended  further  to  aggravate  the 
situation. 

1  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1883,  p.  305. 


4        ARBITRATION   IN   TIIE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

Adverse  working  conditions  of  various  degrees  of  im- 
portance were  fundamental  in  encouraging  the  growth  of 
a  feeling  of  common  interests  among  the  laborers  and  the 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  those  conditions  could  not  be 
changed  by  one  group  of  men  or  by  one  gi'oup  of  em- 
ployers. This  common  feeling  had  its  birth  among  men 
bound  only  by  a  common  language  and  forced  itself  for- 
ward in  spite  of  the  different  national  characteristics  and 
customs  of  the  English,  Scotch,  Irish,  Welsh,  and  Ger- 
man ^  peoples.  It  would  have  come  sooner  among  the 
workers  of  any  one  nationality  had  it  not  been  for  the 
counteracting  influence  of  the  influx  of  nationalities  that 
did  not  have  even  a  common  language  as  a  means  of 
approach.  Fortunately  for  the  bituminous  fields  this  in- 
flux did  not  come  so  rapidly  as  to  overwhelm  the  union 
movement.  In  the  anthracite  region  we  find  that,  though 
the  union  was  swamped  by  the  influx  from  southern  Eu- 
rope, the  fundamental  economic  conditions  and  adverse 
working  regulations  pressed  so  hard  that  it  took  but 
a  spark  of  human  sympathy  from  the  solidly  organized 
union  field  to  set  off  a  conflagration  that  swept  twenty 
nationalities  within  its  compass. 

An  element  not  to  be  forgotten  is  the  development  of 
education  and  opportunity  for  enlightenment  that  enabled 
competent  leaders  to  come  to  the  front  and  put  the  rank 
and  file  in  a  position  to  appreciate  and  support  the  policies 
necessary  to  bring  results  for  all. 

With  the  growth  of  canals,  river  navigation,  and  rail- 
roads, what  had  been  local  markets  with  monopolistic 
conditions  widened  into  a  general  market  in  which  all 
were  competitors.  This  situation  brought  larger  problems 
which  needed  cooperation  for  solution.  The  conclusion 
was  constantly  forced  upon  both  parties  that  there  must 
be  on  a  few  fundamental  matters  such  uniformity  as 
would   enable   competition  to  exist   on   a  higher  level. 

^  The  Germans  are  incladed  when  referring  to  English-speaking  peoples. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    5 

Under  these  conditions  it  was  necessary  to  evolve  a 
method  of  industrial  adjustment.  It  is  hoped  that  the 
concrete  details  which  follow  will  fully  bear  out  this 
hypothesis. 

We  shall  endeavor  to  describe  the  rise  and  extension  of 
a  system  of  industrial  adjustment  which  has  met  the  needs 
of  capital  and  labor  employed  in  an  industry  where  many 
complex  problems  arise.  Varied  working  conditions,  differ- 
ences in  productivity  of  mines,  and  the  uncertainty  of 
investment  and  of  profits  for  capital  are  all  factors  un- 
derlying constant  demands  for  change  and  readjustment. 
Conciliation  and  arbitration  have  their  opportunity  when 
the  parties  recognize  the  necessity  for  peaceful  settlement. 
The  individual  worker  cannot  obtain  justice  in  bargaining 
with  his  employer  under  the  complex  conditions  of  mod- 
ern industry.  When  the  employer  recognizes  this  situation 
and  the  further  fact  that  he  cannot  make  his  own  position 
clear  to  his  workers  without  a  frank  discussion  of  his  prob- 
lems, another  important  stage  has  been  reached. 

With  the  recognition  of  these  fundamentals  the  parties 
seek  to  devise  means  that  will  enable  them  to  come  to  an 
understanding,  adjust  inequalities,  and  extend  the  system. 
This  must  be  done  in  order  to  govern,  so  far  as  possible, 
the  economic  forces  which,  under  an  unregulated  regime, 
bring  overproduction  and  depression. 


2.  CONDITIONS  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD  FROM  THE 
CIVIL  WAR  TO  THE  JOINT  MOVEMENT  IN  1885 

A.  Early  Organizations 

A.    AMERICAN    MINERS*    ASSOCIATION 

In  the  forties  and  fifties  the  influx  of  British  workmen 
imbued  with  Chartist  ideas  and  the  opening  up  of  many 
coal  fields  to  railroad  traffic  laid  the  foundations  for  a 
national  movement  among  the  miners  of  America.  Pro- 


6        ARBITRATION  IN  THE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

duction  was  estimated  at  6,500,000  tons  in  1861  and  there 
were  about  30,000  miners  in  the  industry .^  Daniel  Weaver, 
an  Englishman,  and  Thomas  Lloyd,  a  Welshman,  were 
the  prime  movers  in  the  first  attempt  at  national  organ- 
ization. They  were  employed  as  miners  in  the  Belleville 
Track,  Illinois,  and  in  January,  1861,  issued  an  address 
to  their  fellow  workers  pointing  out  the  necessity  for 
improving  the  physical,  mental,  and  social  conditions 
within  their  ranks,  calling  for  cooperation  to  reduce  the 
animosity  between  the  nationalities,  and  appealing  for 
unity  to  force  legislative  action  for  the  improvement  of 
their  condition.^ 

As  a  result  of  this  address  the  convention  held  at  St. 
Louis,  Missouri,  formed  the  "American  Miners'  Associa- 
tion" and  elected  Weaver  president  and  Lloyd  secretary. 
Local  lodges  formed  the  units  of  the  organization,  and 
they  in  turn  were  grouped  into  districts  with  a  board  of 
directors  exercising  general  supervision  over  all.  Besides 
the  national  officers  the  membership  of  the  board  was 
made  up  of  one  delegate  from  each  lodge  elected  annually. 
These  delegates  met  each  year  and  elected  national  officers 
every  two  years.  Each  delegate  was  allowed  a  vote  for 
every  twenty  members  he  represented.  The  organization 
spread  rapidly  in  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Maryland, 
and  became  active  in  obtaining  legislative  measures  for 
mine  inspection  and  general  mining  laws.  In  spite  of  its 
so-called  national  organization  the  time  was  not  ripe  for 
national  action  on  policies  governing  the  industry  as  a 
whole.  During  the  Civil  War  the  men  easily  profited  by 
the  rise  in  wages,  but  with  local  dissensions,  popular  dis- 
approval of  labor  organizations,  the  return  of  men  from 
the  war,  and  the  loss  of  local  strikes  in  1867  and  1868, 
the  organization  disintegrated. 

1  Warne,  Bulletin  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  no.  51,  March,  1904. 

2  McBride,  The  Labor  Movement,  edited  by  McNeill,  p.  245. 


CONCILIATION   IN  THE  BITUMINOUS   FIELD    7 

B.  miners'  and  laborers'  benevolent  association 

With  the  break-up  of  the  American  Miners'  Association 
the  active  cohesion  of  the  miners  was  maintained  some- 
what by  the  formation  of  local  organizations.  The  Work- 
ingmen's  Benevolent  Association  had  been  formed  in  the 
anthracite  region  of  Pennsylvania  in  1867.^ 

AVith  the  grant  of  a  state  charter  in  1870  the  organiza- 
tion became  known  as  the  Miners'  and  Laborers'  Benevo- 
lent Association,  and  its  influence  was  soon  felt  in  Illinois, 
Indiana,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  West  Vir- 
ginia. In  these  States  it  took  the  form  of  independent  or- 
ganizations which  utilized  the  material  left  from  the  wreck 
of  the  American  Miners'  Association.  "There  was  neither 
state  nor  national  head  to  the  organization,"  but  "when 
occasion  required  the  different  districts  acted  in  concert."  ^ 
Although  the  Illinois  Miners'  Benevolent  and  Protective 
Association  was  formed  in  1871  as  an  independent  organ- 
ization, its  structure  and  purposes  were  so  similar  to  the 
Miners'  and  Laborers'  Benevolent  Association  that  mem- 
bers' cards  were  given  and  accepted  between  them.^  It  had 
been  possible  thus  far  for  local  and  state  organizations  to 
cope  with  their  problems  fairly  well,  but  conditions  were 
fast  arising  that  would  necessitate  thorough  national  or- 
ganization. Prices  were  falling  and  the  extension  of  the 
railroads  resulted  in  opening  new  fields  and  in  making 
the  operators  of  the  fields  competitors  in  common  markets. 

C.    miners'    national    association,    1873 

John  Siney  had  been  president  of  the  Miners'  and  La- 
borers' Benevolent  Association  in  the  anthracite  rejrion 
and  had  led  the  men  successfully  in  a  series  of  strikes  and 

^  Further  description  of  the  organization  will  be  found  in  chap,  vn, 
p.  203. 

2  Roy,  History  of  the  Coal  Miners,  1903,  p.  71. 
8  McBride,  op.  cit.,  p.  249. 


8        ARBITRATION  IN  TIIE   CO.VL   INDUSTRY 

in  the  establishment  of  a  system  of  negotiations.  A  con- 
vention was  called  by  the  officers  of  several  States  to  meet 
at  Youngstown,  Ohio,  in  October,  1873.  The  reputation 
that  Siney  had  gained  in  Pennsylvania  made  him  the  nat- 
ural recipient  of  the  presidency  of  the  Miners'  National 
Association  organized  at  that  time.  The  object  of  the  asso- 
ciation was  to  consolidate  the  mine  workers  in  order  to 
equalize  the  "  contest  in  which  a  handful  of  men  have  to 
contend  with  the  power  of  aggregated  wealth."  ^  To  ac- 
complish this,  districts  which  had  to  strike  to  alleviate 
their  conditions  were  to  receive  pecuniary  and  moral  sup- 
port, and  this  device  was  to  be  supplemented  by  legal  regu- 
lation of  working  conditions.  The  districts  controlled  their 
own  affairs  except  that  they  could  not  engage  in  a  strike 
until  they  had  exhausted  peaceable  means  for  a  settlement 
and  obtained  the  consent  of  the  national  president  and  the 
executive  board  which  was  made  up  of  a  representative 
from  each  State.  It  had  become  evident  to  the  miners  that 
local  strikes  did  not  pay  and  that  prices  and  general  con- 
ditions could  be  established  only  by  general  suspensions. 

(1)  Effects  of  panic  of  1873 

Unfortunately  the  panic  of  1873  occurred  just  as  the 
organization  was  getting  under  way.  That  it  should  have 
survived  this  disastrous  industrial  paralysis  and  increased 
its  membership  is  a  mark  of  its  vitality.  The  national 
office  of  the  organization  was  located  in  Cleveland  and 
the  national  officers  immediately  sought  friendly  relations 
with  the  coal  companies  which  had  headquarters  in  that 
city.  The  labor  leaders  received  no  encouragement  from 
any  but  Mark  Hanna.  As  soon  as  he  was  convinced  that 
the  leaders  proposed  to  stand  by  arbitration  decisions  and 
use  all  their  influence  to  establish  peaceful  relations,  he 
stood  ready  to  help.  In  spite  of  various  handicaps  the 
organization  grew  steadily  until  1875. 

*  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  156. 


CONCILIATION   IN  THE   BITU^ONOUS  FIELD    9 

(2)  Effects  of  indimdualism 

The  national  officers  and  organizers  of  the  union  had  a 
most  difficult  situation  on  their  hands  to  keep  the  local 
unions  from  striking  while  the  market  was  constantly  fall- 
ing and  entailing  attendant  reductions  in  wages.  Too  often 
the  union  element  was  in  a  minority  in  a  mine,  and  when 
the  non-union  element  struck,  the  unionists  would  go  out 
with  them  and  violate  their  contract  and  the  constitution 
of  their  organization.  The  unionists  who  struck  under 
such  circumstances  could  not  get  strike  benefits  and  were 
soon  deserted  by  the  non-unionists,  who  migrated  to  an- 
other place  after  they  had  stirred  up  the  trouble.  Siney 
found  ex-union  men  in  Maryland  who  were  unwilling  to 
organize,  though  their  employers  were  willing  that  they 
should,^  and  many  men  in  Maryland  refused  to  enter  the 
union  because  it  stood  for  a  "  free  turn."  The  "  free  turn  " 
was  demanded  by  the  union  to  prohibit  certain  favored 
ones  from  getting  a  disproportionate  number  of  cars,  which 
enabled  them  to  earn  more  than  their  fellows.  The  spirit 
of  individualism  was  rampant  in  spite  of  the  hard  lessons 
that  both  capital  and  labor  had  learned.  Though  the  oper- 
ators admitted  ^  that  it  paid  them  to  bring  in  unskilled 
non-unionists,  pay  them  more,  break  the  strike,  and  then 
make  the  regular  workmen  labor  at  the  owners'  terms,  a  feel- 
ing of  solidarity  among  the  laborers  was  to  come  only  after 
much  suffering.  The  locals  refused  to  send  their  monthly 
dues  and  strike  payments  to  the  national  treasurer,^  and 
when  the  national  officers  interfered  in  the  settlement  of 
a  local  strike  they  were  met  by  insult  from  the  local.  The 
situation  had  become  so  intolerable  that  the  Executive 
Board  was  called,  in  the  fall  of  1875,  to  consider  the  non- 
compliance of  the  locals  with  the  national  constitution.^ 

1  Miners'  National  B'cord,  vol.  1,  no.  10,  p.  172. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  1,  no.  9,  p.  152. 
8  Ibid.,  vol.  2,  no.  1,  p.  13. 
*  Ibid.,  voL  1,  no.  7,  p.  110. 


10       :VRBITRATION   IN   TIIE  COAL   INDUSTRY 

It  had  to  treat  with  such  cases  as  the  following  resolu- 
tion :  — 

Resolution  of  Clay  County  Board  of  Ohio 

Whereas,  Communications  have  been  received  by  the  General 
Secretary,  from  our  operators,  on  our  present  difficulties,  be  it 
therefore 

Resolved,  that  we  respectfully  recommend  to  the  National 
Executive  that  they  take  no  further  action  upon  our  case  unless 
advised  by  us,  or  have  positive  proof  that  we  are  neglecting  our 
business  or  violating  the  general  laws  of  the  Association.  Our 
men  have  implicit  confidence  in  the  ability  and  honesty  of  the 
National  Officers,  but  they  believe  that  we  at  home  understand 
affairs  better  than  they  can  in  Cleveland  —  at  least  so  far  as 
propositions  from  the  operators  or  outsiders  are  concerned. 
When  we  feel  incompetent  ourselves  to  meet  any  emergency, 
we  will  not  hesitate  to  call  on  your  assistance. 

Under  such  conditions  the  operators  refused  to  treat 
with  the  national  organization  unless  its  officers  could  hold 
the  men  to  their  contracts.  To  remedy  the  situation  Siney 
proposed  to  have  the  grievances  of  each  local  submitted 
through  the  national  officers  to  the  vote  of  the  other  locals. 
Only  on  condition  of  a  majority  vote  would  a  strike  be 
declared  legal  and  the  local  receive  strike  benefits.  This 
would  relieve  the  national  officers  of  the  responsibility  and 
keep  down  the  number  of  strikes  to  a  point  where  they 
could  be  supported  effectively.^  However,  the  change  in 
the  constitution  finally  adopted  divided  the  responsibility 
for  the  strike  between  the  national  officers  and  the  officers 
of  the  district  affected.^ 

(3)  Inauguration  of  arbitration 

The  beginnings  of  arbitration  were  made  in  the  middle 
of  the  seventies  during  the  prominence  of  the  Miners' 

^  This  suggestion  came  from  H.  J.  Walls,  an  officer  of  the  Iron  Mould- 
ers' Union. 

2  Miners*  National  Record,  vol.  2,  no.  1,  p.  13. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUIVIINOUS  FIELD     11 

National  Association.  In  1873,  the  miners  of  western  Penn- 
sylvania had  got  a  bill  through  the  state  legislature  regu- 
lating payment  by  ruu-of-mine  and  entitling  the  miners 
to  station  a  checkweighman  at  the  scales  with  the  company 
weigher  to  see  that  the  men  were  given  full  weight  for 
their  coal.  The  purpose  of  the  law  was  thwarted  by  the 
proviso  that  nothing  in  the  act  should  prevent  operators 
and  miners  from  contracting  for  any  method  of  measuring 
and  screening  that  the  parties  could  agree  upon.^  This 
proviso,  with  the  lack  of  solidarity  among  the  miners 
and  the  ability  of  the  "railroad  "  operators  and  "river" 
operators  to  play  off  their  respective  woi'kmen  against 
each  other,  thwarted  the  honest  attempts  made  by  the 
leaders  of  the  miners  to  come  to  an  agreement  by  arbi- 
tration. However,  the  feeling  of  the  necessity  for  arbitra- 
tion was  penetrating  the  minds  of  men  who  had  held 
tenaciously  to  the  individualist  concept  of  ownership  and 
operation  of  their  business.  The  first  approach  to  success- 
ful negotiations  and  settlement  was  made  in  the  Tuscara- 
was Valley  of  Ohio  in  1874. 

The  operators  notified  the  miners  of  that  region  of  a 
reduction  of  twenty  cents  on  a  ton.  This  heavy  reduction 
led  the  miners  to  think  that  the  operators  wished  to  force 
a  fight,  but  the  national  ofiicers  sent  to  the  operators  a 
constitution  of  the  Miners'  National  Association  and  called 
attention  to  its  provisions  for  arbitration.  As  a  result  a 
board  was  formed  consisting  of  three  representatives  of 
the  miners  and  an  equal  number  of  operators,  among  whom 
was  Mark  Hanna.  Judge  Andrews,  of  Cleveland,  was 
selected  as  umpire  and  he  decreed  a  nineteen-cent  reduc- 
tion instead  of  twenty  cents.^  Although  the  miners  felt 
that  they  could  have  secured  better  terms  by  a  strike, 
they  accepted  the  award  and  went  to  work. 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1880-81, 
p.  302. 

2  Report  on  the  Statistics  of  Labor,  Massachusetts,  1881,  p.  58 ;  also  Koy, 
oj).  cit.,  p.  1G8. 


12       ARBITRATION   IN   THE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

The  Crawford  Coal  Company  of  the  same  field  did  not 
belong  to  the  Operators'  Association,  and  its  miners  had 
not  joined  the  union.  The  company  locked  out  its  men  be- 
cause they  demanded  a  checkweighman.  After  the  award 
of  the  arbitration  board  the  company  offered  their  miners 
an  advance  of  nine  cents  a  ton  above  the  awarded  price 
if  the  miners  would  recede  from  their  demand  for  a  check- 
weighman. It  would  seem  that  it  might  have  occurred  to 
these  men  that  if  a  checkweighman  was  worth  nine  cents 
a  ton  to  the  operators  for  the  purpose  of  getting  rid  of 
him,  he  would  be  a  still  more  valuable  functionary  for 
them.  Evidently  the  miners  could  not  see  so  far,  for  they 
accepted  the  offer  of  the  company.  Thus  an  occasion  was 
made  for  breaking  the  award  by  the  union  miners,  who 
demanded  the  same  rates. 

The  union  miners  appealed  to  the  national  officers  and 
executive  board  to  be  absolved  from  the  decision  of  the 
arbitration  board,  and  the  struggle  was  on  again. ^  The 
miners'  appeal  was  granted  without  giving  the  operators 
the  hearing  which  they  asked  for,  and  the  miners  struck. 
After  a  short  suspension  the  operators  granted  the  nine- 
cent  increase  paid  by  the  Crawford  Company.  This  did 
not  help  to  convince  the  miners  of  their  ability  to  obtain 
either  justice  or  the  best  terms  from  arbitration.  In  fact, 
the  whole  episode  was  rather  a  severe  blow  to  the  princi- 
ple of  arbitration  and  contributed  largely  to  the  decline 
of  the  union. 

(4)  The  organization  at  its  height 

The  Miners'  National  Association  had  reached  its  largest 
development  by  November,  1875.  At  that  time  it  had  347 
lodges  with  a  total  membership  of  35,355.  The  extent  and 
distribution  of  the  union  element  at  this  time  is  worth 
noting.  In  Pennsylvania  there  were  20,840  members ; 
in  Illinois,  5122 ;  in  Ohio,  4734 ;  in  Indiana,  2135  ;  in  MIs- 

'  Koy,  op.  cit.,  p.  170. 


CONCILIATION    IN  THE   BITUMINOUS  FIELD     13 

souri,  547  ;  in  Wyoming,  544  ;  in  Maryland,  431 ;  in  Iowa, 
272  ;  in  Colorado,  242  ;  in  West  Virginia,  178  ;  in  Tennes- 
see, 129 ;  in  Kansas,  123  ;  in  Indian  Territory,  67.  In  1875 
the  union  had  total  receipts  of  126,699  and  spent  about 
$15,523  in  aiding  strikers.^  We  shall  see  that  these  men 
were  the  advance  guard  of  one  of  the  largest  industrial 
unions  in  the  world  and  were  made  up  of  the  most  hetero- 
geneous population. 

(5)  TriaVof  Siney  and  Parhs 

The  failure  of  arbitration  proceedings  in  Ohio  was 
closely  followed  by  an  event  which  did  still  more  to  break 
up  the  union.  Xingo  Parks,  an  organizer  of  the  National 
Association,  was  sent  into  the  Clearfield  District  of  cen- 
tral Pennsylvania  to  organize  the  miners.  His  success  in 
organizing  the  men  was  quickly  followed  by  a  strike.  The 
operators  rather  than  treat  with  the  union  imported  strike- 
breakers, and  the  miners  were  successful  in  persuading  a 
trainload  of  these  men  to  leave  by  explaining  the  situa- 
tion to  them  and  paying  for  their  transportation.  The 
operators  used  this  occasion  to  bring  action  under  the  con- 
spiracy laws,  and  Siney  (who  had  gone  to  the  scene  of 
the  trouble),  Parks,  and  several  others  were  arrested  and 
brought  to  trial.  Roy,  who  knew  Siney  personally,  says 
that  the  arrest  of  Siney  "  created  a  profound  sensation, 
not  only  in  the  labor  circles  of  the  United  States,  but 
among  the  business  and  public  men  as  well.  He  was  the 
best  known  man  in  the  ranks  of  organized  labor  in  the 
country,  and  was  universally  liked  and  respected  by  all 
the  labor  organizations.  His  character  was,  however,  not 
understood  by  the  business  men  of  the  country,  and  he 
was  hated  and  feared  by  the  coal  and  railway  companies. 
The  newspapers  in  the  interest  of  these  constituencies  had 
for  years  held  him  up  before  the  country  as  a  demagogue 
who  did  nothing  but  foment  discord  between  the  coal 
^  Miners'  National  liccord,  vol.  2,  no.  1,  p.  5. 


14       iUlBITRATION   IN   THE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

companies  and  their  employees."  It  undoubtedly  created 
a  furore  quite  ou  the  order  of  our  recent  case  of  the  dy- 
namiters. The  questions  at  issue  were  the  right  to  picket 
peacefully  and  the  maintenance  of  the  miners'  organization. 

United  States  Senator  Wallace,  of  Pennsylvania,  was 
engaged  by  the  coal  companies  and  the  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road to  assist  the  prosecuting  attorney  of  Clearfield 
County.  United  States  Senator  Carpenter,  of  Wisconsin, 
was  engaged  by  the  miners,  and  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  of 
Massachusetts,  volunteered  his  services. 

In  1869  a  law  had  been  enacted  authorizing  mechanics, 
journeymen,  etc.,  to  form  labor  organizations,  but  to  favor 
some  interest  the  proviso  had  been  inserted  that  "  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act  shall  not  apply  to  the  Counties  of  Clear- 
field and  Centre."  ^  And  the  act  of  1872,  relieving  work- 
men and  their  associations  from  the  laws  of  conspiracy 
for  refusing  to  work  for  wages  or  under  conditions  that 
were  unsatisfactory,  had  provided  "  that  nothing  herein 
contained  shall  prevent  the  prosecution  or  punishment, 
under  existing  laws,  of  any  person  or  persons  who  shall, 
in  any  way,  hinder  persons  who  desire  to  labor  for  their 
employers  from  so  doing."  ^  The  prosecuting  attorneys 
were  thus  able  to  apply  in  Clearfield  County  the  law  of 
conspiracy  under  the  common  law  and  find  a  technical 
violation  of  the  act  of  1872  against  picketing.  The  de- 
fense rested  its  case  on  the  obsoleteness  of  the  law  of  con- 
spiracy in  England,  the  prevailing  sentiment  in  the  other 
States  of  our  country  which  had  passed  statutes  permit- 
ting organization,  and  the  fact  that  capital  combined  to 
do  the  very  things  for  which  labor  was  indicted.  The 
judge  said  that  "  any  agreement,  combination,  or  confed- 
eration to  increase  the  price  of  any  vendible  commodity, 
whether  labor,  mechandise,  or  anything  else,  [was]  indicta- 
ble."^ Yet  it  was  common  knowledge  that  the  coal  com- 

^  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1869,  p.  1260.  "Ibid.,  1872,  p.  1175. 

^  Miners'  National  Record,  vol.  1,  no.  11,  p.  188. 


CONCILIATION   IN  THE   BITUMINOUS  FIELD     15 

panies  combined  to  limit  output  and  fix  prices.  With  this 
the  miners  had  no  quarrel,  but  insisted  that  they  also 
should  be  allowed  to  organize  to  meet  the  situation.  One 
of  the  operators  testified  that  seven  companies  had  com- 
bined to  prosecute  the  men,  and  the  miners  pertinently 
pointed  out  that  they  "  had  struck  and  conspired  to  pre- 
vent other  men  from  going  to  work  at  prices  lower  than 
the  strikers  were  willing  to  accept  for  their  labor.  The 
operators  refused  the  price  demanded  and  combined  to 
raise  means  to  keep  labor  down  and  send  the  leaders  to 
the  penitentiary.  Which  is  the  more  heinous  offense  ?  "  ^ 

Siney  was  acquitted.  Parks  was  sentenced  to  one  year 
in  prison,  one  thousand  five  hundred  dollars  costs,  and  one 
dollar  fine.  The  president  and  secretary  of  the  local  imion 
were  sentenced  to  one  year  because  they  were  officers,  and, 
although  forty  miles  away  at  the  time  of  the  technical  vio- 
lation of  law,  it  was  held  not  necessary  for  them  to  have 
been  present  to  be  guilty  of  a  conspiracy.  The  other  men 
were  sentenced  to  sixty  days.  The  jury  refused  to  obey  the 
mandate  of  the  court  and  convict  Siney,  and  afterwards 
signed  a  petition  for  the  release  of  the  other  men.^ 

The  event  so  stirred  the  people  in  general  that  the  fol- 
lowing year,  1876,  the  law  of  1872  was  amended  so  that 
the  proviso  "  should  be  so  construed  that  the  use  of  lawful 
or  peaceful  means,  having  for  their  object  a  lawful  pur- 
pose, shall  not  be  regarded  as  '  in  any  way  hindering  * 
persons  who  desire  to  labor ;  and  that  the  use  of  force, 
threat,  or  menace  of  harm  to  persons  or  property  shall 
alone  be  regarded  as  in  any  way  hindering  persons  who 
desire  to  labor."  ^  However,  the  miners'  leaders  contin- 
ued to  be  punished  under  the  law  of  conspiracy  in  the 
eighties.* 

^  Miners^  National  Record,  vol.  1,  no.  12,  p.  198. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  1,  p.  153.  ^  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1876,  p.  45. 

*  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1880-81,  p.  380, 
and  1882-83,  p.  163. 


IC       ARBITRATION   IN   THE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

(6)  Decline  of  the  organization 

The  national  officers  had  from  the  beginning  advocated 
a  Fabian  policy  during  a  period  of  falling  prices  and 
slutted  markets  and  advised  the  men  to  make  the  best 
terms  possible  with  their  employers.  This  condition  ex- 
tended over  so  many  years  after  the  panic  of  1873  that 
the  miners  lost  all  patience  and  in  the  autumn  of  1875  and 
spring  of  1876  engaged  in  a  series  of  disastrous  strikes 
which  left  the  organization  in  a  very  weak  state.  In  the 
summer  of  1876  the  national  officers  were  forced  to  give 
up  their  headquarters,  and  settle  debts  of  several  hundred 
dollars  out  of  their  own  pockets  because  of  lack  of  funds. 
Thus  the  organization  came  to  an  end. 

B.  Events  leading  to  the  Joint  Conference  of 

1885 

A.    arbitration   in    OHIO 

Although  the  men  neglected  to  support  an  organization 
of  national  compass,  yet  immediately  after  its  break-up 
the  industry  entered  upon  a  period  of  development  and 
adjustment  that  was  to  lead  to  the  joint  agreement  in 
1885.  The  Knights  of  Labor  were  becoming  prominent 
and  absorbed  many  of  the  local  miners'  organizations,  but 
there  was  still  enough  solidarity  of  feeling  to  attempt  the 
adjustment  of  local  differences.  We  shall  concern  our- 
selves at  this  point  with  events  and  conditions  which  indi- 
cate that  new  machinery  for  industrial  adjustment  was 
necessary. 

In  1877,  in  another  attempt  made  at  arbitration  in  the 
Tuscarawas  Valley  of  Ohio,  the  miners  made  the  fruitful 
suggestion  that  in  the  award  to  be  made  there  should  be 
a  standing  committee  of  three  miners  and  three  operators 
to  adjust  all  differences  which  might  arise  under  the  award.^ 

1  Beport  on  the  Statistics  of  Labor,  Massachusetts,  1881,  p.  61. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    17 

This  is  in  accordance  with  the  development  of  true  con- 
ciliation in  industry,  for  there  must  be  two  distinct  proc- 
esses —  the  making  of  a  wage  contract  and  the  adminis- 
trative machinery  for  working  out  its  details.  The  award 
was  to  be  the  minimum  price  for  mining,  and  the  miners 
suggested  that  the  standing  committee  have  access  to  the 
companies'  books  to  ascertain  the  selling  price  of  coal.^ 
But  this  was  a  step  too  advanced  for  the  operators,  who 
disagreed  technically  on  the  selection  of  the  proper  mouths 
which  should  determine  the  selling  price  of  coal. 

B.    ARBITRATION   IN    WESTERN    PENNSYLVANIA 

Interesting  arbitration  proceedings  took  place  in  west- 
ern Pennsylvania  in  the  region  of  Pittsburg  in  1879.  The 
"river"  miners  on  the  Monongahela  and  Youghiogheny 
Kivers  and  the  "  railroad  "  miners  on  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  and  the  Pennsylvania  Railroads  had  been  organized 
into  the  Miners'  Association  of  Western  Pennsylvania  in 
1879.  With  the  beginning  of  prosperity  in  1879  the  min- 
ers were  quick  to  seek  improvement  in  wages.  At  their 
convention  in  July  they  decided  to  try  arbitration  and 
appointed  a  committee  to  confer  with  the  River  Coal  Ex- 
change. As  an  organization  the  Exchange  refused  to  enter 
an  arbitration  arrangement,  but  a  few  of  its  members  along 
with  a  number  of  "  railroad  "  operators  were  induced  by 
Mr.  Joseph  D.  Weeks,  a  disinterested  authority  on  arbi- 
tration, to  form  a  board  and  a  set  of  rules.^ 

Mr.  Weeks  had  made  a  study  of  conciliation  and  arbi- 
tration boards  in  England,  and  the  rules  drawn  up  followed 
English  models.  Fundamentally  the  board  was  to  adjust 
wage  questions,  settle  disputes  that  arose  over  working  con- 
ditions, and  by  conciliatory  means  prevent  disputes.  It  con- 
sisted of  nine  members  from  each  side,  who  were  to  appoint 
a  referee  in  case  of  a  tie  vote.     A  smaller  conference 

^  Rcptjrt  on  Statistics  of  Labor,  Massachusetts,  1881,  p.  01. 

2  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Penntylvania,  1878-79,  p,  144. 


18       ARBITRATION  IN  THE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

committee  of  four  was  to  give  a  preliminary  hearing  on 
matters  to  come  before  the  board.  lu  the  general  board 
only  an  equal  number  from  each  side  could  vote  if  either 
side  were  not  fully  represented.  A  decision  of  the  majority 
was  to  be  final.  Pending  a  settlement,  work  was  to  go  on 
and  neither  operators  nor  miners  were  to  interfere  with  a 
man  because  he  was  union  or  non-union.  The  expenses  of 
the  board  were  to  be  borne  equally  by  both  parties,  and 
besides  the  stated  meetings  of  the  board  it  was  to  be  as- 
sembled upon  a  requisition  of  the  president  signed  by  five 
members  stating  the  nature  of  the  business.  No  subject 
could  be  brought  up  for  discussion  before  the  conference 
committee  or  the  board  unless  five  days'  notice  was  given. 
This  should  be  contrasted  with  the  freedom  of  a  truly  con- 
ciliatory board  where  the  only  limiting  provisions  are  the 
courtesies  due  under  ordinary  parliamentary  rules. 

The  parties  came  to  a  preliminary  agreement,  but  the 
chief  point  at  issue  was  temporarily  deferred.  The  miners 
wished  to  base  a  scale  on  the  price  paid  in  the  iron  mills 
for  boiling  iron,  and  held  that  since  most  of  the  coal  they 
mined  was  used  in  the  iron  industry  and  the  price  for  boil- 
ing was  fixed,  they  would  always  know  what  the  basis  was. 
The  operators  pointed  out  that  not  one  fourth  of  the  coal 
they  mined  was  used  in  the  iron  industry  and  that  it 
was  illogical  to  base  the  scale  on  anything  but  the  price 
obtained  in  the  yard  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  at  Pitts- 
burg. The  operators  yielded  to  the  miners  temporarily, 
but  the  iron  industry  was  experiencing  a  rapid  expansion 
and  the  price  for  boiling  reached  $7.25  per  ton,  which  would 
have  given  the  miners  $5.20  per  hundred  bushels.-^  This 
was  so  out  of  proportion  to  what  the  miners  had  ever  re- 
ceived that  it  seemed  to  the  "  public  as  extremely  excessive 
and  to  the  miners  as  somewhat  ludicrous."  ^  A  "  railroad  " 

^  Eeport  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1878-79, 
p.  147. 

2  Ibid.,  1880-81,  p.  377  —  the  words  of  miners'  leader  in  report  to  State 
Bureau. 


CONCILIATION   IN  THE  BITUMINOUS   FIELD     19 

miners'  convention  met  and  shaved  the  scale  down  so  that 
the  miners  would  get  $3.62|  per  hundred  bushels  under 
similar  conditions.  But  even  this  was  rejected  by  the  Rail- 
road Coal  Exchange,  and  the  miners  withdrew  their  demand 
for  a  scale  and  asked  for  a  flat  rate  of  four  cents  per  bushel. 
In  the  mean  time  the  arbitration  board  had  failed  to  agree 
on  a  scale  and  on  the  selection  of  an  arbiter  because  they 
could  not  get  the  man  they  wanted.  The  Coal  Exchange 
stuck  to  its  original  offer  of  S^  cents  per  bushel  and  a 
break  in  the  ranks  of  the  miners  forced  acceptance.  The 
failure  of  the  board  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  atti- 
tude both  parties  had  taken  toward  arbitration,  and  to  the 
inferiority  of  arbitration  as  compared  with  conciliation. 

C.    INTERSTATE    CONVENTION    OF    1880 

After  the  demise  of  the  Miners'  National  Association 
in  1876,  the  miners  seemed  content  with  local  organiza- 
tions and  with  entering  upon  local  struggles.  The  need  of 
a  general  strike  to  meet  changing  conditions  in  a  more 
broadly  competitive  market  was  not  appreciated.  One  of 
the  first  signs  we  have  that  the  recognition  of  this  was  to 
come  is  seen  in  the  Interstate  Convention  of  1880. 

In  the  spring  of  1879  the  miners  on  the  Monongahela 
and  Youghiogheny  Rivers  had  struck  for  an  advance  in 
wages.^  They  obtained  their  increase  through  accepting 
the  advice  to  continue  the  strike  for  a  couple  of  weeks 
longer.  This  advice  was  given  by  a  young  lawyer,  formerly 
a  miner,  who  observed  that  the  operators  "  were  daily  in 
receipt  of  orders  for  coal  at  constantly  increasing  prices." 
He  was  elected  president  of  the  local  miners'  organization 
and  through  the  autocratic  power  vested  in  him  was  able 
to  wring  other  concessions  from  the  operators.  He  soon 
gained  a  reputation  for  his  excellent  management  of  the 
local  union,  and  the  effect  of  the  union's  reputation  for 
1  Roy,  op.  ci<.,p.  190. 


20       ARBITRATION   IN   THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

unanimity  of  action  was  not  lost  on  the  miners  in  other 
localities.^ 

In  the  mean  time  the  miners  in  the  Tuscarawas  and 
Hocking  Valleys  of  Ohio  took  advantage  of  rising  prices 
to  demand  increases  in  wages  and  obtained  them.  But  a 
dispute  arose  in  the  Tuscarawas  Valley  over  the  weighing 
and  screening  of  coal.  The  operators  of  this  field  agreed 
to  abandon  the  use  of  screens  if  their  competitors  in  the 
neighboring  fields  could  be  induced  to  do  so.^  An  inter- 
state  conference  of  miners  from  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania 
met  at  Pittsburg  on  March  17, 1880,  and  demanded  pay- 
ment by  weight  for  all  coal  mined,  receipt  of  their  wages 
fortnightly,  abolition  of  the  company  stores,  and  an  eight- 
hour  day.^  If  these  demands  were  not  granted  by  August  1, 
a  general  strike  was  planned  to  force  concessions.  The 
Hocking  Valley  and  Jackson  County  miners  of  Ohio  re- 
fused to  enter  into  a  struggle  over  payment  by  weight  and 
the  abolition  of  the  screen  system,  but  the  Tuscarawas 
Valley  men  held  out  for  nine  months  and  were  finally 
forced  to  surrender  by  the  importation  of  negroes  imder 
military  protection.*  At  the  same  time  the  Pennsylvania 
miners  were  trying  to  the  best  of  their  ability  to  secure 
some  uniformity,  by  local  strikes  where  individual  oper- 
ators were  obdurate.^  These  experiences  were  demonstrat- 
ing the  necessity  for  solidarity  and  concerted  action. 

D.    OHIO  miners'   amalgamated  ASSOCIATION 

During  the  struggle  over  the  screen  question  John  Mc- 
Brideand  other  prominent  miners  had  been  active  in  agitat- 
ing for  the  orgfanization  of  a  state  union  for  Ohio.  As  the 
result  of  the  miners'  failure  to  win  their  strike,  McBride  was 
blacklisted  and  he  found  it  impossible  to  obtain  work  in  the 

1  McBride,  op.  cit,  p.  252.  2  Roy^  ^p.  cif.,  p.  192. 

3  McBride,  op.  cit.,  p.  253. 

*  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  194 ;  also  Warne,  op.  cit.,  p.  383. 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1880-81,  p.  379. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    21 

mines.^  But  he  obtained  other  employment  and  continued 
to  agitate  for  a  state  union.  By  April,  1882,  he  succeeded 
in  getting  a  representative  convention  together  at  Colum- 
bus and  the  Ohio  Miners'  Amalgamated  Association  was 
formed.  The  most  extended  source  of  information  we  have 
on  the  organization  ^  leaves  us  to  infer  that  the  State  was 
divided  into  district  and  local  divisions  with  corresponding 
organizations.  No  more  power  was  given  the  state  officers 
than  was  actually  necessary  to  bring  about  concerted  ac- 
tion in  the  various  fields.^  It  was  not  long  before  the  oper- 
ators as  well  as  the  miners  recognized  the  desirability  of 
some  organization  which  should  keep  track  of  conditions 
over  the  State  at  large  and  prevent  one  district  from 
securing  advantages  over  another  by  cutting  wages.*  The 
chief  importance  of  the  organization  lies  in  the  fact  that 
it  is  an  expression  of  the  tendency  to  extend  the  principle 
of  solidarity  over  State-wide  areas  in  contrast  with  locali- 
ties and  districts.  The  organization  also  furnished  some 
moving  spirits  who  were  far-seeing  enough  to  recognize 
that  the  principle  of  cooperation  must  be  national  in 
scope. 

E.   ARBITRATION    UNDER    STATE    LAWS    PROVIDING 
FOR   TRIBUNALS 

(1)  Arbitration  in  western  Pennsylvania 

The  following  year  in  western  Pennsylvania  successful 
arbitration  took  place  under  the  Trade  Tribunal  Act  of 
1883.  This  act  provided  that  a  license  or  authority  for 
establishing  a  tribunal  should  be  issued  by  the  presiding 
Judge  of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas.  The  license  should 
be  denied  unless  the  petition  were  signed  by  fifty  work- 
men and  five  firms  within  the  county  where  the  petitioners 

'  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  104. 

2  lieport  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1885,  p.  25. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  20.  1  Ibid.,  p.  25. 


22       ARBITRATION   IN   THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

resided.  The  tribunal  was  to  exist  for  one  year  and  consider 
further  disputes  that  arose  within  that  time.  Vacancies 
were  to  be  filled  by  judges  from  lists  submitted  by  the 
parties,  and  an  umpire  was  to  be  selected  by  mutual  choice, 
who  should  act  ouly  when  the  parties,  after  three  meet- 
ings held  for  discussion,  had  failed  to  reach  an  agreement. 
The  award  was  to  be  final  on  all  matter  submitted,  but  it 
was  to  be  binding  only  on  condition  that  both  parties  ac- 
quiesced. If  agreed  to  and  made  a  part  of  a  court  record 
the  court  could  grant  judgment  for  its  fulfillment.  The 
tribunal  fixed  its  own  rules  of  procedure  and  the  chairman 
was  vested  with  a  power  of  procuring  witnesses,  preserving 
order,  and  obtaining  proofs.^ 

In  May,  1883,  the  "  railroad  "  operators  sought  to  force 
a  reduction  of  a  half  cent  a  bushel  on  their  miners.  This 
would  be  a  matter  of  thirteen  cents  a  ton  of  two  thousand 
pounds.  The  local  miners'  organization,  after  several  un- 
successful conferences  with  the  operators,  decided  to  arbi- 
trate under  the  Trade  Tribunal  Act.  On  the  organization 
of  the  board  it  was  decided  that  the  miners  should  resume 
work  at  once,  with  a  checkweighman  to  see  that  they  re- 
ceived proper  weight,  and  at  a  price  to  be  determined  by 
the  tribunal.  This  price  should  apply  from  the  time  they 
began  work.  A  committee  of  four  was  appointed  to  visit 
the  Lake  ports  to  obtain  the  selling  price  of  Pittsburg  coal 
and  to  find  out  the  freight  rates  on  the  same.  They  were 
to  obtain  also  the  prices  of  competitive  coal  and  its  cost 
of  transportation.  Another  committee  of  four  was  to  visit 
Pittsburg  and  examine  the  books  of  the  operators  to  ob- 
tain their  selling  prices,  prices  paid  for  mining,  and  costs 
of  mining  other  than  wage  costs.  After  this  investigation 
the  parties  were  "obliged  to  confess  that  the  information 
they  obtained  but  served  to  strengthen  [their]  feeling  of 
partisanship,"  and  they  had  to  appeal  to  an  arbitrator. 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,   1882-83, 
p.  160. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    23 

The  umpire  split  the  difference  and  the  parties  accepted 
the  award.^  In  December  of  the  same  year  a  promising 
case  of  arbitration  regarding  a  differential  between  the 
Fourth  and  Second  Pools  of  the  Monongahela  River  was 
effected.  Later,  however,  the  award  was  broken  by  several 
of  the  operators  in  the  Fourth  Pool  positively  refusing  to 
pay  the  back  wages  due  the  men  or  to  abide  by  the  terms 
in  general.^  In  another  case  at  this  time  in  Allegheny 
County  both  parties  abode  faithfully  by  a  scale  of  wages 
and  the  selling  price  of  coal  fixed  by  Mr.  Joseph  D.  Weeks. 

(2)  Hocking  Valley  strike,  ISSJf 

In  1884,  the  Ohio  Miners'  Amalgamated  Association 
crossed  swords  with  the  Hocking  Valley  coal  syndicate 
while  consolidation  of  mines  by  the  Ohio  Coal  Exchange 
and  the  Hocking  Valley  Coal  and  Iron  Company  was  going 
on.  The  difference  in  the  thickness  of  the  seams  in  the 
northern  part  (ten  feet)  and  in  the  southern  part  (six 
feet)  of  the  valley  resulted  in  too  many  laborers  being  in 
the  thick  seam  and  causing  others  to  clamor  for  a  chance 
to  work  it.  The  competition  of  workmen  enabled  the  coal 
syndicate  to  force  reductions  from  seventy  cents  per  ton  to 
sixty  cents  and  then  to  fifty  cents.  It  was  the  policy  of  the 
operators  thus  to  hold  the  market.  The  average  monthly 
wage  in  one  of  the  Ohio  Coal  Exchange  mines  ran  — 
March,  $27.53  ;  April,  118.55  ;  May,  $19.95 ;  June,  $12.83. 
In  one  of  the  Hocking  Valley  Coal  and  Iron  Company 
mines  the  average  monthly  wage  from  January  to  June 
was  $17.84.2  The  nearest  approach  we  have  to  statistics 
bearing  on  the  industry  of  the  State  in  general  is  from 
fifty-nine  reports  of  representative  miners'  earnings  from 
various  parts  of  the  State.  The  average  yearly  wage  was 
$239.17.  We  have  no  record  of  the  average  daily  wage  or 
the  number  of  days  worked.   The  fluctuation  in  average 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1882-83,  p.  142. 
2  Ibid.,  1884,  p.  73.  8  Saliers,  The  Coal  Miner,  p.  13. 


24       ARBITRATION  IN  THE   COAL  INDUSTRY 

yearly  wage  arrived  at  under  similar  circumstances  in  the 
reports  of  the  State  Bureau  of  Statistics,  is  shown  thus  — 
1879,  !5;314  ;  1881, 1397.54 ;  1883,  $443.14 ;  1885,  $239.17 ; 
1886,  $239.99.^ 

The  Ohio  coal  and  iron  products  were  experiencing  se- 
vere competition  from  Pennsylvania  and  Alabama,  and  the 
Ohio  blast  furnaces  were  tenaciously  holding  on  to  the 
use  of  the  native  ores  from  the  coal  measures.^  Besides, 
Ohio  coal  met  severe  competition  in  the  Chicago  market 
from  the  Pennsylvania  bituminous  and  anthracite  coals. 

The  trouble  in  1884  had  been  settled  by  a  compro- 
mise, and  by  the  latter  part  of  October,  1885,  a  general 
strike  over  the  State  was  imminent  when  the  operators  re- 
fused to  grant  an  advance  from  fifty  cents  to  sixty  cents 
per  ton.  The  operators  finally  accepted  an  offer  to  arbi- 
trate. Ohio,  in  February,  1885,  passed  an  arbitration  law 
similar  to  Pennsylvania's,  but  the  miners  and  operators 
organized  a  board  without  the  aid  of  the  law,  examined 
books,  and  heard  evidence.  They  failed  to  agree  and  re- 
sorted to  an  arbitrator.  The  award  was  against  the  oper- 
ators and  they  were  forced  to  pay  an  advance  of  ten  cents 
per  ton  .2 

F.    CHANGES    IN    THE    COAL    INDUSTRY 

(1)  Enlargement  of  the  market 

These  troubles  in  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  were  among 
many  of  similar  nature  in  other  States.  An  evolution  had 
been  taking  place  in  competitive  markets  which  was  bound 
to  force  both  parties  to  cease  looking  upon  their  business 
and  working  conditions  with  a  local  or  provincial  attitude 
and  to  compel  them  to  expand  their  concepts  to  national 
boundaries  and  conditions.  The  coal  from  eastern  West 

^  Reports  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  for  the  above  years. 

2  Saliers,  op.  cit.,  p.  13. 

3  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1885,  p.  252. 


CONCILIATION   IN   THE   BITUMINOUS  FIELD    25 

Virginia  and.  Maryland  fields  and  the  central  Pennsyl- 
vania and  anthracite  regions  went  to  seaboard  cities,  while 
coal  from  western  Pennsylvania,  western  West  Virginia, 
Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  went  to  the  Lake  ports  and 
the  Northwestern  States.^  The  coal  fields  located  on  the 
Ohio  River  and  its  tributaries  sent  their  product  to  Cin- 
cinnati, Louisville,  and  points  on  the  Mississippi.  But  the 
railroad  development  was  fast  breaking  down  the  influ- 
ence of  the  physiographical  features  which  had  widely 
separated  markets  and  was  making  sectional  markets  re- 
sponsive to  coal  supply  from  other  fields.  This  fact  with 
the  rapid  increase  of  new  coal  fields  made  overproduction 
inevitable  in  the  race  to  pay  dividends. 

(2)    Working  conditions 

Along  with  extreme  competition,  overproduction,  and 
reduction  of  wages  went  certain  working  conditions  that 
must  be  understood  to  appreciate  the  welding  force  which 
was  driving  the  men  to  united  action  to  secure  the  regu- 
lation or  suppression  of  these  conditions.  In  most  cases 
the  conditions  were  the  direct  outgrowth  of  competition 
and  overproduction,  but  the  men  recognized  that  they 
could  be  utilized  to  bring  about  uniformity  and  set  a 
limit  to  cutthroat  competition.  If  these  basic  conditions 
of  labor  could  be  established  and  the  standard  of  living 
raised,  the  operator  could  carry  on  his  competition  so  long 
as  he  did  not  attempt  to  make  his  men  suffer  for  it. 

Among  the  more  obvious  grievances  which  caused  fric- 
tion with  even  the  most  ignorant  of  men,  because  of  Its 
audacious  robbery,  was  the  short  weighing  that  went  on 
when  the  miner  had  no  checkweighman  at  the  scales  in  his 
employ  to  check  up  the  company  man.  Not  until  1902, 
after  the  award  of  the  Anthracite  Commission,  do  we  have 
definite  figures  of  the  amount  of  saving  this  meant  to  the 
miner.2  Closely  connected  with  this  matter  was  the  abuso 
*  Warne,  op.  cit.,  p.  384.  ^  Sqo  post,  p.  253. 


26       ARBITRATION   IN   THE   COAL   INDUSTRY 

of  the  "  dockage  "  system.  This  was  an  institution,  legiti- 
mate in  itself,  for  making  the  miner  careful  about  loading 
impurities,  but  easily  subjected  to  abuse  when  no  check- 
weighman  was  at  hand.  The  question  of  mine-run  pay- 
ment versus  compensation  for  the  amount  of  coal  that 
passed  over  a  screen  of  a  certain  size,  was  hotly  disputed. 
The  miner  pointed  out  that  the  operator  sold  the  small 
sizes  which  were  left  as  screenings  and  could  see  no  reason 
for  non-payment.  The  operator  said  that  the  screen  sys- 
tem was  to  encourage  careful  mining,  and  justified  the 
method  by  paying  a  somewhat  higher  price  for  screened 
coal,  supposed  to  compensate  for  the  small  coal  that  fell 
through  the  screen.  The  miner  found  that  the  screen  sys- 
tem was  subject  to  many  abuses ;  for  example  —  larger 
openings  than  agreed  upon,  non-repair  when  the  screens 
had  spread  and  allowed  an  extra  large  percentage  of  coal 
to  pass  through,  and  the  placing  of  spreaders  and  other 
obstructions  on  the  screens  which  would  break  the  coal.^ 
This  abuse  was  further  aggravated  as  the  demand  for 
small  sizes  increased.  The  only  way  out  of  this  situation 
the  miuer  saw  was  to  demand  run-of-mine  payment  for  his 
coal  (payment  for  all  coal  mined},  and,  since  the  operator 
refused  to  grant  it,  the  workmen  early  sought  legislation 
which  should  do  away  with  these  abuses  and  establish  stand- 
ard weights  and  measures  and  legalize  checkweighmen.^ 
But  the  legislation  obtained  along  this  line  was  generally 
thwarted  by  the  proviso  that  the  operator  and  miner 
might  contract  between  themselves  for  any  method  of 
payment,  and  usually  the  miner  had  to  accept  the  employ- 
er's terms  or  starve.  Besides,  to  obtain  redress  for  non- 
payment for  all  clean  coal  a  suit  for  damages  was  neces- 
sary. The  mine-run  question  is  still  a  live  one. 

^  Le^slative  Record  of  Pennsylvania,  June  7,  1897,  —  quoted  by 
Georg-e,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  12,  p.  19G. 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1882-83, 
p.  172a. 


CONCILIATION   IN   THE   BITUMINOUS  FIELD    27 

Another  practice  the  injustice  of  which  the  miner  was 
quick  to  feel  was  the  non-payment  for  "deadwork."  It 
was  well  named,  for  the  miner,  without  pay,  had  to  bail 
water  from  his  room,  post  the  roof,  lay  track,  cut  clay 
veins  and  spars,  and  move  all  obstructions  which  hin- 
dered his  getting  at  the  coal.  In  some  cases  a  little  was 
added  to  the  price  per  ton  or  per  bushel,  or  a  miner  was 
paid  a  certain  amount  for  his  time  while  doing  such  work. 
In  most  cases  he  had  the  alternative  of  performing  what 
he  was  told  to  do  or  losing  his  job.  The  amount  to  be  paid 
for  such  work  is  still  a  controverted  question  when  mak- 
ing wage  scales. 

The  company  store  was  an  institution  of  great  service 
to  the  miner  in  the  early  days  in  isolated  sections.  But 
with  the  growth  of  a  mining  camp  into  a  town  its  real 
function  was  nil,  unless  it  could  give  as  cheap  and  good 
service  as  the  town  stores.  In  too  many  cases  the  owner- 
ship of  property  about  the  mines  enabled  the  operators  to 
refuse  to  allow  competing  stores.  Where  economic  growth 
was  too  powerful  for  them  to  control  in  this  way,  the 
operators  could  still  resort  to  favoritism  in  employment 
and  conditions  of  work  towards  those  men  who  patronized 
the  company  store  and  quietly  dismiss  those  who  did  not. 
In  many  cases  the  operator  depended  on  the  store  profits 
to  enable  him  to  undersell  his  comjietitor  who  did  not 
own  stores.  This  element  was  such  a  strong  factor  in  a 
vaniformity  scheme  in  the  Pittsburg  district,  as  late  as 
1895,  that  the  operators  who  did  not  have  company  stores 
were  given  a  differential  of  five  cents  on  a  ton.^  The  ex- 
istence of  the  store  encourages  the  operator  to  employ 
more  men  than  are  really  needed  for  the  sake  of  their 
trade  at  the  store.  This  limits  the  earnings  of  the  miner 

^  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  vol. 
7,  p.  164.  A  twenty  cents  differential  was  given  to  operators  who  had  a 
limit  to  the  weight  of  the  car,  allowed  a  checkweighman,  used  the  regu- 
lation screen,  and  paid  in  nothing  but  cash. 


28       ARBITRATION   IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

because  he  obtains  less  work.  The  operator  thus  gets  a 
"  rake-off  "  from  all  the  miner's  consuming  ability  as  well 
as  his  productive  capacity.  But  still  more  important,  the 
surplus  labor  kept  wages  down  to  a  subsistence  level. 
The  extortionate  prices  and  the  enforced  use  of  scrip  soon 
brought  state  legislation  ^  which  it  was  hoped  would 
remedy  the  evils.  But  as  the  Ohio  Commission  of  Labor 
Statistics  points  out,  the  laws  were  ineffective  because  no 
provision  was  made  to  enforce  them,^  and  it  took  united 
action  on  the  part  of  the  workmen  to  make  them  effec- 
tive. With  the  growth  of  concentration  of  capital  and 
strong  unionism  in  the  mining  industry,  the  large  com- 
panies, at  least,  have  done  away  for  the  most  part  with 
the  semblance  of  the  store  system,  although  it  hangs  on  in 
places  in  the  form  of  stores  in  which  the  mining  corpora- 
tion may  hold  stock  and  for  which  it  deducts  store  bills  from 
the  miner's  wages.  Another  subtle  form  is  the  ownership 
of  stores  by  relatives  of  officials  or  mine  bosses  and  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  men  who  will  trade  at  their  stores. 

In  the  eighties  semimonthly  pay  was  becoming  a  strong 
demand.  The  company  store  kept  the  men  constantly  in 
debt  and  encouraged  the  improvident  to  spend  their  last 
penny.  In  fact,  the  combined  system  of  company  store 
and  deferred  payment  is  nothing  but  peonage. 

Analogous  to  the  store  are  the  company  houses.  Besides 
yielding  exceptionally  good  returns  on  the  investment,  the 
operator  was  in  a  position  to  evict  the  miner  on  short  no- 
tice in  case  of  a  strike,  and  this  power  was  used  when  the 
miners  were  particularly  obdurate. 

The  seasonal  demand  for  coal,  the  surplus  number  of 
mines  in  operation,  too  many  men  in  the  industry,  and  the 
willingness  of  the  miner  to  share  work  with  his  fellow 
unionist  in  times  of  depression,  have  been  the  elements 
that  have  given  the  miner  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to 

^  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1878,  p.  115. 
a  Ibid.,  p.  116. 


CONCILIATION  IN   THE   BITUMINOUS   FIELD    29 

a  little  over  two  hundred  working  days  in  a  year.  This 
situation  and  the  adverse  conditions  of  work  prompted  the 
miner  to  demand  and  fight  for  the  eight-hour  day  as  a 
means  of  lessening  overproduction,  distributing  the  work 
more  evenly  over  the  year,  and  giving  him  more  time  to 
spend  in  the  daylight  and  for  self-improvement. 


3.  THE  STRUGGLE   FOR  A  JOINT  AGREEMENT 
FROM  1885  TO   1898 

A.  The  National  Federation  of  Miners  and 
Mine  Laborers 

The  economic  pressure  of  the  conditions  described,  the 
relative  homogeneity  of  population,^  and  the  rise  in  intel- 
ligence of  the  mass  of  workers  laid  a  basis  for  the  system 
of  joint  interstate  agreements  begun  in  1885.  The  miners' 
organizations  in  the  various  States  and  districts  were 
learning  the  futility  of  attempting  to  cope  with  the  eco- 
nomic pressure  without  solidarity  of  organization  and 
purpose.  The  leaders  from  the  various  States  came  to- 
gether in  convention  at  Indianapolis,  September,  1885, 
and  formed  a  national  organization  known  as  the  "  Na- 
tional Federation  of  Miners  and  Mine  Laborers."  The 
preamble  to  the  constitution  recited  the  evils  growing 
out  of  excessive  competition  and  overproduction  and  re- 
called the  adverse  working  conditions  under  which  the 
craft  was  laboring.  The  belief  was  expressed  that  "  in  a 
federation  of  all  lodges  and  branches  of  miners'  unions 
lies  our  hope."  The  chief  purposes  of  the  organization 
were  to  spread  intelligence  and  promote  the  social  and  in- 
dustrial welfare  of  the  workers  by  the  use  of  arbitration 
and  legal  enactment.^ 

The  executive  and  legislative  powers  of  the  organiza- 
tion were  put  in  the  hands  of  five  representatives  at  large, 

1  That  is,  tlioy  had  a  common  language  and  a  similar  standard  of  living. 

2  McBride,  op.  cit,,  p.  255. 


so       ARBITRATION   IN   THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

and  one  member  from  each  of  the  coal-producing  States 
with  one  additional  nieniber  from  the  anthracite  field. 
The  five  members  at  large,  a  secretary,  and  a  treasurer 
were  charged  with  the  administrative  functions.  A  per 
capita  tax  on  each  member  furnished  the  f unds.^  It  was 
truly  a  federation  as  compared  with  the  organization  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers,  which,  we  shall  see,  has  de- 
veloped into  a  strong  industrial  imion  and  democracy .^ 

A.  SUGGESTION    OF   THE    INTERSTATE    JOINT 

CONFERENCE 

At  this  federal  convention  the  suggestion  was  made  by 
Daniel  McLaughlin,  chairman,  that  the  miners  seek  to 
bring  about  a  joint  interstate  convention  of  miners  and 
operators  to  frame  a  scale  of  wages,  agree  upon  uniform 
working  conditions,  adjust  "  market  and  mining  prices  in 
such  a  way  as  to  avoid  strikes  and  lockouts,  and  give  to 
each  party  an  increased  profit  from  the  sale  of  coal."  Only 
one  operator,  W.  P.  Rend,  responded  to  the  call  for  the 
convention  at  Cliicago,  October,  1885.  Mr.  Rend,  in  the 
Hocking  Valley  strike  and  on  other  occasions,  had  shown 
himself  a  friend  of  the  miners  when  he  felt  that  they  were 
in  the  right,  and  he  encouraged  the  miners  to  issue  an- 
other call.  A  few  Chicago  operators  responded  to  the 
second  call  and  with  the  miners  signed  another  invitation 
for  a  meeting  at  Pittsburg,  December,  1885.  Emphasis 
was  put  upon  the  belief  that  the  movement  would  inau- 
gurate a  new  era  for  the  settlement  of  industrial  ques- 
tions and  that  friendly  conferences  would  accomplish  what 
force  had  failed  to  bring  about  in  the  past.^ 

B.  Interstate  Joint  Conference  of  1886 

Although  a  larger  number  attended  the  Pittsburg  meet- 
ing, it  was  not  representative  of  the  industry,  and  it  drew 
*  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  244.  ^  See.  chap.  in.  ^  "Roj,  op.  cit.,  p.  252. 


CONCIUATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    31 

up  a  possible  scale  of  wages  and  issued  another  call  for  a 
convention  at  Columbus  in  February,  1886.  The  February 
meeting  was  well  attended,  and  the  novel  experiment  met 
with  strong  advocates  and  with  determined  opponents 
among  the  operators.  At  the  same  time  a  spirit  of  fair- 
ness pervaded  the  proceedings  and  the  debate  on  the  wage 
scale.  Each  State  was  allowed  eight  votes  as  a  basis  of 
representation  —  four  for  the  operators  and  four  for  the 
miners.  As  only  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Pennsylvania 
were  represented  by  the  operators,  the  miners  from  Mary- 
land and  West  Virginia  were  not  allowed  to  vote. 

The  Pittsburg  scale  was  adopted  for  one  year,  lapsing 
April  30,  1887,  and  established  differentials  among  the 
various  coal  fields  varying  from  56|  cents  per  ton  in  the 
Mount  Olive  and  Staunton  districts  to  95  cents  per  ton 
at  Wilmington,  Illinois.^  A  national  board  of  arbitration, 
consisting  of  nine  operators  and  an  equal  number  of 
miners,  was  established  to  settle  disputes  that  might  arise 
between  States,  and  similar  boards  were  to  care  for  state 
matters.  The  national  board  met  several  times  durine;  the 
year  and  tried  to  come  to  some  agreement  on  the  eight- 
hour  day  question,  but  it,  along  with  other  matters  that 
needed  general  sanction  to  make  them  effective,  was  wisely 
left  for  the  convention. 

C.  Withdrawal  op  Illinois 

The  meeting  of  the  convention  of  1887  was  an  occasion 
for  felicitations  on  the  success  of  the  movement  and  the 
good  feeling  it  had  engendered.  But  hardly  had  the  echoes 
of  praise  died  away  before  the  participants  discovered 
forces  at  work  which  were  to  disrupt  the  movement.  The 
operators  from  southern  Illinois  refused  from  the  beginning 
to  enter  the  agreement,  and  the  operators  from  northern 
Illinois  withdrew  in  1888.  The  thicker  seams  of  coal, 
the  greater  opportunity  to  use  mining  machinery,  and  the 
'  McBride,  op.  cit.,  p.  250. 


32       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

readjustment  of  freight  rates  enabled  southern  Illinois  to 
put  its  coul  in  the  Chicago  markets  at  a  price  lower  than 
could  northern  Illinois.^  Both  sections  of  the  State  de- 
pended on  coal  contracts  with  the  railroads  for  their  chief 
business,  and  it  was  charged  in  the  convention  of  1888 
that  there  was  a  conspiracy  of  the  Northwestern  railroads 
and  the  Illinois  operators  to  shut  out  the  Ohio  and  Penn- 
sylvania coal  from  the  Northwestern  markets.^  It  has  been 
pointed  out,  by  one  who  knew  the  situation  at  first  hand,^ 
that  the  ownership  of  Illinois  mines  by  railroads  and  their 
officials  was  the  real  reason  why  Illinois  was  not  anxious 
to  stay  in  an  interstate  uniformity  agreement.  As  long  as 
the  ownership  of  the  bituminous  field  was  not  consolidated, 
it  was  to  their  interest  to  be  free  to  deduct  from  the  earn- 
ings of  their  coal  mines  to  pay  the  railroad,  or  to  put 
those  operators  not  in  the  combine  at  a  disadvantage  by 
high  freight  rates.  We  shall  find  this  situation  and  the 
working  out  of  this  policy  in  the  bituminous  fields  of 
Pennsylvania,  West  Virginia,  and  Maryland  (and  in  the 
anthracite  field),*  and  there  is  no  reason  to  think  the  same 
influences  were  not  at  work  in  Illinois.  In  fact  the  same 
questions  of  rebating  and  discrimination,  supplying  of 
cars  and  the  use  of  "  individual  cars,"  have  come  before 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  from  Illinois  as  from 
Pennsylvania  and  the  other  States.^  Furthermore,  "  Illi- 
nois never  went  into  the  movement  heartily,  notwithstand- 
ing the  enthusiasm  of  certain  operators  for  it."  ^  There 
were  also  disrupting  influences  among  the  Ohio  operators.^ 

D.  Withdrawal  of  Indiana 

The  refusal  of  Illinois  to  be  governed  by  the  agreement 
put  Indiana  at  a  disadvantage,  and  she  withdrew  in  1889. 

^  Report  of  Special  Commission  on  Northern  Illinois  Coal  Strike,  1889,  p.  9. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  11.  8  Lloyd,  A  Strike  of  Millionaires,  p.  205. 

*  See  p.  IQJf.  ^  Reports  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

^  Report  of  Special  Commission,  op.  cit.,  p.  10  (italics  mine). 
'  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  J8SS,  p.  208. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    33 

The  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  operators  were  wroth  and 
went  so  far  as  to  propose  to  throw  one  sixth  of  their  coal 
into  the  Northwestern  markets  at  reduced  prices  until 
Illinois  was  forced  to  come  into  the  agreement.  The  scales 
of  1886  and  1887  had  set  mining  prices  for  Illinois  which 
were  contingent  on  the  ability  of  the  miners  to  force  the 
guerrilla  operators  into  the  agreement.  The  strikes  of  the 
miners  were  without  avail.  The  withdrawal  of  Indiana 
and  the  failure  of  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  to  come  to  an 
agreement  brought  the  joint  conference  to  an  end  in  1889. 

E.  The  Problem  of  the  Joint  Conference 

The  parties  to  the  agreement  did  not  fully  comprehend 
the  magnitude  of  the  problem  before  them.  They  must 
first  establish  an  equality  in  common  markets  which  would 
take  account  of  nearness  to  market,  the  ease  with  which 
coal  could  be  mined,  quality  of  the  coal,  cost  of  transpor- 
tation, the  rate  of  mining  and  "  deadwork,"  and  the  many 
other  conditions  that  enter  into  the  production  of  coal. 
In  the  second  place,  they  had  included  in  the  movement 
only  the  central  States  of  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  western 
Pennsylvania,  and  one  district  of  West  Virginia.  To  estab- 
lish differentials  between  the  coal  from  Michigan,  Iowa, 
and  the  Southwestern  field  of  Kansas,  Missouri,  Okla- 
homa, Texas,  and  Arkansas,  was  one  of  their  first  prob- 
lems. But  before  the  operators  became  ready  to  attack 
the  problem  with  earnestness,  they  were  to  experiment 
for  a  decade  longer  with  cutthroat  competition  and  over- 
production. 

F.  The  Formation  of  the  United  Mine  Workers 

During  the  life  of  the  agreement  the  miners  had  been 
passing  through  a  period  of  discord  and  evolution  in  trade- 
union  philosophy  that  was  to  lay  a  basis  for  solid  indus- 
trial unionism.  In  the  same  year  (1885)  that  the  National 
Federation  of  Miners  was  formed,  the  Knights  of  Labor, 


3i       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

which  had  locals  scattered  over  the  mining  regions,  or- 
ganized a  National  District  Assembly  of  Miners  further  to 
extend  their  principles  of  general  solidarity  among  work- 
men in  all  industries.  The  Knights  had  been  a  strong 
educational  influence  among  workmen,  and  the  adherents 
of  the  organization  determined  not  to  have  it  crowded  out. 
Each  organization  sought  to  gain  supremacy,  and  the  di- 
vided counsel  and  quarrels  in  every  district  worked  to  the 
advantage  of  the  operators. 

A  threat  on  the  part  of  the  Knights  of  Labor  that,  un- 
less they  were  put  on  an  equal  basis  witli  the  Federation 
in  the  adjustment  of  disputes  with  the  operators,  they 
would  not  be  under  obligation  to  abide  by  the  contracts, 
brought  the  Federation  to  a  compromise.  An  attempt 
at  consolidation  was  made  in  December,  1887,  but  the 
Knights  refused  to  sink  their  identity  in  another  organi- 
zation, and  the  only  results  that  came  from  the  meeting 
were  a  reorganization  of  the  Federation  and  the  changing 
of  its  name  to  the  National  Progressive  Union.^  By  the 
latter  part  of  1889,  the  organization  had  had  enough  of 
war  and  recognized  that  only  by  unity  could  it  cope  with 
its  problems.  A  plan  for  amalgamating  the  two  organiza- 
tions was  submitted  to  all  the  locals  and  a  call  issued  for 
a  national  convention  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  January,  1890. 
At  this  convention  the  two  organizations,  the  National 
Progressive  Union  and  the  National  District  Assembly 
No.  135  of  the  Knights  of  Labor,  united  under  the  name  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  with  provisions  that 
allowed  each  organization  to  retain  its  essential  features, 
hold  open  or  secret  meetings,  and  permit  the  general  ad- 
ministration to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  national  ofi&cers.^ 
The  organization  began  its  career  with  a  membership  of 
about  20,000  out  of  a  body  of  255,244  miners  and  laborers.^ 
After  pointing  out  the  significance  of  the  miner's  func- 

^  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  270.   Reorganization  consisted  in  having  a  president 
instead  of  an  executive  secretary  as  administrative  head. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  274.  8   United  States  Census  Report,  1890. 


ftUSSEa  SAlaE  COLLEGE  UHH, 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    35 

tion  in  the  production  of  coal  for  modern  industrial  life, 
the  organization  announced  its  purpose  to  secure  ade- 
quate earnings,  payment  of  wages  in  lawful  money,  an 
eight-hour  day,  laws  providing  for  checkweighmen,  safety 
appliances,  equipment  for  ventilation,  and  regulations 
which  would  do  away  with  the  mine  guard  system.  The 
miners  felt  that  their  children  should  not  be  compelled  to 
go  to  work  until  they  were  fourteen  and  recognized  that 
education  must  stand  as  their  chief  emancipating  factor. 
Although  they  expected  considerable  from  legal  enactment, 
they  pointed  to  the  lack  of  enforcement  of  existing  laws 
as  one  of  their  chief  handicaps.  Furthermore,  conciliation 
and  arbitration  were  recognized  as  among  their  most 
powerful  instruments  for  obtaining  betterment  and  for 
establishing  relationships  which  no  amount  of  legislation 
could  bring  about. 

The  national  union  was  given  jurisdiction  over  all  its 
affiliated  bodies  and  the  national  executive  officers  were 
given  powers  commensurate  with  such  jurisdiction.  The 
president,  vice-president,  and  secretary-treasurer  and  four 
other  members  made  up  the  national  executive  board  and 
were  elected  by  the  annual  national  convention.  The  presi- 
dent with  the  consent  of  the  executive  board  was  em- 
powered to  make  appointments  for  vacant  offices  and 
suspend  or  remove  national  officers  for  insubordination. 
Organizers  and  other  workers  needed  by  the  union  re- 
ceived their  appointments  through  the  same  source.  The 
executive  board,  besides  acting  as  a  national  board  of 
arbitration  and  conciliation,  also  had  full  power  to  direct 
the  workings  of  the  union  when  the  national  convention 
was  not  in  session.  The  national  convention  was  the  power 
of  last  resort  and  was  made  up  of  representatives  from 
the  locals,  who  were  given  one  vote  for  each  one  hundred 
members  or  majority  fraction  thereof.^ 

1  Reprint  of  Constitution  in  the  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Con- 
vention, 1891,  p.  07. 


86       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.\X  INDUSTRY 


Comparison  of  English-speaking  and  Southern  European 
Labor  in  the  Coal  Industry  ^ 


Year. 

Workers. 

Pennsyl- 
Tauia. 

Ohio. 

Indiana. 

niinoifl. 

West 
Virginia. 

18702 

Total  workers  in 
industry       .     . 
South  Europe 

41,997 
121 

12,501 
50 

1,109 
2 

6,954 
43 

1,525 

4 

18802 

Total  workers  in 

industry      .     . 

Other  countries^ 

103,917 
2,037 

16,331 
356 

4,469 
100 

16,301 

604 

4,497 
25 

1890 

Total  anthracite 
Slav  and  Italian 
Total  bituminous 
Slav  and  Italian 

124,203 
31,2026 
53,712 
26,8066 

19,591 
2,5096 

6,532 

876 

24,323 
6,0956 

9,952 

1518 

1901 

Total  anthracite 
Slav  and  Italian 
Total  bituminous 
Slav  and  Italian  ^ 

141,780* 
67,1186 

111,229* 
86,8556 

25,963 
8,2436 

10,593 
3786 

46,005 
14,2496 

23,914 
1,7929 

'  U.S.  Census  Reports. 

'  The  reports  of  1870  and  1880  give  figures  of  the  number  of  nationalities  employed  in 
each  industry  in  each  State,  but  the  other  reports  do  not. 

'  Other  than  English-speaking  peoples. 

*  These  figures  are  from  State  Reports.  The  U.S.  CensuB  gives  only  the  average 
number  employed. 

5  Includes  Roumanians. 

6  These  figures  include  the  total  Slavic  and  Italian  population  engaged  in  all  industries 
in  the  principal  coal  counties  of  the  above  States.  The  number  of  principal  coal 
counties  in  each  State  is  as  follows :  Illinois,  23  ;  Indiana,  8 ;  Ohio,  14 ;  Pennsylvania, 
anthracite,  C  ;  bituminous,  16 ;  West  Virginia,  7.  The  nationahties  selected  include 
Russians,  Hungarians,  Bohemians,  Poles,  and  Italians  in  the  case  of  every  State  except 
West  Virginia  where  the  Bohemians  and  Poles  are  omitted. 

The  revenue  for  the  support  of  the  national  organiza- 
tion was  derived  from  a  per  capita  tax  of  twenty  cents  per 
month.  Fifteen  cents  of  this  amount  was  set  apart  as  a 
defense  fund  to  be  used  to  support  men  on  strike.  Such 
support  was  paid  on  condition  that  the  strike  took  place 
after  investigation  by  the  district  and  national  officers.  In 
case  the  national  officers  failed  within  ten  days  to  render 
a  decision  based  on  the  report  of  the  district  officers  of 
conditions  with  which  the  men  were  dissatisfied,  the  dis- 
trict officers  could  call  a  strike.  During  the  strike  the  men 
received  $3.50  per  week,  and  after  a  strike  had  been  au- 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    37 

thorized  under  the  above  provisions  the  national  officers 
could  not  declare  a  strike  off  "  except  with  the  consent  of 
a  majority  of  the  members  involved."  ^  The  secretary- 
treasurer  could  not  pay  out  sums  for  the  support  of  strikes 
"without  the  consent  of  the  national  executive  board  which 
held  the  local  receiving  committee  responsible  for  such 
funds. 

We  have  here  the  nucleus  for  the  elaborate  provisions 
connected  with  the  present  organization  of  the  miners' 
union.  These  provisions  will  be  considered  in  chapter  ill 
to  show  the  development  of  the  organization  and  to  give 
the  reader  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  real 
forces  which  meet  in  the  Interstate  Joint  Conference  in 
order  to  bargain  for  mine  labor. 

G.  The  Absorption  of  the  Immigrant 

It  was  indeed  fortunate  for  the  miners  that  the  orsrani- 
zations  ceased  their  warfare  and  sought  to  build  up  unity. 
During  the  decade  of  the  nineties  the  central  bituminous 
fields  were  subjected,  to  a  less  extent,  to  the  same  influx 
of  a  heterogeneous  population  that  had  taken  place  in  the 
anthracite  regions  during  the  eighties  and  continued  into 
the  nineties.  A  glance  at  the  table  on  page  36  will  show 
that  in  Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Ohio,  this  influx  was  of  an 
extent  that  could  be  controlled  and  absorbed  while  allow- 
ing opportunity  for  the  English-speaking  peoples  to  attain 
some  degree  of  solidarity  and  invent  a  system  of  adjusting 
differences.  We  shall  see  that  this  heterogeneity  in  the 
anthracite  regions  during  the  eighties  and  nineties  was 
one  of  the  chief  factors  that  destroyed  the  beginnings  of 
organization  for  conciliation  and  prevented  their  rise  until 
pressing  economic  conditions  should  force  nationalities 
and  races  to  rise  above  their  prejudices  and  customs  and 
unite  for  their  common  welfare. 

Although  the  censuses  of  1890  and  1900  do  not  give 

^  Rq)ort  of  United  Mine  Workers''  Convention,  1891,  p.  OS. 


88       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

the  number  of  each  nationality  in  each  industry,  yet  the 
total  population  of  the  Slavic  and  Italian  nationalities  in 
the  coal  counties  standi  there  as  an  asset  for  the  operators 
to  draw  upon  to  thwart  combination  among  the  workers. 
As  will  be  seen  from  the  table,  the  figures  for  the  mining 
population  include  all  the  coal  counties,  while  the  Slavic 
and  Italian  population  constitute  the  total  of  the  nation- 
alities in  all  industries  in  the  principal  coal  counties. 
These  offset  one  another  somewhat  in  making  a  compari- 
son of  the  relative  homogeneity  or  heterogeneity  in  the  coal 
industry  as  between  different  years  and  different  States. 
Besides,  the  nature  of  the  country  in  the  coal  counties  of 
Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Ohio  permits  employment  in  other 
industries  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  the  anthracite 
counties  of  Pennsylvania.  The  estimate  of  the  recent  Im- 
migration Commission  is  that  seventy-five  per  cent  of 
the  miners  in  Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Ohio  are  of  English- 
speaking  stock.i 

In  addition  to  a  glutted  and  heterogeneous  labor  mar- 
ket, we  may  point  out  the  estimate  made  that  with  the 
mines  continually  employed  enough  mines  were  in  opera- 
tion in  1890  to  have  produced  40,000,000  tons  more  than 
were  mined.^  Moreover,  during  1891, 1892,  and  1893  the 
number  of  mines  increased  and  a  larger  number  of  men 
were  enrolled  in  the  industry.  Under  such  circumstances 
we  can  better  appreciate  the  efforts  made  by  the  United 
Mine  Workers  to  reestablish  the  interstate  agreement  and 
improve  conditions  of  labor. 

H.  Efforts  to  revive  the  Joint  Conference 

In  1891  a  committee  of  miners  met  a  committee  of  oper* 
ators  from  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  and  endeavored  to  draw 
up  a  scale  and  introduce  the  eight-hour  day.  The  failure 
to  accomplish  this  was  the  signal  for  local  strikes  all  over 

1  Report  of  Immigration  Commission,  vol.  1,  534. 

2  Warne,  op.  cit.,  p.  388. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    39 

the  coal  regions.  Among  these  was  a  strike  in  the  Con- 
nellsville  coke  region  similar  to  that  of  1887  when  the  op- 
erators were  given  their  first  real  intimation  of  the  nature 
of  Slavic  peoples  and  their  ability  to  fight  when  pressed 
far  enough.^  Their  tenacity,  the  violence  with  which  they 
met  eviction  from  the  company  houses,  and  their  destruc- 
tion of  property  were  in  great  contrast  to  the  tameness 
with  which  the  English-speaking  peoples  met  similar  con- 
ditions and  manifested  a  respect  for  law  and  order. 

In  the  same  year  the  "  United  Mine  Workers'  Joui'nal " 
was  established  and  began  its  educational  work  for  unity. 
The  news  and  the  principles  of  the  organization  were 
printed  in  several  languages.  The  full  import  of  such  a 
propaganda  became  apparent  when  the  anthracite  strikes 
of  1900  and  1902  brought  about  the  welding  of  many 
nationalities. 

A.    THE    "suspension"    OF    1894 

Again  in  1892  the  miners  made  an  attempt  to  get  an 
interstate  convention,  but  were  successful  only  in  bringing 
about  state  meetings  which  somewhat  relieved  the  chaotic 
competition.  In  the  following  year  the  general  industrial 
depression  forced  a  series  of  reductions  in  wages  and  the 
number  of  working  days  considerably  below  two  hundred. 
In  1894  the  union  resolved  to  resort  to  a  series  of  general 
suspensions  to  relieve  the  market,  bi-ing  up  prices,  and 
ultimately,  wages.^  The  command  of  the  national  officers 
to  suspend  work  (April  21)  was  obeyed  by  125,000  men, 
although  the  organization  had  only  13,000  paid-up  mem- 
bers.3  In  fact,  the  conditions  of  the  previous  year  were  so 
hard  that  many  were  excused  from  paying  dues.  What 
had  been  planned  as  a  series  of  two-weeks  suspensions 
developed  into  a  general  strike  of  eight  weeks. 

Meanwhile  forces  were  operating  which  brought  about     ^j^t^dt    W*"*^ 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1887,  pp.  2-17. 
2  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  325.  »  Warno,  op.  cit.,  p.  S'JO. 


40       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO^VL  INDUSTRY 

in  both  parties  a  I'eadiness  to  come  to  an  agreement.  An- 
thracite coal  and  soft  coal  from  non-union  districts  of 
West  Virginia  were  fast  supplying  Western  markets,  and 
when  the  superior  West  Virginia  coal  once  found  an  en- 
trance it  was  hard  to  supplant  it.  The  suffering  of  the 
miners  from  want  of  necessities  was  putting  them  in  a 
mood  to  fight  such  inexorable  forces  with  something  other 
than  passivity,  and  threats  were  heard  of  burning  bridges 
that  allowed  imported  coal  to  come  in.  An  appeal  to 
President  Cleveland  to  protect  such  connecting  points 
brought  a  call  from  four  States  for  troops.^  Another  pow- 
erful factor  that  brought  terms  of  agreement  was  the 
threatened  cooperation  of  manufacturers  and  railroads  with 
the  operators  in  replacing  union  with  non-union  men.^  At 
a  meeting  held  June  9,  there  were  enough  representative 
operators  present  so  that  a  scale  was  formed  for  Pennsyl- 
vania, Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  with  the  provision  that  it 
was  to  be  effective  if  it  could  be  enforced.  The  miners  knew 
that  most  of  the  enforcing  would  have  to  come  through 
strikes  on  their  part,  but  it  gave  them  some  sort  of  standard 
to  go  by.  An  interstate  board  of  conciliation  and  arbitration 
was  named  which  was  to  look  after  disputed  differentials 
between  fields,  and  the  miners  were  allowed  checkweigh- 
men  and  promised  semi-monthly  pay.^ 

It  was  hoped  that  this  beginning  meant  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  the  joint  movement,  but  the  squabbles  and  bick- 
ering over  differentials,  the  breaking  of  agreements,  the 
determined  selfishness  and  greed  of  certain  operators 
owning  mines  in  fields  of  greatest  natural  advantage,  and 
the  forcing  down  of  prices,  all  militated  against  it.  The 
miners  even  kept  faith  with  their  agreement  in  one  case 
to  the  extent  of  voluntarily  lowering  the  wages  in  a  dis- 
trict because  they  could  not  force  one  concern  to  keep  the 
agreement.* 

1  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  330. 

2  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1894,  p.  128. 

3  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  334.  *  Ibid.,  p.  342. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    41 

I.  The  Strike  op  1897 

A.    CONDITIONS    OF    WORK    AND    WAGES 

It  is  a  long  road  that  has  no  turn,  and  to  appreciate  the 
turning-point  in  this  situation,  it  is  necessary  to  know  the 
full  extent  of  the  depths  to  which  the  labor  and  capital 
of  the  industry  had  sunk.  The  mining  prices  in  the  Pitts- 
burg district  in  the  beginning  of  1893  had  ranged  from 
65  cents  per  ton  in  the  thick  vein  to  79  cents  in  the  thin 
vein,  but  by  1897  they  had  sunk  to  between  28  cents  and  v4*vy' 

30  cents  in  the  thick  vein  and  between  47  cents  and  54 
cents  in  the  thin  vein.^  When  it  is  known  that  a  man  can 
mine  but  three  to  five  tons  a  day,  and  added  to  this  could 
obtain  but  about  190  days'  work  a  year,  the  low  level  to 
which  the  standard  of  living  must  have  fallen  is  obvious. 
Testimony  before  a  special  legislative  committee  of  Penn- 
sylvania revealed  the  fact  that  in  some  localities  eighty 
per  cent  of  the  miners  had  no  knowledge  of  the  English 
language  and  lived  "like  sheep  in  shambles."  In  Indiana 
and  Ohio  mining  prices  had  fallen  from  75  cents  and  70 
cents  respectively  to  51  cents,  with  a  contemplated  cut  to  45 
cents  in  Ohio.  In  Ohio  the  yearly  earnings  for  1896  ranged 
from  $213.20  to  1319.62.2  minois  wages  had  been  on  a  par 
with  the  other  States  and  for  five  months  previous  to  the 
strike  averaged  about  $12  per  month.^  President  Ratch- 
ford,  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  characterized  the  strike 
of  1897  as  a  "  spontaneous  uprising  of  an  enslaved  people," 
but  pointed  out  that  the  conditions  of  the  industry  could 
not  be  laid  at  the  doors  of  the  great  majority  of  employers. 
The  situation,  he  held,  depended  for  the  most  part  on  the 
actions  of  a  few  operators  who  "cut  prices  far  below  the 
demands  of  the  market." 

^  Georfje,  "The  Coal  Strike  of  1897,"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 
vol.  12,  p.  187. 

"^  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1897,  p.  113. 
^  George,  op.  cit.,  \).  190. 


42       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

B.    EFFECTS    OF    MACHINERY 

The  introduction  of  mining  machinery  began  in  1875, 
but  by  1891  only  6,211,732  tons,  or  6.6  per  cent  of  the 
production,  was  machine  mined.  In  1896  the  production 
was  16,424,932  tons,  or  14.17  per  cent,  and  by  1902  it 
had  reached  69,611,582  tons,  or  26.09  per  cent.^  Wher- 
ever machinery  is  introduced  it  does  away  with  pick  miners 
and  makes  them  machine  tenders  or  mere  "  loaders,"  and 
the  incentive  to  work  which  the  skilled  laborer  has  is  gone. 
It  makes  possible  the  introduction  of  a  larger  and  larger 
percentage  of  unskilled  labor.  The  price  for  loading  in 
1897  in  Ohio  was  one  half  the  rate  for  pick  mining,  and 
production  had  to  double  for  the  "loader"  to  make  the 
same  wages  as  a  pick  miner.^ 

By  1897  machines  had  almost  supplanted  pick  mining 
in  the  Hocking  Valley  of  Ohio,  which  produced  ninety 
per  cent  of  the  State's  output.  Although  the  State's  pro- 
duction had  increased  only  282,976  tons  from  1890  to 
1895,  machine  production  had  increased  1,878,674  tons, 
and  by  displacing  pick-mined  coal  thereby  decreased  the 
miner's  (or  loader's)  earnings.  Besides,  there  was  no  pro- 
portionate decrease  in  the  number  of  men  to  help  main- 
tain earnings  at  the  old  rate.  On  the  contrary,  from  1890 
to  1895  there  had  been  an  increase  of  787  men  employed, 
which,  with  the  failure  of  the  demand  for  coal  to  exceed 
or  equal  the  supply,  served  only  as  an  added  element  to 
decrease  the  yearly  earnings. 

C.    EARNINGS    OF    CAPITAL 

The  average  selling  price  of  coal  at  the  mine  had  fallen  in 
the  previous  six  years,  in  Illinois,  11  per  cent ;  in  Indiana, 
18  per  cent;  in  Ohio,  16  per  cent;  in  Pennsylvania,  18 
per  cent ;  and  in  West  Virginia,  28  per  cent.^  The  full 

^  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 

2  Eeport  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1897,  p.  112.      ^  j^jW.,  p.  192. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    43 

significance  of  persistent  overproduction  and  the  exploita- 
tion of  unorganized  labor  by  uncontrolled  fields  is  demon- 
strated by  the  fact  that,  in  the  face  of  the  beggarly  con- 
dition of  the  miners  and  the  low  eai-nings  of  capital  in 
their  own  States,  West  Virginia  and  Illinois  operators 
were  increasing  their  tonnage  by  2,000,000  tons  each, 
while  the  production  of  the  other  States  was  falling  be- 
hind their  usual  output.^  All  the  evils  of  the  company 
store,  abuse  of  screen  system,  dockage,  etc.,  were  rampant. 
The  New  York  and  Cleveland  Gas  Coal  Company,  which 
utilized  all  these  methods,  made  its  men  work  under  an 
"  iron  contract,"  ^  and  got  its  coal  mined  for  ten  cents  a 
ton  less  than  any  other  company  in  the  Pittsburg  district, 
gave  testimony  under  oath  that  it  was  making  only  fSOOO 
profit  on  an  investment  of  81,000,000.3 

D.    CONDITION    OF   THE    UNION 

During  the  few  years  previous  to  the  formation  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers  in  1890,  the  coal  trade  had  been 
on  a  fairly  prosperous  basis.  The  impetus  given  to  the 
trade  led  to  a  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  mines  op- 
erated and  the  number  of  men  employed.  By  1894  the 
number  of  employees  in  the  industry  had  increased  52,399 
over  the  number  employed  in  1890,  and  an  increase  in 
coal  production  of  over  7,000,000  tons  had  taken  place. 
But  the  total  production  of  coal  mined  in  1894  sold  for 
11,768,350  less  than  that  of  1890  in  spite  of  the  surplus 
production.  The  secretary-treasurer  of  the  union  esti- 
mated that  this  was  virtually  the  same  as  having  the  em- 
ployees mine  over  ten  million  tons  for  nothing.'*  Of  this 
increase  of  seven  million  tons  the  Virginias  alone  were 
responsible  for  five  millions.^ 

^  lifport  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1898,  p.  75. 

^  A  contract  not  to  strike  under  penalty  of  losing  all  money  due  them. 

^  George,  op.  cit.,  p.  19(5. 

*  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1890,  p.  15. 

'^  Ibid.,  1890,  p.  10. 


44       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

These  considerations  show  that  there  were  fundamental 
economic  factors  which  caused  the  decline  in  membership 
of  the  union.  Its  membership  of  20,000  in  1890  had 
dropped  off  about  5000  by  1893,  but  this  was  offset  some- 
what by  an  addition  of  about  5000  in  1894,  the  year  of 
the  attempted  "  suspension."  The  failure  of  the  suspen- 
sion, continued  unregulated  production  with  attending 
low  wages,  and  the  slow  recovery  of  business  from  the 
depression  of  1893,  were  all  conducive  to  further  loss  of 
membership.  By  1896  the  membership  reached  its  lowest 
level,  9617.1  With  a  membership  of  9731  in  1897,  and 
not  enough  money  in  the  treasury  to  pay  its  officers  or 
the  expense  of  having  a  convention,  the  outlook  for  united 
action  was  not  promising.  The  leaders  from  the  States 
traveled  to  national  headquarters  at  their  own  expense, 
and,  after  careful  consideration  of  market  conditions  and 
the  condition  of  the  workers,  decided  to  call  a  general 
strike  (July  4)  as  a  last  resort.  At  least  150,000  men 
finally  responded,  practically  the  entire  central  field  ex- 
cept a  few  districts  in  West  Virginia  and  southern  Illinois. 
Some  districts  in  West  Virginia  were  finally  brought  out 
by  peaceful  picketing  and  in  spite  of  injunctions.  In  fact, 
a  new  solidarity  seems  to  have  been  born,  an  appreciation 
of  the  meaning  of  quiet,  united  action. 

E.    NEGOTIATIONS  FOR    THE   JOINT    CONFERENCE    OF 

1898 

Until  the  union  succeeded  in  bringing  out  the  West 
Virfjinia  miners  in  the  Pan-Handle  and  unororanized  mines 
in  the  Pittsburg  district,  the  operators  had  "  nothing  to 
arbitrate."  By  the  latter  part  of  August,  however,  they 
were  ready  to  submit  a  plan  for  arbitration  within  each 
State  and  named  a  scale  which  should  apply  until  an 
award  was  given.  The  miners  refused  to  settle  locally  un- 
til conditions  over  the  whole  field  had  been  adjusted,  and 
^  Beport  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1905,  p.  45. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD      45 

called  for  a  conference  of  all  the  central  States.  At  the 
Pittsburg  conference  in  September  a  compromise  scale 
granting  an  advance  was  agreed  upon,  with  the  under- 
standing that  it  would  be  revised  at  a  joint  conference 
which  should  meet  in  Chicago  in  January,  1898.  On  that 
date  a  really  representative  body  of  operators  and  miners 
from  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Pennsylvania^  laid  a 
sound  basis  for  further  development  in  settling  dis- 
putes.     /      - 

A  new  generation  of  men  had  come  to  the  front  on 
both  sides.  They  had  suffered  from  adverse  conditions 
and  had  learned  a  little  from  experience.  Whether  they 
recognized  it  or  not,  the  operators  had  got  some  distance 
away  from  the  position  of  "  This  is  my  business  and  I 
propose  to  run  it,"  while  the  miners  had  learned  that 
there  really  was  only  one  coal  field  and  that  only  unity 
would  enable  them  to  control  the  forces  that  oppressed 
them.  Business  in  general  during  the  nineties  had  been 
learning  the  value  of  combination  and  cooperation,  and 
the  operators  and  miners  began  to  realize  that  the  same 
spirit  must  prevail  in  the  coal  industry.  Industrial  opera- 
tions were  reaching  too  large  proportions  for  the  indi- 
vidual entrepreneiir  to  expect  to  be  a  controlling  factor. 
The  regime  of  cutthroat  competition  had  brought  the 
earnings  of  capital  and  labor  in  the  coal  industry  to  the 
low  level  on  which  it  then  rested,  and  some  controlling 
force  was  needed  to  establish  differentials  that  would  offset 
the  irregularities  of  the  coal  fields.  Differences  in  distance 
from  the  market  and  the  accompanying  freight  rates  must 
be  taken  into  consideration.  The  relative  richness  and 
quality  of  coal  resources  in  the  various  regions  needed  at- 
tention. The  nature  and  form  of  the  coal  deposits,  which 
of  necessity  established  different  working  conditions  for 
the  men  and  affected  their  earnings,  must  be  understood. 

^  West  Virginia  miners  appeared  at  the  convention,  but  were  not  seated 
because  their  operators  did  not  appear. 


46       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

The  uniformity  of  a  scale  of  wages  for  "  outside "  and 
"  day  labor "  was  another  important  element  in  putting 
the  various  coal  fields  on  a  basis  of  equality.  These  are 
some  of  the  factors  that  determine  the  formation  of  a  scale 
in  the  Interstate  Joint  Conference.  The  methods  used  in 
the  conference  in  the  formation  of  a  scale,  a  statement  of 
the  scale  of  1898,  and  the  history  of  succeeding  agree- 
ments up  to  1912  will  be  taken  up  in  chapter  v. 

4.  EXTENSION  OF  THE  JOINT  MOVEMENT 

At  this  point  we  are  chiefly  interested  in  the  conditions 
which  both  parties  had  to  meet  in  order  to  make  the  scale 
of  1898  effective.  It  was  a  comparatively  easy  matter  to 
form  an  agreement  among  the  men  who  met  in  the  confer- 
ence, but  to  put  that  agreement  into  operation  widely 
enough  to  bring  order  out  of  what  had  been  chaos  was 
the  chief  problem  of  both  parties.  The  conference  was 
undoubtedly  made  up  of  the  more  far-seeing  from  both 
sides  and  of  those  who  were  suffering  most  from  adverse 
conditions.  To  make  operators  and  miners  with  strong 
individualistic  tendencies  see  the  necessity  for  concerted 
action  was  a  different  problem,  especially  if  they  happened 
to  be  fairly  well  satisfied  with  their  state  of  prosperity. 
This  difficulty  was  further  increased  by  the  general  im- 
provement in  industrial  conditions  then  beginning.  But  if 
the  scale  was  to  be  effective,  it  was  necessary  to  extend 
the  agreement  as  widely  as  possible,  and  the  burden  of 
this  extension  had  to  rest  upon  the  miners.  Where  the 
miners  were  organized  and  their  employers  happened  to 
be  obdurate  about  paying  the  scale  prices,  a  strike  had 
to  be  ordered  to  bring  conformity.  In  sections  where  the 
miners  were  not  united,  their  organization  was  a  task  that 
must  be  performed  before  pressure  could  be  brought  upon 
their  employers.  In  order  that  we  may  understand  the 
significance  of  the  joint  agreement  in  the  bituminous 
fields  as  it  exists  to-day,  we  must  know  the  extent  of  the 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD     47 

area  over  which  the  joint  agreement  is  in  operation  and 
trace  a  few  of  the  struggles  that  accompanied  its  installa- 
tion. 

A.  The  Struggle  in  Illinois 

A.    VIRDEN  AND   PANA IMPORTATION  OF   NEGROES 

Over  the  various  States  it  was  expected  that  the  miners 
would  have  trouble  with  two  classes  of  operators  —  those 
who  were  not  represented  at  the  conference  and  did  not 
consider  themselves  bound  by  the  agreement,  and  those 
who  were  represented  but  were  dissatisfied.  In  Illinois  the 
miners  had  to  deal  with  about  twenty  such  cases,  chief 
among  which  were  the  Virden  and  Paua  operators.  The 
Virden  Coal  Company  announced  that  it  was  impossible 
for  it  to  pay  the  scale  (forty  cents  a  ton)  and  submitted 
its  claims  to  the  State  Board  of  Arbitration  for  adjudica- 
tion, promising  to  abide  by  the  award.  The  board  found 
evidence  that  the  company  could  afford  to  pay  the  forty 
cents,  but  the  company  repudiated  the  decision  and  con- 
tinued the  contest.^  The  company  then  appealed  to  a 
committee  of  the  national  executive  board  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers,  but  met  with  the  same  decision. 

During  the  general  strike  of  1897  certain  of  the  Illi- 
nois operators  had  threatened  to  break  it  by  importing 
Chinese  coolies,  but  learned  that  Governor  Tanner  would 
not  allow  such  a  procedure.  So  now,  with  the  adverse 
decision  of  the  miners'  committee,  the  company  erected 
stockades  about  the  mines  and  imported  negroes  from 
Alabama  under  armed  guards.  The  governor  also  refused 
to  allow  this  action,  on  the  ground  that  under  the  sys- 
tem of  convict  labor  in  the  South  the  probabilities  were 
that  a  large  percentage  of  the  negroes  were  criminals  and 
had  learned  their  trade  under  the  convict  system.  Be- 
sides, bringing  them  in  under  a  force  of  armed  guards  was 

1  Report  of  Illinois  Inspector  of  Mines,  1898,  p.  5. 


48       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

practically  an  armed  invasion  of  the  State.  The  governor 
onlered  the  militia  out  with  strict  injunctions  not  to 
permit  the  disembarkation  of  the  negroes.  As  was  then 
said,  "  This  is  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  State 
or  the  nation  that  the  military  power  of  the  law,  dur- 
ing an  industrial  contest,  has  been  exercised  in  defense 
of  the  rights  of  American  labor."  ^  The  event  created  a 
furore  in  the  metropolitan  press  (or  as  the  "  Coal  Trade 
Journal "  of  New  York  put  it,  "  the  moneyed  aristocracy 
press  "),  which  tried  to  make  political  capital  out  of  it 
and  explain  it  on  the  basis  of  race  hatred  and  discrim- 
ination. As  the  above  "  Journal  "  describes  it,  "  The  con- 
demnation heaped  upon  the  governor,  boiled  down  and 
crystallized,  is  hatred  for  his  position  as  a  fair  man,  and 
opposition  to  his  method  of  doing  justice  to  all  men.  It  is 
such  a  new  thing." 

"  Such  a  departure  from  the  ordinary  way  of  doing 
business  by  the  chief  executive  of  any  State  is  such  an 
unheard-of  thing  that  the  employers,  who  heretofore  have, 
almost  without  exception,  been  able  to  use  the  militia  in 
defeating  the  projects  and  objects  of  the  laboring  people, 
are  surprised.  Workingmen  have  rej)eatedly  charged  that 
the  militia  were  used  to  coerce  them  into  obedience  to  the 
wishes  of  the  employers,  and  that  they  were  used  for  that 
purpose  is  at  present  very  evident  from  the  abuse  heaped 
upon  Governor  Tanner."  ^ 

The  lockout  at  Virden  continued  from  April  to  Novem- 
ber. By  its  complete  capitulation  in  paying  the  scale  and 
dismissing  superintendents  and  mine  managers  who  had 
taken  obnoxious  parts  in  the  contest,  the  company  demon- 
strated that  it  had  been  chiefly  animated  by  stubbornness 
and  a  determination  not  to  treat  with  union  men. 

The  Pana  operators  refused  to  submit  disputed  ques- 
tions to  the  State  Board  of  Arbitration  or  any  committee, 
basing  their  action  on  the  assumption  that  the  State  had 

1  Beport  of  Illinois  Inspector  of  Mines,  1898,  p.  6.         2  ^j^^  iggg,  p.  15. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD     49 

no  right  to  interfere  in  private  affairs  (though  they  were 
a  corporation)  or  to  inspect  their  books.^  They  succeeded 
in  getting  negro  miners,  and  the  militia  was  stationed  in 
the  region  for  months  to  prevent  rioting.  In  April,  1899, 
the  state  board  again  offered  its  services  for  conciliation, 
but  failed  to  bring  the  parties  to  agreement  because  they 
were  unable  to  come  to  a  settlement  of  the  question  of 
reemployment  of  union  and  the  discharge  of  non-union 
men.  By  October,  1899,  the  operators  were  willing  to  pay 
the  scale  prices  and  to  reemploy  their  old  men.^ 

This  gives  one  an  idea  of  the  fierce  fighting  and  the 
necessarily  extended  support  by  the  union  to  the  miners 
who  were  engaged  in  the  struggle  to  bring  the  operators 
into  the  joint  movement  and  establish  uniform  working 
conditions. 

B.  Iowa  and  Michigan  seek  Admission  to  the 
Joint  Conference 

In  the  miners'  convention  of  1898  their  president  an- 
nounced that  the  union  had  organizers  in  every  coal-pro- 
ducing State,  from  the  anthracite  field  in  the  East  to 
Wyoming  in  the  West.  The  efforts  of  these  men  soon 
bore  fruit  in  Iowa,  for  by  1900  the  membership  was  over 
7000,  the  State  was  organized  into  a  district,  and  repre- 
sentative miners  and  operators  were  seeking  admission  to 
the  joint  conference.  The  same  year  Michigan  was  organ- 
ized into  a  district  with  about  one  thousand  members. 
But  every  coal  miner  in  the  State  was  within  the  union, 
and  the  growing  importance  of  the  State  as  a  coal  pro- 
ducer warranted  such  action.^  In  1901  the  operators  and 
miners  entered  into  a  state  agreement  which  gave  the 
miners  an  increase  of  sixteen  cents  per  ton  and  payment 
for  inside  and  outside  day  labor  equal  to  the  wage  in  the 

^  Report  of  Illinois  Inspector  of  Mines,  1898,  p.  5. 
^  Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  vol.  17,  p-  431. 
^  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1900,  p.  18. 


50       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

central  field.^  In  connection  with  the  efforts  of  the  opera- 
tors and  miners  of  Iowa  and  Michigan  to  gain  admission 
to  the  joint  conference,  the  operators  of  Ohio,  Indiana, 
and  Pennsylvania  have  always  voted  against  it,  while  the 
operators  of  Illinois  and  the  miners  of  all  these  States 
have  been  in  favor  of  it.  The  operators  have  opposed  it 
on  the  ground  that  mining  conditions  and  competition  were 
different  and  it  would  result  in  breaking  down  the  system. 
The  Illinois  operators  and  the  miners  of  the  four  State? 
join  with  the  Iowa  and  Michigan  contingents  and  hold 
that  Iowa  and  Michigan  are  in  the  competitive  field  as 
much  as  West  Virginia,  and,  since  the  central  States  are 
the  basing  point,  they  should  have  a  voice  in  making  the 
scale.  In  1900,  as  a  matter  of  courtesy,  since  they  had 
attended  the  conference  with  the  hope  of  being  admitted, 
the  Iowa  representatives  were  given  a  seat  in  the  conven- 
tion with  no  voice  or  vote.^  Although  Iowa  and  Michigan 
do  not  participate  in  the  joint  conference  of  the  central 
field,  their  scales  are  fixed  with  reference  to  the  prices 
established  in  that  field. 

C.  Oeganization  of  the  Southwest  Field 

A.    THE    STRIKE    OF    1899 

In  what  is  termed  the  "  Southwest  Field  "  —  Missouri, 
Kansas,  Arkansas,  Oklahoma,  and  Texas  —  the  United 
Mine  Workers  had  organized  the  men  by  March,  1899. 
A  request  for  recognition  of  the  organization  and  for  a 
joint  meeting  to  form  a  scale  was  ignored  by  the  large  com- 
panies. The  opposition  came  for  the  most  part  from  four 
large  companies  termed  the  "  Big  Four,"  who  insisted  on 
meeting  their  own  men  and  refused  to  recognize  that  con- 
ditions in  the  industrial  world  had  become  such  that  the 
men  had  a  right  to  representation. 

1  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1901,  p.  52. 

2  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Convention,  1900,  p.  46. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD     51 

The  demands  of  the  men  centered  mostly  around  the 
eight-hour  day,  increase  in  the  mining  rate,  and  a  decrease 
in  the  price  of  powder.  A  joint  conference  in  June  drew 
up  a  scale  which  conceded  most  of  the  demands  of  the 
men  and  it  was  signed  by  twenty-five  of  the  small  com- 
panies. It  provided  for  a  board  of  arbitration  to  settle  dif- 
ferences that  could  not  be  settled  by  the  "  pit  committee  " 
of  a  mine  and  the  mine  officers.  The  institution  of  a  com- 
mittee in  each  mine  to  settle  differences  immediately  was 
becoming  common  over  the  bituminous  fields.  It  made 
possible  the  adjudication  of  working  conditions  that  ap- 
plied to  all  alike  without  making  the  individual  workman 
who  dared  to  state  his  grievances  the  object  of  persecu- 
tion by  an  inconsiderate  official.  Besides,  it  brought  up 
for  immediate  settlement  matters,  which,  if  left  to  grow, 
would  produce  widespread  trouble. 

B.    CONFLICT    OF   FEDERAL   AND    STATE    INJUNCTIONS 

The  "  Big  Four  "  refused  to  recognize  the  union  and 
imported  negroes  from  Alabama.  The  miners  met  the  ne- 
groes as  they  got  off  the  trains,  explained  the  situation, 
promised  support  or  transportation  back  to  their  homes, 
and  induced  many  to  leave.  This  was  sufficient  cause  for 
the  coal  companies  to  obtain  a  federal  injunction  prohib- 
iting the  miners  from  "  doing  any  act  whatever  "  which 
would  hinder  the  companies  from  carrying  on  their  busi- 
ness.^ The  miners  tried  their  hand  at  injunctions  and  ob- 
tained from  a  state  court  an  injunction  restraining  the 
companies  from  importing  a  criminal  class  of  citizens  which 
would  be  a  menace  and  expense  to  the  State.  But  the  fed- 
eral injunction  superseded  the  State  injunction,  and  the 
negroes  continued  to  come. 

^  Appendix  to  Report  of  Kansas  Bureau  of  Labor,  1898,  p.  340. 


52       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

C.    THE   REESE    CASE 

In  connection  with  the  strike  a  typical  case  arose  which 
gives  one  an  appreciation  of  the  handicap  under  which 
union  organizers  labored  in  their  efforts  to  extend  the 
organization  of  the  miners  and  establish  a  basis  for  further 
extension  of  the  joint  agreement.  During  the  progress  of 
the  strike,  J.  P.  lieese,  of  Iowa,  a  national  organizer,  was 
sent  to  the  scene  of  the  trouble  to  direct  the  men.  He  had 
come  into  the  State  of  Kansas  before  the  injunction  was 
issued,  but  was  not  brought  under  its  provisions  by  name 
or  by  the  inclusion  of  the  terms  "  servants,  agents,  and 
attorneys  of  the  defendants."  He  addressed  a  meeting  at 
Yale,  Kansas,  and  some  of  the  strikers  committed  trespass 
in  going  to  the  meeting.  The  judge,  when  sentencing  him 
to  three  months  in  jail,  a  fine  of  one  hundred  dollars,  and 
costs  of  the  case,  admitted  that  the  injunction  did  not  pro- 
hibit assemblage  and  discussion ;  that  it  was  not  proven 
that  Reese  used  violent  language  ;  that  the  strike  was  con- 
ducted peacefully  ;  but  held  that  the  effect  of  the  meeting 
was  to  intimidate  the  negroes  and  cause  them  to  quit  work. 
After  Reese  had  spent  a  month  in  jail  he  was  released  on 
a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  granted  by  the  United  States  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  Appeals  at  St.  Louis.  The  writ  was  granted 
on  the  grounds  that  the  injunction  had  not  been  phrased 
so  as  to  include  him  and  the  fact  that  the  lower  court  had 
exceeded  its  jurisdiction,^  The  instance  shows  what  an 
unsatisfactory  process  it  is  to  be  subjected  to  a  one-man 
trial,  lie  in  jail,  and  finally  be  informed  that  one  is  not 
guilty.  In  fact  the  injunction  has  been  one  of  the  most 
effective  weapons  in  many  cases  for  snatching  victory  from 
the  miners  just  as  they  seemed  ready  to  bring  about  an 
extension  of  the  joint  agreement.  That  labor  in  general  is 
still  handicapped  by  the  injunction  in  its  legitimate  efforts 
to  better  its  condition  would  seem  to  show  the  necessity 

^  ^epwt  of  Kansas  Bureau  of  Labor,  1S99,  p.  465. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    53 

of  raising  the  question,  as  to  the  proper  use  of  the  injunc- 
tion, out  of  the  realm  of  controversy  between  labor  and 
capital  and  connecting  it  with  the  issues  that  demand  a 
broad  social  policy  and  action  for  their  solution.  This  case 
"  excited  great  indignation  among  the  industrial  masses  of 
the  United  States  by  reason  of  the  high-handed  usurpation 
of  judicial  authority," ^  but  the  miners  had  been  merely  in- 
troduced to  the  use  of  the  injunction  as  a  "strike-breaker." 

D.    THE    miners'    COMMISSARY 

A  notable  feature  of  the  strike  was  the  successful  opera- 
tion of  commissary  stores  which  were  supported  by  the 
miners.  The  stores  were  in  charge  of  local  secretaries  who 
handled  the  provisions  in  the  same  manner  as  in  a  general 
store,  and  the  miners  obtained  goods  to  meet  their  actual 
needs  by  signing  a  receipt  which  showed  the  extent  to 
which  each  individual  was  being  helped  and  enabled  the 
secretary  to  account  for  all  that  he  had  received. 

Finally,  in  the  spring  of  1900,  as  the  miners  showed 
no  signs  of  being  starved  out,  the  "  Big  Four  "  companies, 
one  after  another,  offered  their  employees  wage  scales  and 
working  conditions  practically  the  same  as  the  scale  of  the 
joint  convention.  But  the  companies  refused  to  recognize 
the  United  Mine  Workers  as  an  organization  and  the 
agreements  were  drawn  up  between  the  companies  and 
their  own  employees. 

E.    THE    SOUTHWESTERN    INTERSTATE   JOINT 
CONFERENCE 

From  1899  to  1903  the  miners  and  individual  operators 
continued  the  plan  of  joint  agreements.  But  in  1903  the 
Southwestern  Interstate  Coal  Operators'  Association  was 
organized  and  the  contracts  were  made  and  carried  out 
between  the  Association  and  the  United  Mine  Workers  as 

1  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  378. 


64       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

organizations.  In  that  year  the  "  Big  Four "  joined  in 
making  a  scale  in  the  interstate  conference,  and  since 
these  four  companies  produced  about  two  thirds  of  the 
coal  of  that  region,  it  was  "  particularly  gratifying  "  to  the 
president  of  the  miners  to  be  able  to  report  their  partici- 
pation.i  The  interstate  meeting  establishes  general  condi- 
tions over  the  whole  field,  and  then  special  agreements  are 
made  to  suit  the  varying  working  conditions  and  oppor- 
tunities for  production  in  the  different  districts.^ 

F.    THE    SOUTHWEST    FIELD  SEEKS  ADMISSION  TO  THE 
JOINT    CONFERENCE    OF    THE    CENTRAL    FIELD 

In  1906  the  delegates  of  miners  and  operators  from 
Missouri,  Arkansas,  Texas,  and  Indian  Territory  were  re- 
fused admission  to  the  conference  of  the  central  field  on 
the  ground  of  diversity  of  interest.  The  operators  of  the 
conference  pointed  out  that  the  method  of  voting  made 
it  possible  for  one  State  to  forestall  an  agreement  and 
accused  the  miners  of  misdirecting  their  efforts  in  organ- 
izing the  southwest  field  when  they  should  have  been 
occupied  with  coercing  West  Virginia,^  which  they  re- 
garded as  their  most  dangerous  competitor.  The  scale  in 
the  southwest  field  is  governed  largely  by  the  action  taken 
in  the  central  field. 

D.   Attempt  to  organize  Maryland 

In  the  spring  of  1900  the  miners  of  the  George's  Creek 
district  of  Maryland  had  been  organized  and  a  request 
made  for  joint  agreement.  The  companies  refused  to  meet 
the  organization,  but  offered  as  a  sop  an  increase  of  ten 
cents  a  ton,  which  was  five  cents  less  than  the  scale  for  the 
central  field  of  Pennsylvania.^  The  miners  wisely  saw  that 

1  Beport  of  United  Mine  W'jrhers'  Convention,  1904,  pp.  27-28. 

2  Texas  has  not  been  in  the  joint  agreement  since  1908. 

'  Proceedings  of  Joint  Conference  of  Central  Field,  1906,  p.  8. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    55 

this  increase  would  be  one  only  in  appearance,  not  in  sub- 
stance, for  the  companies  refused  to  allow  the  men  to  have 
checkweighmen.  Because  the  men  attended  a  meeting  ad- 
dressed by  the  national  officers,  one  hundred  of  them 
were  discharged.  The  officers  appealed  to  the  operators 
for  the  reinstatement  of  the  men,  but  to  no  avail.  A  strike 
was  called  in  April  and  the  men  held  out  till  August,  when 
a  break  in  their  ranks  caused  all  of  them  to  apply  for 
work.  Eight  hundred  were  blacklisted,  remaining  an  ex- 
pense to  the  organization,  and  the  fight  already  made  was 
useless.  As  is  common  in  such  a  case,  the  union  helped  to 
distribute  the  men  in  organized  fields. 

During  the  strike  unusual  methods  were  used  by  the 
operators  to  break  up  the  solidarity  of  the  men.  An  at- 
torney was  hired  to  call  a  meeting  and  address  the  men. 
Some  of  the  miners  were  disposed  to  disturb  the  meeting, 
but  they  were  warned  by  the  national  organizer,  Warner, 
not  to  do  this.  For  his  good  offices  he  and  several  others 
were  arrested  and  charged  with  riot  and  unlawful  assem- 
blage. The  charge  of  riot  was  not  proven,  but  on  the 
charge  of  unlawful  assemblage  the  judge  held  that  the 
assemblage  had  prevented  the  right  of  free  speech  and 
Warner  was  made  responsible  for  disbanding  the  men.^ 
With  the  Eeese  case  in  mind,  the  miners  naturally  raised 
the  question  as  to  whether  the  courts  would  have  been  so 
solicitous  if  it  had  been  their  free  speech  which  was  at 
stake.  Warner  was  sentenced  to  six  months  and  the  others 
to  shorter  terms.  Requests  for  a  change  of  venue  and 
appeals  to  the  higher  courts  and  the  governor  were  with- 
out avail,  although  the  defendants  claimed  evidence  of 
^irejudice  and  unfair  trial.  To  this  day  Maryland  has  no 
joint  agreement.  In  chapter  ii  the  underlying  forces  which 
have  kept  the  industry  in  that  State  in  a  disorganized 
condition  receive  consideration. 

1  Rpj)f)rt  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1901,  p.  37. 

2  Uniud  Mine  Workers^  Journal,  August,  I'JOO,  p.  1. 


56       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

E.   The  Struggle  in  Alabama,  Tennessee,  and 
Kentucky 

Between  September,  1897,  and  January,  1899,  the 
miners  Lad  succeeded  in  organizing  about  2500  men  into 
thirteen  locals  in  Alabama,  four  locals  in  Tennessee  with 
a  membership  of  400,  and  in  Kentucky  into  eighteen  locals 
with  about  2000  members.^  Although  the  membership 
was  still  small  in  1898,  a  strike  of  considerable  propor- 
tions took  place  in  Tennessee  in  protest  against  the  "  sub- 
contracting "  system  of  mining  coal.  This  system  resulted 
in  keeping  about  forty-six  per  cent  of  the  miners  dig- 
ging coal  for  much  less  per  ton  than  they  could  get  by 
working  independently.  The  settlement  obtained  abol- 
ished the  system  and  raised  the  rate  of  mining  about  four- 
teen cents.^ 

By  1900,  District  19,  comprising  Kentucky  and  Tennes- 
see, had  been  formed  with  a  membership  of  over  4000 
scattered  among  thirty-six  locals.  Joint  agreements  were 
entered  into  by  many  operators,  but  the  union  met  with 
very  determined  opposition  in  Hopkins  County,  Ken- 
tucky. The  Hopkins  County  operators  "paid  whatever 
wages  they  chose  and  entered  any  market  they  desired." 
Peaceful  overtures  were  refused,  and  the  strike  called  in 
November,  1900,  resulted  in  the  importation  of  negroes 
and  the  use  of  the  injunction.  The  injunction  in  this  case 
went  so  far  as  to  forbid  the  United  Mine  Workers  to  fur- 
nish the  strikers  with  food  and  supplies.^  Not  until  1908 
did  the  organization  consider  the  situation  favorable 
enough  to  seek  to  gain  a  joint  conference,  but  the  efforts 
of  the  miners'  leaders  were  not  successful  and  the  opera- 
tors of  the  county  still  refuse  to  make  any  agreement  with 
the  union. 

By  1903  the  union  in  Alabama  liad  increased  to  about 

1  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers''  Convention,  1899,  p.  6. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  20.  3  iijid.^  1902,  p.  59.  Reprint  of  injunction. 


CONCILIATION   IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    57 

8000  members,^  and  in  the  state  convention  of  that  year 
the  miners  demanded  that  their  wages  and  working  con- 
ditions be  made  to  conform  more  nearly  to  the  standards 
fixed  by  the  central  field  .^  The  refusal  of  the  operators 
to  meet  these  demands  led  to  arbitration  proceedings 
wherein  the  operators  and  miners  were  each  represented 
by  two  members,  and  Judge  Gray,  the  former  Chairman  of 
the  Anthracite  Coal  Strike  Commission,  acted  as  referee. 
The  award  granted  the  miners  an  increase  of  two  and  one 
half  cents  per  ton  on  the  mining  rate  with  a  correspond- 
ing increase  on  day  wages,  established  a  semi-monthly  pay 
day,  prohibited  the  employment  of  boys  under  fourteen, 
and  regulated  the  issuance  and  transfer  of  store  orders.^ 

The  sliding  scale,  which  automatically  adjusted  mining 
rates  according  to  the  fluctuation  in  the  prices  of  iron, 
was  not  abolished.  The  Tennessee  Coal,  Iron,  and  Rail- 
road Company  was  the  dominant  factor  in  regulating  con- 
ditions of  mining  both  in  Tennessee  and  Alabama.  In  1904 
this  company,  along  with  other  "furnace"^  operators,  re- 
fused to  pay  the  scale  established  by  arbitration  in  1903. 
After  several  conferences  the  operators  still  declined  to 
pay  the  scale  and  declared  their  "inability  to  pay  more 
than  they  had  proposed  and  operate  their  mines  and  fur- 
naces without  a  loss."  ^ 

The  miners'  state  convention  met  and  voted  for  a  strike. 
This  brought  an  offer  of  five  cents  more  on  a  ton  than  the 
operators  had  previously  declared  themselves  able  to  pay, 
but  the  offer  held  good  on  condition  of  an  increase  of  one 
hour  on  the  working  day,  monthly  payment,  increase  in 
the  differential  between  pick  and  machine  mining,  and 
the  severance  of  the  emploj'ees  from  connection  with  their 
union  .^ 

^  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1903,  p.  17. 

2  Ibid.,  1004,  p.  28.  8  iijij_^  p.  28. 

*  Operators  who  employed  minera  to  produce  coal  for  iron  furnaces. 

''  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1905,  p.  10. 

e  Ibid.,  p.  17. 


68       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

The  "  commercial  "  operators  continued  to  pay  the  scale, 
but  10,000  men  employed  by  the  "furnace"  operators 
went  on  strike.  Four  federal  injunctions  and  one  from  a 
state  court  supplemented  the  efforts  of  the  operators  to 
obtain  non-union  labor  from  other  States  with  attending 
success.  The  efforts  of  the  officers  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers  and  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  to 
prevent  shipment  of  non-union  men  from  Eastern  points 
were  not  so  successful.  The  climax  to  the  Alabama  strike 
came  when  the  governor  ordered  the  state  militia  to  cut 
down  the  tents  used  to  shelter  the  evicted  mine  workers 
and  their  families.  In  addition  to  this  order  the  soldiers 
were  directed  to  take  possession  of  the  tents,  and  orders 
were  issued  that  public  meetings  could  not  be  held.  The 
governor  also  threatened  to  call  a  special  session  of  the 
legislature  to  repeal  the  vagrancy  law  of  Alabama,  so  that 
every  striking  miner  could  be  arrested  and  sent  to  prison.^ 

At  Tracy  and  Whitewell,  Tennessee,  the  miners  em- 
ployed by  the  Tennessee  Coal,  Iron,  and  Railroad  Com- 
pany went  on  strike  over  the  same  issues  that  involved 
the  Alabama  employees  of  this  same  company.  By  Janu- 
ary, 1906,  the  organization  had  spent  over  $127,000  in 
supporting  the  strike  in  Tennessee  and  nearly  -f  600,000 
in  Alabama.^  These  strikes  terminated  unfavorably  for 
the  union  and  resulted  in  the  break-up  of  the  joint  agree- 
ments in  Alabama,  but  the  president  of  the  miners  con- 
soled his  followers  in  their  convention  of  1907  with  the 
words,  "  While  we  failed  to  secure  the  conditions  of  em- 
ployment we  sought  to  obtain,  we  have  demonstrated  that 
although  an  organization  of  peace  we  have  the  ability  to 
fight." 

The  membership  of  the  union  has  steadily  declined  un- 
til in  1913  it  stood  at  192.^  If  the  Tennessee  Coal,  Iron, 

^  Beport  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Convention,  1909,  p.  66. 

2  Ibid.,  1906,  p.  59. 

8  Beport  of  Secretary-Treasurer  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  1913. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    59 

and  Railroad  Company,  which  is  a  subsidiary  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation,  continues  to  follow  out  the 
policy  of  the  larger  corporation  in  dealing  with  its  labor, 
the  miners  may  expect  a  long  struggle  before  their  organ- 
ization will  be  able  to  gain  recognition. 

F.  Organization  of  the  Northwest 

In  1904  Montana  and  Wyoming  were  organized  into 
a  district  which  included  nearly  all  the  miners  in  those 
States,  and  the  next  year  a  district  was  formed  in  Wash- 
ington. The  same  year  in  which  Montana  and  Wyoming 
were  organized,  the  union  formed  a  district  in  British  Co- 
lumbia, and  the  organization  became  international  in  scope. 
This  expansion  was  recognized  by  the  union's  prefacing 
the  designation  of  their  union  and  its  officers  by  the  term 
"  international." 

In  1907  a  dispute  in  British  Columbia  furnished  one 
of  the  first  occasions  for  conciliation  under  the  Canadian 
Industrial  Disputes  Investigation  Act.  The  miners  of  the 
district  had  met  the  operators  in  joint  conference  March 
4  and  18,  but  failed  to  agree.  This  same  month  the  Dis- 
putes Act  was  enacted.  The  contract  of  the  operators  with 
the  miners  ran  out  on  April  1,  and  as  no  agreement  had 
been  reached  the  miners  made  application  for  a  concilia- 
tion board  as  provided  for  in  the  act.  A  board  was  estab- 
lished by  the  Government,  but  during  the  delay  in  the 
appointment  of  its  members  and  their  arrival  at  the  scene 
of  the  trouble  the  miners  suspended  work.  This  was  con- 
trary to  the  act  but  was  attributed  to  a  lack  of  understand- 
ing of  its  provisions  and  hasty  action  on  the  part  of  the 
miners'  executive  board. ^  General  fear  of  a  coal  famine  on 
the  part  of  the  public  in  that  section  caused  the  Minister 
of  Labour  to  send  the  Deputy  Minister  to  the  scene.  Explan- 
ation of  the  act  and  conciliatory  measures  by  the  Deputy 

^  Bq)ort  of  Canadian  Department  of  Labour,  1907,  p.  238. 


60       ARBITRATION  IN  TIIE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Minister  soon  brought  the  parties  together  and  resulted  in 
their  settling  the  grievances  among  themselves.  Further- 
more, arrangements  were  made  for  future  peaceful  settle- 
ments by  a  series  of  conferences  between  the  parties.  Pro- 
vision was  made  for  the  appointment  of  an  independent 
chairman  by  the  Minister  of  Labour  if  the  parties  failed  to 
agree  upon  a  selection. ^  By  1908  the  president  of  the  min- 
ers joyfully  announced"  that  the  operators  in  these  districts 
(Washington,  Montana,  Wyoming,  and  British  Columbia) 
have  recognized  our  organization ;  they  have  entered  into 
contracts  with  us  establishing  the  best  mining  rate  and 
the  highest  day  wage  scale  existing  in  the  United  States 
or  Canada."  2 

G.  The  Colorado  Struggle 

Colorado  was  organized  into  a  district  in  1901,  but  the 
union  increased  in  numbers  very  slowly.  Their  union  rep- 
resentatives failed  repeatedly  to  get  a  hearing  and  the  dis- 
trict entered  upon  a  strike  the  latter  part  of  1903.  After 
the  strike  had  been  in  progress  about  four  months  the  na- 
tional officers  considered  it  futile  to  continue  the  struggle 
longer  and  called  a  convention  at  which  it  was  expected 
the  miners  could  be  induced  to  go  back  to  work.  The  gov- 
ernor anticipated  the  convention  by  the  declaration  of  mar- 
tial law  the  day  previous  to  the  one  set  for  the  meeting. 
The  miners  "  were  so  incensed  at  the  unwarranted  and 
uncalled-for  action  of  the  governor  that,  instead  of  calmly 
considering  the  status  of  the  strike  and  declaring  it  off, 
as  they  undoubtedly  would  have  done  had  the  troops  not 
been  there,  they  decided  that  while  the  civil  laws  were 
suspended  a  resumption  of  work  would  be  regarded  as  a 
cowardly  surrender."  ^ 

Non-unionists  were  imported  ;  organizers  and  members 

^  Report  of  Canadian  Department  of  Labour,  1907,  p-  2ol. 
2  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers''  Convention,  1908,  p.  28. 
®  Ibid.,  1905,  p.  11 ;  report  of  tlie  president. 


CONCILIATION  IN  THE  BITUMINOUS  FIELD    61 

of  the  national  executive  board  "  were  murderously  as- 
saulted in  broad  daylight  while  traveling  on  passenger 
trains ;  other  organizers  were  held  up  and  beaten  on  the 
public  streets,  while  still  others  were  threatened  that  if 
they  did  not  depart  from  Colorado  their  lives  would  be  in 
danger."  ^  After  the  organization  had  spent  about  half  a 
million  dollars  in  supporting  the  men,  the  national  execu- 
tive board  decided  to  advise  a  resumption  of  work  and 
every  victimized  man  and  his  family  were  transported  to 
some  place  where  he  could  obtain  work.  The  union  has 
been  unremitting  in  its  efforts  to  build  up  membership  in 
Colorado  and  obtain  a  joint  agreement,  but,  as  we  write 
this  account,  current  news  describes  conditions  similar  to 
those  recorded  above.  Martial  law,  imprisoning  of  or- 
ganizers and  holding  them  incomunicado,  and  resolutions 
on  the  part  of  Congress  providing  for  an  investigation  of 
the  trouble  are  items  inviting  the  attention  of  the  public. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  principle  of  the  joint  agreement 
is  in  operation  in  the  central  field  comprising  Illinois, 
Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Pennsylvania  ;  in  the  southwestern  field 
which  includes  Missouri,  Arkansas,  Kansas,  and  Okla- 
homa; in  Iowa  and  Michigan;  in  Kentucky  and  Tennes- 
see ;  and  in  the  Northwest. 

One  naturally  wonders  why  West  Virginia  does  not  ap- 
pear in  the  list.  In  order  to  answer  that  query  satisfac- 
torily, it  has  been  found  necessary  to  devote  a  separate 
chapter  to  this  State.  A  greater  significance  attaches  to 
it  than  a  mere  explanation  as  to  why  the  State  is  not 
included  in  the  system  of  joint  agreements.  Besides  the 
importance  of  the  relation  of  the  State  to  the  further 
continuance  of  the  system  of  joint  agreement,  the  factors 
at  work  in  West  Virginia  should  be  of  great  concern  to 
the  public  in  connection  with  a  policy  dealing  with  the 
control  of  our  coal  resources.  In  the  richest  bituminous 
field  in  America  (comprising  West  Virginia,  western  Vir- 
*  Report  oj  United  Mine  Workers'  Convention,  1905,  p.  12. 


62       ARBITRATION  IN  TIIE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

ginia,  Maryland,  central  and  southwestern  Pennsylvania) 
we  shall  find  the  same  influences  at  work  which  have 
brought  concentrated  ownership  and  control  of  the  an- 
thracite region  and  have  given  rise  to  the  social  problems 
attached  thereto.  We  must  understand  why  the  West 
Virginia  problem  has  played  such  an  important  role  in 
the  interstate  joint  conference  of  the  central  field,  and 
why  it  has  loomed  up  as  the  most  important  factor  which 
threatens  to  disrupt  the  system  of  conciliation  and  arbi- 
tration. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM 

1.   THE  IMPORTANCE   OF  THE   PROBLEM 

An  invitation  was  extended  to  the  West  Virginia  opera- 
tors to  attend  the  joint  conference  in  1898,  but  they  did 
not  respond.  The  question  arises  as  to  why  they  failed  to 
respond.  The  most  important  reason  was  because  they 
could  produce  coal  more  cheaply  than  other  fields,  realized 
it,  and  proposed  to  use  their  advantage  to  build  up  a 
market  for  their  coal.  In  fact  they  had  to  make  a  market 
for  their  coal,  because  as  late  as  1913  only  ten  per  cent  of 
their  production  was  sold  to  consumers  within  the  State.* 
One  factor  making  cheaper  production  possible  is  found 
in  the  wealth  of  coal  lying  within  the  state  borders.  It  is 
said  that  West  Virginia  has  more  soft  coal  than  any  other 
State  in  the  Union.^  Besides,  this  coal  can  be  got  at  easily 
by  direct  entrances  made  into  the  sides  of  the  hills,  while 
Illinois  operators,  for  example,  have  to  sink  shafts.  The 
character  of  the  veins  is  such  as  to  enable  the  West  Vir- 
ginia operators  to  get  from  six  to  ten  feet  of  clean  coal  in 
contrast  to  the  five-foot  vein  in  eastern  Ohio  and  the  Pitts- 
burg district.  Besides  possessing  the  finest  quality  of  coal, 
there  is  considerable  variation  of  coals  —  gas  coals,  cok- 
ing coals,  steam,  and  domestic  coals. 

Because  their  labor  was  unorganized,  the  West  Virginia 
operators  were  able  to  demand  a  ten-hour  working  day 
over  against  the  eight-hour  day  of  the  union  fields.  The 

^  Hearings  before  a  suboommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Education  and 
Labor  of  the  United  States  Senate,  63d  Congress,  Ist  Session,  Senate  Sea. 
37,  part  3,  p.  2175. 

^  Report  of  Ohio  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1901,  p.  294. 


G4       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

lack  of  a  union  also  enabled  them  to  require  larger  mining 
cars  containing  more  pounds  to  the  ton,  refuse  the  men 
checkweighmen  in  connection  with  the  weighing  of  their 
coal,  and  exercise  their  own  discretion  in  regard  to  the 
amount  of  coal  which  they  docked  the  men  on  account  of 
impurities  in  the  coal.  Besides,  they  were  in  a  position  to 
say  what  they  would  pay  the  men  for  "deadwork,"  and 
whether  the  men  should  be  paid  for  their  coal  according 
to  a  mine-run  method  or  after  it  had  been  screened. 

Although  the  West  Virginia  operators  had  to  ship  coal 
a  greater  distance  to  put  it  into  the  Great  Lakes' markets, 
the  freight  rates  were  adapted  to  their  needs  so  that  by 
1901  the  Industrial  Commission  pointed  out  that  the  rates 
from  West  Virginia  to  the  Lake  ports  were  as  cheap  as 
from  points  in  Ohio  but  half  the  distance.  The  rates  from 
W^est  Virginia  to  St.  Paul  (one  thousand  miles)  were  as 
cheap  as  from  points  in  Illinois  which  were  only  four  hun- 
dred miles  from  St.  Paul.  The  railroad  connection  with 
some  of  the  best  Atlantic  ports  and  with  the  Lake  and 
Northwestern  markets  has  enabled  the  State  to  rise  from 
the  lowest  rank  as  a  producer  of  coal  until  it  now  stands 
next  to  Pennsylvania,  which  has  the  highest  tonnage.^ 
West  Virginia  coal  is  now  sold  all  over  the  country  and  is 
shijjped  from  Newport  News  to  foreign  countries. 

As  early  as  1884  we  hear  complaints  from  the  Penn- 
sylvania operators  on  the  Monongahela  River,  who  had 
formerly  held  the  market  from  Pittsburg  to  New  Orleans, 
that  coal  from  the  Kanawha  River  district  of  West  Vir- 
ginia was  taking  their  market.  The  chief  explanation  then 
offered  was  that  the  building  of  locks  on  the  river  by  the 
State  gave  the  Kanawha  operators  constant  boating  with- 
out payment  of  tolls  and  placed  them  240  miles  nearer  the 
market.  But  the  Monongahela  operators  were  subjected  to 
tolls  from  a  navigation  company,  and  the  Monongahela 
was  frozen  over  several  weeks  during  the  winter.  However, 

1  West  Virginia  produced  2,500,000  tons  in  18S2 ;  in  1912,  59,000,000. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  65 

It  was  pointed  out  that  the  miner  had  to  bear  the  chief 
burden  of  this  competition  by  accejjting  wages  low  enough 
to  enable  the  Monongahela  operator  to  get  the  market 
and  still  make  a  profit.^ 

We  have  seen  that  the  miners  and  operators  of  the  cen- 
tral field  were  made  to  appreciate  the  full  significance  of 
West  Virginia  competition  during  the  "  suspension  "  of 
1894.2  jn  tije  joint  conference  of  1898,  the  fact  that  West 
Virginia  was  not  in  the  conference  was  looked  upon  as  the 
element  most  likely  to  cause  a  break-up  of  the  system  of 
joint  agreements.  They  realized  that  West  Virginia  com- 
petition was  to  be  a  growing  danger,  and  that  every  effort 
must  be  made  to  establish  working  conditions,  wages,  and 
freight  rates  that  would  place  the  States  as  nearly  as  possi- 
ble on  an  equal  basis.  The  granting  of  the  eight-hour  day 
and  other  concessions  was  looked  upon  by  the  operators 
as  their  part  of  a  contract  which  bound  the  miners  to  give 
the  operators  in  return  "adequate  protection  against  the 
competition  of  unorganized  fields."  The  tonnage  from 
West  Virginia  and  Kentucky  (600,000  tons)  entering  into 
competition  with  the  central  field  was  not  "  so  large  as 
it  was  aggressive  and  threatening";  but  by  1910  it  was 
estimated  that  the  competitive  tonnage  from  non-union 
fields  was  equal  to  fifty  per  cent  of  the  coal  consumed  in 
northern  and  western  Ohio,  eastern  Indiana,  and  Michi- 
gan, while  8,000,000  tons  from  non-union  fields,  not  in- 
cluding fields  adjacent  to  Pittsburg,  entered  into  competi- 
tion with  coal  from  eastern  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania.^ 

Year  after  year  the  competition  from  West  Virginia  has 
taken  on  a  more  threatening  aspect  as  an  obstacle  to  agree- 
ment on  a  wage  scale.  The  fact  that  the  United  Mine 
Workers  have  failed  to  organize  the  State  has  furnished 
occasion  for  taunts  from  the  operators  that  the  miners 

*  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1884,  p.  76. 

^  See  above,  p.  39. 

^  Repm-t  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  3,  p.  2152. 


CG       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

were  not  properly  directing  their  efforts.  In  return  from 
the  miners  came  veiled  and  open  implications  that  the 
operators  did  not  want  the  State  organized  and  were  not 
doing  what  they  might  to  help  bring  it  about.  By  1910 
the  only  remedial  measure  which  the  operators  could  sug- 
gest to  meet  the  growing  pressure  from  West  Virginia 
was  for  the  miners  to  take  a  step  backward  toward  the 
wage  scale  and  working  conditions  of  West  Virginia.  It 
remains  for  us  to  consider  the  attempts  that  the  miners 
have  made  to  organize  the  State  and  the  reasons  why  they 
have  failed. 

2.  THE  ATTEMPTS  AT  ORGANIZATION 

It  has  been  said  that  in  the  middle  eighties  West  Vir- 
ginia had  more  local  unions  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  miners  than  now.^  Though  this  is  very  indefinite,  it 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  there  was  considerable  agita- 
tion in  West  Virginia  about  the  time  of  the  organization 
of  the  National  Federation  of  Miners  and  Mine  Laborers 
in  1885.  Evidently  what  was  attained  was  not  very  effec- 
tive, for  the  West  Virginia  operators  were  never  a  party 
to  the  interstate  joint  conferences. 

At  the  meeting  of  the  First  Annual  Convention  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers  in  1891,  there  was  a  voting  power 
of  representatives  from  West  Virginia  which  would  in- 
dicate a  membership  of  about  fifteen  hundred.^  The  fol- 
lowing year  the  miners  in  the  Fairmont  district  of  West 
Virginia  made  a  demand  for  higher  wages  and  struck 
without  notifying  the  national  officers.  The  local  leaders 
then  called  upon  the  national  organization  for  support, 
but  an  investigation  by  the  national  officials  convinced 
them  that  neither  market  conditions  nor  wages  in  com- 
peting districts  warranted  the  men  in  striking  or  in  appeal- 
ing for  aid.  The  strikers  were  ordered  back  to  work.  The 

1  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  2,  p.  1670. 

2  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Convention,  1891,  p.  7. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  67 

operators  took  advantage  of  this  situation,  discharged  the 
leaders,  and  declined  to  recognize  the  union .^ 

During  the  general  strikes  over  the  central  field  in 
1894  and  1897,  the  West  Virginia  operators  raised  the 
rates  of  wages  to  their  miners  and  kept  them  at  work 
while  the  other  fields  were  idle.  Out  of  15,049  workers  in 
1897  only  5314  struck.  At  this  time  the  union  had  but 
206  members  in  West  Virginia.  Besides  a  raise  in  wages, 
some  of  the  operators  gave  their  men  a  bonus  which 
allowed  them  to  share  in  the  results  of  increased  business 
activity.  This  was  not  only  effective  for  the  moment,  but 
it  enabled  the  West  Virginia  coal  to  get  into  markets 
where  it  had  never  been  before,  and  its  superior  quality, 
followed  later  by  cut  prices,  enabled  it  to  hold  its  ground. 
As  we  have  seen,  it  was  the  influence  of  West  Virginia 
coal  that  brought  quick  settlement  of  the  strikes,  and 
under  conditions  that  ultimately  reacted  on  the  West  Vir- 
ginia miner.  If  the  West  Virginia  miner  had  stood  with 
his  fellows  and  enabled  them  to  bring  up  the  general 
scale,  he  would  not  have  been  forced  to  work  on  so  low  a 
level.  This  has  now  become  evident  to  the  national  offi- 
cers of  the  miners.  They  pointed  out  to  the  operators,  in 
the  recent  joint  conference  of  the  central  field,  that  it 
would  be  useless  for  them  to  accept  a  reduction  in  the 
hope  of  competing  with  West  Virginia,  for  West  Vir- 
ginia wages  and  working  conditions  would  only  be  forced 
down  lower  than  those  of  the  central  field.  This  would  still 
enable  the  West  Virginia  operator  to  profit  by  his  natural 
advantage.^ 

During  the  years  1897  to  1900  the  union  made  very 
little  progress  in  West  Virginia,  but  in  1901  a  specially 
organized  campaign  brought  eighty  local  unions  with  a 
membership  of  5000  into  the  fold.  The  State  was  divided 
into  two  subdistricts  with  active,  working   officers,  but 

1  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  322. 

*  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference  (central  field),  1912. 


6S       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

"  active  participation  in  the  organization  by  any  West 
Virginia  miner  [was]  invariably  followed  by  dismissal 
from  employment."  ^  Furthermore,  the  movement  was 
greatly  handicapped  by  the  intense  race  prejudice  exist- 
ing between  the  American  miner  of  that  region  and  the 
foreign  woi-ker.  The  extent  of  this  prejudice  may  be  ap- 
preciated when  we  recall  that  even  Americans  from  other 
sections  of  the  country  are  looked  upon  as  "  furriners  "  by 
the  mountaineer.  The  operators  were  also  able  to  make 
effectual  use  of  the  argument  that  "  the  sole  object  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers  in  sending  organizers  into  West 
Virginia  was  for  the  purpose  of  inaugurating  a  general 
strike  in  the  interest  of  other  States."  ^ 

In  the  early  spring  of  1902  the  miners  of  West  Vir- 
ginia in  a  state  convention  formulated  a  wage  scale  and 
sought  a  joint  conference  with  the  operators.  Failure  to 
obtain  a  meeting  stirred  up  discontent  to  the  point  where 
the  national  and  district  officers  thought  it  advisable  to 
call  a  strike  in  order  to  prevent  the  union  from  disinte- 
grating.^ 

The  strike  which  was  begun  in  June  involved  about 
eighty  per  cent  of  the  miners  of  the  State  and  the  "  pros- 
pects of  a  complete  tie-up  were  encouraging."  Non-union- 
ists were  imported  and  the  injunction  was  used  to  prevent 
organizers  from  "  holding  meetings  at  or  near  the  mines 
of  the  companies,"  and  even  though  the  assemblage  took 
place  on  leased  ground  the  organizers  were  imprisoned. 
When  they  were  released  on  bond  they  "  were  required 
to  abstain  from  their  functions  as  organizers  in  that 
State."  Under  a  habeas  corpus  proceeding,  brought  by 
the  miners  to  secure  the  release  of  some  of  their  organ- 
izers, the  issue  was  raised  as  to  whether  the  Guaranty 
Trust  Company  of  New  York  had  the  right  to  sue  out  an 
injunction  ;  but  when  the  "  case  was  taken  to  the  higher 

1  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Contention,  1902,  p.  41. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  55.  8  jji^.^  1903,  p.  38. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  69 

courts  the  decision  of  the  lower  court  was  affirmed  and 
our  members  were  remanded  back  to  jail."^  The  vice- 
president  of  the  miners,  in  answering  the  question  as  to 
why  injunctions  were  issued  in  labor  disputes,  pointed  out 
that  the  injunction  as  a  "  strike-breaker  is  the  most  dan- 
gerous weaj)on  ever  brought  into  existence  because  of  its 
sweeping  character ;  the  most  effective  in  its  application 
because  it  is  used  in  the  name  of  the  law ;  the  most  de- 
structive to  labor's  interests  because  there  seems  to  be  no 
appeal  from  the  opinions  of  the  individual  judges  who 
issue  the  injunction  ;  the  least  expensive  to  the  employers 
of  labor  because  the  official  representatives  of  the  Govern- 
ment enforce  the  provisions  of  the  injunction."  He  also 
found  in  his  travels  over  the  State  that  the  operators 
"  were  fearful  that  in  some  manner  we  were  attempting  to 
organize  that  State  in  order  to  drive  them  out  of  business."  ^ 

With  such  feelings  actuating  them  and  with  the  power 
to  gain  their  ends,  there  was  small  chance  of  the  operators 
meeting  the  miners  to  obtain  a  peaceful  settlement.  The 
strike  rapidly  disintegrated  in  the  Fairmont  district  and 
along  the  Norfolk  and  Western  Railroad,  but  was  con- 
tinued in  the  New  River  and  Kanawha  districts  until 
September. 

It  was  during  the  strike  in  the  Kanawha  district  that 
an  event  occurred  which  reveals  the  strength  of  the  deter- 
mination to  prevent  unionism  from  gaining  a  foothold  in 
West  Virginia.  The  national  officers  were  sending  sup- 
plies to  the  striking  miners  of  the  Kanawha  district.  Sev- 
eral carloads  of  groceries,  ordered  from  the  wholesale  gro- 
cery house  of  Shaw,  Irwin  &  Co.  of  Cincinnati,  failed  to 
reach  their  destination  and  it  was  found  that  they  had  been 
side-tracked.  The  application  of  Shaw,  Irwin  &  Co.  for  an 
injunction  against  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway  in 
the  United  States  District  Court  at  Covington,  Kentucky, 
asking  that  the  railway  be  enjoined  from  hindering  the 

1  Rqiort  of  United  Mine  Workeis'  Convention,  1903,  p.  53.     -  Ibid-,  p.  54. 


70       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

free  delivery  of  their  goods,  was  granted.^  Of  course  the 
railway  depended  on  the  transportation  of  coal  for  its 
chief  business  in  that  district  and  it  would  have  been 
just  as  well  pleased  to  have  had  the  strike  stopped  as 
soon  as  possible.  However,  we  shall  see  later  whether  that 
explains  the  whole  situation. 

In  spite  of  all  handicaps  the  miners  in  the  Kanawha 
disti'ict,  with  the  help  of  the  national  union,  held  together 
until  the  operators  were  ready  to  meet  them.  The  settle- 
ment reached  on  September  4,  involving  about  8000 
miners,  gave  the  men  a  nine-hour  day,  checkweighmen, 
reduction  in  the  price  of  powder,  semimonthly  pay,  the 
right  to  trade  at  any  store  they  preferred,  the  right  to  be- 
long to  the  United  Mine  Workers,  and  the  reinstatement 
of  all  strikers  without  discrimination.^  The  contract  was 
made  for  two  years.  Besides,  an  increase  of  ten  per  cent 
in  wages  (which  the  union  attributed  to  its  agitation)  was 
granted  in  the  Fairmont  district  and  in  the  region  trav- 
ersed by  the  Norfolk  and  Western  Railroad.^ 

At  the  expiration  of  the  contract  in  the  Kanawha  field 
in  1904,  another  agreement  was  reached  in  joint  confer- 
ence which  also  included  the  Cabin  Creek  district.  The 
national  vice-president,  who  attended  the  conference,  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  successful  working  of  the  joint 
agreement  in  the  Kanawha  district  would  make  the  other 
operators  more  willing  to  enter  into  similar  contracts. 
But  the  Kanawha  contract  included  a  provision  for  the 
"  check  off  "  of  dues  to  the  union,  and  the  operators  of 
Cabin  Creek  gave  their  men  to  understand  by  notices  and 
by  instructions  to  foremen  that  the  miners  did  not  have 
to  pay  their  dues,  and  by  other  means  encouraged  —  if 
not  coerced  —  them  to  sever  their  connection  with   the 


*  United  Mine  Workers'  Journal,  September  18,  1902.  Reprint  from  Cin- 
cinnati Post. 
^  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1903,  p.  53. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  38. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  71 

unlon.^  In  answer  to  the  protest  of  the  district  officers, 
the  Cabin  Creek  operators  offered  to  arbitrate  the  question, 
but  when  the  matter  was  referred  to  the  national  officers, 
they  "  approved  the  action  of  the  district  officers  in  re- 
fusing to  arbitrate  a  question  clearly  defined  in  the  records 
of  our  convention  and  accepted  without  equivocation  by 
seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  operators  in  the  Kanawha 
field."  2  The  union  men  struck  without  success  and  the 
organization  removed  them  to  other  fields  where  they  se- 
cured work  in  union  mines. 

The  miners  and  operators  in  the  Kanawha  field  have 
continued  to  form  agreements,  but  the  membership  of  the 
union  in  West  Virginia  has  been  maintained  with  diffi- 
culty and  there  has  been  no  extension  of  the  joint  agree- 
ment to  other  fields  until  recently.  The  struggle  in  the 
Cabin  Creek  and  the  Paint  Creek  districts  in  1912  is  con- 
sidered in  another  connection  in  the  latter  part  of  this 
chapter. 

These  events  which  have  been  described  are  fairly  indica- 
tive of  the  factors  which  have  prevented  the  organization 
of  the  State  and  the  joint  agreement,  but  there  are  larger 
economic  and  social  considerations  which  demand  atten- 
tion before  we  are  in  a  position  to  appreciate  the  full 
significance  of  the  West  Virginia  problem. 


a   WHY  WEST  VIRGINIA   HAS   REMAINED 
UNORGANIZED 

A.  KuRAL  Workers  and  Individualism 

In  the  first  place,  there  has  always  been  a  large  force 
of  country  laborers  to  draw  upon  to  whom  the  wages  paid 
in  the  mine  were  very  attractive.  Unless  the  worker  was 
intelligent  enough  to  consider  carefully  what  his  net 
wages  were,  he  would  not  discover  that  the  job  was  really 

^  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1905,  p.  19. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


72       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

less  attractive  than  it  looked.  Only  after  deductions  were 
made  for  tools,  supplies,  powdei",  unfair  weighing  and 
measuring,  dockage,  an  allowance  made  for  "  deadwork," 
and  the  small  number  of  working  days  taken  into  account, 
would  he  be  able  to  determine  whether  he  was  better  off 
than  at  rural  work.  The  standards  of  living  and  prices  in 
the  rural  regions  of  West  Virginia  are  relatively  lower 
than  in  the  rural  regions  of  Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Ohio. 
In  1897  (the  year  of  the  lowest  level)  only  in  the  Pitts- 
burg thick  vein,  where  southern  European  labor  was  abun- 
dant and  rates  low,  were  the  wages  of  miners  lower  than  in 
"West  Virginia.  In  the  former,  28  to  30  cents  per  ton  was 
paid,  while  West  Virginia's  average  yearly  wage  was  $275. 
In  1903,  a  year  of  one  of  the  highest  levels  which  the  scale 
reached  in  all  the  States,  West  Virginia  had  an  average 
price  of  49.5  cents  per  ton,^  while  the  average  in  Illinois 
was  64.4  cents  ;  in  Indiana,  88  cents  ;  in  Ohio,  76.7  cents  ; 
and  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  52.9  cents.^  Individualism 
was  highly  developed,  as  is  always  the  case  with  native 
mountain  peoples.  Many  miners  worked  on  a  contract 
basis  and  employed  negroes  to  work  for  them  at  a  very 
low  rate.2  Even  now,  ten  per  cent  of  the  mine  workers  are 
negroes  working  on  such  a  basis,  while  six  per  cent  of  the 
workers  are  skilled  negro  miners  working  on  their  own 
initiative.'*  Thus  a  rural  population  with  strong  individual 
tendencies  and  with  opportunities  for  individual  enterprise 
in  employing  contract  labor  would  not  take  readily  to  an 
organization  which  required  group  action. 

B.  Ijoiigration 

Immigration  has  also  played  an  important  part  in 
preventing  organization.  In  1903  the  Society  for  the 
Protection  of  Italian  Immigrants  found  it  necessary  to 

1  Beport  of  Chief  Mine  Inspector  of  West  Virginia,  1903,  p.  74. 

2  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1903. 

3  George,  op.  cit-,  p.  193.  *  Official  correspondence. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  73 

investigate  conditions  in  West  Virginia.  From  this  in- 
vestigation it  was  found  that  large  bands  of  men  were 
being  imported  into  West  Virginia  by  coal  and  construc- 
tion companies  to  carry  on  the  exploitation  of  natural 
resources.  The  companies  were  in  collusion  with  Italian 
agents  in  New  York  who  made  a  business  of  distributing 
immigrants.  In  most  cases  the  immigrants  were  deceived 
into  thinking  their  destination  was  but  a  short  distance 
from  New  York.  The  companies  paid  their  transportation 
and  naturally  made  efforts  to  retain  them  as  long  as  pos- 
sible. The  avarice  of  the  agents  led  them  to  send  barbers, 
waiters,  and  other  men  entirely  unfitted  for  the  work  of 
mining,  thus  increasing  the  difficulty  of  holding  them. 
However,  in  the  "  boarding-house  law  "  the  keepers  of  the 
commissary  had  a  ready  weapon  at  hand  for  their  arrest 
and  detention.  Forceful  detention  and  the  employment  of 
armed  guards  to  intimidate  the  men  led  to  practices  which 
were  well  termed  peonage.  The  society  took  measures 
both  in  New  York  and  in  West  Virginia  to  remedy  condi- 
tions.i  But  the  fact  that  the  companies  could  thus  direct 
a  labor  supply,  whether  forcibly  or  peacefully,  shows  the 
significance  of  immigration  to  a  working  population  which 
is  seeking  solidarity  in  order  to  raise  its  standard  of  living. 
Recent  testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Educa- 
tion and  Labor  ^  brought  out  the  fact  that  the  State  Gov- 
ernment had  cooperated  in  directing  the  flow  of  immigra- 
tion. A  state  law  was  passed  in  1871  which  provided  for  the 
appointment  of  an  immigration  commissioner.  He  was  to 
correspond  with  parties  outside  of  the  State  to  obtain  both 
labor  and  capital  and  "  to  show  the  advantages  of  West 
Virginia."  ^  Although  there  was  no  provision  in  the  law 
to  warrant  it,  the  commissioner  appointed  in  1907  did  not 

^   United  Mine  Workers'  Journal,  June  18,  100-'5,  quotes  tlie  society's  re- 
port from  the  Pittsburg  Dispatch. 

*  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Llearinijs,  op.  cit.,  part  2,  p.  2080^ 
2  Ibid.,  p.  208G. 


74       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

receive  a  salary,  but  obtained  his  compensation  by  fees 
from  coal  companies  for  furnishing  them  labor.  Before 
the  commissioner  was  authorized  to  act  he  was  supposed 
to  investigate  working  conditions  and  to  obtain  an  indorse- 
ment from  the  Board  of  Public  Works.  The  act  was  passed 
at  a  time  when  the  State  badly  needed  an  industrial 
population,  and  it  was  thought  good  policy  for  the  State 
to  get  its  share  of  the  stream  of  immigration.  The  Board 
of  Public  Works  organized  for  this  purpose  had  the  power 
to  appoint  a  commissioner,  fix  his  salary,  and  obtain 
payment  for  all  expenses  from  the  state  treasury.^ 

This  state  cooperation  resulted  in  the  commissioner's 
hiring  himseK  for  a  stated  salary  to  one  company,  the 
New  River  Company,  for  which  he  worked  from  1907  to 
1909,  and  to  the  Consolidation  Coal  Company  from  1909 
to  1913.2  ^'■g  sliall  hear  more  of  this  company  later.  The 
companies'  advertisements  for  labor  bore  the  official  in- 
dorsement of  the  "  State  Commissioner  Immigration,  State 
of  West  Virginia,"  and  gave  no  indication  that  he  was  a 
special  agent  of  the  company.  Thirty-one  per  cent  of  the 
mine  workers  are  now  of  non-English-speaking  peoples, 
and  sixteen  per  cent  are  negroes.^  It  is  easy  to  appreciate 
the  part  which  a  heterogeneous  mining  population  has 
played  in  preventing  organization. 

C.  Absentee  Ownership 

A  condition  that  early  showed  its  force  in  preventing 
organization  was  the  ownership  of  West  Virginia  mines 
by  operators  and  capitalists  of  other  States.  So  long  as 
they  could  keep  the  rural  population  working  for  less  than 
union  wages,  they  had  no  desire  to  pay  them  more  even 
though  the  coal  they  owned  in  West  Virginia  did  drive  out 
the  coal  they  owned  in  other  States.  At  the  same  time  that 
their  West  Virginia  coal  was  supplanting  some  of  their  coal 

^  West  Virginia  Laws,  1871,  chap.  156. 

2  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  2,  p.  2085. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  2028. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  75 

in  Ohio  and  Illinois,  it  was  also  taking  a  larger  percentage 
away  from  their  competitors  in  those  States.  There  is 
plenty  of  evidence  that  this  situation  exists,  for  operators 
who  have  cried  loudest  against  West  Virginia  competition 
have  been  known  to  use  their  West  Virginia  coal  to  take 
the  local  market  away  from  a  mining  town  in  Illinois  and 
force  the  closing  of  the  mine.^  And  from  these  same  men 
the  United  Mine  Workers  have  met  with  the  sternest  oppo- 
sition in  attempting  to  organize  the  West  Virginia  miners.^ 
In  fact,  absentee  owners  concern  themselves  mostly  with 
dividends,  and  may  well  consider  the  pertinency  of  a  ques- 
tion asked  by  Senator  Kenyon  of  an  absentee  owner  — 
"  Now,  is  not  that  one  of  the  troubles  in  this  country,  that 
wealth  sits  back  and  says,  '  Our  responsibility  is  ended  in 
merely  getting  our  dividends  and  seeing  that  things  are 
done  in  an  orderly  way  '  ?  "  3 

D.  The  System  of  Armed  Guards 

The  nature  of  the  region  and  the  necessity  for  the  pro- 
tection of  their  properties  has  been  the  chief  argument 
which  the  operators  have  advanced  for  maintaining  a  sys- 
tem of  armed  guards.  This  system  has  been  a  powerful 
weapon  in  controlling  the  working  force.  In  holding  the 
men  who  had  been  imported  until  they  at  least  worked  out 
the  cost  of  their  transportation,  and  in  keeping  out  union 
organizers,  it  has  been  very  effective.  In  1897  a  law  was 
passed  which  prohibited  the  employment  by  corporations 
of  non-residents  of  the  State  for  police  duty.  This  was 
aimed  at  the  mine  guard  system.  In  so  interpreting  it, 
Senator  Kenyon  in  the  recent  investigations  was  informed 
by  a  representative  of  the  operators  that  he  was  stating 
the  statute  "  a  little  too  broadly,"  as  tlie  statute  forbade 
"  the  employment  of  any  non-resident  of  the  State  to  do 
police  duty,"  ^  though  this  interpretation  has  not  prevented 

^  Report  of  Senate  Commillee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part.  2,  p.  2027. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  2028.  8  Ibid.,  p.  2125.  *  Ibid.,  p.  i:J92. 


76       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

the  operators  from  employing  private  agencies  who 
brought  in  strong-arm  men  from  outside  the  State.^  The 
full  significance  of  such  a  system  was  shown  during  the  re- 
cent strike  when  the  feeling  between  the  men  and  the 
mine  guards  rose  to  the  point  of  causing  bloodshed.  We 
are  interested  at  this  point  in  simply  enumerating  the 
guard  system  as  one  of  the  factors  preventing  organization 
by  the  union.  The  full  import  of  the  system  of  guards  will 
be  shown  in  the  discussion  of  the  recent  West  Virginia 
strike. 

E.   Injunctions  and  Conspiracy  Laws 

The  treatment  which  the  union  has  received  at  the  hands 
of  the  federal  and  West  Virginia  courts  under  injunction 
and  conspiracy  laws  is  anything  but  conducive  to  the  mod- 
erate language  in  which  the  organization's  one-time  leader 
referred  to  injunctions  —  "  It  is  difficult  to  speak  in  meas- 
ured tones  or  moderate  language  of  the  savagery  and  venom 
with  which  unions  have  been  assailed  by  the  injunction, 
and  to  the  working-classes,  as  to  all  fair-minded  men,  it 
seems  little  less  than  a  crime  to  condone  or  tolerate  it."  ^ 
One  of  the  judges  of  a  United  States  District  Court  showed 
his  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  union  movement  by  refer- 
ring to  the  organizers  as  "  a  professional  set  of  agitators  " 
and  "  vampires  that  fatten  on  the  honest  labor  of  the  coal 
miners."  In  1902,  under  an  injunction  case  the  union 
movement  was  held  to  be  a  conspiracy  by  which  the  union 
sought  to  control  the  coal  industry  of  West  Virginia.  Sev- 
eral organizers  were  punished  under  the  law  of  conspiracy 
and  for  the  violation  of  an  injunction  forbidding  them  to 
hinder  (by  picketing)  the  operation  of  the  Virginia  Iron, 
Coal,  and  Coke  Company's  plant.  The  case  was  ai:)proved 
by  two  circuit  judges,  and  as  it  was  impossible  to  get  a 
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  direct  appeal  was  made  to  President 

1  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  85. 

2  MitcheU,  Organized  Labor,  1903,  p.  324. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  77 

Roosevelt,  who,  after  an  investigation  of  the  case  had  been 
made,  pardoned  the  men.^ 

F.  State  Statutes  versus  the  Common  Law 

Another  important  factor  which  has  prevented  the  union 
from  gaining  a  foothold  has  been  the  overthrow  of  the 
state  statutes  by  court  decisions  based  on  the  common 
law. 

In  connection  with  a  general  law  on  mining  in  1897,  a 
prohibition  was  inserted  against  threats,  force,  and  intimi- 
dation of  workingmen  by  any  person  or  combination  of 
persons ;  "  but  this  provision,"  it  was  declared,  "  shall  not 
be  so  construed  as  to  prevent  any  two  or  more  persons 
from  associating  together  under  the  Knights  of  Labor, 
or  any  other  name  they  may  desire,  for  any  lawful  pur- 
pose, or  for  using  moral  suasion  or  lawful  argument  to 
induce  any  one  not  to  work  in  and  about  any  mine."  ^  In 
1903  a  case  arose  under  this  provision  wherein  a  coal  com- 
pany brought  action  against  organizers  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers  for  enticing  miners,  who  were  employed  by  the 
company  but  not  under  written  contract  except  in  two  in- 
stances, to  quit  work.  The  organizers  were  legitimately  en- 
gaged in  their  regular  business  of  preaching  unionism  and 
forming  local  unions.  As  is  usual  when  the  union  senti- 
ment is  strong  enough,  the  local  made  demands  and  sought 
recognition  of  their  organization.  The  fact  that  two  of 
the  men  who  struck  happened  to  be  working  under  a  writ- 
ten contract  gave  a  basis  of  action  under  the  common  law. 
The  lower  court  refused  to  grant  a  remedy  to  the  com- 
pany, but  on  apj)eal  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  leg- 
islature had  meant  this  law  to  be  a  criminal  act  to  prevent 
the  malicious  enticing  of  woi-kers  from  their  employers  and 
that  it  did  not  prevent  the  employer  from  bringing  civil 

^  United  Mine  Workers^  Journal,  April  3,  1902,  reprint  of  the  court  de- 
cision. 

^  West  Virginia  Laws,  1897. 


78       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 
action  for  damages  against  the  person  who  enticed  the 


men 


The  method  by  which  this  conclusion  was  reached  is 
an  interesting  phenomenon  which  the  average  citizen  may 
well  begin  to  consider  in  its  application  to  future  social, 
industrial,  and  political  development.  To  most  minds  it 
would  seem  that  the  above-quoted  words  of  the  law  meant 
what  they  said  —  that  the  provision  against  force,  threats, 
etc.,  "  should  not  be  so  construed  "  as  to  prevent  "  using 
moral  suasion  or  lawful  argument,"  etc.,  especially  so 
since  the  general  act  and  the  section  of  the  act  in  which 
the  clause  is  introduced  is  for  regulation  of  general  con- 
ditions of  the  industry  and  not  a  "  criminal  "  act.  After 
a  series  of  citations  thoroughly  to  prop  up  the  master  and 
servant  doctrine  of  common  law,  the  court  applied  it  to 
an  assumed  contractual  relation  existing  between  the  em- 
ployer and  the  miner.  The  fact  that  the  men  were  em- 
ployed was  assumed  to  be  a  contract.  "  Now,  if  the  law 
gives  action  for  the  enticement  of  a  servant,  it  is  not  con- 
ceivable that  a  third  person  can  maliciously  entice  away 
a  lot  of  employees,  simply  because  there  was  no  contract 
fixing  term  of  service."  It  was  not  conceivable  to  the 
court  either  that  "  a  party  "  should  "  have  a  justifiable 
cause  to  investigate,  to  move,  the  breach  of  contract  be- 
tween master  and  servant."  But  what  law  gives  action 
for  "  enticement  of  a  servant "  ?  The  common  law,  of 
course.  The  state  statute  did  not  give  any  right  of  action 
for  enticement,  but  sanctioned  it.  But  the  court  prohibited 
the  organizers  from  spreading  their  doctrines. 

As  a  result  of  this  decision  rendered  in  1906,  the  state 
law  remains  on  the  books  and  permits  combination,  pick- 
eting, and  lawful  persuasion  of  men  to  leave  their  employ- 
ment when  it  is  to  their  interest  and  the  interest  of  their 
trade  in  general.  But  the  legislature  in  1907  sanctioned 
a  revised  code  containing  this  law  with  the  interpretation 
^  Thacker  Coal  Company  ts.  Burke,  59  West  Virginia,  253. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  79 

the  court  put  upon  it.  The  union  is  now  subject  to  a  law 
which  says  that  any  person  or  persons  shall  have  the 
right  to  combine  and  persuade  others  to  leave  their  em- 
ployment and  yet  they  are  subject  to  punishment  if  they 
"  maliciously  entice  servants  to  desert  the  service  in  which 
they  are  engaged  .  .  .  nor  does  it  restrict  the  master's 
right  to  sue  another  for  damages  resulting  from  the  ma- 
licious enticement  of  the  servant."  ^  In  short,  the  common 
law  takes  precedence  over  the  state  statute  and  makes 
it  ineffective,  and  it  rests  with  the  court  to  decide  what  is 
malicious  enticement  and  to  apply  punishment  therefor. 

4.  THE  BROADER  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

A.   The  Territorial  Aspect 

Besides  the  conditions  which  we  have  considered  above, 
there  is  a  larger  aspect  to  the  West  Virginia  problem 
which  involves  not  merely  the  question  of  union  organiza- 
tion of  the  State,  but  the  possible  continuation  of  the 
system  of  joint  agreements  at  large  and  a  consideration 
of  the  development  of  economic  and  industrial  conditions 
which  are  of  national  importance.  In  order  to  compre- 
hend the  forces  which  lie  behind  the  problem,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  extend  our  consideration  of  it  beyond  the  confines 
of  the  State  of  West  Virginia.  It  is  a  question  of  control 
and  exploitation  of  a  territory  made  up  of  the  State  of 
West  Virginia,  southwestern  and  central  Pennsylvania, 
Maryland,  and  the  western  portion  of  Virginia.  Our 
chief  interest  lies  in  discovering  what  are  the  forces  that 
control  and  direct  the  policies  and  the  attitude  of  capital 
toward  labor  and  threaten  the  disruption  of  the  joint  con- 
ference. In  order  to  understand  the  situation  it  is  neces- 
sary to  know  the  extent  of  concentrated  ownership  of  coal 
lands,  stock  ownership  by  railroads  in  coal  companies  and 
coal  lands,  and  the  interlocking  directorates  which  make 
1  West  Virffinia  Code  Supplement,  1909,  p.  GO. 


80       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

it  possible  for  a  few  individuals  to  control  the  natural  re- 
sources and  transportation  facilities  upon  which  the  eco- 
nomic welfare  of  a  large  population  depends.  The  power 
and  extent  of  these  forces  were  brought  out  by  the  find- 
ings of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in  1907. 

B.   Investigation  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  1907 

By  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress  in  1906  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  was  directed  to  make  an  in- 
vestigation into  railroad  discriminations  and  monopolies 
in  coal  and  oil  in  the  region  outlined  above.^  More  specifi- 
cally the  Commission  was  directed  to  find  out  the  extent 
of  stock  holding  and  ownership  in  coal  properties  and 
mines  by  common  carriers  ;  how  far  their  officers  were  in- 
terested in  this  ownership ;  whether  there  was  any  conspir- 
acy in  restraint  of  trade ;  and  whether  the  system  of  car- 
supply  and  distribution  was  equitable.  Any  other  facts  it 
might  consider  pertinent  and  any  remedy  it  could  sug- 
gest were  also  to  be  reported  to  Congress. 

C.  Ownership  of  Coal  Lands  and  Stock 

A.    holdings    of    NORFOLK    AND    WESTERN    RAILWAY 

Previous  to  1901,  300,000  acres  of  coal  land  had  been 
held  by  the  Flat  Top  Coal  Land  Association  in  the  Poca- 
hontas Flat  Top  coal  field  of  Virginia  and  West  Virginia. 
In  that  year  the  Pocahontas  Coal  and  Coke  Company 
was  incorporated  in  New  Jersey  to  take  over  these  coal 
lands.  The  Norfolk  and  Western  Railroad  Company  ac- 
quired the  stock  of  the  coal  company  the  same  year 
and  transferred  $20,000,000  of  joint  bonds  of  the  two 
companies  to  the  syndicate  which  put  through  the  deal.  At 

^  Report  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  on  the  Investigation  of  the 
Eastern  Bituminous  Coal  Situation,  59th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Doc. 
561. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  81 

the  same  time  the  interest  on  these  joint  bonds  was  guar- 
anteed by  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company  and  the 
Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,  Chicago,  and  St.  Louis  Railway 
Company.  The  Pocahontas  Coal  and  Coke  Company  up 
to  1907  had  not  been  able  to  meet  its  expenses  and  pay 
interest  on  its  bonded  indebtedness.  The  revenue  it  got 
from  royalties  on  coal  and  coke  produced  on  its  land  by 
lessees  was  not  sufficient  to  cover  its  obligations.  The  com- 
pany itself  did  not  mine  coal  and  the  deficiency  in  interest 
had  to  be  met  by  the  railroads.  Since  the  Norfolk  and  West- 
ern Railroad  gets  about  seventy  per  cent  of  its  coal  traffic 
from  the  Pocahontas  region,  it  was  worth  controlling. 

B.    WESTERN    MARYLAND    RAILROAD    COMPANY 
HOLDINGS 

By  the  acquisition  of  the  West  Virginia  Central  and 
Pittsburg  Railway  Company  and  its  coal  lands  in  1902, 
the  control  of  the  Davis  Coal  and  Coke  Company,  and 
the  purchase  of  the  Maryland  Smokeless  Coal  Company 
stock  in  1905,  the  Western  Maryland  Railroad  Company 
acquired  control  of  138,000  acres  of  coal  land  in  West 
Virginia  and  Maryland. 

C.    THE   BALTIMORE    AND    OHIO    RAILROAD 
COMPANY 

The  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  Company  carries 
coal  from  the  bituminous  fields  in  the  southern  part  of 
Pennsylvania,  the  western  part  of  Maryland,  and  the 
northern  part  of  West  Virginia.  The  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad  in  1873  purchased  fifty-two  per  cent  of  the 
stock  of  the  Consolidation  Coal  Company  (organized  in 
1860),  which  had  reached  a  capitalization  of  $10,250,000 
by  1907  and  produced  about  2,000,000  tons  yearly.  Some 
years  previous  the  Consolidation  Coal  Company  had  pur- 
chased the  stock  of  the  Cumberland  and  Pennsylvania 


82       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Railroad  which  serves  the  region  in  which  a  large  part 
of  the  coal  company's  lands  are  located.  In  1903  the 
Consolidation  Coal  Company  purchased  the  majority 
stock  of  the  Fairmont  Coal  Company  which  produces 
a  yearly  tonnage  of  3,800,000  tons  and  owns  56,986 
acres  of  coal  land.  The  Fairmont  Coal  Company  at  the 
time  of  its  deal  with  the  Consolidation  Coal  Company 
owned  the  Clarksburg  Fuel  Company  which  produced 
800,000  tons  yearly ;  the  Northwestern  Fuel  Company 
which  is  engaged  in  the  business  of  forwarding,  storing, 
selling,  and  retail  distribution  of  coal  and  coke  for 
Chicago  and  the  Lake  markets  ;  and  the  Pittsburg  and 
Fairmont  Fuel  Company  which  shipped  300,000  tons 
yearly.  The  Fairmont  Coal  Company  also  was  engaged  in 
the  purchasing  of  coal  from  independent  operators  along 
the  lines  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Raih'oad.  In  1903 
the  Consolidation  Coal  Company  also  purchased  the 
Somerset  Coal  Company  and  the  following  j^ear  bought 
the  Metropolitan  Coal  Company  of  Boston  which  buys, 
sells,  and  distributes  coal  in  New  England.  In  1905  the 
Southern  Coal  and  Transportation  Company,  which  owned 
4800  acres  of  coal  lands  in  Barbour  County,  West  Vir- 
ginia, was  forced  to  sell  out  at  a  loss  to  the  Consolidation 
Coal  Company  because  it  could  not  get  sufficient  car  serv- 
ice from  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.^  Through  its 
ownership  of  the  "West  Virginia  and  Pittsburg  Railway 
Company,  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  is  the  owner 
of  a  large  body  of  coal  lands  in  the  Gauley  country  in 
West  Virginia.  "  It  appears  in  the  record  that  this  com- 
pany owns  directly  a  very  large  amount  of  coal  lands." 
Thus  the  ownership  by  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
of  fifty-two  percent  of  the  Consolidation  Coal  Company's 
stock  gave  it  control  over  an  immense  coal-producing 
area  and  placed  at  its  command  distributing  agencies  in 
New  England  and  in  the  Lake  markets. 

^  Report  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  Congress,  op.  cit.,  p.  IL 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  83 

During  the  progress  of  the  investigation  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  informed  the  Commission  that  it  had 
made  a  sale  of  its  stock  in  the  Consolidation  Coal  Com- 
pany. But  the  announcement  was  made  only  after  the 
stock  ownership  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  in 
the  coal  company  and  discriminations  against  other  ship- 
pers had  been  developed.  The  nature  of  this  sale  is  worth 
examining.  It  was  described  as  an  absolute  sale  of  the 
stock  to  a  syndicate  of  men  interested  in  other  coal  com- 
panies, and  gave  the  railroad  a  lien  on  the  coal  properties 
for  unpaid  purchase  money ;  nor  could  the  periodically 
fixed  payments  on  the  stock  be  completed  for  thirty  years. 
One  provision  of  the  sale  required  that  all  coal  of  the 
Consolidation  Coal  Company  and  its  subsidiaries  should 
be  shipped  over  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  till  the 
purchase  money  was  paid.  Both  parties  refused  to  state 
the  price  at  which  the  sale  had  been  made.  After  the  first 
payment  was  made  the  stock  was  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  Windsor  Trust  Company  of  New  York  to  assure  the 
other  payments  and  the  "  observance  of  certain  covenants 
made  by  the  purchasers  in  reference  to  the  sale."  The 
railroad  defended  its  policy  of  acquiring  stock  and  control 
as  a  "  war  measure "  to  prevent  the  Wabash  interests 
from  gaining  the  ascendancy.  The  whole  transaction 
failed  to  deceive  the  Commission,  for  it  ascertained  that 
the  earnings  for  years  had  been  greater  than  the  dividends 
and  by  utilizing  the  net  earnings  above  the  interest  on  the 
purchase  money  the  principal  could  be  gradually  paid  off 
*'  without  any  expenditure  on  the  part  of  the  purchasers." 
The  Commission  concluded  that  the  railroad  was  still 
"very  largely  interested  in  the  prosperity  of  the  Consoli- 
dation Coal  Company  and  its  subsidiary  companies."  Fur- 
ther, it  was  discovered  that  this  "  sale  "  could  not  have 
been  made  without  the  consent  of  men  who,  besides  being 
directors  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  were  also 
directors  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  and  the  New  York 


84       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Central  and  Hudson  River  Railroad  Company.    But  the 
full  significance  of  this  will  be  seen  later. 

D.     THE    PENNSYLVANIA   RAILROAD    COMPANY 

The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  owned  the  entire  capital 
stock  and  <|4,383,231  of  bonds  of  the  Manor  Real  Estate 
and  Trust  Company,  whose  business  is  the  buying  and  sell- 
ing of  real  estate,  and  it  owned  8899  acres  of  coal  land 
*' more  or  less"  in  the  various  counties.  Besides,  the  rail- 
road had  "some  interest"  in  the  Walhonding  Coal  Com- 
pany on  its  lines  west  of  Pittsburg  and  owned  the  entire 
capital  stock  of  the  Susquehanna  Coal  Company  whose 
holdings  were  in  the  anthracite  region. 

E.     THE    NEW   YORK    CENTRAL    AND    HUDSON   RIVER 
RAILROAD    COMPANY 

The  New  York  Central  acquired  control  of  the  Fall 
Brook  Railroad  and  the  Beech  Creek  Railroad  by  lease 
in  1899  and  by  purchase  of  stock  in  1910.^  This  gives  the 
Central  a  line  extending  from  Lyons,  New  York  (on  its 
main  line),  into  central  Pennsylvania.  It  hauls  coal  out 
of  Cambria,  Clearfield,  Indiana,  Center,  and  Tioga  Coun- 
ties. The  railroad  owns  the  capital  stock  (-11,000,000)  of 
the  Clearfield  Bituminous  Coal  Corporation  whose  entire 
product  is  used  by  this  railroad  for  fuel.  Formerly  this 
coal  corporation  engaged  in  commercial  coal  business. 
But  in  1901,  by  agreement  with  the  Beech  Creek  Coal 
and  Coke  Company,  the  commercial  coal  business  was  dis- 
pensed with.  In  the  same  year  the  New  York  Central  was 
given  5000  shares  of  the  Beech  Creek  Coal  and  Coke  Com- 
pany on  condition  that  it  furnish  ready  transportation  for 
1,000,000  tons  of  coal  mined  by  the  coal  company.  Four 
years  later  the  railroad  exchanged  these  5000  shares  for 
5000  shares  of  common  stock,  5000  shares  of  preferred 

1  Official  correspondence. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  85 

stock,  and  $500,000  in  bonds  of  the  Pennsylvania  Coal 
and  Coke  Company,  which,  by  taking  over  the  Beech 
Creek  coal  and  coke  properties,  became  owner  of  26,000 
acres  of  coal  lands,  3000  acres  under  lease,  21  mines  in 
operation,  and  about  four  fifths  of  the  capital  stock  of  the 
North  River  Coal  and  Wharf  Company,  which  controls 
"  a  tidewater  delivery  point  of  the  Central  Railroad  of 
New  Jersey,  for  coal  originating  on  the  line  of  the  New 
York  Central  and  Hudson  River  Railroad."  The  railroad 
also  owned  fifty-two  per  cent  of  the  stock  of  the  West 
Branch  Coal  Company,  a  small  concern  with  a  capital 
stock  of  $50,000  (in  1907). 

F.  BUFFALO  AND  SUSQUEHANNA  RAILROAD  COMPANY 

The  Buffalo  and  Susquehanna  Railroad  Company's  ac- 
tivities were  confined  to  the  northern  central  portion  of 
Pennsylvania,  and  it  owned  the  Buffalo  and  Susquehanna 
Coal  and  Coke  Company  which  had  a  capital  of  $1,140,- 
000,  and  all  but  S400  of  the  $100,000  capital  of  the  Pow- 
hatan  Coal  and  Coke  Company. 

G.  BUFFALO,  ROCHESTER,    AND   PITTSBURG   RAILWAY 

COMPANY 

The  Buffalo,  Rochester,  and  Pittsburg  Railway  Com- 
pany owned  $3,999,500  of  the  $4,000,000  capital  stock 
of  the  Rochester  and  Pittsburg  Coal  and  Iron  Company, 
and  the  latter  company  owned  a  controlling  interest  in 
the  Jefferson  and  Clearfield  Coal  and  Iron  Company, 
capitalized  at  $3,000,000. 

H.    PITTSBURG,  SHAWMUT,  AND  NORTHERN  RAILROAD 
COMPANY 

The  Pittsburg,  Shawmut,  and  Northern  Railroad  Com- 
l)any,  through  its  ownership  of  the  Kersey  Mining  Company 
and  the   Shawmut  Mining  Company,  possessed  28,800 


80       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

acres  of  coal  lands  besides  coal  lands  in  Jefferson  County 
that  were  not  in  operation. 

I.     THE    ERIE    RAILROAD    COMPANY 

The  Erie  Railroad  Company  owned  the  Northwest 
Mining  and  Exchange  Company  and  the  Blossburg  Coal 
Company.  The  production  from  these  concerns  was  used 
almost  entirely  by  the  Erie  for  fuel. 

J.    CHESAPEAKE   AND    OHIO   RAILWAY    COMPANY 

It  was  claimed  that  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway 
Company  did  not  own  stock  in  any  coal  properties  along 
its  lines,  but  it  acquired  the  ownership  of  28,000  acres  of 
coal  land  from  the  Western  Pocahontas  Coal  and  Lum- 
ber Company.  In  1907  the  railroad  did  not  penetrate  this 
property  and  no  mining  was  conducted  upon  it. 

D.  Traffic  Associations 

Chaotic  conditions  previous  to  1895  caused  the  railroads 
to  form  themselves  into  traffic  associations  in  order  to 
stop  the  demoralization  of  freight  rates  by  rebating  and 
to  come  to  some  agreement  in  the  allotment  of  tonnage 
and  the  establishment  of  rates.  These  associations  em- 
ployed statisticians  to  determine  tonnage,  and  the  various 
railroads  were  assigned  different  percentages.  Penalties 
were  provided  for  the  violation  of  these  percentages,  but 
it  was  found  impossible  to  enforce  them  strictly.  How- 
ever, the  conferences  of  the  associations  resulted  in  the 
fixing  of  rates. 

A.    THE    TIDEWATER   BITUMINOUS    STEAM    COAL 
TRAFFIC    ASSOCIATION 

The  association  which  controlled  the  territory  we  are 
interested  in  included  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  New 
York  Central  and  Hudson  River  Railroad,  the  Baltimore 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  87 

and  Ohio  Railroad,  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway, 
the  Norfolk  and  Western  Railway,  and  the  Philadelphia 
and  Reading  Railway. 


B.    OWNERSHIP    OF    STOCK    AND    INTERLOCKING 
DIRECTORATES 

The  fact  that  the  association  was  not  effective  in  fixing 
allotments  and  rates  led  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  to  buy 
stocks  in  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio,  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio,  and  the  Norfolk  and  Western  Railway  Company  in 
order  to  act  with  others  in  bringing  about  the  desired  re- 
sults. It  acquired  38  per  cent  of  the  Norfolk  and  Western 
stock,  25  per  cent  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio,  and  37.6 
per  cent  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio. 

The  New  York  Central  acquired  20  per  cent  of  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  stock,  and  21.7  per  cent  of  the  stock 
of  the  Reading  Company,  which  in  turn  owned  the  entire 
capital  stock  of  the  Philadelphia  and  Reading  Company. 
The  Baltimore  and  Ohio  also  acquired  21.7  per  cent  of  the 
Reading  Company's  stock.  Thus  the  New  York  Central 
and  Baltimore  and  Ohio  together  owned  43.4  per  cent  of 
the  Reading  Company's  stock. 

At  the  meetings  of  the  stockholders  the  minority  hold- 
ings by  combining  could  control  the  railroad  policies  and 
the  Commission  was  forced  "  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
practical  control  of  the  several  railroads  mentioned  was 
in  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company  and  the  New  York 
Central  and  Hudson  River  Railroad  Company."  ^  In  the 
make-up  of  executive  committees  of  the  boards  of  directors 
the  full  significance  of  the  allied  interests  is  apparent.  Of 
the  six  members  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  executive 
committee  four  were  officers  of  the  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road ;  of  the  six  members  of  the  executive  committee  of 
the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio,  two  were  officers  of  the  New 

^  Report  of  Inter  state  Commerce  Commission  to  Congress,  op.cit.  p.  40. 


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90       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

York  Central  and  two  were  officers  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad ;  and  of  the  five  members  of  the  executive  com- 
mittee of  the  Norfolk  and  Western  Railroad,  the  Penn- 
sylvania Railroad  controlled  three. 

The  diagrams  on  pages  88  and  89  make  these  facts 
stand  out  more  strikingly  than  words  can  portray  them. 
We  must  remember  also  that  this  is  the  minimum  amount 
of  information  in  regard  to  the  situation.  In  many  cases 
the  Commission  made  no  pretense  of  giving  the  extent  of 
landholdings  of  companies  which  the  railroads  owned  or 
in  which  they  held  a  partial  or  controlling  interest.  These 
facts  make  us  realize  that  the  same  process  is  going  on 
and  the  same  policy  being  pursued  which  has  directed  de- 
velopments in  the  anthracite  field.^  Furthermore,  we  have 
no  knowledge  of  how  close  the  relationship  is  between  the 
big  railroads  and  the  smaller  ones  whose  holdings  are 
shown  on  page  89.  Of  this  we  may  be  sure  —  the  rail- 
roads meant  not  only  to  assure  themselves  of  traffic,  but 
they  proposed  to  gain  the  ownership  of  the  resources  of 
the  region  and  to  direct  so  far  as  possible  the  policies 
which  should  govern  them. 

*  Since  the  investigation  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in  1906 
the  railroads  have  been  carrying  on  a  process  of  consolidation  by  purchase 
and  ownership  instead  of  control  through  majority  stock  ownership  or  com- 
bination of  minority  holdings.  The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  divided  its  hold- 
ings in  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  between  the  Pennsylvania  Com- 
pany (a  holding  company)  and  its  other  companies,  and  by  July,  1913,  its 
interests  amounted  to  $42,547,200  of  preferred  and  common  stock  in  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio,  or  twenty-one  per  cent.  (See  3foodfs  Manual,  1914,  p. 
1369.)  In  July,  1913,  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  traded  its  holdings  in  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  for  $38,292,400  of  Southern  Pacific  stock  held  by  the 
Union  Pacific  Company.  ("See  Moody's  Manual,  1914,  p.  103.)  A  mere  trans- 
fer of  landlords  is  uot  apt  to  change  the  policy  in  respect  to  concentration 
and  control.  Moreover,  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  has  surrendered  none  of 
its  control  of  the  coal  lands  in  possession  of  the  Norfolk  and  Western,  for 
its  percentage  of  the  stock  of  that  road  has  risen  from  thirty-eight  to  forty- 
three  per  cent. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  91 

E.  Direction  of  Policy  toward  Labor 

If  these  interests  were  able  to  control  the  general  poli- 
cies affecting  the  common  carriers  and  natural  resources 
in  regard  to  prices  and  rates,  they  were  also  able  to  direct 
the  policy  of  capital  toward  labor.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  real  powers  with  which  labor  has  to  contend, 
whenever  it  attempts  to  disturb  prices,  become  apparent. 
We  must  remember  that  it  is  not  merely  the  coal  compa- 
nies owned  and  controlled  by  the  railroads  which  are  sub- 
jected to  the  all-pervasive  influence  of  the  railroads,  but 
the  so-called  independent  companies,  in  spite  of  them- 
selves, in  their  attitude  toward  labor,  must  conform  to  the 
wishes  of  the  powerful  railroad  officials.  No  matter  how 
willing  an  independent  operator  may  be  to  grant  conces- 
sions to  his  men,  it  becomes  an  impossibility  if  the  coal 
and  railroad  corporations  decide  to  crush  unionism  and 
establish  wages  and  working  conditions  which  go  with 
individual  bargaining.  The  independent  operator  cannot 
compete  under  such  circumstances  and  he  must  fall  in  line 
with  the  general  policy  of  the  bigger  concerns  in  order 
to  exist.  The  large  corporations,  which  are  able  to  estab- 
lish a  regime  of  individual  bargaining  over  a  large  section 
of  the  most  valuable  coal  fields,  stand  as  a  constant  men- 
ace to  all  the  fields  which  are  willing  to  enter  a  joint 
agreement  to  establish  uniformity.  Besides  the  differen- 
tial which  this  region  has,  because  of  its  better  natural 
advantages  and  resources,  the  opportunity  is  always  pres- 
ent under  individual  bargaining  to  exploit  the  individual 
laborer  to  almost  any  extent  within  the  limit  of  subsistence 
wages  in  order  to  keep  just  under  the  prices  of  the  union 
fields. 

F.  Westmoreland  County  Strike,  1910-11 

If  we  are  disposed  to  qiiestion  this  power  and  the  pol- 
icy of  crushing  all  opposition,  we  have  but  to  refer  to 


92       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

recent  events  in  Westmoreland  County,  Pennsylvania 
(a  county  dependent  on  the  Pennsylvania  liailroad  and 
its  branches),  and  in  West  Virginia.  In  Westmoreland 
County  we  find  a  working  force,  seventy  per  cent  of 
whom  are  foreigners,^  struggling  for  over  a  year  to  obtain 
collective  bargaining,  only  to  be  defeated  by  the  resources 
which  large  corporate  wealth  had  at  its  command. 

A.    CAUSE   AND    SPREAD    OP   THE    STRIKE 

For  twenty  years  the  condition  in  this  county  had  been 
a  bugbear  to  the  collective  agreement  in  the  Pittsburg 
district.  The  miners'  leaders  were  always  confronted  with 
the  statement  that  competitive  conditions  in  Westmore- 
land made  it  impossible  to  grant  concessions.  All  efforts 
of  the  United  Mine  Workers  to  organize  the  county  by 
employing  organizers  had  failed.  Finally,  in  March,  1910, 
the  company  charges  for  "  permissible  explosives  "  (safety 
explosives)  and  safety  lamps  brought  the  men  of  one  com- 
pany together  to  discuss  their  grievances.  As  soon  as  the 
company  officials  learned  that  the  men  had  sent  a  dele- 
gate to  the  United  Mine  Workers  to  obtain  an  organizer 
and  that  a  union  was  being  formed,  the  unionists  were 
discharged.^  The  men  demanded  the  reinstatement  of 
those  victimized.  With  a  refusal  from  the  company  the 
fight  was  on.  Within  a  month  the  strike  had  become  gen- 
eral in  the  Greensburg,  Irwin,  and  Latrobe  Basins,  in- 
volving 10,631  men  out  of  15,537. 

B.  operators'  tactics 

Then  the  companies  began  all  the  tactics  usually  em- 
ployed to  defeat  the  worker.  Unskilled  strike-breakers 

^  Report  on  the  Miners^  Strike  in  Westmoreland  County,  Pa.,  1910-11, 
prepared  under  the  direction  of  C.  P.  Neill,  Commissioner  of  Labor,  62d 
Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Doc.  847,  p.  108. 

2  The  law  of  1897  prohibiting  interference  with  employees  for  connection 
with  a  labor  union  and  providing  penalties  was  declared  uncoDStitutional  in 
1900.  Ibid.,  p.  46. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  93 

were  imported  at  higher  wages  than  the  regular  men  de- 
manded, with  resulting  increase  of  accidents  and  loss  of 
life.^  The  strikers  were  evicted  from  the  company  houses 
and  the  United  Mine  Workers  sheltered  them  in  camps 
on  leased  ground.  The  ever- ready  injunction  prohibited 
the  men  from  marching  on  the  public  highways  to  stir  up 
enthusiasm  and  gain  adherents.^  State  coal  and  iron  po- 
lice, deputy  sheriffs,  deputy  constables,  and  state  police 
made  up  the  small  army  of  men  which  protected  the  prop- 
erties. The  state  coal  and  iron  police  were  commissioned 
by  the  governor  at  the  request  of  the  companies,  and  paid 
by  the  companies.  The  state  police  were  a  body  of  mounted 
men  belonging  to  the  state  constabulary.  The  deputies 
were  made  up  of  outsiders  furnished  by  the  sheriff  to  the 
companies  according  to  contract  at  a  rate  of  from  four  to 
five  dollars  per  day.  When  the  sheriff  sent  deputies  with 
warrants  to  arrest  some  non-unionists  employed  by  the 
companies  who  were  alleged  to  have  fired  upon  the 
strikers,  the  deputies  were  arrested  for  trespass  by  coal 
and  iron  police  employed  by  the  companies.  They  were 
taken  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  and  sentenced  to  ten 
days'  imprisonment.  The  sheriff  refused  to  imprison  his 
deputies  and  later  was  tried  for  this  offense  by  the 
Court  of  Quarter  Sessions  and  sentenced  to  thirteen 
months  in  the  penitentiary.  This  charge  and  one  for 
embezzlement  of  fees  the  sheriff  claimed  were  instigated 
by  the  companies  because  of  a  disagreement  over  the 
amount  of  profit  he  was  to  make  out  of  furnishing  dep- 
uties.3 

^  An  increase  of  twenty-one  fatal  accidents  above  normal  years.  Re- 
port nf  Miners'  Strike  in  Westmoreland  County,  Pa.,  1911,  op.  cit.,  p.  14. 

^  The  miners  obtained  a  modification  of  the  injunction  in  order  to  attend 
the  funeral  of  a  comrade  in  a  body.  Their  march  took  them  over  a  high- 
way leading  through  a  coal  company's  property.  Before  the  officials  of  the 
company  and  their  hired  police  would  honor  the  modified  writ,  the  men 
were  compelled  to  furl  their  American  flags  and  carry  them  with  staffs 
pointing  downward.  Ibid.,  p.  02. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  21. 


94       ARBITili\.TION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Seven  companies  filed  suits  against  the  union  officers 
for  damages  amouuting  to  from  f  200,000  to  *500,000  for 
each  company.  They  were  charged  with  conspiracy,  intimi- 
dation, violence,  and  general  lawlessness.  This  raised  such 
a  furor  among  organized  labor  in  all  industries  that  the 
suits  were  not  pressed. 

C.    REFUSAL   TO    ARBITRATE 

Offers  to  arbitrate,  by  the  men,  and  attempts  at  medi- 
ation by  the  Pittsburg  Chamber  of  Commerce  were  with- 
out results.  Appeals  to  the  governor  brought  the  response 
that  he  had  no  power  to  investigate  the  situation  or  reme- 
dies to  offer.  The  union  spent  $1,064,865  in  supporting 
the  miners,  but  finally  declared  the  strike  off  in  July, 
1911.  As  a  mere  test  of  strength  and  resources  the  union 
was  fighting  against  too  great  odds. 

G.  The  Strike  of  1912  in  West  Virginia 

When  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  recent  troubles  in 
West  Virginia  we  find  many  conditions  similar  to  those 
which  were  present  in  Pennsylvania.  In  West  Virginia 
the  ill-feeling  developed  into  actual  warfare  between  the 
contending  parties.  In  the  early  part  of  this  chapter  we 
found  that  the  union  had  gained  a  foothold  in  the  Kana- 
wha district  in  1902,  but  since  that  time  no  headway  had 
been  made  in  organizing  the  State. 

The  trouble  in  the  Kanawha  field  began  in  April,  1912, 
and  after  a  ten  days'  strike  an  agreement  was  made  with 
all  the  field  except  Paint  Creek.  But  the  trouble  at  Paint 
Creek  soon  spread  to  Cabin  Creek  and  New  River,  both 
non-union  fields.  In  the  background  of  the  immediate  or 
surface  causes  for  discontent  stood  the  larger  economic 
and  geographical  factors  which  influenced  the  viewpoint 
of  the  operators  and  encouraged  them  to  assume  an  arbi- 
trary attitude  toward  what  they  regarded  as  insurmount- 
able difficulties.  The  geographical  situation  of  West  Vir- 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  95 

ginia,  which  leaves  the  West  Virginia  operator  farthest 
from  the  Lake  market,  led  him  to  assume  that  a  fair 
adjustment  of  differentials  between  the  State  and  other 
States  could  not  be  worked  out  in  the  joint  conference  of 
the  central  field.^ 

Until  a  little  more  than  a  year  ago  the  operators  in  the 
Pittsburg  district  had  a  differential  in  freight  rates  over 
the  West  Virginia  operators  of  9  cents  on  a  ton.  Pressure 
from  the  Pittsburg  operators  upon  the  railroads  brought 
a  joint  meeting  of  railroad  officials,  Pittsburg  operators, 
and  West  Virginia  operators  in  an  attempt  to  settle  upon 
satisfactory  rates. ^  The  parties  could  not  agree,  but  the 
railroads  raised  the  rates  on  the  West  Virginia  coal  9^ 
cents  per  ton,  which  gave  the  Pittsburg  district  a  differen- 
tial of  18|^  cents.  As  the  result  of  an  appeal  which  the 
West  Virginia  operators  carried  to  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  the  rates  were  suspended,  but  later  the 
Commission  ordered  a  decrease  of  10  cents  per  ton  on  the 
existing  rates  from  the  Pittsburg  district,  which  gave  it  a 
differential  of  19  cents. 

Because  of  this  differential  the  operators  on  Cabin 
Creek  and  Paint  Creek  claimed  they  could  not  pay  the 
union  scale  which  went  into  effect  in  the  Kanawha  district, 
but  "  even  with  the  differential  spread  to  19  cents,  they 
are  shipping  coal  as  fast  as  they  can  mine  it."  ^ 

The  Paint  Creek  miners  were  organized,  but  they  re- 
ceived information  that  their  operators  would  not  sign  the 
union  scale  for  another  year  and  that  they  would  insist  on 
conditions  similar  to  those  in  vogue  in  the  unorganized 
Cabin  Creek  district.  This  forecast  proved  correct,  and 
the  Paint  Creek  operators  withdrew  from  the  Kanawha 
Operators'  Association. 

^  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  962. 
2  Ibid.,  part  2,  p.  18S0. 

8  West,  "  The  Civil  War  in  the  West  Virginia  Coal  Mines,"  ITit  Survey, 
April  5,  1913,  p.  40. 


96       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

The  issues  which  weighed  most  heavily  with  the  miners 
are  expressed  in  their  formal  demands:  — 

Abolition  of  the  mine  guard  system, 

A  reform  in  the  system  of  docking  used  (which  deducted  as 
high  as  1000  pounds  for  impurities).^ 

The  employment  of  checkvveiglimen  on  the  tipples  to  repre- 
sent the  miners  and  to  be  paid  by  the  miners.  The  law  provides 
for  these  checkweighmeu,  but  this  law  is  ignored  by  the  coal 
companies. 

Permission  for  the  men  to  trade  where  they  please  without 
discrmiination  against  them  for  so  doing. 

The  payment  of  wages  in  cash  every  two  weeks  and  not  in 
script  or  credit  cards. 

Improved  sanitary  conditions,  with  the  requirement  that  the 
companies  remove  garbage  and  keep  the  houses  in  good  con- 
dition. 

Payment  for  mining  coal  on  the  basis  of  the  short  ton,  on 
which  the  coal  is  sold,  and  not  on  the  basis  of  the  long  ton,  on 
which  it  is  at  present  mined. 

Rentals  of  houses  based  on  a  fair  return  on  their  cost  with 
allowance  for  upkeep  and  electric  lights  on  the  same  basis. 

The  nine-hour  day  [the  men  now  work  ten  hours]. 

Recognition  of  the  union. 

An  increase  in  pay. 

It  is  significant  that  the  abolition  of  the  mine  guard  sys- 
tem stands  at  the  head  of  the  list.  When  the  Paint  Creek 
operators  refused  to  pay  the  union  scale,  the  mine  guards 
were  brought  in  and  the  war  was  on.  The  strike  spread 
through  Cabin  Creek  and  the  struggle  developed  into  a 
fight  for  supremacy  and  to  settle  old  scores  between  the 
mine  guards  and  the  miners.  In  order  to  appreciate  the 
part  which  the  mine  guards  have  played,  we  have  but  to 
recall  their  function  in  maintaining  the  regime  of  peonage, 
landlordism,  and  "union  smashing."  Former  Governor 
M.  O.  Dawson  said  in  his  special  message  to  the  legislature 
of  1907  in  response  to  complaints  of  peonage  from  the 
^  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op-  cit.,  part  1,  p.  951. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  97 

Italian  ambassador,  which  had  been  brought  to  his  atten- 
tion by  Secretary  of  State,  Elihu  Koot :  — 

The  use  of  mine  guards  in  this  state  is  not  restricted  to  cases 
like  these  under  investigation.  They  are  used  at  some  of  the 
coUieries  to  protect  the  property  of  owners,  to  prevent  trespass- 
ing, and  especially  to  prevent  labor  agitators  and  organizers  of 
a  miners'  union  from  gaining  access  to  the  miners.  .  .  .  Many 
outrages  have  been  committed  by  these  guards,  many  of  whom 
appear  to  be  vicious  and  dare-devil  men  who  seem  to  aim  to  add 
to  their  viciousness  by  bull-dozing  and  terrorizing  people.  It  is 
submitted  in  all  candor  that  it  is  not  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
owners  of  these  collieries  to  employ  such  lawless  men  or  to  justify 
the  outrageous  acts  committed  by  them.^ 

The  commission  appointed  by  Governor  Glasscock  in 
August,  1912,  expressed  similar  sentiments :  — 

From  the  cloud  of  witnesses  and  mass  of  testimony  figuring 
in  the  hearings,  there  emerges  clearly  and  unmistakably  the 
fact  that  these  guards  .  .  .  recklessly  and  flagrantly  violated, 
in  respect  to  the  miners  on  Paint  Creek  and  Cabin  Creek,  the 
rights  guaranteed  by  natural  justice  and  the  Constitution  to 
every  citizen  howsoever  lowly  his  estate.  •  .  .  Many  crimes  and 
outrages  laid  to  their  charge  were  found  upon  careful  sifting  to 
have  no  foundation  in  fact,  but  the  denial  of  tlie  right  of  peace- 
ful assembly  and  of  freedom  of  speech,  [the]  many  and  grievous 
assaults  on  unarmed  miners,  show  that  their  main  purpose  was 
to  overawe  the  miners  and  their  adherents  and,  if  necessary,  to 
beat  and  cudgel  them  into  submission.  We  find  that  the  system 
employed  was  vicious,  strife-prompting,  and  un-American.'' 

These  statements  were  further  verified  by  the  testimony 
given  before  the  Senate  investigation  committee.  At  that 
time  men  testified  that  they  were  imported  to  become 
"strong-arm  "  men,^  and  it  was  shown  that  the  Baldwin- 
Felts  Detective  Agency  furnished  guards  and  sent  secret 

^  Quoted  by  West,  op-  cit.,  p.  40. 

^  Rf-p'/rt  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  380. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  85. 


98       ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

spies  among  the  miners  to  report  on  their  movements,^ 
provided  blacklists,^  and  sought  to  prevent  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  union.3  A  special  train  was  fitted  up  with  a 
machine  gun  and  armed  men  who  fired  into  the  miners' 
camp  as  the  train  passed  by.^  Additional  testimony  by 
men  imported  from  New  York  brought  out  the  fact  that 
they  were  kept  in  locked  cars  and  under  guard  from  the 
time  the  train  left  New  York  State  until  they  were  landed 
in  West  Virginia.^  Such  activities  show  the  abuses  which 
can  arise  under  the  guard  system. 

The  ill-feeling  between  the  miners  and  the  guards  had 
progressed  to  such  a  degree  that  thorough  preparations 
for  warfare  were  made  by  both  sides  and  pitched  battles 
were  fought.  The  leaders  of  the  miners  urged  the  gov- 
ernor to  declare  martial  law,  but  not  until  a  request  for 
troops  came  from  the  county  sheriff  on  July  26, 1912,  was 
the  governor  in  a  position  to  take  a  hand  in  the  matter. 
The  state  law  made  it  necessary  for  the  governor  to  wait 
till  the  local  officers  requested  aid  before  he  could  inter- 
fere, and  the  commission  appointed  to  investigate  the 
situation  could  not  refrain  from  recording  its  judgment 
that  the  local  peace  officers  "  exhibited  a  woeful  lack  of 
resolution  and  energy  in  enforcing  law  and  order."  ^  A 
few  companies  of  troops  were  sent  to  aid  the  sheriff,  and 
finally  the  entire  state  militia  was  stationed  in  Cabin 
Creek  and  Paint  Creek  prior  to  the  first  declaration  of 
martial  law  on  September  2. 

Feeling  over  the  issues  involved  had  arisen  to  such  a 
pitch  that  it  was  undoubtedly  impossible  for  the  civil  au- 
thorities to  cope  with  the  situation.  During  August  the 
miners  kept  up  an  agitation  and  held  mass  meetings  in 
protest  against  the  guard  system  and  the  importation  of 
non-unionists.    The  governor  invited  the  operators  and 

^  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op,  cit.,  part  1,  p.  856. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  863.  8  Ibid.,  p.  864.  *  Ibid.,  part  2,  p.  1642. 
6  Ibid.,  part  1,  p.  Q9iff.  «  Ibid.,  p.  386. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  99 

miners  each  to  appoint  two  members  on  a  commission 
which  should  undertake  a  state- wide  investigation  of  the 
coal  industry,  but  as  that  was  not  done,  he  finally,  in  the 
latter  part  of  August,  appointed  a  commission  of  three 
which  made  an  extended  inquiry  into  conditions. 

Along  with  the  declaration  of  martial  law  on  the  2d  of 
September  a  military  commission  was  placed  in  power. 
The  militia  confiscated  2354  rifles  and  pistols,  6  machine 
guns,  and  over  178,000  rounds  of  ammunition  of  various 
kinds.^  State  statutes  and  constitutional  provisions  were 
laid  aside  and  the  commission  punished  at  its  discretion 
regardless  of  statutory  penalties.^  The  findings  were  not 
divulged  until  the  governor  had  passed  upon  them.  The 
governor  explained  that  it  was  understood  between  the 
commission  and  himself  "  that  it  was  not  the  intention 
that  these  people  should  be  required  to  serve  the  time  for 
which  they  were  apparently  sentenced.  We  used  that 
practically  for  the  purpose  of  detaining  these  people  until 
we  had  peace  and  order  in  that  territory."  ^  However,  this 
did  not  prevent  the  militia  from  arresting  the  local  justice 
of  the  peace,  (seemingly)  unwarrantedly  detaining  him  ^ 
and  in  aiding  the  guards  in  bringing  in  non-unionists. 

When  the  miners  realized  that  martial  law  meant  pun- 
ishment for  "  unlawful  assemblage  "  and  brought  with  it 
trial  by  military  commission,  they  appealed  to  the  courts, 
but  without  avail.  A  judge  of  the  county  court,  who  is- 
sued a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  on  the  theory  that  the  de- 
fendants had  a  right  to  trial  by  jury,  later  "  reversed  his 
opinion  and  decided  that  [he  had]  '  no  right  to  interfere 
with  a  court  martial  duly  organized  under  the  laws  of  a 
State ' ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  West  Virginia  Supreme 
Court  of  Appeals  upheld  the  governor's  right  to  declare 
martial  law  and  to  appoint  a  military  commission."  ^ 

1  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  80. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  164.  3  Ibid.,  p.  398.  *  Ibid.,  p.  493^7: 
''  Literary  Digest,  April  5,  1913. 


100     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Five  union  leaders  who  were  brought  before  the  mili- 
tary commission  refused  to  put  up  any  defense  to  a  charge 
of  conspiracy  to  murder,  with  the  hope  that  their  counsel 
would  thus  be  able  to  carry  the  case  by  appeal  to  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  and  there  establish  whether 
the  civil  law  can  be  suspended  and  trial  by  jury  super- 
seded by  court  martial.  The  defendants  based  their  appeal 
upon  the  following  clauses  of  the  West  Virginia  constitu- 
tion :  — 

The  military  shall  be  subordinate  to  the  civil  power ;  and  no 
citizen,  unless  engaged  in  the  military  service  of  the  State,  shall 
be  tried  or  punished  by  any  military  court  for  any  ofEense  that 
is  by  the  civil  courts  of  the  State  .  .  . 

The  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and 
of  this  State  are  operative  alike  in  a  period  of  war  as  in  time  of 
peace,  and  any  departure  therefrom,  or  violation  thereof,  under 
the  plea  of  necessity,  or  any  other  plea,  is  subversive  of  good 
government,  and  tends  to  anarchy  and  despotism. 

On  September  11  the  governor  received  a  copy  of  a 
letter  addressed  to  the  operators  by  the  international  vice- 
president  and  the  district  president,  asking  for  a  confer- 
ence to  try  to  effect  "  an  honorable  and  fair  settlement." 
The  good  offices  of  the  governor  were  sought  to  bring 
about  such  a  conference.  In  complying  with  the  request 
the  governor  reminded  the  operators  that  no  law  existed  in 
West  Virginia  which  would  permit  his  appointing  a  board 
of  arbitration  whose  decision  should  be  final,  appealed  to 
their  patriotism  to  "  save  life  and  property,"  and  earnestly 
pleaded  with  them  "  to  make  some  suggestions  and  use 
your  best  efforts  to  end  this  struggle,  which  we  all  admit 
is  a  disgrace  to  our  State."  ^ 

In  response  to  the  governor's  appeal  the  operators  in- 
formed him  that  they  declined  to  meet  the  representatives 
of  the  miners  because  they  were  "  convinced  that  no  good 
could  result  from  a  conference."  They  reminded  the  gov- 
^  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  520. 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  101 

ernor  that  the  United  Mine  Workers  had  been  trying 
"  for  twenty  years  or  more  to  '  organize '  West  Virginia 
in  response  to  the  insistent  demands  of  the  operators  of 
the  '  organized '  districts.  If  we  were  to  admit,  which  we 
are  unwilling  to  do  without  more  convincing  evidence  than 
has  yet  been  presented  to  us,  that  the  officers  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America  in  good  faith  would  endeavor 
to  put  wages  in  the  field  on  a  fairly  competitive  basis  with 
those  in  other  fields,  we  believe  they  could  not  resist  the 
pressure  brought  upon  them  by  the  interests  of  the  com- 
petitive fields."  1  Furthermore,  the  operators  had  steadily 
resisted  the  United  Mine  Workers,  "  with  the  sympathy, 
we  believe,  of  a  great  majority  of  the  miners,  who  have 
no  wish  to  see  union  conditions  with  the  consequent  hard- 
ship upon  all  the  interests  of  this  State."  And  again, "  We 
repeat  that  there  has  never  been  any  demand,  formal  or 
informal,  made  upon  us  for  higher  wages  or  any  different 
conditions  of  employment  or  living  than  are  now  in  force 
at  our  mines."  They  were  also  convinced  that  if  proper 
protection  could  be  given  their  men  who  had  ceased  work 
they  would  return,  and  the  United  Mine  Workers  as  the 
"persistent  and  malignant  foe  to  the  prosperity  of  the  coal 
industry  of  the  State  .  .  .  should  be  taught  that  such 
methods  [of  carrying  on  war]  will  not  be  tolerated." 

On  September  14  the  representatives  of  the  parties 
came  to  the  capitol  at  the  governor's  invitation,  but  as- 
sembled in  separate  rooms.  The  governor  submitted  a  plan 
of  arbitration  to  both  parties,  which  involved  the  selection 
of  a  representative  by  each  side  and  the  third  member 
"  by  the  governor  of  one  of  the  adjoining  States  or  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor." 
The  system  of  mine  guards  was  to  be  abandoned  and  only 
honajide  citizens  employed  as  watchmen  or  guards.  If 
the  miners  would  return  to  work  on  the  terms  under  which 
they  had  been  working,  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was 
*  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  522. 


102     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

to  go  iuto  effect  from  September  1,  1912.  The  arms  still 
held  by  the  parties  in  the  strike  zone  were  to  be  turned  over 
to  the  military  commander  and  the  governor  offered  to  pay 
for  the  expense  of  arbitration  from  his  contingent  fund.^ 

The  miners  were  willing  to  accept  this  plan  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  they  would  have  liked  to  change  some  of  its 
provisions,  "but  by  doing  this  we  realize  the  proposition 
would  not  be  yours,  and  since  we  believe  you  have  only 
the  interests  of  both  parties  to  this  unfortunate  controversy 
at  heart  and  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  harmony  as  well 
as  the  public  good,  we  agree."  ^ 

To  meet  the  operators'  criticisms  on  technicalities  the 
governor  submitted  a  revised  plan  limiting  the  range  of 
the  arbitration  to  the  guard  system,  the  right  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  belong  to  a  union,  and  the  right  of  the  employees 
to  meet  their  employers  to  discuss  wages  and  conditions 
of  labor.  The  decision  should  involve  only  the  Paint  Creek, 
Cabin  Creek,  and  Coal  River  operators,  and  the  agreement 
of  arbitration  should  be  signed  by  representatives  of  both 
union  and  non-union  men. 

The  miners  accepted  this  second  proposition,  but  the 
operators  refused  on  the  basis  of  their  right  to  protect 
their  property  and  employees  and  because  of  their  deter- 
mination not  to  recognize  the  union  in  any  way.^ 

On  October  15,  1912,  martial  law  was  revoked,  but  by 
November  15  the  governor  found  it  necessary  to  put  it  in 
force  again.  It  was  again  "  lifted  "  on  December  12,  but 
the  adjutant-general  was  directed  not  to  make  it  public 
with  the  hope  of  keeping  peace  "  by  simply  leaving  the 
impression  "  that  martial  law  was  in  force.  In  the  early 
part  of  February  another  battle  took  place  in  which  about 
sixteen  persons  were  killed  and  the  governor  sought  the 
advice  of  the  legislature  which  indorsed  his  action  in  de- 
claring martial  law  again. ^ 

1  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  1,  p.  521. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  521.  8  Ihid.,  p.  528.  *  Ibid.,  p.  396^ 


THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  103 

When  Governor  Hatfield  came  into  office  In  March, 
1913,  martial  law  was  still  in  force.  He  made  a  determined 
effort  to  restore  law  and  order,  and  finally,  on  April  25, 
practically  issued  an  ultimatum  that  the  "  strife  and  dis- 
sension must  cease  within  thirty-six  hours  "  and  the  fol- 
lowing terms  for  a  settlement  which  he  suggested  were 
accepted :  — 

First,  the  operators  were  to  agree  to  allow  checkweigh- 
men  to  act  for  the  miners  "  as  indicated  and  in  keeping 
with  sections  438-439  of  the  code." 

Second,  a  nine-hour  day,  which  should  be  understood  as 
nine  hours  of  actual  service,  "  at  the  same  scale  of  wages 
now  paid." 

Third,  "  that  no  discrimination  be  made  against  any 
miner,  and  that  if  he  elects  he  may  be  permitted  to  pur- 
chase the  supplies  for  the  maintenance  of  his  family  wher- 
ever it  suits  him  best,  as  this  was  claimed  by  the  operators 
to  be  the  case  at  the  present  time.  It  is  hoped  by  the  chief 
executive  that  it  will  be  the  pleasure  of  the  mine  opera- 
tors who  own  and  control  commissaries  to  see  that  the 
prices  of  their  merchandise  are  in  keeping  with  the  same 
prices  made  by  independent  or  other  stores  throughout 
the  Kanawha  Valley." 

Fourth,  that  the  operators  grant  a  semimonthly  pay. 

The  governor  proposed  to  see  that  the  above  conditions 
were  carried  out,  and  "  where  the  law  is  not  now  explicit 
to  have  the  same  so  amended  as  will  secure  in  the  future 
the  carrying  out  of  the  suggestions  I  have  made."  ^ 

By  the  middle  of  July  the  Paint  Creek  operators  and  min- 
ers were  working  under  a  formal  agreement  which  provided 
for  the  same  working  conditions  existing  in  the  unionized 
Kanawha  field,  except  that  the  Paint  Creek  miners  had 
gone  to  work  for  two  and  a  half  cents  per  ton  less  than  their 
former  scale.  The  Cabin  Creek  operators,  in  their  settle- 
ment the  latter  part  of  July,  refused  to  permit  the  "  check 

1  Quoted  by  Literary  Digest,  May  10,  1913. 


104     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

off  "  for  dues  or  to  allow  representation  of  the  men  by  a 
mine  committee.  The  individual  had  to  deal  with  the  mine 
foreman  and  superintendent  or  manager.  If  grievances 
were  not  settled,  then  the  miner  might  appeal  to  his  local 
president,  who  could  ask  for  an  arbitration  committee  made 
up  of  a  representative  selected  by  the  miner,  one  by  the 
operators,  and  a  third  selected  by  these  two,  if  necessary. 
A  majority  decision  was  made  binding  on  either  party .^ 
The  Cabin  Creek  operators  refused  to  make  an  agreement 
with  the  United  Mine  Workers,  and  the  settlement  was 
made  with  representatives  of  their  employees. 

The  agreement  made  between  the  New  Kiver  operators 
and  other  operators  along  the  Virginian  Railroad  (repre- 
senting in  all  an  ownership  of  ninety  mines)  and  their 
employees  not  only  included  the  provisions  demanded  by 
the  governor,  but  also  provided  for  a  commission  of  four 
—  two  representatives  from  each  side  —  to  settle  disputes 
by  majority  decision.  In  case  of  failure  to  obtain  a  major- 
ity decision,  the  governor  as  umpire  must  give  the  decid- 
ing vote.^  Decisions  must  be  rendered  within  ten  days  and 
in  the  mean  time  the  men  must  remain  at  work.  In  regard 
to  their  attitude  toward  union  organization,  the  following 
statement  is  made:  "It  is  not  within  our  province  to  ques- 
tion the  right  of  any  man  which  the  laws  of  nature  or  the 
statutes  of  State  or  nation  concede  him,  and  it  is  not  a 
question  for  arbitration  or  consideration;  if  the  stipula- 
tions above  submitted  are  agreed  and  lived  up  to,  it  seems 
to  us  that  no  questions  of  dispute  will  arise,  and  one  that 
will  be  given  no  consideration  as  far  as  we  are  concerned. 
Nothing  more  could  of  right  be  demanded  if  the  principles 
included  in  the  above  propositions  are  carried  out."  This 
was  supplemented  by  a  promise  to  "  eliminate  anything  in 
the  shape  of  the  old  guard  system." 

1  Memorandum  of  Agreement  between  Cabin  Creek  Operators  and  their  Em- 
ployees, 1913,  p.  2. 

2  Memo)  andum  of  Agreement  of  New  Biver  Coal  Operators  {and  others) 
with  their  Employees,  1913,  p.  5. 


THE   WEST   VIRGINIA   PROBLEM  105 

The  territory  now  unionized  includes  eight  counties  in 
the  central  part  of  West  Virginia,  which  is  about  one 
third  of  the  mining  district  of  the  State.^  The  union  lead- 
ers say  that  they  do  not  anticipate  any  trouble  in  renew- 
ing their  agreements,  and  they  probably  hope  soon  to  see 
the  whole  State  organized  and  representatives  of  both 
sides  meeting  with  the  joint  conference  of  the  central  field. 
The  fact  that  such  a  large  percentage  of  the  State  is  work- 
ing under  certain  regulations  as  to  hours,  company  stores, 
checkweighmen,  etc.,  ought  greatly  to  encourage  further 
spread  of  the  joint  agreement.  The  influence  of  the  oper- 
ators working  under  these  regulations  ought  to  weigh 
heavily  in  the  movement  to  reduce  the  unfair  competitive 
conditions. 

In  answer  to  the  operators'  arguments  that  fair  com- 
petitive conditions  between  West  Virginia  and  the  other 
States  could  not  be  established  in  the  joint  conference  of 
the  central  field,  the  miners  reply :  — 

We  have  made  it  clear  to  both  sides  [northern  operators  and 
West  Virginia  operators]  that  it  is  not  our  intention  to  unionize 
these  fields  for  the  purpose  of  strangHng  competition  with  the 
operators  in  the  Northern  States,  nor  to  establish  prohibitive 
wages  and  conditions,  viewed  from  a  competitive  standpoint, 
that  will  keep  their  product  out  of  its  most  favorable  market. 
It  is  needless  to  say  that  if  we  adopted  such  a  short-sighted 
policy  it  would  act  as  a  boomerang  and  would  hit  our  cause  and 
the  men  we  organize  harder  than  it  would  the  operators,  inas- 
much as  it  would  greatly  Umit  the  output  of  these  fields,  deprive 
the  men  of  work,  and  cause  them  more  hai'dship  than  they  now 
suffer.  Such,  of  course,  is  not  our  intention,  all  reports  and  wild 
statements  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  and  in  the  making 
of  any  wage  scale  these  economic  facts  must  and  will  be  taken 
into  consideration.  Every  mining  district  in  the  country  has  a 
natural  market  and  an  inherent  right  to  the  same,  and  we  are 
well  aware  of  the  peculiar  geographical  location  of  those  par- 
ticular fields,  and  in  dealing  with  this  complex  problem  we  fully 

1  Official  correspondence. 


106      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

realize  that  we  are  face  to  face  with  a  condition  and  not  a  theory, 
and  must  meet  it  with  reason  and  intelligence,  and  with  the  sin- 
cere desire  to  be  constructive  and  not  destructive,  to  build  up 
and  not  tear  down,  until,  at  last,  in  the  evolution  of  things, 
now  being  hastened  by  intelligent,  world-wide  discontent,  uni- 
versal cooperation  shall  supplant  the  present  inefficient  system 
of  competition,  with  all  its  waste,  brutality,  and  utter  disregard 
for  the  higher  and  nobler  phases  of  our  common  life.^ 

And  the  president  of  the  union  in  testifying  before  the 
West  Virginia  Mining  Commission  in  1912  pointed  out 
that  the  formation  of  contracts  involves  consideration  of 
freight  rates,  market  conditions,  and  physical  conditions 
in  the  mines  in  arriving  at  an  equitable  price  which  will 
permit  all  the  fields  to  get  their  proper  share  of  the 
market.^ 

But  it  is  estimated  that  in  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  Mary- 
land, Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Alabama  approximately 
150,000  miners  are  unorganized  and  "utterly  helpless  in 
meeting  the  encroachments  of  organized  wealth"  under  a 
regime  of  individual  bargaining.^  Moreover,  this  leaves 
out  of  account  the  unorganized  men  in  southeastern  and 
central  Pennsylvania,  and  the  miners  realize  that  the  fate 
of  the  joint  agreement  is  dependent  upon  their  success  in 
thoroughly  unionizing  the  coal  industry. 

In  chapter  i  we  have  shown  how  the  system  of  concilia- 
tion and  arbitration  arose,  pointed  out  the  economic  and 
social  factors  which  underlie  such  development,  and  de- 
scribed the  methods  by  which  the  joint  agreement  has  been 
extended.  In  the  midst  of  the  process  of  the  extension, 
the  West  Virginia  problem  loomed  up  as  the  most  threat- 
ening factor  for  disruption  of  the  system  thus  built.  We 
have  seen  the  significance  of  the  geographical  location  of  the 
State,  the  importance  of  its  wealth  in  coal,  and  the  effect 

^  Jleport  of  Vice-President  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  1912,  p.  5. 
^  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  3,  p.  2175. 
2  Eeport  of  Vice-President  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  1912,  p.  4. 


THE   \\'EST  VIRGINIA  PROBLEM  107 

of  longer  hours  and  adverse  working  conditions.  Along 
with  such  factors  as  immigration  and  a  conservative  rural 
population  stands  the  concentration  of  wealth  and  a  deter- 
mination on  the  part  of  the  owners  thoroughly  to  control 
and  direct  the  exploitation  of  the  natural  resources.  The 
importance  of  these  considerations  must  be  held  in  mind 
as  we  turn  to  make  a  further  study  of  the  conciliatory  sys- 
tem and  the  organization  of  the  parties  which  make  the 
system  effective. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AlVIERICA 

We  have  reserved  the  consideration  of  the  organization 
and  development  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  and  of  the 
Operators'  Associations  for  chapters  iii  and  iv,  in  order 
to  present  to  the  reader  the  effective  forces  which  stand 
behind  collective  bargaining  in  the  interstate  joint  confer- 
ence. One  cannot  appreciate  the  real  power  behind  the 
armed  neutrality  of  nations  without  an  understanding  of 
their  fighting  equipment  and  natural  resources.  Neither 
can  one  conceive  of  the  significance  of  industrial  forces 
making  for  peace  without  a  knowledge  of  the  machinery 
of  organization  and  the  methods  by  which  effective  soli- 
darity is  attained.  The  effectiveness  of  an  organization 
must  be  kept  at  a  maximum  quite  as  much  in  peaceful 
times  as  in  those  of  strife,  in  order  that  their  agreements 
may  be  loyally  carried  out.  To  understand  how  400,000 
men  are  held  in  line  in  times  of  peace,  induced  to  conform 
to  the  laws  during  strikes,  and  taught  to  exercise  the  might 
of  non-resistance  and  inactivity,  one  must  have  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  technical  features  of  organization  that  have 
secured  a  unity  of  action  in  industrial  democracy  not 
attained  in  political  democracy.  When  we  consider  that, 
besides  the  difficulty  of  holding  a  widely  scattered  mem- 
bership to  a  continuous  policy,  there  are  added  the  dis- 
ruptive factors  involved  in  the  fact  that  twenty  different 
nationalities  and  several  races  are  concerned,  the  difficulty 
of  the  problem  of  organization  is  apparent.  We  shall  de- 
scribe the  United  Mine  Workers'  organization  as  con- 
trolled by  the  constitution  of  1912  which  presents  a  great 
contrast  to  the  loose  federations  of  the  sixties  and  eight- 
ies. We  shall  find  that  every  phrase  of  the  preamble  to  the 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    109 

mine  workers'  constitution  recalls  concrete  industrial  prob- 
lems with  which  the  orgauizatiou  has  to  cope. 


1.  PURPOSES  OF  THE  ORGANIZATION 

The  purposes  of  the  organization  are  thus  set  forth  in 
the  constitution :  — 

There  is  no  truth  more  obvious  than  that  without  coal  there 
could  not  have  been  such  marvelous  social  and  industrial  prog- 
ress as  marks  present  day  civilization. 

Believing  that  those  whose  lot  it  is  to  toil  within  the  earth's 
recesses,  surrounded  by  peculiar  dangers  and  deprived  of  sun- 
light and  pure  air,  producing  the  commodity  which  makes  pos- 
sible the  world's  progress,  are  entitled  to  protection  and  the  full 
social  value  of  their  product,  we  have  formed  the  "  United  Mine 
Workers  of  America  "  for  the  purpose  of  estabhshing,  by  lawful 
means,  the  principles  embraced  in  the  body  of  the  constitution. 

First.  To  unite  in  one  organization,  regardless  of  creed,  color, 
or  nationality,  all  workmen  eligible  for  membership,  employed 
in  and  around  coal  mines,  coal  washers,  and  coke  ovens  on  the 
American  Continent. 

Second.  To  increase  wages  and  improve  the  conditions  of 
employment  for  our  members  by  legislation,  conciliation,  joint 
agreements,  or  strikes. 

Third.  To  demand  that  not  more  than  eight  hours  from  bank 
to  bank  in  each  twenty-four  hours  shall  be  worked  by  members 
of  our  organization. 

Fourth.  To  strive  for  a  minimum  wage  scale  for  all  members 
of  our  craft. 

Fifth.  To  provide  for  the  education  of  our  children  by  law- 
fully prohibiting  their  employment  until  they  have  reached  at 
least  sixteen  years  of  age. 

Sixth.  To  secure  equitable  statutory  old  age  pension  and 
workmen's  compensation  laws. 

Seventh.  To  enforce  existing  just  laws  and  to  secure  the  re- 
peal of  those  which  are  unjust. 

Eighth.  To  secure  by  legislative  enactment  laws  protecting  the 
limbs,  lives,  and  health  of  our  members  ;  establishing  our  right 
to  organize ;  prohibiting  the  use  of  deception  to  secure  strike- 


110     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

breakers  ;  preventing  the  employment  of  armed  guards  during 
labor  disputes ;  and  such  other  legislation  as  will  be  beneficial 
to  the  members  of  our  craft. 


2.  UNITS  OF  ORGANIZATION 
A.   International 

The  jurisdictional  units  of  the  organization  are  divided 
into  international  districts,  subdistricts,  and  local  unions. 
There  are  twenty-five  districts,  fifty  subdistricts,  and 
twenty-four  hundred  local  unions.^  The  international 
union  has  jurisdiction  over  all  the  other  units  and  derives 
its  name  "  international "  from  the  extension  (in  1905)  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  to  the  mine 
workers  of  Canada.  In  all  questions  of  dispute,  appeals, 
and  grievances  under  the  constitution,  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  international  organization  is  limited  only  by  the  terms 
of  the  joint  agreement,  and  the  decision  of  the  international 
executive  board  is  final  unless  reversed  by  the  action  of 
the  international  convention.^ 

B.   Districts 

The  districts  are  designated  by  the  international  officers 
and  may  encompass  two  or  three  States,  a  whole  State,  or 
part  of  a  State,  according  as  varying  conditions  or  the  ex- 
tent of  the  territory  may  warrant.  For  example,  in  Penn- 
sylvania the  anthracite  region  is  divided  into  three  districts 
and  the  organized  portions  of  western  and  central  Penn- 
sylvania are  divided  into  three  districts.  In  the  south- 
western field  a  district  may  include  two  or  three  States. 
Farther  west.  District  15  includes  Utah,  Colorado,  and 
New  Mexico.  The  districts  are  allowed  to  adopt  such  rules 
and  regulations  as  do  not  conflict  with  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  international  organization  or  the  terms  of  the  joint 
agreement. 

^  Official  correspondence. 

2  United  Mine  Workers^  Constitution,  1912,  Article  rn. 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    111 

C.    SUBDISTRICTS 

If  the  conditions  warrant  the  arrangement,  the  districts 
may  be  divided  into  subdistricts,  but  not  until  the  officers 
of  districts  and  local  unions  which  are  affected  have  been 
consulted  and  the  accounts  of  locals  with  the  district,  com- 
prising taxes  and  assessments,  are  settled.  Subdistricts 
are  necessary  only  in  States  having  a  large  coal  area  and 
a  large  working  force,  and  they  are  organized  to  facilitate 
prompt  settlement  of  disputes.  The  officers  of  a  State  like 
Illinois,  with  large  coal  fields  and  75,000  men,  could  not 
be  expected  to  cope  with  all  the  demands  made  upon 
them.  The  rules  of  the  subdistricts  must  conform  to  the 
rulings  of  the  jurisdiction  above,  but  the  subdistrict  unit 
makes  possible  certain  regulations  which  it  is  unnecessary 
to  impose  on  the  whole  district. 

D.  Local  Unions 

A.    JURISDICTION 

The  local  union  is  the  unit  upon  which  the  other  juris- 
dictions are  built.  It  is  subject  to  all  the  rulings  of  the 
jurisdictions  above,  but  withal  it  has  a  great  deal  of  power 
in  dealing  with  its  own  affairs.  In  fact  it  has  all  the  auton- 
omy which  it  has  not  been  found  necessary  to  delegate 
to  the  jurisdictions  above.  In  chapter  i  we  described  the 
period  during  which  the  functions  and  powers  of  the  local 
were  accentuated  to  the  neglect  of  the  welfare  of  the  in- 
dustry as  a  whole.  That  the  jurisdictions  above  have 
received  their  power  has  been  the  result  of  pressing  neces- 
sity, and  to  enable  the  organization  to  cope  with  the  many 
problems  of  the  industry.  A  local  union  is  allowed  juris- 
diction over  only  one  mine. 

B.    DEMOCRATIC   FEATURES 

The  locals  are  democratic  in  their  form  of  government 
and  procedure,  and  it  is  here  that  the  individual  is  made 


112     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

to  feel  the  spirit  of  unionism  which  binds  the  men  to- 
gether. Besides  the  acquaiutances  and  friendships  formed 
as  working  comrades,  they  gain  a  higher  estimate  of  one 
another  as  they  study  and  discuss  their  common  industrial 
problems.  Here  native  ability,  character,  and  the  efforts 
at  self -education  reap  their  full  fruits  and  are  judged  on 
their  merits.  The  immediate  problems  of  industry  lead 
to  a  consideration  of  the  wider  problems  of  citizenship. 
These  local  organizations  stand  as  a  potent  influence  for 
the  encouragement  of  political  and  industrial  democracy. 
By  the  use  of  the  referendum  the  average  individual  is 
able  to  express  his  judgment  on  the  policies  that  shall 
govern  an  industry,  and  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  man  who 
is  in  immediate  contact  with  the  problem  is  in  a  better 
position  to  recognize  the  need  for  a  remedy  than  the  one 
who  is  farther  away  and  who  has  not  felt  the  pressure  of 
necessity. 

C.     LOCAL    AND    INDIVIDUAL    GRIEVANCES 

Strikes  and  difficulties  over  working  conditions  usually 
originate  in  local  unions.  The  man  who  is  mining  coal  is 
the  first  to  feel  the  effect  of  adverse  conditions,  and  for- 
tunately he  has  a  means  of  rectifying  matters  without 
being  subjected  to  the  pressure  which  comes  with  the  ex- 
pression of  dissatisfaction  under  a  regime  of  individual 
bargaining.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  local  officials  to  bring 
about  an  amicable  settlement  with  the  employers  if  possi- 
ble, but  if  not,  the  district  and  international  officers  are 
called  in.  These  jurisdictions  may  reverse  the  action  of 
the  local  officials,  but  the  latter,  in  turn,  if  dissatisfied 
with  the  decision,  may  appeal  the  case  until  it  reaches  the 
highest  authority,  the  international  convention.  If  the  local 
union  continues  to  strike  in  spite  of  a  ruling  of  the  inter- 
national jurisdiction  forbidding  the  strike,  not  only  may  it 
be  denied  financial  aid,  but  it  may  be  suspended  or  have 
its  charter  revoked. 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    113 

The  local  has  full  power  to  penalize  or  debar  members, 
but  the  iudividual  is  protected,  through  the  right  of  appeal 
to  the  international  jurisdiction,  against  malicious  action 
on  the  part  of  a  coterie  of  men.  If  it  is  found  that  any 
branch  of  the  union  has  done  an  injustice  to  a  member  or 
applicant  for  membership,  the  branch  responsible  for  this 
injustice  has  to  compensate  the  individual  for  his  time 
and  the  expense  incurred  in  defending  his  rights,  and  the 
member  or  applicant  is  restored  to  all  rights  and  privi- 
leges of  the  organization. 

D.    MEMBERSHIP 

A  local  union  cannot  have  fewer  than  ten  members, 
and  they  may  be  composed  of  skilled  and  unskilled  men 
working  in  and  around  the  mine.  No  distinction  is  made 
on  the  basis  of  race,  color,  or  nationality.  Mine  officials, 
operators'  commissioners,  persons  selling  intoxicating  li- 
quors, and  members  of  the  National  Civic  Federation  or 
Boy  Scout  Movement  are  ineligible  to  membership.  The 
insertion  of  the  provision  against  members  of  the  Civic 
Federation  in  1911  was  evidently  aimed  at  Mr.  John 
Mitchell,  former  president,  and  to  test  his  loyalty  to  the 
miners'  organization.^  The  Boy  Scouts  were  debarred  from 
membership  because  at  the  time  of  the  convention  the 
delegates  were  under  the  impression  that  the  movement 
was  a  "  first  step  towards  militarism,"  and  they  "  felt  they 
were  justified  in  their  action  from  past  experience  with  an 
organization  of  a  military  character."  The  miners  have 
since  been  informed  of  the  real  nature  of  the  movement. 

By  a  system  of  transfer  cards  members  in  good  stand- 
ing find  a  welcome  when  they  move  from  one  district  to 
another.  The  issuing  of  these  cards  is  strictly  regulated  and 
violation  of  the  regulations  subjects  the  offenders  to  severe 

^  Mr.  Mitchell  proved  his  loyalty  by  resigriing  from  a  position  in  which 
he  was  doing  exceedingly  good  work.  lie  deserves  better  treatment  for  the 
extremely  valuable  services  he  rendered  the  organization. 


114     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

penalties.  When  a  local  union  is  organized  by  an  organizer 
or  any  other  official,  it  pays  a  fee  of  $S  to  the  international 
union,  which  in  turn  supplies  it  with  full  equipment  of  char- 
ter, seal,  books,  cards,  etc.,  for  conducting  its  business.  An 
organizer  must  report  the  organization  of  any  local  within 
a  week  and  send  the  international  fee  or  show  valid  cause 
for  delay.  The  initiation  fee  is  $10  for  skilled  miners  and 
$2.50  for  boys  from  fourteen  to  seventeen.  Members  who 
forfeit  their  membership  by  working  in  non-union  mines 
or  by  arrearages  in  dues  can  only  be  reinstated  by  paying 
another  initiation  fee. 

E.    FINANCES 

The  local  dues  paid  by  each  member  are  fifty  cents  per 
month  plus  such  other  assessments  as  are  levied  by  the 
jurisdiction  above.  The  local  union  as  an  organization 
is  made  responsible  for  a  tax  of  twenty -five  cents  per  month 
per  member  and  such  other  assessments  as  are  levied  by 
the  international  convention  and  referendum  vote.  The 
extent  to  which  this  provision  enabled  the  organization 
to  rise  to  an  emergency  was  exemplified  in  the  anthracite 
strike  of  1902  when  each  member  contributed  an  aver- 
age of  $7  to  $16  in  four  months  with  a  total  col- 
lection of  $2,645,324.1  Boys  under  sixteen  and  decrepit 
or  disabled  members  are  classified  as  haK  members  and 
are  taxed  one  half  the  regular  dues. 

The  local  financial  secretary  is  responsible  for  a  monthly 
report  on  all  members  in  good  standing  and  a  statement 
of  taxes  and  assessments  due  the  international  organiza- 
tion. Locals  which  fail  to  fulfill  this  obligation  are  notified 
by  the  international  secretary,  and  if  he  receives  no  response 
within  ten  days  the  local  is  suspended  from  membership 
and  its  name  is  published  in  the  delinquent  list.  Once  on 
the  delinquent  list,  it  can  only  be  reinstated  by  payment 
of  arrearages  and  a  fine  of  $2  for  each  one  hundred  mem- 

1  Mitchell,  Organized  Labor,  p.  379. 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    115 

bers.  Local  officers  entrusted  with  funds  are  required  to 
give  bonds,  and  for  failure  to  perform  their  duties  they  are 
subjected  by  the  international  union  to  a  suspension  from 
office-holding  for  two  years.  Since  their  failure  to  perform 
their  duties  involves  the  whole  local  in  trouble,  a  duty  is 
placed  upon  each  member  to  see  that  his  local  is  in  good 
standing  if  he  does  not  wish  to  be  subjected  to  the  penal- 
ties applied  to  the  local  for  delinquency.  The  local  finan- 
cial secretary  is  required  to  furnish  each  member  with  a 
"  Due  Card,"  which  is  a  receipt  for  the  taxes  and  assess- 
ments recorded  upon  it.  No  local  is  allowed  to  divide  its 
funds  among  its  members,  and  if  a  local  disbands  (due  to 
abandonment  of  a  mine  or  any  other  cause)  the  funds  and 
supplies  revert  to  the  international.  Locals  which  have 
been  idle  for  a  month  or  more  through  no  fault  of  their 
own  are  exonerated  from  international  taxation  upon  writ- 
ten request  from  the  local  officers. 

Each  local  is  required  to  subscribe  to  the  "  Mine 
Workers'  Journal,"  which  furnishes  a  convenient  means 
of  disseminating  official  notices  and  gives  the  individual 
an  outlook  upon  the  whole  industry.  "  It  shall  be  non- 
sectarian  in  religion,  dignified  in  tone,  and  shall  serve  the 
political  interest  of  our  members  and  the  general  move- 
ment." 

We  thus  see  that  the  local  is  the  foundation  upon  which 
the  superstructure  of  the  national  organization  is  built. 
The  locals  furnish  the  funds  which  make  the  organization 
effective  in  maintaining  loyalty  to  the  union,  in  extending 
it  into  new  fields,  and  in  supporting  strikes  which  include 
large  areas.  The  close  relationship  established  is  illus- 
trated by  the  use  of  the  term  "brother"  which  the  mem- 
bers use  in  addressing  one  another.  This  spirit  of 
brotherhood  along  with  detailed  regulations  proves 
a  powerful  factor  in  holding  the  rank  and  file  in  line 
and  in  building  the  cohesion  necessary  for  a  continuous 
policy. 


116     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

3.  OFFICERS 

A.  Qualifications 

The  officers  of  the  international  organization  are  a  presi- 
dent, vice-president,  secretary,  treasurer,  three  tellers, 
three  auditors,  seven  delegates  to  the  American  Federa- 
tion of  Labor,  and  the  members  of  the  executive  board 
composed  of  one  member  from  each  district.  Any  member 
in  good  standing  in  the  organization  is  qualified  to  hold 
office,  provided  he  has  been  a  member  three  consecutive 
years,  has  had  five  years'  experience  as  a  mine  worker, 
and  has  never  been  guilty  of  misappropriating  funds  of 
the  organization.  No  two  tellers  or  auditors  can  be  elected 
from  the  same  district.  In  case  two  such  officials  from  the 
same  district  receive  a  plurality  of  votes,  the  one  receiv- 
ing the  lesser  number  of  votes  must  resign  in  favor  of  a 
candidate  in  another  district  who  received  the  next  highest 
number  of  votes.  This  would  seem  to  be  a  measure  of  pro- 
tection against  coteries  or  cabals. 

B.  Duties  of  Officers 

In  the  office  of  president  we  have  a  fine  illustration 
of  full  delegation  of  authority  supplemented  by  features 
which  enable  the  rank  and  file  to  retain  ultimate  authority 
and  power.  Besides  presiding  over  all  international  con- 
ventions and  executive  board  meetings,  all  bills  and 
official  documents  must  receive  his  signature.  He  fills  by 
appointment  all  vacancies  in  international  offices  except 
executive  board  members,  who  must  be  elected  by  their 
districts,  and  he  may  remove  any  international  officer 
or  appointee  "for  insubordination  or  just  and  sufficient 
cause."  Organizers,  committees  necessary  to  transact  the 
work  of  the  international  convention,  traveling  auditors, 
and  a  statistician  are  subject  to  his  appointment  and  he 
may  visit  or  appoint  an  officer  to  visit  local  unions.  How- 
ever, his  appointments,  suspensions,  or  removals   must 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA     117 

meet  with  the  approval  of  the  executive  board.  His  inter- 
pretation of  the  constitution  is  subject  to  repeal  only  by 
the  executive  board.  He  may  grant  dispensations  in  regard 
to  initiation  fees  when  he  thinks  they  will  encourage  the 
growth  of  the  union.  In  short,  he  is  responsible  for  gen- 
eral supervision  of  the  organization,  and  is  delegated  suffi- 
cient authority  to  prevent  the  evils  that  occur  as  the  re- 
sult of  divided  leadership  or  lack  of  unified  policy.  This 
is  particularly  important  during  strikes,  for  then  the  indus- 
trial army  must  have  a  commander-in-chief  who  has  power 
to  direct  his  forces  to  the  best  advantage,  and  no  labor 
organization  has  suffered  more  than  the  miners  by  not  ap- 
preciating the  importance  of  this.  For  these  valuable  serv- 
ices the  president  receives  a  salary  of  $3000  per  year. 

The  vice-president  works  under  the  direction  of  the 
president,  and  gives  valuable  service  by  investigating  and 
settling  disputes  and  going  upon  missions  for  which  it 
would  be  impossible  for  the  president  to  find  time.  He 
makes  a  report  of  his  work  to  the  international  conven- 
tion and  is  eligible  to  the  presidency  in  case  the  office  is 
vacated  by  resignation  or  removal.  His  salary  is  $2500. 

The  office  of  secretary-treasurer  is  more  important  than 
the  name  ordinarily  implies.  Besides  having  charge  of 
books,  documents,  and  other  effects,  he  is  the  guardian  of 
the  organization's  finances.  And  this  is  of  no  small  im- 
portance because  the  financial  organization  is  one  of  the 
strongest  features  of  the  union.  The  secretary-treasurer 
exercises  supervision  over  locals  and  their  reports,  and 
penalizes  them  for  violation  of  rules.  Except  at  a  period 
just  before  each  meeting  of  the  international  convention, 
when  the  locals  desire  as  large  a  representation  as  possi- 
ble, they  are  greatly  tempted  to  minimize  in  their  reports 
the  number  of  paid-up  members.  This  is  explained  by  the 
desire  of  the  locals  to  fill  their  own  treasuries  in  order 
that  they  may  build  and  equip  meeting-places  and  take 
care  of  their  own  particular  wants.  To  prevent  such  ir- 


118     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

regularities  is  the  duty  of  the  secretary-treasurer.  He  is 
required  to  give  a  bond  of  $25,000,  and  has  only  $15,000 
subject  to  his  order  at  any  one  time.  His  report  to  the 
convention  keeps  the  organization  thoroughly  informed  of 
its  standing  in  every  way.  He  receives  a  salary  equal  to 
that  of  the  vice-president. 

During  the  interval  between  international  conventions 
the  executive  board  has  "  full  power  to  direct  the  workings 
of  the  organization."  The  board  is  composed  of  one  mem- 
ber elected  from  each  district  and  of  the  president,  vice- 
president,  and  secretary-treasurer.  It  levies  and  collects  as- 
sessments during  such  intervals  when  necessary,  but  not 
for  a  period  of  more  than  two  months  unless  authorized  by 
a  referendum  vote  of  the  members.  The  board  holds  the 
money  of  the  organization  in  trust,  but  a  withdrawal  of 
the  money  requires  a  written  order  indorsed  by  two  thirds 
of  the  members  of  the  board.  It  may  recommend  the  call- 
ing of  a  strike  by  a  two-thirds  vote,  "  but  under  no  cir- 
cumstances shall  it  call  such  a  strike  until  approved  by 
a  referendum  vote."  On  ordinary  matters  the  board  takes 
a  "  unity  "  vote,  but  at  any  time  a  member  may  ask  for  a 
roll  vote  in  which  each  member  has  "  one  vote  and  one 
additional  vote  for  each  2000  members,  or  majority  frac- 
tion thereof,  in  good  standing  he  represents."  This  sort 
of  vote  prevents  a  minority  from  inaugurating  policies 
that  are  detrimental  to  the  majority.  The  president,  vice- 
president,  and  secretary-treasurer  are  allowed  to  vote  in 
"  unit "  votes,  but  not  on  a  roll  call.  In  case  of  a  tie  on 
a  roll  call,  the  president  has  the  deciding  vote.  Board 
members,  tellers,  auditors,  and  delegates  to  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  receive  $4  and  expenses  when  em- 
ployed. 

C.  Importance  of  Organizers 

From  the  simple  statement  in  the  constitution  that  or- 
ganizers are  appointed  by  the  president  and  are  subject 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    119 

to  his  direction,  it  would  be  impossible  to  gain  a  concept 
of  the  importance  of  their  work.  In  chapter  i  we  saw 
something  of  the  difficulties  with  which  the  union  had  to 
contend  in  its  attempt  to  extend  its  jurisdiction  and  inau- 
gurate joint  agreements.  The  brunt  of  this  battle  for  the 
extension  of  unionism  is  borne  by  the  organizers.  They 
are  the  missionaries  or  apostles  of  the  faith.  They  natu- 
rally expect  opposition  from  the  operators  when  they  at- 
tempt to  sow  the  seeds  that  spring  up  and  choke  the  abuses 
of  individual  bargaining.  But  they  also  meet  with  indif- 
ference, ignorance,  suspicion,  fear  of  the  employers,  and 
race  antipathies  among  the  workers,  all  of  which  must  be 
overcome  by  the  ideals  of  unionism  and  faith  in  the  things 
to  be  accomplished  by  solidarity.  In  spite  of  injunctions 
and  intimidation  from  armed  guards  they  spread  their 
gospel.  By  the  employer  who  proposes  to  surrender  none 
of  his  prerogatives  as  proprietor  they  are  hated  as  pests 
and  they  meet  with  treatment  appropriate  to  the  regard 
in  which  they  are  held.  But  they  disseminate  their  teach- 
ings as  they  meet  the  individual  or  give  him  literature 
until  a  small  group  is  won  over  to  form  a  nucleus  for  a 
local  union.  With  the  formation  of  a  local  and  increase  in 
membership  there  comes  a  demand  for  recognition  of  the 
union  and  collective  bargaining.  Usually  it  takes  a  strike 
and  help  from  the  international  union  to  inaugurate  the 
joint  agreement  and  seal  the  outpost  as  union  territory. 

4.    NOMINATION  AND  ELECTION  OF  OFFICERS 
A.  Nominations 

The  full  significance  of  democratic  control  and  the  pro- 
visions for  attaining  it  are  shown  in  the  nomination  and 
election  of  officers.  The  international  officers  are  nomi- 
nated directly  by  the  membership  upon  nomination  blanks 
sent  out  twenty  weeks  before  the  election.  These  nomina- 
tions must  be  returned  within  five  weeks,  and  within  ten 


UO     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

days  from  the  close  of  nominations  the  international  sec- 
retary notifies  the  candidates  who  have  been  nominated 
by  at  least  five  local  unions.  The  nominees  who  desire  to 
become  candidates  have  their  official  notice  attested  by 
the  local  officers  and  return  them  to  the  international  sec- 
retary. After  a  candidate  has  filed  his  acceptance  he  is 
not  allowed  to  withdraw.  Not  later  than  four  weeks  after 
the  acceptances  are  in,  the  secretary  must  forward  to  the 
locals  ballots  containing  the  names,  showing  the  place  of 
residence,  and  stating  the  positions  for  which  the  nomi- 
nees are  candidates.  Local  secretaries  are  required  to  post 
notices  not  later  than  one  week  before  nominations  and 
elections. 

B.  Elections 

The  international  officers  are  elected  by  referendum 
vote  for  a  period  of  two  years.  The  candidates  receiving 
a  plurality  of  the  legal  votes  cast  are  declared  elected. 
This  legal  vote  is  cast  by  members  in  good  standing  and 
the  number  of  these  is  determined  by  special  reports  from 
the  subdistrict  and  district  secretaries. 

The  local  union  is  at  liberty  to  designate  an  official 
voting  place,  and  strict  Injunctions  are  issued  in  regard  to 
tabulation  of  votes  and  interference  with  tellers.  Mem- 
bers who  have  not  attended  at  least  one  half  of  the  local 
meetings  for  a  period  of  six  months  before  the  election 
are  not  allowed  to  act  as  tellers.  All  members  must  be 
present  at  the  time  the  votes  are  cast  in  order  to  have  their 
votes  tabulated,  "  except  officers,  organizers,  and  workers 
in  the  field  away  from  home,  whose  votes  shall  be  recorded 
if  sent  to  the  secretaries  of  their  respective  local  unions." 
.  The  locals  elect  from  three  to  six  tellers,  who  are  responsi- 
ble for  the  tabulation,  the  correctness  of  which  must  be 
further  attested  by  the  local  seal  and  signatures  of  the 
local  officials.  If  more  votes  are  recorded  than  were  actu- 
ally cast,  the  vote  of  the  local  is  thrown  out,  and  those 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA     121 

responsible  for  the  fraud  are  "  tried  by  the  international 
executive  board,  and  fined,  suspended,  or  expelled,  as  the 
magnitude  of  the  transgression  may  warrant." 

The  return  sheets  in  sealed  envelopes  and  properly  at- 
tested are  sent  to  the  international  secretary,  who  keeps  a 
record  of  their  receipt,  and  before  turning  them  over  to 
the  tellers  checks  them  off  and  obtains  a  receipt  from  the 
tellers.  The  international  tellers  are  not  allowed  to  count 
the  votes  of  locals  which  have  cast  more  votes  than  they 
have  paid  a  j^er  capita  tax  upon  to  the  international  union 
for  one  month  preceding  the  election,  "  unless  a  satisfac- 
tory explanation  for  so  doing  accompanies  the  '  Return 
Sheet'  of  the  local."  Contests  must  be  filed  with  the  in- 
ternational tellers  not  later  than  ten  days  after  the  elec- 
tion, and  in  case  no  plurality  vote  is  cast  for  a  candidate 
another  election  is  held.  Local  officers  are  required  to  pre- 
serve all  ballots  for  a  period  of  six  months  after  the  elec- 
tion. Loitering  about  the  voting  place  is  not  allowed,  and 
tellers  are  held  responsible  for  all  irregularities  and  are 
subject  to  trial  by  the  international  executive  board. 

A.    THE    RECALL 

If  ten  per  cent  of  the  entire  membership  request  it,  the 
international  secretary  is  obliged  to  send  out  to  the  local 
unions  a  petition  for  the  recall  of  any  international  officer 
guilty  of  malfeasance.  Accompanying  the  petition  are  the 
charges  on  which  the  recall  is  based  and  the  defense  of  the 
officer,  issued  in  answer  to  these  charges.  If  within  thirty 
days  thirty  per  cent  of  the  members  sign  the  petition, 
the  international  executive  board  must  "  call  an  election 
for  the  recall  of  any  international  officer  so  charged."  The 
recall  was  an  innovation  introduced  into  the  constitution  in 
1912,  but  it  has  not  been  used. 


122     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

5.    THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTION 

A.  Powers 

The  extent  of  democratic  control  is  further  illustrated 
in  the  international  convention.  The  administrative  officers 
are  given  their  extensive  powers  in  order  that  they  may 
do  the  will  of  the  rank  and  file  as  expressed  through  the 
medium  of  the  convention  and  the  referendum.  The  inter- 
national convention  is  held  biennially  on  the  third  Tuesday 
in  January.  This  meeting  comes  just  before  the  meeting 
of  the  joint  conference  to  form  a  wage  scale.  Opportunity 
is  thus  furnished  for  the  leaders  to  know  how  the  rank 
and  file  feel  about  the  working  conditions  under  which 
they  have  labored  during  the  two  years  past.  The  conven- 
tion is  the  supreme  body  of  the  organization  and  is  limited 
only  on  measures  which  are  submitted  to  referendum  vote. 
Since  it  is  made  up  from  the  general  membership,  expres- 
sion is  sure  to  be  given  to  vital  problems  connected  with 
the  coal  industry  and  with  the  functioning  of  the  union. 
The  convention  can  amend  or  revise  the  constitution  and 
reverse  any  action  or  policy  of  the  officials.  It  stands  as  a 
responsive  agent  of  the  mass  of  workers  and  offers  free 
opportunity  to  introduce  measures  to  meet  changing  needs. 

B.  Representation 

The  delegates  are  elected  directly  by  local  unions  and 
are  allowed  "  one  vote  for  one  hundred  members  or  less, 
and  one  additional  vote  for  each  one  hundred  members  or 
majority  fraction  thereof,  but  no  delegate  shall  be  allowed 
more  than  five  votes."  Representation  is  based  upon  the 
paid-up  membership  for  a  period  of  three  months  previous 
to  the  convention.  Several  local  unions  with  less  than  one 
hundred  members  are  allowed  to  unite  in  sending  a  dele- 
gate, but  h©  shall  not  have  more  than  five  votes.  Locals 
that  are  in  arrears  for  taxes  and  assessments  for  two 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    123 

months  previous  to  the  convention  are  not  allowed  repre- 
sentation. Nor  can  a  person  act  as  a  delegate  unless  he 
has  attended  one  half  the  meetings  of  his  local  for  a  period 
of  six  months  previous  to  the  convention. 

C.  Election  of  Delegates 

Delegates  can  be  selected  only  at  an  official  meeting  of 
the  locals,  notice  of  which  has  been  posted  by  the  local 
secretary  three  days  before  the  meeting.  This  notice  must 
state  that  an  election  of  delegates  is  to  take  place.  The 
delegates  receiving  a  majority  vote  of  the  meeting  are 
declared  elected.  "  No  other  meeting  than  the  one  first 
advertised  and  called  .  .  .  [is]  recognized  as  an  official 
meeting  for  the  election  of  delegates."  The  failure  of  local 
officers  to  read  the  call  and  post  the  notices  of  the  meeting 
subjects  them  to  removal  from  office  and  they  are  not 
allowed  to  hold  office  for  a  period  of  two  years.  If  a 
delegate's  credentials  are  to  be  contested,  notice  of  the 
fact  must  be  sent  to  the  international  secretary  ten  days 
prior  to  the  opening  of  the  convention  and  the  matter  is 
turned  over  to  the  credentials  committee.  The  interna- 
tional organization  pays  the  transportation  of  delegates, 
to  obtain  which  they  must  submit  railroad  certificates  or 
receipts  for  fare. 

All  resolutions,  grievances,  and  constitutional  amend- 
ments must  also  be  in  the  hands  of  the  international  sec- 
retary ten  days  before  the  opening  of  the  convention  in 
order  that  they  may  be  considered  by  the  proper  commit- 
tees. But  the  international  convention  refuses  to  consider 
internal  grievances  of  districts  unless  they  have  been  first 
considered  by  the  lower  jurisdiction. 

D.  Special  Conventions 

Special  conventions  are  called  by  the  president  when 
the  executive  board  thus  instructs  him  or  upon  request 
of  five  or  more  districts.    But  the  districts  must  state 


124     ARBITRATION  IN  TIIE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

their  reasons  for  desiring  a  convention.  These  reasons  are 
embodied  in  the  call  for  the  convention.  Once  assembled, 
the  special  convention  is  limited  to  the  consideration  of  the 
particular  measures  for  which  it  was  called.  This  provision 
for  a  special  convention  stands  ready  for  emergencies  and, 
as  we  shall  see,  was  effectively  used  in  the  formulation  of 
a  policy  to  govern  the  bituminous  miners  during  the  an- 
thracite strike  of  1902. 

6.  STRIKES 

A.  The  Referendum 

The  strike  is  regarded  as  the  measure  of  last  resort. 
The  organization  has  learned  from  experience  that  it  pays 
in  time,  money,  and  suffering  to  utilize  conciliation,  arbi- 
tration, and  joint  agreements.  This  is  substantiated  by 
the  fact  that  general  strikes  must  be  declared  by  a  refer- 
endum vote.  It  demonstrates  also  the  extent  to  which  the 
idea  has  penetrated  the  rank  and  file.  The  referendum  re- 
lieves the  conservative  leaders  from  the  responsibility  of 
declaring  a  strike  and  robs  the  radical  leaders  of  undue 
power ;  but  when  conditions  have  arisen  that  stir  the  rank 
and  file  to  the  fighting  point,  the  referendum  is  a  fair 
indicator  of  the  extent  of  the  discontent  in  the  industry. 

B.  When  Strikes  are  supported 

The  value  placed  on  peace  Is  shown  by  the  measures 
which  hedge  in  the  alternative  of  the  strike.  A  district  is 
not  allowed  to  engage  in  a  strike  which  would  involve  a 
major  portion  of  its  members  without  the  sanction  of  the 
international  executive  board.  The  districts  may  order 
local  strikes,  but  if  they  expect  financial  aid  from  the  in- 
ternational organization  the  action  must  be  sanctioned  by 
the  international  executive  board.  The  international  exec- 
utive board  decides  the  conditions  upon  which  financial 
support  shall  be  rendered  to  strikes,  and  the  amount  of 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    125 

relief  per  member.  It  appoints  a  bonded  representative  to 
handle  the  funds  and  no  bills  are  paid  by  the  international 
union  unless  contracted  and  authorized  by  its  representa/- 
tive.  The  international  secretary  furnishes  locals  on  strike 
with  report  blanks  upon  which  itemized  and  detailed  state- 
ments of  expenditures  must  be  recorded.  The  reports  are 
signed  by  the  local  officials,  and  one  copy  is  sent  to  the 
international  secretary,  one  to  the  international  represent- 
ative, and  one  is  kept  by  the  local.  Only  by  fulfilling 
these  conditions  can  the  local  obtain  financial  support. 

7.  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCES 
The  extent  to  which  aid  in  support  of  strikes,  either  in 
gaining  new  union  territory  or  adjusting  difficulties  within 
old  districts,  is  a  drain  on  the  international  treasury,  is 
shown  in  the  report  of  the  international  secretary  for  the 
year  ending  January  1,  1912.  In  that  year  the  organiza- 
tion spent  $1,749,106.07  in  aiding  ten  districts.  This  was 
met  for  the  most  part  by  special  assessments  amounting 
to  $1,408,079.93,  while  the  income  from  the  regular  taxes 
was  1769,157.72.  The  organization  refused  some  years 
ago  to  enter  upon  the  policy  of  storing  up  a  large  fund, 
and  the  end  of  the  year  saw  the  union  with  a  balance  on 
hand  of  only  1160,793.77.  The  next  largest  item  of  ex- 
pense was  the  payment  of  $215,153.85  for  the  salaries 
and  traveling  expenses  of  194  officers  and  employees. 
Most  of  these  salaries  are  below  $500,  and  only  the  more 
important  officers  reach  a  little  over  $1000.  In  fact,  the 
total  expense  account  was  only  $8000  above  the  amount 
paid  for  salaries.  It  is  this  small  army  of  executive  officers 
which  supplies  the  brains  and  enthusiasm,  keeps  the  or- 
ganization from  succumbing  to  mere  inertia,  and  prevents 
the  unwieldiness  of  numbers  from  degenerating  into  chaos. 
An  understanding  of  the  effectiveness  of  this  organiza- 
tion and  its  solidarity  in  collective  bargaining  gives  one 
some  conception  of  the  real  forces  that  lie  behind  the 


UO     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

arguments  of  the  leaders  in  the  joint  conference.  Its 
effective  financial  system  enables  it  to  prepare  for  and 
carry  on  a  protracted  struggle.  The  democratic  control  of 
the  union's  policies  gives  the  leaders  greater  and  more 
vital  power  than  they  could  possess  under  a  riigime  in 
which  their  effectiveness  depended  upon  their  ability  as 
demagogues  to  sway  the  rank  and  file.  But  perhaps  greater 
than  all  —  this  effectiveness  in  organization,  this  democ- 
racy, and  the  consequent  forcing  of  the  individual  to  feel 
his  responsibility,  has  brought  a  conservatism  that  can- 
not come  to  men  who  are  unused  to  acting  under  rules 
and  regulations  and  who  do  not  feel  the  full  force  of 
unity. 

The  whole  mechanism  of  this  organization  is  arranged 
for  the  purpose  of  controlling  mine  labor.  The  miners 
have  had  to  organize  to  meet  changing  economic  condi- 
tions and  to  offset  the  evils  of  individual  bargaining. 
Not  until  their  right  to  oi-ganize  is  admitted  and  their 
leaders  are  intelligent  enough  to  cope  with  the  employers 
are  the  miners  on  a  basis  of  equality  in  bargaining.  To 
maintain  this  equality  the  miners  have  had  to  force  the 
independent  worker  into  the  organization  and  bring  coer- 
cion on  trade-union  organizations  like  the  blacksmiths, 
engineers,  firemen,  and  carpenters  employed  about  the 
mine,  in  order  to  make  it  an  industrial  union  as  opposed 
to  a  mere  trade  union.  The  appointment  of  a  statistician, 
who  must  "  collect  and  compile  statistics  on  the  produc- 
tion, distribution,  and  consumption  of  coal  and  coke, 
freight  rates,  market  conditions,  and  any  other  matter 
that  may  be  of  benefit  to  the  organization,"  has  proven  a 
valuable  aid  to  the  miners'  leaders  in  intelligent  bargaiu- 
ing. 

In  selling  their  labor  the  miners  cannot  offer  it  to  a 
disorganized  market  where  separate  bargains  are  driven 
with  each  individual  consumer,  but  they  must  offer  it  to 
an  organization  or  organizations,  of  buyers.  Also  these 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF  AMERICA    127 

buyers  of  labor  are  coming  to  realize  that  they  have 
more  and  more  in  common.  Buyers  and  sellers  are  thus 
made  approximately  equal  in  bargaining  power.  In  the 
next  chapter  we  shall  examine  the  degree  of  organization 
that  has  taken  place  among  the  operators. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  COAL  OPERATORS'   ASSOCIATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 

A.    THE    FORCES    WHICH  GAVE    RISE   TO    THE 
ASSOCIATIONS 

In  discussing  the  organization  of  the  operators  as  a  party 
opposed  to  the  miners  in  joint  conference,  we  should 
understand  at  the  outset  that  we  cannot  expect  to  find 
the  solidarity  of  feeling  and  universality  of  organiza- 
tion which  we  have  seen  among  the  miners.  Although  we 
find  references  to  organization  among  the  operators  as 
early  as  the  seventies,  such  organization  was  local.  The 
growth  of  a  feeling  of  common  interests  among  them  over 
the  industry  in  general  has  had  a  very  slow  development. 
This  was  to  be  expected  when  we  consider  that  the  force 
of  competition  between  different  fields  has  been  so  strong 
as  almost  to  prohibit  action  on  policies  for  the  industry 
in  general.  One  important  factor  which  has  helped  them 
to  develop  so  far  as  they  have  is  the  necessity  of  prevent- 
ing cutthroat  competition  from  bringing  the  general  in- 
dustry to  a  low  level  of  prices.  Another  factor  quite  as 
powerful  was  the  growing  strength  of  unionism  and  the 
necessity  for  meeting  it  effectively. 

"We  have  seen  that  the  chief  cause  of  the  break-up  of 
the  joint  conference  in  1885-89  was  the  diversity  of  in- 
terests among  the  operators  and  their  inability  to  har- 
monize these  interests.  After  a  decade  of  ruinous  compe- 
tition and  strife,  a  general  strike  on  the  part  of  the  miners 
in  1897  brought  the  operators  together  again  in  joint  con- 
ference.  Even   then  the   operators'  side  was  made  up 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS       129 

merely  of  representatives  from  the  various  fields  who 
recognized  the  necessity  for  harmony  on  at  least  a  few 
fundamental  matters.  Gradually,  from  1898  on,  harmony 
of  interests  within  particular  fields  developed  to  a  point 
which  permitted  the  formation  of  operators'  associations 
for  the  different  fields.  This  organizing  was  further  in- 
duced by  the  necessity  of  meeting  the  growing  solidarity 
of  the  miners'  organization  in  the  various  fields.  But  di- 
versity of  interests  between  fields  has  thus  far  raised  too 
many  barriers  to  permit  the  growth  of  a  general  organiza- 
tion among  the  operators  comparable  to  the  United  Mine 
Workers.  This  can  come  only  after  sufficient  unity  has 
developed  to  lead  the  operators  in  the  various  fields  to 
sink  their  individual  inclinations  for  the  sake  of  the  wel- 
fare of  the  industry  as  a  whole  and  in  thus  acting  find 
that  they  are  ultimately  serving  their  own  best  interests.  It 
would  seem  that  the  only  force  which  could  compel  such 
cohesion  is  the  necessity  for  meeting  an  absolute  monop- 
oly control  of  mine  labor,  or  the  necessity  for  a  combi- 
nation of  the  independent  operators  to  meet  the  pressure 
brought  by  larger  combinations  of  capital.  We  shall  turn 
our  attention  to  a  consideration  of  the  extent  of  federa- 
tion among  the  coal  operators'  associations  in  the  various 
fields  and  to  the  organization  of  one  of  the  most  highly 
developed  associations.  Thus  we  shall  be  able  to  see  the 
effectiveness  of  the  forces  which  the  operators  bring  to 
the  bargaining  for  mine  labor  in  the  market  of  the  joint 
conference  of  the  central  field  and  understand  the  com- 
munity of  interests  which  will  stand  opposed  to  the  United 
Mine  Workers  in  the  event  of  a  general  strike. 

1.  THE  AMERICAN  FEDERATION  OF  COAL 
OPERATORS 

What  may  be  regarded  as  the  first  step  taken  in  the 
direction  of  the  formation  of  a  general  organization 
among  the  bituminous  coal  operators  was  consummated  in 


lao     .VRBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

the  latter  part  of  1909.  At  that  time  the  commissioners 
and  secretaries  of  coal  operators'  associations  from  ten 
States  met  and  inaugurated  a  preliminary  organization. 
There  the  plan  was  broached  of  organizing  a  national 
association  or  national  federation  of  associations.  To  this 
end  a  committee  was  appointed  to  draft  a  form  of  organi- 
zation to  be  submitted  at  a  later  meeting.  In  January, 
1912,  an  organization  known  as  the  American  Federation 
of  Coal  Operators  was  formed  and  included  in  its  mem- 
bership the  coal  operators'  associations  of  Illinois,  Michi- 
gan, Iowa,  Montana,  Washington,  and  Wyoming,  and  the 
Southwestern  Interstate  Coal  Operators'  Association.^ 

The  purpose  of  the  federation  is  "  to  promote  the  com- 
mon interests  of  the  coal  operators  of  America  by  all  law- 
ful means  ;  but  the  federation  shall  not  deal  with  matters 
relating  to  freight  rates  or  with  prices  and  sale  of  coal."  ^ 
All  associations  whose  purposes  are  similar  to  those  of 
the  federation  are  eligible  to  membership,  but  we  do  not 
find  the  names  of  the  operators'  associations  of  Indiana, 
Ohio,  and  Pennsylvania  in  the  list.  We  have  seen  in 
chapter  i  that  the  operators  of  these  three  States  have 
thus  far  taken  a  conservative  attitude  on  the  question  of 
including  coal  fields  outside  of  the  central  field  in  the 
joint  conference,  and  undoubtedly  the  same  objection  of 
a  supposed  lack  of  community  of  interests  accounts  for 
their  being  outside  of  the  federation.  However  willing 
Indiana  may  be  to  enter  the  federation,  she  is  placed  in 
an  embarrassing  position  by  the  opposition  and  competi- 
tion from  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania.  We  are  inclined  to 
think  that,  though  the  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  operators 
are  unwilling  to  include  the  other  fields  in  the  joint  bar- 
gaining, they  will  see  the  day  when  they  will  be  glad  of 
their  support  in  facing  the  united  opposition  of  the  union 
during  a  general  strike.    Some  of  their  opposition  to  the 

^  Constitution  of  American  Federation  of  Coal  Operators,  1912,  p.  7. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  1. 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS       131 

adjustment  of  differentials  between  fields  may  die  away 
because  of  the  necessity  for  a  larger  community  of  inter- 
est on  other  matters. 

In  the  deliberations  of  the  federation  each  operators' 
association  is  entitled  to  one  vote  "  for  each  two  million 
tons  or  majority  fraction  thereof,"  but  no  association  has 
less  than  two  votes.  Though  each  association  may  send  as 
many  delegates  as  it  has  votes,  the  delegation  represent- 
ing an  association  may  cast  its  entire  vote.  Thus  there  is 
a  democratic  basis  for  ultimate  control,  but  there  is  suf- 
ficient authority  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  president  and 
executive  committee  to  provide  for  effective  administra- 
tion. On  the  executive  committee  there  is  a  representative 
from  each  association,  and  although  the  committee  pos- 
sesses all  the  powers  of  the  federation  when  the  latter  is 
not  in  session,  it  is  limited  by  the  mandates  of  the  larger 
body  and  by  constitutional  provisions.  Nor  is  unanimity 
of  feeling  and  action  to  be  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of  ra- 
pidity in  administration,  for  any  two  members  of  the 
executive  board  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  action  of 
the  board  on  main  or  principal  questions  may  demand 
that  the  committee  receive  a  mandate  from  the  federation 
convention  before  carrying  its  policies  into  effect.  The 
most  important  function  of  the  executive  committee  is  to 
act  in  conjunction  with  the  national  executive  board  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers  in  constituting  a  court  of  con- 
ciliation and  arbitration  for  the  interpretation  of  agree- 
ments and  the  adjudication  of  disputes  which  are  referred 
to  it. 

The  policy  of  the  federation  is  to  make  regulations 
which  enable  it  to  enforce  all  contracts  made  by  its  mem- 
bers with  their  employees.  Of  course  the  coercion  is  to  be 
placed  upon  the  employees  by  providing  penalties  for  vio- 
lations. This  is  to  be  accomplished  chiefly  by  suspending 
the  "check-off  "  of  dues  to  the  miners'  organization.  Thus 
the  leaders  are  compelled  to  make  greater  efforts  to  hold 


132     .UIBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.VL  INDUSTRY 

their  followers  in  line  and  prevent  local  strikes.  Members 
who  are  suffering  from  strikes  in  violation  of  contracts  are 
reimbursed  by  the  association,  though  we  are  not  informed 
just  how,  probably  by  the  furnishing  of  coal  and  the  meet- 
ing of  losses  attendant  upon  the  suspension  of  mine  opera- 
tion. 

The  financial  obligations  of  the  federation  are  met  by 
the  returns  from  membership  fees  ($25  for  each  one  mil- 
lion tons  produced)  and  special  assessments,  which  are 
levied  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  tons  produced. 

Although  these  provisions  characterize  the  organization 
as  a  true  federation,  it  shows  possibilities  of  developing 
into  a  capitalistic  industrial  union.  Only  the  future  can 
reveal  whether  it  will  pass  through  the  same  evolution  as 
did  the  United  Mine  Workers  in  feeling  the  necessity  of 
more  centralized  control  and  the  subjection  of  local  and 
district  autonomy  in  certain  matters  to  the  larger  inter- 
ests of  the  industry  as  a  whole.  Of  course  the  force  of 
competition  between  fields  has  been  and  will  be  a  source 
of  conflict  and  a  constant  menace  to  measures  taken  to 
bring  about  unanimity  of  action.  Moreover,  this  force  of 
competition,  so  long  as  the  bituminous  coal  is  produced 
by  relatively  small  companies,  is  less  apt  to  yield  to  con- 
certed action  than  the  competition  between  union  and  un- 
organized labor  did.  Fixed  capital  being  less  mobile  than 
labor,  and  the  expense  of  production  being  so  dependent 
upon  the  variation  in  the  size  of  the  vein  of  coal,  the 
amount  of  debris  necessitating  removal,  etc.,  every  possi- 
ble effort  will  be  made  to  bring  returns  upon  the  invest- 
ment. The  further  fact  that  the  mines  in  operation  are 
always  able  to  produce  millions  of  tons  more  than  the 
market  will  absorb  will  not  encourage  the  development 
of  altruism  on  the  part  of  the  larger  concerns  sufficiently 
for  them  to  be  willing  to  permit  the  little  fellows  to  have 
their  share  of  the  market.  On  the  other  hand,  the  smaller 
concerns  will  take  their  share  if  the  difference  between 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS      133 

selling  prices  of  coal  and  their  expenses  of  production 
will  permit  it.  In  fact,  it  would  seem  that  a  capitalistic 
industrial  union  comparable  to  the  United  Mine  Workers 
could  not  develop  unless  concentration  of  ownership  and 
control  should  increase  to  such  an  extent  as  to  permit  of 
the  exhaustion  of  the  most  profitable  mines  first  and  a 
gradual  extension  of  production  to  the  less  profitable. 
Were  this  to  take  place  it  would  be  a  matter  of  vital  con- 
cern to  the  public  and  to  the  miners'  union  :  to  the  former 
as  affecting  the  prices  paid  for  coal  and  to  the  latter  as 
affecting  the  prices  paid  for  labor.  If  the  miners  could 
present  forces  as  united  as  those  of  the  operators,  and  if 
the  public  would  not  permit  extended  warfare,  the  miners' 
wages  would  undoubtedly  reach  a  higher  level  by  employ- 
ment of  the  men  only  in  the  richest  mines.  We  are  con- 
cerned about  seeing  the  degree  of  unity  and  the  magni- 
tude of  the  forces  which  the  operators  bring  at  present  to 
the  bargaining  for  mine  labor,  and  it  is  on  this  side  that 
the  operators  are  likely  to  find  their  greatest  community 
of  interest. 

It  has  been  within  each  coal  field  or  district  that  the 
operators  have  learned  their  greatest  community  of  inter- 
est. There  conditions  of  production  and  marketing  were 
similar  enough  to  permit  the  growth  of  a  recognition  of 
like  interests  in  the  competition  within  the  fields.  With 
the  expansion  of  the  union  from  local  to  district  and  na- 
tional scope  an  ever-present  necessity  was  at  hand  com- 
pelling the  operators  to  bring  about  some  degree  of  uni- 
formity in  wages  and  working  conditions.  Thus  a  new 
sense  of  common  interests  emerged  and  encouraged  the 
development  of  district,  field,  or  state  operators'  associa- 
tions, as  the  situation  demanded.  Most  of  this  develop- 
ment has  taken  place  since  1898  as  the  fields  have  been 
unionized.  It  is  in  these  associations  that  we  find  the 
greatest  degree  of  solidarity  yet  developed  among  the  op- 
erators, and  it  has  been  the  representatives  from  these 


131     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

organizations  that  have  thus  far  met  the  leaders  of  the 
miners  in  joint  conference  and  established  wage  scales 
and  differentials  between  coal  fields.  In  the  Illinois  Coal 
Operators'  Association  we  find  the  highest  degree  of  de- 
velopment. There  the  operators  have  had  to  meet  a  strong 
union  organization  and  there  they  mined  coal  under  simi- 
lar competitive  conditions.  These  factors  have  encouraged 
a  complex  organization  among  the  operators  and  made 
Illinois  one  of  the  prime  movers  for  an  extension  of  capi- 
talistic solidarity  from  state  to  national  scope.  We  cannot 
do  better,  then,  than  to  consider  the  way  the  Illinois  as- 
sociation is  organized. 

2.   ILLINOIS  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATION 
A.  Objects 

The  following  statement  of  the  objects  of  the  associa- 
tion is  taken  from  the  constitution :  — 

Its  object  shall  be  to  promote  stable,  just,  harmonious  and 
business-like  relations  between  the  coal  operators  of  Illinois  and 
their  employees ;  to  secure  in  coal  trade  agreements  a  recog- 
nition of  the  legitimate  needs  and  rights  of  the  employers ;  to 
aid  in  enforcing  agreements  between  the  members  of  this  asso- 
ciation and  their  employees  when  made ;  to  aid  in  seeing  that 
suspension  of  operations  in  violation  of  contract  is  visited  with 
adequate  penalties ;  to  see  that  any  member  of  this  association 
suffering  from  strikes  in  violation  of  contract  is  sustained  and 
supported,  and  that  he  is  reimbursed  by  those  violating  the  con- 
tract and  otherwise ;  to  promote  business-like  methods  in  negoti- 
ating agreements  and  in  operating  under  them  ;  to  provide  means 
for  interpreting  of  trade  agreements ;  to  compile  coal  mining 
statistics  and,  in  general,  to  promote  in  all  lawful  ways  the  inter- 
ests of  the  coal  operators  of  the  State.-^ 

The  State  is  divided  into  nine  districts,  each  of  which  is 
at  liberty  to  form  district  associations,  if  it  thinks  it  to  its 

^  Constitution  of  Illinois  Coed  Operators^  Association,  as  amended,  1912. 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS       135 

interest  to  do  so,  and  provided  that  none  of  the  rules  and 
regulations  of  such  associations  shall  conflict  with  the 
state  association. 

B.  Membership 

Any  person,  firm,  or  corporation  is  eligible  to  member- 
ship upon  making  application  to  the  recording  secretary 
and  paying  the  membership  fee  of  $2  for  each  mine  oper- 
ated and  the  annual  dues  of  §5  per  year.  But  no  "official 
or  representative  of  more  than  one  coal  mining  interest  in 
the  State  shall  be  entitled  to  the  privileges  of  the  associa- 
tion, unless  each  such  separate  interest  shall  have  mem- 
bership in  good  standing  in  the  association,  or  unless  mem- 
bers of  the  executive  board  representing  two  thirds  of  the 
districts  shall  decide  otherwise.  Should  any  dispute  arise 
as  to  the  eligibility  of  any  applicant,  it  shall  be  decided 
by  a  majority  vote  of  the  executive  board." 

A.    OBLIGATIONS    OF   MEMBERS 

In  joining  this  association  the  member  obligates  himself 
to  do  all  within  his  power  to  further  the  interests  of  the 
association,  "  to  maintain  and  observe  the  agreements 
entered  into  by  the  association  (paying  no  more  nor  no 
less  than  the  rates  established,  and  making  no  more  favor- 
able conditions  than  those  set  forth  therein),  any  devia- 
ations  therefrom  to  be  considered  a  violation  of  such  agree- 
ments." When  a  member  is  charged  with  a  violation  he 
is  given  an  opportunity  for  defense.  If  the  charges  are 
proven  and  he  fails  or  refuses  to  conform  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  constitution,  he  may  be  expelled  from  the 
association  by  a  majority  vote. 

A  member  further  obligates  himself  to  furnish  any  other 
member  with  coal  in  case  his  mine  has  been  closed  by  his 
laborers  violating:  the  agreements.  Before  this  aid  is  jjiven 
the  executive  board  inquires  into  the  suspension,  and  if  it 
finds  the  violation  was  unwarranted  designates  the  other 


13G     .VRBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

members  who  shall  be  required  to  furnish  coal  to  take  care 
of  the  afflicted  member's  existing  contracts  for  coal.  In 
taking  this  action,  where  voluntary  contributions  of  coal 
are  insufficient,  the  board  takes  into  consideration  the 
location  of  mines  which  are  to  contribute,  the  character 
of  the  coal,  the  relative  cost  at  points  of  delivery,  the  pro- 
portion to  be  contributed  by  each,  the  prices  to  be  charged, 
and  the  existing  contracts  of  other  members.  In  no  case 
can  the  board  require  a  member  "  to  contribute  coal  at 
less  than  the  operating  cost  thereof." 

B.    DELINQUENTS    AND    WITHDRAWALS 

But  if  a  member  becomes  delinquent  in  paying  his  dues 
and  assessments  he  may  be  deprived  of  the  right  to  partici- 
pate in  the  affairs  of  the  organization,  or  he  may  be  ex- 
pelled by  the  executive  board  "  (subject  to  reversal  by  the 
association),  or  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  association,'* 
provided  due  notice  has  been  given  of  the  pending  action. 

A  member  may  withdraw  at  the  expiration  of  a  thirty 
days'  notice  on  condition  that  he  is  not  involved  in  a  labor 
dispute  (which  exists  or  is  pending)  and  if  no  labor  negotia- 
tions are  in  progress.  But  this  withdrawal  does  not  "  re- 
lease him  from  any  then  existing  obligations  concerning 
labor  matters,  nor  from  being  bound  by  the  provisions  of 
any  labor  agreement  for  which  negotiations  are  then  in 
progress,"  if  the  agreement  with  the  union  is  authorized 
"by  a  majority  vote  of  the  members  of  the  association  in 
his  district." 

A  member  who  withdraws  or  is  expelled  can  be  rein- 
stated only  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  executive  board  or  of 
the  association  and  after  the  payment  of  all  arrearages  in 
assessments  and  dues. 

C.    BASIS    OF   REPRESENTATION    AND    VOTING 

Each  member  is  entitled  to  one  vote,  and  a  majority 
vote  governs,  except  that  at  the  request  of  three  members 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS      137 

a  two-thirds  vote  is  required  to  secure  the  adoption  of 
a  resolution  in  reference  to  pending  labor  negotiations  or 
agreements,  declarations  or  terminations  of  lockouts  or 
strikes,  grants  of  power  to  the  executive  board  to  consum- 
mate labor  agreements,  appropriation  of  money,  levying 
of  assessments,  and  the  adoption  of  rules  for  the  collec- 
tion, disbursement,  and  maintenance  of  the  defense  fund. 

C.  Officers  and  their  Duties 

The  officers  of  the  association  consist  of  a  president, 
vice-president,  secretary-treasurer,  recording  secretary, 
commissioner,  secretary  of  the  commission,  and  an  execu- 
tive board.  These  officers  are  all  elected  annually  except 
the  commissioner,  secretary  of  the  commission,  and  the 
recording  secretary,  who  are  appointed  by  the  executive 
board. 

A.    THE    commission 

The  duties  of  the  president,  vice-president,  secretary- 
treasurer,  and  the  recording  secretary  are  sufficiently  set 
forth  by  the  names  they  bear.  But  the  commissioner  and 
secretary  of  the  commission  are  at  the  head  of  a  depart- 
ment whose  chief  business  is  to  carry  out  the  adminis- 
trative work  connected  with  trade  agreements.  This  func- 
tion has  proven  to  be  as  necessary  as  the  making  of 
agreements.  The  individual  members  on  the  side  of  either 
capital  or  labor  cannot  be  left  to  interpret  the  agreement 
as  may  suit  their  purposes.  It  is  as  necessary  that  capital 
have  its  representation  in  adjusting  disputes  as  it  is  for 
labor  to  be  represented  by  its  leaders.  Only  in  this  way 
can  an  approach  be  made  to  consistency  and  uniformity 
of  policy.  Furthermore,  they  stand  as  salaried  officials 
who  have  no  pecuniary  interest  in  the  disputes  and  are 
able  to  bring  a  corresponding  degree  of  fairness  in  their 
attitude  to  the  matters  at  issue.  But  they  have  no  author- 
ity to  set  aside  or  modify  decisions  or  interpretations  of 


138     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

agreements  previously  made  by  the  association  or  executive 
board.  The  association  evidently  considers  that  one  of  its 
most  important  duties  is  the  "  enlightenment  of  public  opin- 
ion, that  the  public  may  know  that  the  operators  desire  to 
respect  the  agreemententered  into  with  labor  organizations, 
and  to  enlist  its  moral  support  in  behalf  of  this  organi- 
zation and  of  responsible  officers  of  labor  organizations,  to 
the  end  that  violation  of  agreements  on  either  side  may 
be  condemned  and  rebuked."  In  order  that  the  members 
of  the  commission  may  have  a  full  understanding  of  the 
policy  of  the  association,  they  are  given  a  seat  and  a  voice 
without  a  vote  in  all  meetings  of  the  association,  executive 
board,  and  all  standing  committees  except  the  finance  and 
auditing  committees.  The  secretary  of  the  commission  is 
expected  to  collate  statistics  concerning  production  of  coal 
in  other  States,  the  markets  to  which  it  is  consigned,  mine 
casualties,  etc. 

B.    THE   EXECUTIVE    BOARD 

The  executive  board  is  composed  of  three  members 
from  each  of  the  nine  districts,  and  where  more  than  one 
method  of  mining  is  in  vogue  in  a  district  each  method 
must  be  represented  on  the  board.  The  members  are  se- 
lected by  the  several  disti*icts  "  subject  to  confirmation  by 
the  association  at  each  annual  meeting  "  and  hold  office 
till  their  successors  are  selected.  Ex-presidents  of  the  as- 
sociation are  honorary  members  of  the  board  without  a 
vote. 

(1)  Duties  of  the  hoard 

The  executive  board  represents  the  association  when  it 
is  not  in  session,  adopts  its  own  rules  (to  conform  with 
the  constitution),  directs  the  administrative  officers,  and 
may  delegate  any  of  its  powers  to  an  officer  or  standing 
committee.  It  may  recommend  to  the  association  a  repeal 
or  change  in  any  provision  of  the  constitution  in  its  an- 
nual or  special  reports.    It  is  the  scale  committee  during 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS      139 

the  negotiations  of  labor  agreements,  "  but  when  such 
[agreements]  have  been  reached,  and  ratified  by  the  asso- 
ciation, and  promulgated,  its  powers  as  such  shall  cease." 
It  then  becomes  a  "  standing  committee  with  power  to  in- 
vestigate and  adjudicate  all  alleged  violations  of  existing 
agreements  with  intent  to  secure  their  faithful  observ- 
ance." 

Either  the  association  or  the  board  may  take  means  to 
enforce  contracts  with  employees,  provide  penalties  for 
their  violation,  and  arrange  for  the  reimbursement  of  em- 
ployers suffering  from  strikes  which  are  in  violation  of 
contracts.  One  of  the  most  effective  measures  the  board 
has  at  its  command  for  penalizing  the  union  for  violation 
of  contracts  is  the  refusal  to  grant  the  "check-off"  of 
dues.  To  this  end  the  board  is  authorized  to  formulate 
plans  which  would  provide,  "if  practicable,"  for  the  inser- 
tion in  contracts  of  the  provision  for  releasing  members 
of  the  operators'  association  from  paying  the  check-off 
when  the  miners  violate  their  contracts.  Another  provision 
the  operators  desire  to  have  inserted  in  the  contracts  would 
prohibit  the  union  from  reimbursing  individual  employees 
or  locals  for  penalties  inflicted  as  the  result  of  breaking 
contracts.  Evidently  the  operators  expected  that  these 
measures  would  require  the  state  and  national  unions  to 
exert  more  power  over  the  locals  and  individual  members. 
During  the  stormy  period  of  development  from  1898  up 
to  1907  (the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  operators'  consti- 
tution), these  provisions  would  have  been  very  hard  to 
inaugurate  either  from  the  operators'  or  the  miners'  side, 
for  the  whole  movement  was  too  recent  and  rested  on  a 
too  unstable  basis  to  stand  much  coercion.  With  further 
development  of  the  full  significance  of  conciliation  in  the 
minds  of  both  parties  the  conditions  which  require  such 
provisions  ought  to  disappear. 

The  diversity  of  the  activities  of  an  association  is  illus- 
trated by  the  number  of  its  standing  and  special  commit- 


140     .VRBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

tees,  such  as  a  general  affairs  committee ;  an  interstate 
relations  committee,  consisting  of  the  past  and  existing 
presidents  ;  railroad  and  ti-ansportation  committee  ;  mine 
casualty  and  mining  institute  committee  ;  legislative  com- 
mittee ;  coal-stoking  and  anti-smoke  committee ;  finance 
committee  ;  and  auditing  committee.  "  The  association  or 
the  executive  board  can,  at  their  discretion,  revoke  or 
modify  the  powers  and  duties  of  any  standing  or  special 
committee,  or  transfer  the  same  from  one  committee  to 
another,  or  assign  any  power  or  duties  to  any  one  of 
them." 

D.  The  Defense  Funtd 

One  of  the  most  noteworthy  features  of  the  association 
is  the  defense  fund.  This  is  built  up  by  special  assess- 
ments on  the  basis  of  the  tonnage  produced  by  the  mem- 
bers and  is  drawn  upon  to  help  those  who  are  subjected 
to  loss  because  the  union  has  failed  to  live  up  to  its  con- 
tract. If  the  union  officers  cannot  hold  the  men  in  line  in 
a  certain  district  this  fund  proves  a  valuable  asset.  When 
a  suspension  of  work  occurs,  the  members  of  the  executive 
board  of  the  district  make  (or  delegate  the  commissioner 
to  make)  an  investigation  of  the  case  and  report  the  find- 
ings to  the  board.  If  the  executive  board  decides  the  mem- 
ber is  entitled  to  support,  he  is  reimbursed  out  of  the 
defense  fund,  "  taking  into  account  both  the  direct  and 
consequential  loss  sustained  and  the  assistance  and  pro- 
tection rendered  by  any  other  measures  provided  by  virtue 
of  any  existing  joint  agreements  or  through  or  by  the  As- 
sociation." 

The  assessments  for  the  fund  are  levied  as  a  result  of 
a  three-fourtlis  vote  in  annual  or  special  meetings  of  the 
association,  and  all  rules  and  regulations  regarding  collec- 
tion and  disbursement  are  subject  to  a  majority  vote  of 
the  association.  The  defense  fund  is  kept  separate  from 
all  other  funds  of   the   association   and   is   invested  in 


THE  COAL  OPERATORS'  ASSOCIATIONS      141 

readily  convertible  assets.  Payments  from  the  fund  must 
be  approved  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  executive  board. 
Separate  accounts  of  the  amounts  paid  in  by  individual 
members  and  the  deductions  for  defense  purposes  are 
kept,  and  when  a  member  withdraws  or  is  expelled  he  is 
entitled  to  recover  the  unexpended  portion  of  his  contri- 
butions plus  his  apportionment  of  interest  which  has  ac- 
crued on  the  fund. 

The  associations  in  other  fields  are  similarly  organized, 
but  they  are  not  so  highly  centralized,  do  not  have  so  great 
a  diversity  of  activities,  and  the  defense  fund  feature  is 
absent.  But  provision  is  made  for  a  commissioner  to  rep- 
resent the  association  when  disputes  arise  and  in  the 
interpretation  of  agreements.  This  feature  is  found  in  all 
associations  that  recognize  the  union  and  deal  with  its 
representatives.  Such  a  provision  is  a  logical  step  after 
the  formation  of  an  operators'  association  and  after  mak- 
ing a  contract  in  joint  conference.  Thus  the  district,  field, 
and  state  operators'  associations  present  the  most  united 
front  to  labor  organizations  and  upon  the  centers  of  unity 
there  established  the  beginnings  of  federation  have  been 
built.  In  bargaining  for  labor  in  the  joint  conference  and 
during  general  strikes  we  may  expect  a  growing  solidarity. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  appreciate  the  strength  of 
the  parties  that  come  together  to  bargain  for  mine  labor 
and  the  responsibility  the  representatives  of  these  parties 
have  in  forming  an  agreement  acceptable  to  their  constit- 
uents. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE 

1.    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  THE  JOINT  CONFERENCE 

Knowledge  of  the  rise  of  the  miners'  organization,  its 
evolution  into  a  thoroughly  organized  and  well-adminis- 
tered body,  and  the  development  of  operators'  organiza- 
tions along  similar  lines,  affords  a  basis  for  understanding 
the  full  significance  of  the  interstate  joint  conference. 
The  joint  conference  of  the  central  field  is  the  central 
market  for  mine  labor.  Collective  bargaining  has  here 
reached  as  high  a  point  of  development  as  in  any  other 
industry  in  our  country.  An  insight  into  its  complexity 
makes  one  realize  how  far  removed  the  average  miner  is 
from  the  old  days  of  individual  dealing  with  his  employer. 
Under  individual  bargaining  the  employee  was  forced  to 
take  the  wages  the  employer  offered,  and  his  inability  to 
control  the  sanitary  arrangements  and  dangers  under 
which  he  worked  put  him  at  the  mercy  of  his  employer. 
In  short,  it  is  the  contrast  between  the  policy  of  expecting 
the  self-interest  of  the  employer  to  work  out  to  the  best 
interests  of  society  and  the  growing  modern  concept  that 
human  life  and  public  warfare  should  be  held  in  higher 
esteem  than  mere  acquisition  and  preservation  of  property. 
Nor  does  collective  bararainintj  mean  that  a  dead  level  of 
uniformity  must  exist  among  the  laborers.  According  to 
Mr.  John  Mitchell,  trade  unionism  stands  for  competition 
among  workmen  on  "  the  basis  of  efficiency  and  not  upon 
that  of  reduced  wages,  lengthened  hours,  or  any  abate- 
ment of  the  conditions  fixed  by  the  collective  bargain."  ^ 
^  Mitchell,  Organized  Labor,  p.  6. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      143 

A.  The  "  Eight  "  of  Organization  and 
Kepresentation 

A  chief  foundation  stone  in  the  structure  of  the  inter- 
state conference  is  the  "  right  "  of  the  employee  to  organ- 
ize which  carries  with  it  the  right  to  be  represented  in 
bargaining  with  the  employer.  Labor  thus  becomes  a 
product  for  sale,  and,  except  for  the  fact  that  it  is  a  perish- 
able commodity,  the  seller  of  the  same  is  on  a  par  with 
the  coal  operator.  Organized  labor  is  coming  to  the  point 
where  it  deplores  strikes  as  much  as  any  other  group  in 
the  community.  The  fact  that  these  elemental  rights  are 
disputed  or  not  recognized  is  the  cause  of  most  of  the 
strikes.  This  is  because  employers  are  unwilling  to  allow 
labor  the  benefits  of  cooperation  and  representation. 
Strikes  are  to  be  used  only  as  a  last  resort  in  obtaining 
justice,  for  "the  victories  won  in  conference  halls,  where 
the  elements  of  strength  are  the  enlightened  logic  of  the 
combatants,  are  the  victories  which  leave  no  wounds  to 
heal  and  are  the  greatest  victories  of  them  all."  ^ 

B.  The  Encouragement  of  Good  Feeling 

As  we  have  seen,  there  was  a  period  when  the  miners 
had  to  be  educated  in  regard  to  the  benefits  of  concilia- 
tion and  cooperation.  In  the  early  days  of  the  interstate 
conference  the  leaders  on  both  sides  felt  called  upon  to 
impress  upon  the  minds  of  their  constituents  the  impor- 
tance of  the  conciliation  movement.  Hard  experience  had 
taught  them  that  they  had  hit  upon  something  worth  con- 
sidering by  the  rank  and  file  on  either  side.  The  occasion 
of  electing  a  permanent  chairman  was  generally  used  to 
lay  a  groundwork.  "  This  is  not  an  arena  where  foe  meets 
foe,  but  it  is  a  friendly  meeting-place  of  those  who  are 
interested  for  the  benefit  of  all.  And  happy  will  be  the 
day  when  capital  and  labor  can  meet  on  the  same  plat- 
1  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Convention,  1002,  p.  36. 


Hi     ARBITRATION  IN  TUE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

form  and  shake  hands  with  true  friendship."  ^  President 
Katehford  at  the  miners'  convention  laid  emphasis  on  the 
importance  of  maintaining  the  joint  conference  by  point- 
ing out  that  "  the  man  or  men  who  throw  a  single  obsta- 
cle in  its  way  [are]  undeserving  of  a  place  in  the  councils 
of  miners  or  operators,  and  will  be  adjudged  guilty  of  a 
crime  against  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men,  women,  and 
children  whose  comfort  depends  so  largely  upon  its  con- 
summation." 2  The  evolution  in  attitude  of  both  sides  is 
plainly  shown,  in  the  conferences  of  recent  years,  by  the 
brevity  with  which  each  side  exchanges  felicitations  and 
proceeds  to  the  necessary  business. 

C.  Formulation  op  Principles 

Although  the  joint  conferences  had  begun  in  1898,  it 
was  not  until  1902  that  a  clear  formulation  of  their  basic 
principles  was  adopted.  The  following  resolutions  were 
presented  by  Mr.  Herman  Justi,  commissioner  for  the 
Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  :  ^ 

First.  That  this  movement  is  founded,  and  that  it  is  to  rest, 
upon  correct  business  ideas,  competitive  equality,  and  upon  well- 
recognized  principles  of  justice. 

Second.  That,  recognizing  the  contract  relations  existing  be- 
tween employer  and  employee,  we  believe  strikes  and  lockouts, 
disputes  and  friction,  can  be  generally  avoided  by  meeting  in 
joint  convention  and  by  entering  into  trade  agreements  for  spec- 
ified periods  of  time. 

Third.  That  we  recognize  the  sacredness  and  binding  nature 
of  contracts  and  agreements  thus  entered  into,  and  are  pledged 
in  honor  to  keep  inviolate  such  contracts  and  agreements  made 
by  and  between  a  voluntary  organization,  having  no  standing  in 
court,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  merely  collective  body  of  business 
men  doing  business  individually  or  in  corporate  capacity  on  the 

1  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1899,  p.  2. 

*  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers^  Convention,  1898,  p.  7. 

*  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1902,  p.  51. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      145 

other,  each  of  the  latter  class  having  visible  and  tangible  assets 
subject  to  execution. 

Fourth.  That  we  deprecate,  discourage,  and  condemn  any 
departure  whatever  from  the  letter  or  spirit  of  such  agreements 
or  contracts,  unless  such  departure  be  deemed  by  all  parties  in 
interest  for  the  welfare  of  the  coal  mining  industry  and  for  the 
public  good  as  well,  and  that  such  departure  is  first  definitely, 
specifically,  and  mutually  agreed  upon  by  all  parties  in  interest. 

Fifth.  Such  contracts  or  agreements  having  been  entered  into, 
we  consider  ourselves  severally  and  collectively  bound  in  honor 
to  carry  them  out  in  good  faith  in  letter  and  in  spirit,  and  are 
so  pledged  to  use  our  influence  and  authority  to  enforce  these 
contracts  and  agreements,  the  more  so  since  they  rest  in  the 
main  upon  mutual  confidence  as  their  basis. 

A  sixth  resolution  providing  for  arbitration  by  a  board 
of  referees  was  thrown  out. 

2.   THE  CONFERENCE   AT   WORK 
A.  Membership 

The  conference  has  generally  been  held  during  the  lat- 
ter part  of  January  and  the  beginning  of  February.  The 
miners'  convention  is  held  previous  to  this  and  their 
demands  are  formulated.  This  gives  the  joint  conference 
plenty  of  time  to  reach  an  agreement  before  the  previous 
agreement  expires,  usually  April  1. 

Until  1908,  the  interstate  joint  conference  was  made 
up  of  miners  and  operators  from  the  States  of  Illinois, 
Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Pennsylvania.  In  that  year  the  miners 
and  operators  of  Illinois  failed  to  attend  the  conference, 
for  reasons  which  will  be  taken  up  later. 

The  following  table  shows  the  growth  from  1898  to 
1906  (the  highest  point),  the  decline  in  1908  and  1910, 
and  the  relative  strength  of  miners  and  operators  in  the 
various  States :  ^ 

^  In  1012  a  large  committee  took  the  place  of  a  convention. 


140     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 


Variations  in  Membership  in  the  Joint  Conference 


SUtes. 

Mine  Workers. 

Operators. 

1898 

1906 

1908 

1910^ 

1898 

1906 

1908 

iPiOi 

Pennsylvania  .... 

40 

113 

105 

113 

45 

30 

35 

15 

Ohio 

83 

156 

128 

117 

67 

85 

83 

50 

Indiana  (bituminous)    . 

27 '-^ 

111 

31 

60 

43- 

50 

15 

14 

Indiana  (block)    .     .     . 

- 

13 

3 

8 

- 

8 

2 

2 

Illinois 

Ill 

240 

15 

0 

95 

184 

0 

0 

West  Virginia      .     .     . 

17 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

278 

633 

282 

298 

250 

357 

135 

81 

1  The  decrease  in  number  of  representatives  in  1908  and  1910  is  due  to  tlie  participa- 
tion of  only  three  States  in  the  joint  conferences. 

2  No  distinction  made  between  bituminous  and  block  representatives.    Block  coal 
contains  a  higher  percentage  of  carbon  than  bituminous  and  is  taken  out  in  large  chuniia. 

The  operators  not  only  expect  the  miners  to  keep  their 
own  members  within  the  agreement,  but  rely  on  them  to 
coerce  a  delinquent  operator.  This  they  can  do  by  calling 
a  strike,  which  may  be  more  effective  than  any  fine  by  an 
operators'  association.  But  the  cost  of  the  procedure  falls 
upon  the  miners,  and  it  is  a  losing  fight  if  the  operator  can 
get  plenty  of  non-union  labor.  In  fact,  the  chief  burden  of 
the  cost  of  making  competitive  conditions  uniform  in  the 
various  districts  comes  on  the  miners.  "  No  attempt  is  made 
to  make  wages  uniform  or  the  earning  capacity  of  the 
men  equal  between  the  different  districts,  or  within  the 
districts  themselves,  the  principal  object  being  so  to  regu- 
late the  scale  of  mining  as  to  make  cost  of  production 
practically  the  same  in  one  district  that  it  is  in  another, 
regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  earnings  of  the  miners 
are  equal."  ^ 

B.  Organization  and  Kules 

The  organization  and  work  of  the  conference  is  unique 
and  interesting.  The  president  of  the  miners  is  generally 

^  Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  vol.  12,  p.  698. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      147 

elected  temporary  chairman,  which  gives  him  a  chance  to 
extend  felicitations  on  the  continuation  of  the  movement 
and  to  introduce  local  and  national  men  of  prominence 
who  have  been  asked  to  address  the  conference.  A  com- 
mittee on  credentials  and  a  committee  on  rules  and  order 
of  business  and  permanent  organization  are  then  selected. 
These  committees  are  made  up  of  two  operators  and  two 
miners  from  each  State.  A  recess  of  a  couple  of  hours  is 
taken  in  order  to  give  the  committees  time  to  make  up 
their  report.  In  connection  with  the  report  of  the  com- 
mittee on  rules  and  order  of  business  and  permanent  or- 
ganization the  name  of  an  operator  is  suggested  as  perma- 
nent chairman,  a  miner  as  secretary,  and  a  representative 
of  the  operators  as  assistant  secretary.  The  rules  of  the 
convention  contain  provisions  for  definite  hours  of  meet- 
ing and  adjournment,  but  special  meetings  or  an  evening 
session  are  allowable,  which  provision  is  often  made  use 
of  at  critical  times  when  an  agreement  seems  about  to  be 
reached.  The  miners'  representatives  occupy  the  right  of 
the  hall  and  the  operators  the  left.  Each  State  has  the 
same  number  of  votes,  four  votes  for  the  operators  and  four 
votes  for  the  miners.  No  vote  is  declared  carried  except 
upon  the  affirmative  vote  of  both  operators  and  miners 
from  all  the  States.  The  unanimous  vote  shows  that  each 
side  fears  to  trust  the  issue  to  the  other  side  plus  perhaps 
one  vote  from  its  own.  In  questions  of  mere  procedure 
the  rules  in  any  standard  manual  of  parliamentary  pro- 
cedure are  in  force.  But  the  rule  requiring  unanimous 
vote  on  all  main  and  principal  questions  is  never  sus- 
pended. "Main  and  principal  questions"  are  "all  ques- 
tions affecting  the  proposed  scale  and  agreement."  Each 
State  has  four  operators  and  four  miners  on  the  scale 
committee,  who  are  appointed  with  the  understanding  that 
each  representative  shall  have  an  alternate  who  has  all  the 
privileges  of  the  scale  committee,  but  cannot  "  vote  except 
in  the  absence  of  his  principal."  In  the  formation  of  this 


lis     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

method  of  representation  on  the  scale  committee  in  the 
conference  of  1898,  the  minority  of  the  committee  on  rules 
and  regulations  stood  out  strongly  for  representation  on 
the  basis  of  tonnage  of  the  respective  States,  "  one  vote, 
miner  and  operator,  respectively,  for  each  five  million  tons 
or  major  fraction  thereof,  mine-run  coal,  produced  in  the 
year  1896."  The  majority  insisted  that  their  method  was 
fairer  to  all  concerned,  and  that  it  was  not  desirable  that 
"  conclusions  "  should  "  be  forced  on  any  State."  The  ses- 
sions are  open  to  the  public  except  when  otherwise  ordered, 
and  as  a  result  of  this  both  sides  suffer  misrepresentation 
at  the  hands  of  newspaper  reporters.  But  undoubtedly  it  is 
a  considerable  asset  to  the  conciliation  movement  in  con- 
vincing the  public  that  their  proceedings  are  open  and 
aboveboard  and  in  winning  support  for  the  side  which  has 
the  right  of  it. 

C.  The  Order  of  Business 

The  order  of  business  consists  of  the  report  of  the  cre- 
dentials committee,  report  of  the  rules  and  regulations 
committee,  appointment  of  the  scale  committee,  report  of 
the  scale  committee,  disposal  of  the  report  of  the  scale 
committee,  and  adjournment.  This  appears  rather  a  sim- 
ple order  of  business,  but  what  seems  at  the  most  to  be  a 
few  days'  work  has  lengthened  into  weeks  at  critical  times 
in  the  industry.  After  the  report  of  the  credentials  com- 
mittee has  been  accepted,  each  side  learns  what  the  other 
is  expecting  by  the  presentation  of  formal  demands. 
These  demands  generally  pertain  to  an  increase  or  de- 
crease in  the  mining  rate,  uniform  mining  system  (the 
miners  generally  asking  for  mine-run  rather  than  screen 
system),  uniform  wage  scale  for  outside  and  inside  day 
labor,  differential  per  ton  between  pick  and  machine  min- 
ing, advance  in  payment  for  yardage  and  deadwork,  a 
check-off  system  by  which  the  dues  and  assessments  are 
deducted  from  tlie  miners'  wages  and  paid  to  the  United 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      149 

Mine  Workers,  settlement  of  internal  difficulties  and  ine- 
qualities in  the  various  districts,  etc.  Discussion  of  these 
demands  brings  out  the  dissatisfaction  that  both  sides  have 
felt  during  the  life  of  the  previous  agreement,  and  one 
would  imagine  that  such  diametrically  opposite  views  as 
are  there  expressed  could  never  be  reconciled.  On  a  vote 
to  accept  either  the  miners'  or  the  operators'  demands,  the 
miners  vote  unanimously  one  way  and  the  operators  unan- 
imously the  other.  If  the  demands  had  to  be  reconciled 
there  in  open  convention,  they  probably  never  would  be 
settled,  but  the  machinery  of  the  scale  committee  is  now 
set  in  motion  and  the  discussion  is  carried  on  by  thirty-two 
men  and  their  alternates  instead  of  by  several  hundred. 
The  convention  adjourns  subject  to  call  by  the  scale  com- 
mittee (or  chairman)  when  the  committee  is  ready  to  re- 
port. The  scale  committee  is  governed  by  the  rules  of  the 
convention,  and  here  the  minutest  details  of  the  industry 
are  taken  up.  It  does  not  take  long  for  each  party  to  dis- 
cover that  there  are  two  sides  to  every  question  which  is 
brought  forward.  The  only  hope  for  an  agreement  lies  in 
a  willingness  to  recede  from  the  arbitrary  positions  which 
each  side  has  taken.  Usually  each  side  has  certain  de- 
mands which  it  will  not  withdraw,  but  others  which  it  is 
willing  to  trade  on.  These  demands  are  generally  discov- 
ered by  discussion  and  consideration,  in  the  form  of  a 
motion,  of  the  formal  demands  that  each  has  presented. 
Both  sides  are  desirous  of  carrying  full  and  unanimous  con- 
viction of  the  reasonableness  of  their  demands  before  they 
are  allowed  to  come  to  vote,  for  they  always  have  hanging 
over  them  the  knowledge  that  one  dissenting  vote  will  kill 
their  proposition.  Here  one  has  a  chance  to  see  all  the 
foibles  of  human  nature  at  play,  but  withal  mixed  up  with 
banter  and  good  fellowship.  Out  of  it  comes  a  respect  for 
the  man  for  his  real  worth.  Both  sides  realize  that  they 
cannot  be  governed  by  the  personal  concessions  they  are 
willing  to  make,  for  ultimately  they  are  held  responsible 


150     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

by  their  constituents.  They  must  present  an  agreement 
to  the  convention  that  both  sides  feel  will  be  accepted  and 
lived  up  to  by  the  rank  and  file.  If  the  scale  committee 
reaches  an  agreement,  the  convention  is  called  to  order 
and  the  report  of  the  committee  presented.  If  there  is  any 
dissatisfaction  it  is  sure  to  be  heard,  but  the  leaders  of 
both  sides  on  the  scale  committee  defend  their  course  of 
action  and  advise  acceptance  of  the  agreement  that  has 
been  reached.  If  the  scale  committee  has  been  unable  to 
agree,  this  is  reported  to  the  convention  and  there  is  an- 
other period  of  general  discussion  in  the  conference. 

The  leaders  of  the  miners  prove  themselves  just  as 
capable  and  well  informed  as  the  best  of  the  operators. 
It  was  in  1902  that  the  miners  established  a  department 
of  statistics  to  keep  themselves  in  touch  with  prices  and 
conditions  of  trade.^  They  have  used  the  information  ob- 
tained in  this  manner  in  a  very  effective  way.  In  1906, 
when  the  operators  offered  to  open  their  books  for  in- 
spection, that  a  scale  might  be  made  on  the  basis  of  profits 
and  selling  prices,  Mr.  Mitchell  very  properly  wished  to 
know  the  connection  between  the  coal  companies  and  the 
railroads,  who  owned  the  stock,  and  how  much  of  the  profits 
of  the  coal  companies  were  absorbed  to  pay  freight  rates, 
etc.2  At  the  most  critical  times  and  when  the  heat  of  the 
discussion  runs  highest  the  speaker  on  the  floor  is  given  a 
fair  hearing.  We  give  here  a  report  of  a  convention  inci- 
dent :  — 

Mr. (evidently  from  the  miners'  side,  interrupted  Mr. 

R.,  an  operator).  What  are  you  doing,  Mr.  R.  ? 

Mr.  R.  I  am  working,  and  you  would  be  a  great  deal  better 
off  if  you  were  doing  the  same  thing. 

Mr.  W.  (miner).  I  protest  against  any  unfair  treatment  from 
this  convention  to  any  man  who  has  the  floor. 

Mr.  D.  (miner).  I  move  that  the  first  man  who  does  anything 

^  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers''  Convention,  1902,  pp.  44-45. 
^  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1906,  p.  246. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      151 

of  this  kind  be  put  out.  If  the  operators,  when  Mr.  Mitchell  or 
Mr.  Lewis  were  on  the  floor,  would  act  as  our  delegates  are  do- 
ing, would  you  like  it  ? 

Mr.  L.  (miner).  I  believe  it  is  time  to  appoint  a  half-dozen 
sergeants-at-arms  in  this  convention.  Any  man  who  interrupts 
any  speaker  on  the  floor  ought  to  be  ejected  from  the  hall,  I 
don't  care  who  he  is. 

Mr.  R.  (operator).  They  need  n't  do  that  to  protect  me ;  I 
can  take  care  of  myself. 

Mr.  K.  (chairman).  I  believe  it  is  the  feeling  of  the  members 
on  both  sides,  with  a  few  exceptions,  that  every  speaker  should 
be  given  a  fair  hearing.^ 

After  further  discussion  in  general  convention  the  scale 
committee  is  recommitted  to  the  task  of  reaching  an  agree- 
ment. Such  modifications  as  each  side  are  willing  to  make 
are  brought  forward.  But  here  as  elsewhere  the  unani- 
mous vote  required  results  in  a  process  of  elimination  until 
something  is  brought  forward  upon  which  all  can  agree. 
If  it  becomes  evident  that  such  a  large  number  as  are  in 
the  scale  committee  cannot  agree,  a  sub-scale  committee, 
of  two  operators  and  two  miners  from  each  State,  is  se- 
lected by  the  scale  committee.  Stenographic  reports  of  the 
convention  and  scale  committee  deliberations  are  made, 
but  no  record  of  the  sub-scale  proceedings  is  kept.  The 
last  thing  that  either  party  wants  is  a  failure  to  agree,  be- 
cause it  means  loss  of  money.  They  realize  that  they  must 
get  together  and  undergo  the  difficult  process  of  changing 
their  minds  —  In  part,  at  least.  Various  sources  of  infor- 
mation seem  to  Indicate  that  this  Is  a  rather  heating  and 
exciting  process.  In  the  past  it  has  been  part  of  a  sort  of 
gentlemen's  agreement  that  the  participants  should  not 
reveal  the  difficult  contortions  some  Individuals  have  had 
to  go  through  with  In  order  to  accomplish  this  result,  but 
in  the  conference  of  1910  the  rather  disagreeable  practice 
was  begun  of  making  reference  In  general  conference  to 

^  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1904,  p.  03. 


152     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

what  went  on  in  the  committee  meeting.  This  called  for 
an  explanation  on  the  part  of  the  individual  accused,  with 
the  result  that  it  all  went  down  on  the  record.  It  does  not 
look  well,  and  is  likely  to  cause  distrust.  The  sub-scale 
committee  is  appointed  with  the  feeling  that  it  is  a  last 
resort.  When  it  brings  forth  an  agreement  after  much 
labor  and  discussion,  its  report  is  accepted  by  both  the 
scale  committee  and  the  convention.  Neither  side  has  re- 
ceived all  it  wanted,  but  each  feels  that  it  has  obtained  all 
it  can  get  and  that  work  may  as  well  begin  on  this  basis. 
In  cases  where  even  the  sub-scale  committee  has  failed  to 
agree,  the  convention  has  adjourned  and  a  suspension  of 
work  taken  place  until  the  leaders  could  succeed  in  get- 
ting together  another  conference. 

D.  Inviolable  Contracts 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  miners  in  the  begin- 
ning had  an  enlarged  conception  of  the  sacredness  of  the 
agreements  any  more  than  the  operators.  Mr.  Herman 
Justi,  commissioner  of  the  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Asso- 
ciation, in  order  to  impress  upon  the  miners  the  necessity 
of  exercising  more  discipline  over  the  organization,  re- 
minded them  of  the  Spring  Valley  strike.^  In  that  case 
the  strike  was  settled  by  a  board  of  arbitration  composed 
of  three  miners  and  three  operators.  A  unanimous  vote 
was  given  to  the  basis  of  settlement,  but  the  miners  re- 
fused to  submit  and  remained  idle  three  weeks  "  until 
they  had  obtained  by  indirection  what  arbitration  had 
denied  them,  and  until  the  union  had  voted  strike  benefits 
to  the  miners,  although  it  had  been  contended  by  the 
miners'  union  that  the  miners  were  not  legally  on  strike 
and  were  not  entitled  to  such  strike  benefits."  On  the 
other  hand,  this  was  met  by  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Il- 
linois miners  with  "  We  stand  ready  to  prove  that  there 
has  never,  since  the  inception  of  the  joint  movement,  been 
1  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1903,  p.  80. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      153 

a  strike  of  any  kind  indorsed  in  Illinois  by  the  organiza- 
tion that  could  not  have  been  avoided  had  the  operators 
lived  up  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  our  agreement."  ^  There 
was  evidently  room  for  improvement  on  both  sides  if 
President  Mitchell  felt  called  upon  to  say  to  the  1900 
conference,  after  the  scale  had  been  adopted,  "  I  will 
serve  notice  to  the  operators  now  that  when  they  go  home, 
unless  they  keep  the  agreement  inviolate,  we  will  call  the 
men  out ;  and  I  will  serve  notice  on  the  miners  that  unless 
they  keep  the  laws  of  the  organization,  we  will  suspend 
them  from  the  organization."  ^  In  the  miners'  convention 
he  urged  the  miners  to  remember  that  the  agreements  were 
inviolable,  and  that  they  should  be  regarded  all  the  more 
so  because  they  were  purely  matters  of  honor,  and,  if 
broken,  the  employer  could  not  have  a  greater  weapon 
against  them.^ 


3.  THE  FORMATION  OF  SCALES 

A.  The  Scale  op  1898 

The  following  is  the  agreement  reached  in  1898  and  is 
a  good  example  of  the  items  which  are  settled  for  the  whole 
central  competitive  field. 

Chicago  Agreement,  1898 

Chicago,  January  28.  —  Contract  between  the  operators  of 
the  central  competitive  coal  field  and  the  United  Mine  Workers 
of  America. 

The  following  agreement  made  and  entered  into  in  Joint  In- 
terstate Convention  in  this  city  (Chicago,  Illinois),  January  26, 
1898,  by  and  between  the  miners  and  operators  of  Illinois,  In- 
diana, Ohio  and  Western  Pennsylvania,  known  as  the  Pittsburg 
thin  vein  district,  witnesseth  :  — 

^  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1903,  p.  83. 

2  Ibid.,  1900,  p.  142. 

*  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers''  Convention,  1902,  p.  51. 


154      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

1.  That  an  equal  price  for  mining  screened  lump  coal  shall 
hereafter  form  a  base  scale  in  all  the  districts  above  named,  ex- 
cepting the  state  of  Illinois,  the  block  coal  district  of  Indiana  to 
pay  ten  cents  per  ton  over  that  of  Hocking  Valley,  Western 
Pennsylvania,  and  Indiana  bituminous  district;  and  that  the  price 
of  pick  run-of-mine  coal  in  Hocking  Valley  and  Western  Penn- 
sylvania shall  be  determined  by  the  actual  percentage  of  screen- 
ings passing  through  such  screens  as  are  hereinafter  provided, 
it  being  understood  and  agreed  that  screened  or  run-of-mine  coal 
may  be  mined  and  paid  for  on  the  above  basis  at  the  option  of 
the  operators,  according  to  market  requirements,  and  the  opera- 
tors of  Indiana  bituminous  shall  also  have  a  like  option  of  min- 
ing and  paying  for  run-of-mine  coal  or  screen  coal. 

2.  That  the  screen  hereby  adopted  for  the  State  of  Ohio, 
Western  Pennsylvania,  and  the  bituminous  district  of  Indiana 
shall  be  uniform  in  size,  six  feet  wide  by  twelve  feet  long,  built 
of  flat  or  akron-shaped  bar  of  not  less  than  five  eighths  of  an  inch 
surface,  with  one  and  one  fourth  inches  between  bars,  free  from 
obstructions,  and  that  such  screen  shall  rest  upon  sufficient  num- 
ber of  bearings  to  hold  the  bars  in  proper  position. 

3.  That  the  block  coal  district  of  Indiana  may  continue  the 
use  of  the  diamond  screen  of  present  size  and  pattern  with  the 
privilege  of  run-of-mine  coal,  the  mining  price  of  which  shall  be 
determined  by  the  actual  screenings ;  and  that  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois shall  be  absolutely  upon  a  run-of-mine  system  and  shall  be 
paid  for  on  that  basis. 

4.  That  an  advance  of  ten  cents  per  ton  of  2000  pounds  for 
pick-mined  screen  coal  shall  take  effect  in  Western  Pennsylvania, 
Hocking  Valley,  and  Indiana  bituminous  districts  on  April  1, 
1898,  and  tliat  Grape  Creek,  Illinois,  and  the  bituminous  dis- 
tricts of  Indiana  shall  pay  forty  cents  per  ton  run-of-mine  coal 
from  and  after  same  date,  based  upon  sixty-six  cents  per  ton 
screened  coal  in  Ohio,  Western  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Indiana 
bituminous  district,  same  to  continue  in  force  until  the  expira- 
tion of  this  contract. 

5.  That  on  and  after  April  1,  1898,  the  eight-hour  work  day 
with  eight  hours'  pay,  consisting  of  six  days  per  week,  shall  be 
in  effect  in  all  of  the  districts  represented,  and  that  uniform 
wages  for  day  labor  shall  be  paid  to  different  classes  of  labor  in 
the  fields  named,  and  that  internal  differences  in  any  of  the 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      155 

States  or  districts,  both  as  to  prices  or  conditions,  shall  be  referred 
to  the  States  or  districts  affected  for  adjustment. 

6.  That  the  same  relative  prices  and  conditions  between  ma- 
chine and  pick  mining  that  have  existed  in  the  different  States 
shall  be  continued  during  the  life  of  this  contract. 

7.  That  present  prices  for  pick  and  machine  mining  and  all 
classes  of  day  labor  shall  be  maintained  in  the  competitive  States 
and  districts  until  April  1,  1898. 

8.  That  the  United  Mine  Workers'  organization,  a  party  to 
this  contract,  do  hereby  further  agree  to  afford  all  possible  pro- 
tection to  the  trade  and  to  the  other  parties  hereto  against  any 
unfair  competition  resulting  from  a  failure  to  maintain  scale 
rates. 

9.  That  this  contract  shall  remain  in  full  force  and  effect  from 
April  1,  1898,  to  April  1, 1899,  and  that  our  next  annual  Inter- 
state Convention  shall  convene  in  the  city  of  Pittsburg  on  the  third 
Tuesday  in  January,  1899. 

In  the  above  agreement  they  were  unable  to  formulate 
an  inside  day  wage  scale,  and  a  resolution  was  passed  pro- 
viding that  two  miners  and  two  operators  from  each  State 
should  meet  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  and  agree  on  such  a  scale. 
The  mere  enumeration  of  the  kinds  of  labor  to  be  consid- 
ered (tracklayers,  tracklayers'  helpers,  trappers,  bottom 
cagers,  drivers,  trip  riders,  water  haulers,  timbermen,  pipe- 
men,  company  men, "  and  all  other  inside  day  labor  ")  gives 
one  some  conception  of  the  complexity  of  labor  conditions 
in  the  industry.  Besides  these  there  are  various  kinds  of 
outside  day  labor  which  have  had  to  be  adjusted  in  succeed- 
ing agreements. 

B.  The  Renewal  of  the  Scale  of  1898 

In  1899  the  agreement  of  1898  was  continued  for  an- 
other year,  but  with  the  provision  that  the  machine  differ- 
ential in  Illinois,  outside  of  the  basing  point  ^  (the  Dan- 
ville  district),  should  be  referred  to  the    Illinois    state 

^  The  prices  in  the  districts  known  as  basing  points  are  a  gauge  in  reg- 
ulating prices  elsewhere. 


156      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

convention  for  settlement.  In  case  the  convention  should 
not  reach  an  agreement  the  question  was  to  be  referred  to 
a  board  of  arbitration  of  seven  members  composed  of  three 
miners  and  three  Illinois  opei'ators  who  should  select  a 
seventh.  It  was  not  settled  because  of  a  failure  to  agree  on 
a  final  arbiter.  The  Hocking  Valley  operators  (Ohio)  and 
the  Indiana  block-coal  operators  had  to  be  forced  to  sign 
this  agreement.  The  Hocking  Valley  operators  felt  that 
they  were  placed  at  a  disadvantage  with  the  other  com- 
petitive fields  and  suggested  arbitration  for  adjusting  the 
matter.  President  Ratchford  refused  to  comply  with  this 
suggestion  on  the  ground  that  whatever  the  decision  arrived 
at  the  operators  would  insist  on  the  same  advantages  and 
it  would  result  in  breaking  the  agreement.  He  suggested 
that  the  operators  sign  the  agreement  and  redress  their 
grievance  at  the  next  annual  conference,  because  their  de- 
mands pertained  to  internal  differences  which  should  be 
settled  after  the  scale  was  signed  and  he  had  "  neither 
inclination  nor  authority  to  commit  the  organization  to 
any  other  rate  than  that  provided  for  in  the  joint  conven- 
tions." ^  The  operators  signed. 

C.  Scale  of  1900  and  Renewals 
In  the  joint  conference  of  1900  the  miners  received  an 
advance  of  fourteen  cents  per  ton  of  2000  pounds  for  pick- 
mined,  screened  coal  in  the  Western  Pennsylvania  thin 
vein,  the  Hocking  Valley,  and  the  block-coal  district  of  In- 
diana. In  the  Danville  district  of  Illinois  and  the  bitumi- 
nous district  of  Indiana  an  advance  of  nine  cents  was  paid 
for  run-of-mine  coal.  The  differential  between  the  thick  and 
thin  vein  pick  mines  of  the  Pittsburg  district  was  referred 
to  that  district  for  settlement,  and  a  distinction  between 
punching  and  chain  machine  prices  was  made  in  Indiana, 
whether  on  a  screen  or  run-of-mine  basis.  An  advance 
of  twenty  per  cent  was  obtained  for  inside  day  labor  and 
^  Report  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Convention,  1900,  p.  16- 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      157 

all  narrow  deadwork,  and  room  turning  was  paid  a  pro- 
portionate advance  with  the  pick-mining  rate.  We  must 
remember  that  getting  an  agreement  and  seeing  that  it  was 
lived  up  to  was  only  apart  of  the  work  of  the  miners'  organ- 
ization. They  had  to  reduce  competition  which  affected  the 
central  field,  both  for  their  own  sakes  and  for  the  welfare 
of  the  operators  who  were  willing  to  meet  them  on  a  fair 
basis  of  settlement.  We  have  already  noted  the  struggles 
in  Maryland  and  elsewhere  which  followed  the  formation 
of  this  scale. 

The  scale  of  1900  was  renewed  for  the  years  1901  and 
1902,  but  in  1903  the  miners  received  another  increase. 
An  advance  of  ten  cents  per  ton  on  screened,  pick-mined 
coal  was  given  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  the  Hocking  Val- 
ley basing  district  in  Ohio,  and  in  the  block  and  bitumi- 
nous districts  of  Indiana,  while  a  six-cent  advance  on  pick 
mine-run  coal  was  accepted  in  Illinois  and  the  bituminous 
district  of  Indiana.  Advances  of  eight  and  ten  cents  were 
given  on  machine-mined  screened  coal  and  six  cents  on 
machine  mine-run  coal  in  the  above  named  districts.  Yard- 
age and  deadwork  were  advanced  12 1  per  cent  and  a 
suitable  increase  given  to  day  inside  labor. 

A.    ILLINOIS    GRIEVANCES 

It  was  in  this  conference  of  1903  that  the  Illinois  oper- 
ators made  a  formal  presentation  of  the  inequalities  which 
they  felt  they  were  laboring  under  and  called  upon  the 
conference  to  adjust  them.  They  reminded  the  conference 
of  the  resolutions  which  had  been  adopted  in  1902  as  the 
basic  principles  of  the  joint  conference,  and  intimated  that 
their  continuance  in  the  movement  depended  on  a  peaceful 
settlement  in  conference.  Operation  on  a  mine-run  basis 
while  the  other  States  had  a  screen  basis  and  unfair  machine 
differentials  were  the  chief  points  complained  of.  Penn- 
sylvania had  a  machine  differential  of  19J  cents  and  the 
Indiana  bituminous  a  differential  of  12i  cents  and  10  cents 


158     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

ou  chain  and  punching  machines  respectively.  "  While  in 
the  Danville  District  of  Illinois,  the  machine  differential 
was  only  ten  cents  less  than  the  hand  mining  rate  of  both 
types  of  machines  and  in  the  remainder  of  the  State  it 
[was]  but  seven  cents  less."  They  called  attention  to  the 
attempt  to  arbitrate  these  matters  in  1899,  and  attributed 
the  failure  to  the  unwillingness  of  the  miners  to  accept  as 
final  arbiter  "  any  man  in  the  United  States  beyond  both 
financial  and  political  influence."  They  were  further  ag- 
grieved because  the  miners  were  not  making  conditions 
of  entrance  to  the  union  equal  in  the  whole  competitive 
field.  The  conditions  they  had  set  up  in  Illinois  were  such 
that  the  operators  were  entirely  limited  to  union  labor. 
The  laws  of  Illinois  required  a  two  years'  apprenticeship, 
but  the  miners  were  setting  up  a  six  years'  period.  If 
these  grievances  could  not  be  settled  in  conference  they 
were  willing  to  submit  to  any  fair  arrangement  for  arbi- 
tration. To  give  the  conference  a  chance  to  adjust  matters 
they  voted  for  resolutions  referring  their  demands  to  the 
scale  committee. 

The  miners  were  with  the  Illinois  operators  in  a  demand 
for  a  run-of-mine  basis  for  the  entire  competitive  field 
and  a  universal  differential  between  pick  and  machine 
mining.  They  maintained  that  the  mine-run  basis  was  the 
only  fair  method  of  paying  for  coal,  since  by  the  screen 
method  the  operators  got  a  large  percentage  of  coal  for 
which  they  did  not  pay,  and  wherever  the  miners  were  un- 
organized and  the  operator  fixed  conditions  of  employ- 
ment he  was  glad  to  pay  on  a  mine-run  basis.  The  operators 
answered  this  by  pointing  out  screens  as  the  only  means 
by  which  they  could  force  the  miner  to  be  careful  in 
his  mining,  and  since  they  paid  a  higher  price  for  screened 
coal,  the  miner  was  really  paid  for  the  small  coal.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  miner  complained  that  the  operators 
were  not  careful  in  keeping  their  screens  in  good  order 
and  used  "  spreaders  "  so  that  a  larger  and  larger  per- 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      159 

centage  of  small  coal  went  through.  Besides  this  they 
made  the  complaint  that  some  operators  selected  the 
cars  which  appeared  most  profitable  to  pay  for  on  the 
screen  basis  and  the  other  cars  were  paid  for  at  mine-run 
rates.  This  abuse  is  due  to  the  operators'  privilege  of  pay- 
ing according  to  the  double  standard.  The  operator  is 
protected  by  the  privilege  of  fining  a  miner  who  loads 
impurities  (rock  or  slate),  but  he  insists  that  mine-run 
payment  encourages  the  introduction  of  unskilled  labor 
and  unskillful  methods  on  the  part  of  miners  who  know 
better.  The  diversity  in  machine  differential  is  due  for 
the  most  part  to  the  conditions  in  the  various  mines  which 
make  the  use  of  machines  more  or  less  profitable,  and  is 
an  attempt  to  make  the  earnings  of  the  pick  and  machine 
miners  equal.  The  miners  had  obtained  mine-run  payment 
and  the  favorable  machine  differential  in  Illinois  through 
strikes  in  former  years.  It  was  to  the  interest  of  the 
miners  in  other  States  that  they  should  have  as  favorable 
conditions  as  Illinois,  and  to  the  interest  of  the  Illinois 
operators  that  the  other  operators  should  grant  as  favor- 
able terms  or  else  see  that  the  Illinois  operators  had  the 
same  mining  rates.  It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  it  was 
of  advantage  to  the  operators  of  the  other  States  not  to 
grant  Illinois  a  more  favorable  competitive  basis,  and  to 
the  interest  of  the  Illinois  miners  not  to  surrender  what 
they  had  gained.  Since  altruism  is  not  the  basis  of  the 
joint  agreement,  the  only  way  to  have  compelled  justice 
for  all  would  have  been  a  strike  on  the  part  of  the  miners 
of  the  other  States  with  aid  from  the  Illinois  miners  and 
operators  in  coercing  the  other  operators  into  granting 
equally  favorable  terms.  However,  the  miners  had  many 
other  things  to  consider,  and  the  Illinois  operator  had  not 
developed  to  the  point  of  helping  miners  in  a  strike.  The 
Illinois  resolutions  were  turned  down  and  the  State  met 
with  the  joint  conference  in  1904  and  1906  hoping  for  a 
peaceable  solution. 


160     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

D.  Reduction  in  Wages  in  1904 
The  operators  came  to  the  conference  of  1904  with  the 
determination  to  force  the  miners  to  accept  a  reduction  of 
fifteen  per  cent  in  wages.  Industrial  depression,  present 
or  anticipated,  was  offered  as  the  underlying  cause.  The 
miners  conservatively  asked  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
scale  of  1903.  They  met  the  arguments  for  reduction  by 
pointing  out  that  industrial  depression  meant  cessation 
of  labor,  which  was  equivalent  to  reduction.  Since  the  cost 
of  living  woidd  not  fall  with  a  reduction  of  wages,  the 
consequence  would  be  to  lessen  the  miner's  effectiveness 
as  a  consumer  and  this  would  be  another  factor  in  further 
depression.  Furthermore,  this  principle  would  work  all 
through  industry,  and  the  real  solution  of  the  problem 
was  suspension  to  limit  overproduction  and  restore  normal 
equilibrium.  They  quoted  industrial  reports  to  show  that 
industry  was  awakening,  and  used  a  circular  of  the  Pitts- 
burg Coal  Company  which  claimed  a  $5,000,000  surplus 
fund  with  which  to  pay  dividends  for  the  next  five  years.^ 
The  Report  of  the  Labor  Commissioner  of  Ohio  was  used 
to  show  that  the  average  wage  of  the  miner  was  but 
$436  a  year,  while  the  operators  were  getting  a  margin  of 
seventy-one  to  seventy-seven  cents  per  ton  above  labor 
cost  with  which  to  operate  their  mines.^ 

Scale  and  sub-scale  committees  were  of  no  avail  in 
bringing  an  agreement,  but  the  conference  before  adjourn- 
ment appointed  a  special  committee  with  power  to  call 
another  convention  before  the  contract  expired  in  April, 
1904.  Another  joint  conference  was  called  for  February 
29  and  lasted  until  March  5.  The  regular  routine  of  the 
conference  was  gone  through,  but  without  bringing  any 
better  results.  At  this  second  conference  the  operators 
presented  an  ultimatum  which  entailed  a  reduction  of  from 

1  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1904,  p.  SI. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  81. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      161 

three  to  five  cents  per  ton  on  pick-mined  coal  and  from  four 
to  five  cents  ou  machine-mined  coah  The  miners'  delegates 
were  committed  by  the  instructions  of  their  locals  and  did 
not  accept  the  ultimatum.  But  by  a  special  convention 
composed  of  the  miners'  delegates  to  the  joint  conference 
it  was  voted  to  appoint  a  committee  to  determine  their 
policy,  and  this  committee  recommended  that  the  opera- 
tors' proposition  be  submitted  to  the  rank  and  file  of 
miners  by  referendum  vote.  In  accordance  with  this  a 
statement  was  sent  out  embodying  the  ultimatum  with 
instructions  for  voting,  and  on  March  15  the  mines 
were  closed  in  the  afternoon  from  one  to  six  o'clock 
to  ffive  the  miners  a  chance  to  vote.  The  result  was  a 
large  majority  in  favor  of  reduction  in  preference  to  a 
strike,  and  on  March  21  the  joint  sub-scale  committee 
met  and  signed  the  agreement  to  remain  in  effect  till 
1906. 

In  connection  with  the  call  for  the  vote  the  national 
officers  sent  out  a  statement  calling  attention  to  industrial 
conditions,  the  slight  amount  of  reduction,  the  advantages 
obtained  in  the  past  by  peaceful  means,  and  the  possibility 
of  competition  from  West  Virginia  and  other  unorganized 
fields.  "Men  who  will  strike  and  suffer  all  the  hardships 
of  a  long  struggle  when  they  know  that  others  are  strik- 
ing also  will  hesitate,  weaken,  and  finally  return  to  work 
when  day  after  day  coal  is  being  produced  and  shipped 
past  their  doors  into  the  markets  which  they  formerly  sup- 
plied." "  It  will  strengthen  us  with  the  public,  because  it 
will  demonstrate  that  a  trade  union  can,  when  the  occa- 
sion arises,  gracefully  accept  a  reduction  as  well  as  stren- 
uously insist  upon  an  advance,  and  it  will  leave  us  with 
an  organization,  strengthened  by  its  conservatism,  ready 
to  take  advantage  of  any  improvement  in  the  future  of 
the  coal  trade,  to  still  further  better  the  conditions  of  the 
mine  workers."  Half  of  the  battle  would  depend  on  pub- 
lic opinion  and,  "That  body  of  men  has  never  yet  been 


102     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

organized  which  can  long  resist  a  thoroughly  aroused, 
well-organized  and  well-directed  public  opinion."  ^ 

E.  Failure  to  agree  in  1906 

The  miners  opened  the  joint  conference  in  1906  by  de- 
manding an  advance  of  12^  per  cent  over  the  1904  scale. 
This  would  place  them  beyond  the  prices  of  the  1903 
scale  upon  which  they  had  accepted  a  reduction.  The 
operators  were  willing  to  offer  the  1904  scale  with  an 
amendment  to  the  effect  "  that  at  Danville,  the  basing 
point  of  Illinois,  the  price  of  mine-run  coal  be  fifty-two 
cents  per  ton  for  coal  loaded  on  the  cars  at  the  face,  in- 
cluding the  inspection  and  shooting  of  the  shots,  the  tim- 
bering and  care  of  the  working  places,  and,  in  machine 
mines,  the  proper  snubbing  of  the  coal."  The  significance 
of  this  amendment  comes  out  in  connection  with  the  "  shot 
firers  "  law  in  Illinois.  In  the  last  agreement  the  Illinois 
miners  had  made,  they  had  tried  to  get  a  clause  providing 
for  shot  firers  which  would  check  the  growing  loss  of  life 
that  came  from  lack  of  inspection  and  proper  firing.  Not 
succeeding  there,  they  had  lobbied  a  bill  through  the 
legislature,  and  this  had  entailed  extra  expense  on  the  op- 
erators. This  was  an  added  grievance  on  the  Illinois  list. 
The  miners  replied  that  consideration  of  this  factor  would 
be  the  same  as  asking  the  occupant  of  a  house  to  pay  for 
a  fire  escape  or  the  employees  of  a  railroad  to  pay  for  air 
brakes.  Each  party  stuck  tenaciously  to  its  position,  and 
the  conference  adjourned  February  2  with  each  side  accus- 
ing the  other  of  breaking  up  the  agreement. 

President  Roosevelt  wrote  to  each  of  the  parties  ex- 
pressing regret  because  they  had  failed  to  agree  and  sug- 
gested that,  since  Mr,  Robbins,  practically  the  leader  of 
the  operators,  and  Mr.  Mitchell  were  joint  chairmen  of  the 
trade  agreement  committee  of  the  National  Civic  Federa- 
tion, they  were  still  further  obligated  to  make  another  at- 

1  Report  of  Interstate  Convention,  1904,  pp.  118-21. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      163 

tempt  to  reach  an  agreement.^  In  response  to  this  another 
conference  was  held  from  March  20  to  March  29.  After 
going  over  about  the  same  grounds  the  deadlock  was  broken 
by  an  offer  on  the  part  of  the  Pittsburg  Coal  Company  to 
grant  the  1903  scale.  This  seems  to  have  been  in  direct 
contravention  of  an  agreement  among  the  operators  which 
was  to  govern  their  policy,  and  became  the  occasion  of 
much  recrimination.  The  operators  from  Illinois,  Indiana, 
and  Ohio  maintained  that  this  was  establishing  anything 
but  fair  competitive  conditions,  and  the  Indiana  operators 
went  so  far  as  to  offer  not  only  the  1903  scale,  but  free 
powder  if  they  could  employ  the  same  percentage  of  non- 
union labor,  have  the  same  scale  for  dead  work,  the  same 
scale  for  day  work,  and  the  same  machine  differential  as 
Pennsylvania  enjoyed.  The  miners  met  this  Indiana  prop- 
osition with  the  argument  that  the  Pennsylvania  opera- 
tors proposed  to  grant  the  scale  in  the  Ohio  and  Illinois 
mines  which  they  owned,  and  why  should  not  the  operators 
in  those  States  do  the  same  ?  The  real  reason  why  the 
Pennsylvania  operators  could  grant  this  increase  was  be- 
cause they  had  large  contracts  with  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  and  the  railroads.  As  it  was,  the  leader 
of  the  Pennsylvania  operators  voted  some  of  their  tonnage 
against  their  will,  and  this  was  the  beginning  of  his  down- 
fall. The  operators  did  everything  they  could  to  oust  him 
and  finally  ruined  him  financially. 

The  miners  had  met  in  a  special  convention  previous  to 
the  second  joint  conference  and  decided  to  accept  the  1903 
scale.  The  chief  motive  behind  this  action  had  been  a 
doubt  that  they  would  have  public  sympathy  with  them  in 
their  demand  for  a  12|  per  cent  advance,  and  the  fear 
that,  if  some  sort  of  an  agreement  were  not  reached,  a 
commission  similar  to  the  Anthracite  Commission  would 
be  appointed  and  meddle  with  their  affairs.  In  fact  they 
were  of  the  opinion  that  some  of  the  operators  would  be 
^  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  190G,  p.  141. 


1G4     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

olad  to  have  such  a  commission  step  in  and  regulate  the 
differential  between  machine  and  pick  mining.^  The  con- 
ference adjourned  without  an  agreement,  but  the  miners 
announced  the  policy  of  signing  the  1903  scale  with  those 
operators  who  were  willing  to  sign.  The  operators  in  the 
Pittsbui'g  district  and  Kentucky,  and  various  companies  in 
Ohio  signed  at  once,  and  by  July  1  all  the  operators  were 
paying  the  1903  scale. 

F.  Reestablishment  in  1908 

During  the  next  two  years  a  great  effort  was  made  to 
reestablish  the  joint  conference,  and  after  much  dickering 
Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Pennsylvania  operators  met  the  miners, 
April  14-17,  1908.  Illinois  operators  refused  to  come  in 
unless  conditions  of  competitive  equality  were  established. 
The  Illinois  miners  wanted  to  attend  the  conference  and 
there  secure  such  conditions,  but  the  operators  had  no 
faith  that  this  could  be  brought  about  and  insisted  that 
the  miners  meet  them  in  state  conference  and  settle  on 
conditions  which  would  give  interstate  equality.  The 
miners  refused  to  do  this,  on  the  ground  that  settling 
state  agreements  before  the  national  agreements  would 
handicap  the  national  organization  in  reaching  an  agree- 
ment.^ An  agreement  by  the  three  States  was  reached 
providing  that  the  mining  rates,  day  wage  scale,  and 
"general  prices,"  which  had  been  established  in  1907  by 
various  state  and  district  agreements,  should  remain  in 
effect  till  1910.  Internal  differences  were  to  be  left  to  the 
districts,  but  a  resolution  was  added  to  the  scale  vigor- 
ously condemning  the  practice  which  had  grown  up  in 
the  last  two  years  of  suspending  the  operation  of  mines 
during  the  settlement  of  disputes.  The  agreement  was 
submitted  to  referendum  vote  by  the  miners  and  ratified. 

*  Report  of  Special  United  Mine  Workers'  Convention,  1906,  p.  69. 
2  Report  of  Illinois  Joint  Convention,  1908,  p.  15. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      165 

G.    SETTLEMJaiTT  BY   StATES   IN   1910 

The  miners  did  not  present  formal  demands  in  the 
1908  conference,  but  were  satisfied  to  add  to  what  the 
operators  were  willing  to  offer.  In  1910  they  came  for- 
ward with  a  request  for  mine-run  payment,  an  advance 
of  ten  cents  on  pick  mining  and  an  equivalent  increase 
for  machine  mining,  inside  and  outside  day  work,  dead- 
work,  yardage,  etc.  Furthermore  the  wages  for  day  work 
were  to  be  uniform,  with  time  and  a  half  for  overtime, 
Sundays,  and  legal  holidays.  Their  eight-hour  day  was  to 
be  from  "  bank  to  bank  "  (i.e.,  including  time  going  to 
and  from  the  mine  entrance  to  place  of  work  within  the 
mine),  with  a  half -holiday  on  Saturdays.  They  demanded 
that  the  new  explosives,  which  were  required  by  the  min- 
ing bureau  and  were  more  expensive,  should  be  furnished 
to  the  men  at  the  same  relative  cost  as  black  powder. 
There  was  to  be  no  limit  to  the  amount  of  deductions 
from  wages  to  be  paid  as  dues  and  assessments  to  the 
miners'  organization  and  the  miners  were  to  stop  the  re- 
imbursement of  operators  for  expenses  which  the  law  said 
should  be  borne  by  the  operators.  The  Pennsylvania 
operators  showed  a  willingness  to  grant  an  increase, 
though  not  what  the  miners  expected.  Opposition  at 
once  arose  from  the  Ohio  operators  on  the  grounds  that 
competitive  conditions  in  Ohio  and  inequalities  between 
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  would  not  warrant  an  increase. 
In  the  midst  of  the  deadlock  two  interesting  propositions 
to  arbitrate  were  advanced,  one  from  the  Ohio  operators, 
the  other  from  the  miners.  The  operators  were  willing  to 
submit  to  an  impartial  commission  the  questions  of  in- 
crease, decrease,  or  maintenance  of  the  present  mining 
rates.  In  case  this  commission  could  not  agree,  the  opera- 
tors were  to  select  two  representatives,  the  miners  two, 
and  these  four  to  choose  a  fifth.  The  miners  responded 
with  an  offer  to  arbitrate  the  question  of  mining  and 


ICO     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

paying  for  coal  on  the  mine-run  basis  (decision  to  be 
rendered  according  to  whether  or  not  the  majority  of  the 
tonnage  of  the  country  operated  under  that  system),  the 
justifiability  of  the  wide  machine  differential  of  twenty- 
nine  cents  in  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  (decision  to  be 
rendered  according  to  whether  or  not  twenty-nine  cents 
was  "  required  to  pay  for  the  increased  cost  in  the  invest- 
ment of  machinery  and  a  fair  profit  on  that  investment 
as  against  pick  mining  "),  etc.  Neither  party  would  con- 
sider the  other's  proposition,  and  after  both  scale  and 
sub-scale  committees  had  failed  repeatedly,  a  special  com- 
mittee of  one  operator  and  one  miner  from  each  State 
was  appointed.  They  failed  to  agree,  and  the  Indiana 
operators  offered  the  explanation  that  the  Ohio  operators 
in  one  local  district  desired  to  go  back  home  and  arrange 
a  contract  there,  where  they  were  sure  they  could  get  a 
reduction  of  four  cents  a  ton  which  they  could  not  get  in 
joint  conference,  and  in  one  large  district  they  expected 
to  get  a  half-cent  reduction  which  they  could  not  get 
in  the  convention.^  The  convention  adjourned  and  each 
district  and  State  settled  by  itself. 

H.  The  New  Method  in  1912 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Illinois  presented  her  griev- 
ances in  regard  to  mine-run  payment  and  machine  differ- 
entials in  1903,  and  finally  refused  to  come  into  the  joint 
conference  in  1908  because  she  could  get  no  satisfaction 
along  these  lines.  Although  adjustment  of  these  disputed 
points  had  been  secured,  yet  in  the  interval  between  1910 
and  1912  efforts  wei'e  made  to  demonstrate  the  necessity 
for  a  general  conference  including  all  the  central  field. 
The  invitation  sent  out  by  the  miners'  president  included 
the  operators  and  miners  of  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Penn- 
sylvania, and  West  Virginia.  A  feeling  had  grown  up 
that  a  large  convention  of  delegates  was  an  unnecessary 
^  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1910,  p.  345. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      167 

expense  and  mainly  a  waste  of  time  to  both  parties. 
Since  the  convention  merely  ratified  the  work  of  the 
scale  and  sub-scale  committees,  and  had  to  adjourn  while 
they  were  carrying  on  their  negotiations,  it  was  felt  that 
the  ratification  could  be  brought  about  just  as  well  by 
the  referendum.  But  in  cases  where  concessions  by  both 
parties  have  been  made  only  after  exceptionally  hard 
fighting,  and  the  agreement  arrived  at  does  not  come  up 
to  expectations  of  the  rank  and  file,  there  are  fewer  men 
to  disseminate  themselves  over  the  field  and  convince 
their  constituents  that  the  contract  was  the  best  which 
could  be  obtained.  In  critical  times  this  may  be  an 
important  matter  and  worth  all  the  expense  attached  to  a 
convention.  In  response  to  the  invitation  a  committee  in- 
cluding eight  operators  and  eight  miners  from  each  of  the 
abovenamed  States,  except  West  Virginia,  met  at  Indi- 
anapolis January  26,  1912.  The  same  order  of  business, 
selection  of  committees,  and  the  same  rules  that  had  been 
in  operation  in  the  large  convention  were  used.  After  con- 
siderable debate  it  was  voted  to  seat  the  president,  vice- 
president,  and  secretary-treasury  of  the  union  as  ex-officio 
members,  pursuant  to  former  customs.  The  miners  felt 
that  this  would  make  the  agreement  much  more  accept- 
able to  the  rank  and  file. 

The  miners'  demands  as  formulated  in  their  convention 
were  presented  to  the  committee  for  consideration.  In 
view  of  the  increasing  cost  of  living,  the  increasing  in- 
ventions of  labor-saving  machinery,  and  the  dangers  of 
their  calling,  the  miners  felt  that  they  were  entitled  to 
a  flat  ten  cents  per  ton  increase  at  basing  points.  They 
further  demanded  that  coal  be  paid  for  on  a  run-of-mine 
basis  and  asked  for  a  twenty  per  cent  increase  on  dead- 
work,  day  labor,  etc.  A  uniform  work  day  and  wage  scale 
for  all  classes  of  outside  and  inside  day  labor,  as  well  as 
a  uniform  day  of  seven  hours  at  the  working  place  for  all 
classes  of  inside  labor,  were  among  the  demands.    They 


1C8     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

considered  it  essential  that  a  readjustment  of  the  machine 
differential  at  the  basing  points  in  various  States  should 
take  place.  Weeldy  payment  of  wages  and  no  limit  to  the 
amount  of  deduction  made  through  the  companies'  offices 
for  the  miners'  organization  were  also  important  demands. 
As  we  have  pointed  out,  the  organization  has  a  consider- 
able problem  to  make  their  400,000  members  pay  their  dues, 
and  any  hindrance  offered  by  the  operator  in  the  amount 
he  will  allow  to  be  deducted  only  adds  to  the  difficulty. 

The  miners'  demands  were  voted  down  clause  by  clause, 
and  then  the  operators  presented  their  propositions.  They 
were  far  from  being  inclined  to  grant  any  increase.  The 
miners  were  reminded  of  the  keen  competition  from  the 
non-union  fields,  and  warned  that,  unless  the  miners  were 
willing  to  accept  a  reduction,  the  competition  could  not 
be  met,  their  tonnage  would  be  reduced,  and  the  miners 
would  obtain  less  employment.  They  therefore  proposed 
a  return  to  the  scale  of  1904-06,  the  year  in  which  the 
miners,  by  referendum  vote,  had  accepted  a  reduction 
rather  than  strike.  This  they  claimed  would  be  the  only 
way  in  which  the  operators  could  meet  West  Virginia 
competition.  The  miners  reminded  the  operators  that  no 
matter  what  the  reduction  was  in  the  central  field,  the 
West  Virginia  operators  were  in  a  position  to  force  wages 
under  the  scale  of  the  other  States,  and  thus  retain  the 
ability  to  undersell  them. 

Failure  to  come  to  a  compromise  necessitated  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  sub-scale  committee  of  two  miners  and  two 
operators  from  each  State.  One  advantage  of  the  sub-scale 
committee  (where  no  stenographic  report  is  taken)  is 
to  make  both  parties  less  careful  of  what  they  say  and 
less  ready  to  advocate  partisan  ideas.^  The  conference  ad- 
journed February  1,  subject  to  the  call  of  the  sub-scale 
committee,  and  on  March  20  was  called  together  again. 
The  sub-scale  committee  had  reached  no  agreement  and 

^  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1912,  p.  90. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      169 

the  miners  had  not  changed  their  demands.  After  further 
discussion  the  sub-scale  committee  was  again  assigned  the 
task  of  reaching  an  agreement.  This  time  the  operators 
receded  from  their  position  of  exacting  a  reduction  in 
wages  and  offered  to  renew  the  scale  then  in  operation. 
The  miners  refused  to  accept  this,  and  the  discussion  was 
again  taken  up  in  general  conference.  With  the  appoint- 
ment of  another  sub-scale  committee  the  following  agree- 
ment was  reached  to  remain  in  effect  until  March  31, 
1914:  — 

The  price  of  mining  was  increased  five  cents  a  ton  on 
screened  coal,  pick  mined,  in  the  thin  vein  of  western 
Pennsylvania,  the  Hocking  distinct  of  Ohio,  and  in  In- 
diana. Mine-run  coal,  pick  mined,  was  increased  three 
cents  per  ton  in  Indiana  and  Illinois,  while  the  prices  for 
machine-mined  coal  were  increased  from  three  to  four 
cents  according  to  whether  or  not  coal  was  paid  for  as 
screened  or  mine-run  coal.  The  wages  of  inside  and  out- 
side day  labor  were  increased  5.26  per  cent.  The  eight- 
hour  day  was  maintained  and  internal  differences  were 
referred  to  the  various  districts  for  adjustment.  The  agree- 
ment was  referred  to  the  miners  and  approved  by  a  refer- 
endum vote. 

Although  the  agreement  was  reached  only  after  long 
discussion  and  stubborn  opposition  on  both  sides,  it  ended 
with  good  feeling  and  the  inauguration  of  a  new  feature. 
During  the  life  of  the  agreement  a  joint  committee  similar 
to  the  one  which  had  framed  the  scale  was  charged  with 
the  duty  of  meeting  whenever  desirable,  to  consider  and 
take  action  on  matters  pertaining  to  the  welfare  of  the 
industry  in  general.  As  a  first  step  in  this  direction  the 
following  resolution  was  passed :  — 

Whkreas,  It  is  recognized  that  there  is  a  useless  waste  of 
our  fuel  resources  in  the  development  of  the  minmg  industry, 
and  an  unnecessary  loss  of  life,  and 

WuEREAs,  The  useless  waste  of  fuel  and  the  reckless  loss  of 


170     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

life  is  due  to  the  competition  in  the  industry  that  prevents  any 
form  of  agreement  in  establisliing  the  selling  price  of  coal, 

Hesoli'ed,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  this  joint  conference  that 
a  committee  of  operators'  and  miners'  representatives,  of  an  equal 
number  from  the  States  here  represented,  together  with  the  in- 
ternational officers  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  should  be  cre- 
ated for  the  purpose  of  using  their  influence  to  amend  or  have  re- 
pealed such  sections  of  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Law  and  the  anti- 
trust or  conspiracy  laws  of  the  different  States  as  prohibit  mine 
owners  from  arranging  a  fair  selling  price  of  fuel,  or  that  would 
prohibit  miners  and  operators  from  arranging  wage  contracts. 

The  statement  of  the  operators  in  reference  to  the  pur- 
pose of  this  resolution  may  cast  some  light  upon  it :  — 

I  believe  a  committee  from  this  body  would  have  influence  with 
that  Senate  Committee  if  they  appeared  before  it  and  said  we 
would  like  to  have  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Law  so  amended  as  to 
permit  coal  operators  to  enter  into  agreements  on  selling  prices 
of  coal  to  alleviate  the  situation  (competitive)  ;  and  to  remove 
any  fear  of  the  coal  operators  we  are  willing  that  a  commission 
be  appointed,  as  is  now  done  for  the  railroad  interests,  to  say 
to  the  coal  operators  of  this  country  that  when  they  do  so  agree 
on  schedules  of  selling  prices,  those  schedules  shall  not  be  exor- 
bitant, that  they  shall  not  be  vmreasonable  or  unfair.^ 

Probably  the  largest  consideration  in  bringing  the  opera- 
tors to  take  this  position  is  the  "  West  Virginia  Problem  " 
to  which  we  have  referred  in  chapter  ii.  Indeed,  some 
operators  in  West  Virginia  have  reached  the  point  where 
they  are  willing  to  have  the  price  of  coal  regulated  by  a 
commission  with  powers  and  functions  similar  to  those  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission.^ 

4.  RESULTS  OF  COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING 

During  the  time  the  joint  agreement  has  been  in  force 
it  has  not  been  without  its  fruits  for  both  sides.  The  oper- 

1  Proceedings  of  Interstate  Joint  Conference,  1912,  p.  330. 

2  Eeport  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  2,  p.  1664^. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      171 

ators  have  been  able  to  maintain  more  stable  industrial 
conditions  and  less  fluctuation  in  prices.  The  miners  have 
been  able  to  build  up  an  organization  which  has  bettered 
their  conditions  and  helped  the  operators  to  equalize  com- 
petition. In  the  Southwest  and  Northwest  the  miners  have 
reached  out  and  forced  state  and  interstate  agreements 
whose  scales  are  governed  largely  by  the  scale  of  the  cen- 
tral field.  The  miners,  by  extending  their  organization  so 
widely,  have  made  it  possible  for  the  operators  to  grant 
conditions  of  labor  which  they  would  never  have  conceded 
had  they  not  gone  into  effect  generally.  This  is  shown  by 
the  hardship  which  the  various  States  inflict  on  industries 
when  they  pass  laws  compelling  their  industries  to  com- 
pete with  conditions  in  other  States  where  such  laws  do 
not  exist.  The  joint  movement  has  brought,  by  unity  of 
action,  the  abolition  of  company  stores  and  company  tene- 
ments, the  inauguration  of  the  eight-hour  day,  regulation 
of  screens,  equalization  of  wages  of  different  classes,  and 
the  improvement  of  working  conditions  and  safety  appli- 
ances. Dockage  has  been  lessened  and  checkweighmen  are 
employed,  so  that  the  miner  is  paid  for  the  coal  he  pro- 
duces. The  principle  of  conciliation  is  ramifying  every 
part  of  the  industry,  strikes  have  been  lessened,  and  the 
movement  is  working  out  a  better  understanding  of  the 
difficulties  with  which  both  sides  have  to  contend. 

From  the  tables  in  Appendix  A  (pp.  359-363),  we  find 
that,  although  capitalization,  production,  number  of  mines, 
and  the  total  of  employees  in  the  industry  continued  to 
increase,  wages  did  not  rise  to  a  new  level  until  collective 
bargaining  became  effective.  When  wages  are  once  on 
this  level  we  see  no  steady  absorption  of  the  value  of  the 
product,  but  wages  fluctuate  with  the  varying  prosperity 
of  the  industry.  In  fact  labor  is  engaged  in  a  constant 
struggle  to  maintain  this  new  level  and  make  wages  more 
responsive  to  changes  in  prices  and  cost  of  living. 

There    are  several   factors  which   make  this  struggle 


172     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

difficult.  We  have  seen  that  the  effect  of  machinery  has 
been  to  decrease  wages  by  helping  to  glut  the  market  and 
lessen  the  number  of  days  the  miners  could  work.  Added 
to  this  element  is  the  constant  increase  in  the  number  of  em- 
ployees, which  causes  a  further  reduction  in  the  number  of 
working  days  for  those  already  in  the  industry.  These  con- 
ditions are  made  possible  because  the  demand  does  not 
keep  pace  with  the  ability  to  supply  the  market.  Aside 
from  the  advantages  which  might  have  accrued  to  the  oper- 
ator from  the  miner's  patronage  of  company  stores,  there 
is  another  urgent  reason  for  desiring  to  retain  a  surplus 
of  men  on  the  premises  —  the  seasonal  demand  for  coal. 
Further,  it  does  not  pay  to  mine  coal  and  store  it,  thus 
giving  fewer  men  steady  employment,  for  the  handling  is 
a  great  expense  and  the  coal  deteriorates  in  appearance 
and  quality.  For  this  latter  factor  in  the  situation  the 
public  is  largely  responsible  because  consumers  are  very 
slow  about  buying  coal  ahead  of  the  season,  even  though 
they  are  offered  rates  that  are  equal  to  good  interest  on 
the  money  invested. 

The  full  import  of  the  new  level  of  wages  for  the  worker 
is  seen  when  we  consider  that  in  spite  of  the  reduction  of 
possible  working  days  by  the  above  factors,  we  find  that 
in  1911  he  gets  a  larger  yearly  wage  for  working  167 
days  (Illinois  table)  than  he  did  for  229  days  in  1893. 
This  result  is  obtained  by  gradually  forcing  up  the  aver- 
age daily  wage.  The  same  general  principle  is  shown  in 
the  other  States,  though  not  quite  so  strikingly.  The  force 
of  collective  bargaining  is  further  shown  (as  may  be  seen 
from  the  tables  in  the  Appendix,  and  on  page  267)  by  the 
fact  that  the  prices  paid  for  mining  were  more  responsive 
in  the  bituminous  field  than  in  the  anthracite  region  and 
also  by  the  fact  that  the  general  level  of  average  daily 
wages  in  Illinois  and  Ohio  is  kept  on  a  higher  plane  than 
those  of  West  Virginia.  Another  interesting  consideration 
is  that  in  spite  of  the  eight-hour  day  the  production  con- 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      173 

tinues  to  increase,  although  the  men  are  working  a  less 
number  of  days.  Besides  the  increased  efficiency  that 
may  result  from  shorter  hours,  the  increased  use  of  ma- 
chinery and  a  greater  number  of  men  in  the  industry  ac- 
counts for  this.  Table  VI  in  Appendix  A  shows  that  the 
increased  production  per  mine  and  per  employee  is  worth 
noting. 

In  connection  with  the  increase  of  capitalization,  pro- 
duction, and  number  of  mines  it  may  be  observed  that  we 
have  an  exception  here  to  one  of  Professor  Moore's  laws 
of  wages,  "  that  the  more  rapid  the  increase  of  capital  in 
an  industry,  the  more  rapidly  do  wages  increase."  ^  The 
situation  may  be  partly  explained  by  another  of  his  laws, 
"  that  the  fluctuations  of  wages  about  their  general  trend 
are  inversely  correlated  with  the  machine  power  with 
which  the  laborers  work."  But  the  trouble  is  that  there  is 
not  a  general  trend,  and  the  only  power  which  the  laborer 
has  to  make  wages  respond  to  prosperity  is  his  united 
stand  for  higher  wages.  Nor  in  this  case  does  the  "rate 
of  wages,  amount  of  employment,  and  length  of  the  work- 
ing day"  necessarily  improve  "  with  the  increasing  con- 
centration of  industry,"  ^  but  rather  with  the  increase  of 
the  bargaining  power  of  the  laborer. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,^  the  simple  average  wage  in 
the  coal  industry  is  fairly  significant  because  the  different 
employees  are  earning  about  the  same  wages.  There  is  not 
so  much  difference  in  the  pay  of  the  skilled  and  unskilled 
labor  as  to  affect  the  simple  average  greatly.  Several  in- 
stances are  noted  in  the  tables  where  the  average  yearly 
earnings  of  the  miners  do  not  vary  much  from  the  earn- 
ings of  all  employees.  In  fact,  in  many  cases  in  the  bitumin- 
ous field  the  yearly  average  earnings  of  all  employees 
(even  when  the  salaries  of  officials  are  not  included)  is 
greater  than  that  of  skilled  miners.  The  inclusion  of  the 

1  Moore,  Laws  of  Wages,  p.  177.  ^  ]j,{j_^  p.  193. 

^  Nearing,  Wages  in  the  United  States,  p.  119. 


174     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

skilled  miners  among  the  total  employees  only  helps  to 
lessen  the  depression  of  the  simple  average  by  low-paid 
unskilled  labor.  It  was  not  possible  to  get  a  weighted 
average  from  the  census  reports  previous  to  1902,  nor 
from  the  reports  of  the  state  bureaus  of  labor  at  any  time. 
For  1902,  when  the  figures  were  procurable,  the  weighted 
average  of  yearly  earnings  of  all  occupations  in  the  bitu- 
minous field  is  $470.73,  while  the  simple  average  is  $493.67. 
In  the  anthracite  field,  the  weighted  average  for  all  occu- 
pations is  $329  and  the  simple  average  is  $377.89.  This 
was  the  year  of  the  "big  strike"  in  the  anthracite  field, 
which  accounts  for  such  a  large  difference  between  it  and 
the  bituminous  field. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  difference  in  the  general 
level  of  wages  in  the  bituminous  and  anthracite  fields  in 
1902.  The  average  daily  wage  (weighted)  for  contract 
miners  in  the  anthracite  field  was  $2.72,  for  all  occupa- 
tions, $1.88.  In  the  bituminous  field  the  corresponding 
daily  wages  were  $2.31  and  $2.21 ;  the  miners  not  being 
much  above  the  general  level,  while  in  the  anthracite  field 
there  is  a  variation  of  84  cents. 

A  comparison  of  the  median  daily  wage  gives  a  truer 
picture  of  the  variation  between  contract  miners  and  the 
median  daily  wage  for  other  occupations,  for  it  is  not  af- 
fected by  the  extremely  low  wage  of  the  boy  workers,  on 
the  one  hand,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the  tendency  of 
the  high  wages  of  the  officials  (which  are  included  in  the 
enumeration  of  the  wages  of  all  occupations)  to  raise  the 
general  level.  The  median  ^  (or  mid-point)  daily  wage  of 
contract  miners  in  the  anthracite  field  was  $2.53,  and  for 
all  other  occupations  $1.79,  a  variation  of  74  cents  instead 

^  Professor  R.  E.  Chaddock  describes  the  median  thus :  "  Having  ar- 
ranged the  wage-earners  in  regular  ascending  order,  according  to  the 
amount  of  their  wages,  the  median  average  wage  is  that  of  the  mid-wage 
earner  of  the  series.  This  method  of  computing  an  average  minimizes  the 
influence  of  extremely  high  or  low  wages,  and  where  such  wide  extremes 
exist  gives  a  more  typical  result." 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE      175 

of  84  cents  as  expressed  by  the  weighted  averages.  In  the 
bituminous  field  the  corresponding  figures  were  f  2.22  and 
f  2.16,  which  again  corroborates  the  conclusion  that  the 
general  level  of  wage  there  was  higher  than  in  the  anthra- 
cite field.  We  can  assign  no  reason  for  this  unless  it  is 
an  expression  of  the  results  of  collective  bargaining  power 
which  had  been  in  effect  in  the  bituminous  field  since  1898. 
The  discrepancy  between  the  fields  would  have  been 
greater  had  not  the  anthracite  field  already  profited  by 
collective  bargaining  in  1900  to  the  extent  of  a  ten  per 
cent  raise. 

In  a  notation  on  the  tables  in  Appendix  A,  we  have 
called  attention  to  the  erroneous  conception  of  yearly 
earnings  given  by  the  use  of  the  average  number  of  em- 
ployees during  the  year.  The  United  States  Census  Re- 
port of  1902  employs  these  figures,  and,  when  an  attempt 
is  made  to  arrive  at  average  yearly  earnings  by  dividing 
total  wages  by  the  total  number  of  employees,  the  average 
is  too  high.  The  census  does  not  give  the  average  daily 
wage  and  the  average  number  of  working  days,  so  there 
is  no  other  way  of  obtaining  an  approximation.  But  the 
use  of  the  average  number  employed  leaves  out  of  account 
the  fact  that  there  are  a  great  many  more  men  in  the  in- 
dustry who  depend  for  their  subsistence  upon  the  earnings 
they  receive  during  the  course  of  a  whole  year.  "Where  it 
is  possible  to  obtain  the  average  daily  wage  and  the  num- 
ber of  working  days,  it  is  demonstrable  that  the  proper 
procedure  is  to  divide  the  total  wages  by  the  total  em- 
ployees on  the  pay  rolls,  which  gives  an  average  yearly 
wage  that  is  comparable  to  the  average  daily  wage  multi- 
plied by  the  number  of  days  worked. 

The  table  for  West  Virginia  (from  the  state  report) 
shows  that  the  average  daily  wage  in  1902  for  all  other 
employees  than  pick  miners  was  $1.45.  This,  multiplied 
by  the  average  number  of  days  worked,  gives  $3G1.05. 
No  average  daily  wage  for  pick  miners  is  quoted,  but  their 


17G     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

average  yearly  wage  averaged  witli  the  yearly  wage  of 
other  employees  gives  $447.30.  In  1911  the  average  daily 
wage  of  pick  and  machine  miners  was  given  and  included 
to  obtain  the  average  of  all  employees,  which  was  $2.15. 
The  average  of  pick  and  machine  miners  was  f2.34,  and 
it  is  seen  that  their  yearly  earnings  do  not  vary  much 
from  the  yearly  earnings  of  the  total  employees.  The 
yearly  wages  of  pick  miners,  obtained  by  multiplying  the 
average  number  of  tons  mined  by  the  average  price  per 
ton,  was  $570.48.  The  total  wages  paid  is  not  given  by 
the  reports  in  either  case,  so  there  is  no  way  of  checking 
lip  the  yearly  wage  by  dividing  the  total  wages  by  the 
total  employees.  Even  though  the  total  yearly  wage  of 
West  Virginia  should  exceed  the  total  yearly  wage  of  the 
other  central  States,  a  fair  comparison  of  the  real  welfare 
of  the  workers  cannot  be  made  until  the  number  of  work- 
ing days  and  the  hours  per  day  are  taken  into  considera- 
tion. From  1904  to  1909  the  miners  of  West  Virginia 
averaged  "  216  days  of  10  hours  per  day  or  a  total  of 
2160  hours  each  year.  [This]  reduced  to  8  hours  per  day 
would  be  an  average  of  270  days  each."  Ohio  averaged 
173  eight-hour  days  from  1904  to  1909,  "  or  97  days  less 
than  the  average  work  in  West  Virginia  on  the  eight-hour 
basis."! 

The  only  fair  basis  of  comparison,  seeing  that  there  is 
this  wide  discrepancy  in  actual  number  of  days  and  hours 
worked,  is  to  reduce  the  wage  to  a  rate  per  hour.  This 
was  done  by  taking  the  number  of  days  worked  by  pick 
miners  in  Illinois,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  and  West  Virginia 
and  multiplying  by  eight  or  ten  hours  according  to  the 
length  of  the  working  day  in  the  various  States.  The  total 
yearly  wages  received  were  then  divided  by  the  total  num- 
ber of  hours,  and  we  find  that  the  rate  per  hour  for  West 
Virginia  was  below  all  the  other  States  in  all  the  years 
listed  in  Table  V,  except  that  it  was  equal  to  the  rate  in 
1  Report  of  Senate  Committee  Hearings,  op.  cit.,  part  3,  p.  2155. 


THE  INTERSTATE  JOINT  CONFERENCE       177 

Pennsylvania  in  1909  and  in  1911  and  one  cent  higher 
than  the  Pennsylvania  rate  in  1908.  In  this  connection 
we  must  remember  the  total  yearly  wage  of  pick  miners 
in  Pennsylvania  is  the  result  of  averaging  the  wages  from 
unorganized  districts  with  the  wages  from  unionized  fields. 
We  have  made  a  comparison  between  the  rates  per  hour 
for  pick  miners  because  their  wages  are  near  the  average 
for  all  employees  and  because  sufficient  data  for  making 
a  comparison  of  the  average  wages  for  all  employees  could 
not  be  obtained  in  all  the  States. 

In  the  years  in  which  West  Virginia  has  a  greater  total 
yearly  wage  than  the  other  States,  if  this  difference  or 
surplus  wage  is  divided  by  the  total  surplus  hours  that 
West  Virginia  miners  are  working  above  the  States  which 
have  an  eight-hour  day,  it  results  in  a  payment  per  hour 
for  this  time  of  never  more  than  fourteen  cents.  It  not 
only  goes  as  low  as  three  cents  per  hour,  but  in  the  in- 
stances where  the  other  States  have  a  surplus  over  West 
Virginia  it  can  only  be  expressed  as  a  negative  rate.  This 
gives  us  some  appreciation  of  the  necessity  of  considering 
not  only  the  total  yearly  wage  and  the  number  of  days 
worked,  but  the  rate  per  hour  and  the  extent  to  which  a 
worker  is  really  recompensed  for  the  surplus  hours  he  works 
as  compared  with  the  worker  who  is  getting  a  less  total 
yearly  wage,  and  who,  at  the  same  time,  is  working  a  less 
number  of  hours. 

The  importance  of  the  minimum  wage  and  maximum 
working  hours  has  been  demonstrated  in  the  bituminous 
coal  industry.  The  abuse  of  the  minimum  wage  is  safe- 
guarded by  the  employer's  right  to  discharge,  and  the 
workingman  must  come  up  to  a  certain  standard  of  effi- 
ciency or  his  services  are  dispensed  with.  The  cost  of 
labor  is  definitely  fixed  to  all  employers,  and  the  union 
guarantees  the  employers  against  undercutting  by  their 
competitors.  Where  such  a  regulation  does  not  exist  there 
is  almost  no  limit  to  the  depth  to  which  wages  may  sink, 


178      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

and  the  just  employer  is  compelled  by  competitive  forces 
to  depress  wages  to  the  level  of  the  most  unfair  employer. 
As  has  been  well  said,  the  minimum  wage  "  places  com- 
petition where  it  should  be  —  upon  a  plane  of  legitimate 
business  activity."  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
interstate  joint  conference  simiDly  cleared  away  questions 
which  pertained  to  the  whole  industry.  The  settlement  of 
state  and  district  matters  brings  us  to  our  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  STATE  CONFERENCE 

INTRODUCTION 

A.    THE   TASK    OF    THE   STATE    CONFERENCE 

As  we  have  seen,i  the  local  and  state  agreement  preceded 
the  interstate  agreement,  and  the  partial  success  there 
suggested  the  interstate  conference  and  the  establishment 
of  uniformity  over  a  larger  area.  State,  district,  or  local 
agreements  are  made  in  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Pennsyl- 
vania, West  Virginia,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Kan- 
sas, Arkansas,  Missouri,  Michigan,  Montana,  Iowa,  Wyo- 
ming, Washington,  and  British  Columbia,  Canada.  This 
also  gives  some  idea  of  the  scattered  area  of  the  bituminous 
coal  fields.  The  state  conference  follows  the  interstate 
conference  and  proceeds  at  once  to  the  consideration  of 
details  which  are  local  and  could  not  be  settled  effectively 
in  the  interstate  convention.  The  prices  at  the  basing 
point  in  the  various  States  having  been  settled  by  the  in- 
terstate joint  conference,  the  State  is  left  to  settle  upon 
the  variations  in  the  different  districts.  If  there  are  special 
questions  which  concern  only  the  district,  they  are  left  for 
the  operators  of  the  particular  district,  but  district  agree- 
ments must  be  in  conformity  with  interstate  and  state 
agreements.  Questions  which  the  state  and  district  con- 
ferences cannot  settle  are  usually  referred  to  a  board  of 
arbitration  consisting  of  two  miners  and  two  operators 
who,  if  they  cannot  agree,  choose  a  fifth  party. 
1  See  chap,  i,  p.  19. 


180     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

B.    CONDITIONS    OF   THE    INDUSTRY    IN    ILLINOIS 

Illinois  has  many  peculiar  complications  whicli  are  con- 
ducive to  labor  disputes,  and  a  study  of  methods  there 
will  show  the  state  agreement  at  its  highest  point  of  de- 
velopment. There  are  886  mines  with  over  72,000  miners, 
forty  per  cent  of  whom  are  ignorant  of  our  language.  The 
miners'  organization  has  not  yet  devised  means  by  which 
it  can  rigidly  enforce  agreements  upon  its  members.  All 
of  the  operators  have  not  yet  been  brought  into  the  oper- 
ators' association,  and  not  all  of  those  who  are  in  have 
abandoned  the  idea  of  fighting  out  their  difficulties  singly 
rather  than  working  through  the  association.  The  pro- 
vision in  the  agreement  for  fining  both  the  miner  and  the 
operator  is  an  attempt  to  make  both  parties  realize  that 
it  is  a  serious  offense  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands 
rather  than  to  work  through  the  channels  provided  for 
settling  disputes  peacefully  and  without  suspension  of 
work.  The  miners  have  great  trouble  in  replacing  incom- 
petent and  unruly  members  who  do  not  live  up  to  the 
agreement.  The  radical  element  is  too  often  in  the  saddle, 
and  the  officials  are  frequently  compelled  to  assent  to 
much  that  they  disapprove  of.  The  underlying  industrial 
situation  probably  makes  each  party  particularly  touchy 
in  regard  to  the  least  infringement  on  their  earnings.  In 
spite  of  the  size  and  rapid  development  of  the  coal  in- 
dustry in  Illinois,  the  industry  is  not  prosperous.  A  great 
many  mines  have  been  opened  and  large  sums  of  capital 
invested  which  were  not  warranted  from  the  standpoint 
of  normal  commercial  demand.  This  overdevelopment  was 
largely  encouraged  by  the  unusual  demand  for  coal  from 
the  central  States  at  the  time  of  the  anthracite  strike  in 
1902.  The  overproduction  which  results  increases  the  cost 
of  production  by  irregular  operation  of  plants  and  reduces 
the  average  number  of  working  days  per  year  for  the 
miner  to  about  168.  The  normal  demand  for  coal  could 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  181 

be  met  by  the  labor  of  about  50,000  men  instead  of  72,000, 
and  the  annual  wage  of  the  miner  would  be  more  nearly 
commensurate  with  the  standard  of  living  which  is  his  due. 
It  is  evident  that  these  conditions  are  very  favorable  to 
the  periodic  occurrence  of  industrial  strife.^ 

1.  ORGANIZATION 

The  state  conference  is  much  the  same  in  organization 
and  methods  as  the  interstate  conference.  A  description 
of  conditions  in  Illinois  will  show  the  most  advanced  stages 
of  development  in  almost  every  line,  for  there  the  regula- 
tions from  year  to  year  have  been  the  most  elaborate.  The 
same  method  of  requiring  a  unanimous  vote  on  all  main 
and  principal  questions  and  the  same  use  of  the  scale  com- 
mittee are  in  operation  as  in  the  interstate  conference. 
The  scale  committee  has  two  operators  and  two  miners 
from  each  of  the  nine  districts,  and  most  of  the  work  of  the 
convention  is  done  by  this  committee.  The  practice  seems 
to  be  in  vogue  of  appointing  special  committees  from  the 
scale  committee  to  draw  up  different  articles  of  the  agree- 
ment.^ 

2.  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  SETTLED 

One  of  the  first  things  settled  on  in  the  state  confer- 
ence is  the  scale  of  prices  to  be  paid  in  the  various  dis- 
tricts as  it  varies  from  the  basing  point  according  to  the 
different  coal  veins  and  working  conditions.  Changes  or 
working  conditions  which  increase  the  cost  of  production 
are  not  to  be  put  in  operation  during  the  life  of  the  agree- 
ment. Certain  employees  about  the  mines  are  exempt  from 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  miners'  organization.  They  are  in 
positions  of  authority,  are  definitely  enumerated,  and  their 
right  to  hire  and  discharge  is  not  to  be  abridged.  It  is 
definitely  stated  that  this  right  in  conjunction  with  the 

^  Report  of  Illinois  Employers^  Liability  Commission,  1010,  p.  118. 
2  Eeport  of  Illinois  State  Convention,  1908,  pp.  217,  249. 


182     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

management  of  the  mine  and  the  direction  of  the  working 
force  are  vested  exclusively  in  the  operator  and  he  dele- 
gates his  authority  to  his  lieutenants.  It  is  understood 
that  the  coal  is  to  be  practically  free  from  impurities  such 
as  bone,  clay,  slate,  or  sulphur.  When  the  miner  offends 
in  this  respect  the  impurities  are  estimated  by  an  inspector 
and  their  weight  deducted  from  the  car.  Besides,  the 
miner  is  fined  fifty  cents  for  the  first  offense,  in  any  given 
month,  and  for  the  second  offense  he  is  fined  two  dollars 
or  suspended  for  two  days  at  the  discretion  of  the  opera- 
tor. For  the  third  offense,  or  in  any  particularly  aggra- 
vated or  malicious  cases,  the  miner  is  subject  to  discharge. 
In  case  of  discharge  the  impurities  are  preserved  as  evi- 
dence, if  the  man's  case  comes  up  for  trial,  and  the  com- 
pany posts  in  a  conspicuous  place  the  names  of  miners 
thus  dealt  with.  The  inspector  cannot  be  a  member  of 
the  miners'  organization  nor  can  he  be  embarrassed  in  his 
duties.  Any  one  who  hinders  him  in  his  duties  is  subject 
to  punishment  by  the  miners'  organization  and  may  be 
suspended  by  the  operator.  If  charges  are  brought  that 
the  inspector  is  not  performing  his  duties  properly,  he 
is  subject  to  trial  through  the  regular  channels  and,  if 
found  guilty,  is  discharged  or  transferred  to  other  duties. 
The  fines  collected  under  these  provisions  are  paid  to  the 
miners'  sub-district  treasurer.  This  helps  the  miner  to  see 
that  all  the  owner  asks  is  honest  labor. 

Closely  connected  with  this  is  the  provision  that  a  miner 
who  absents  himself  from  work  for  two  days  without  the 
consent  of  his  employer,  and  without  proven  sickness,  is 
subject  to  discharge.  Employees  guilty  of  throwing  a  mine 
into  idleness  or  materially  reducing  the  output  of  the  mine 
by  using  any  methods  to  force  demands  contrary  to  the 
agreement,  or  to  secure  a  decision  by  any  other  methods 
than  those  provided  in  the  agreement,  are  subject  to  a  fine 
of  five  dollars  each.  On  the  other  hand,  any  operator  who 
locks  out  all  or  part  of  his  employees  in  order  to  force 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  183 

conditions  in  violation  of  the  agreement  is  subject  to  a 
fine  of  one  hundred  dollars.  Of  the  fines  thus  collected 
one  half  is  paid  to  the  miners'  and  one  half  to  the  oper- 
ators' organization. 

To  insure  skilled  workmanship  it  is  agreed  that  all  min- 
ing and  shooting  of  coal  shall  be  according  to  the  state 
mining  law.  It  is  stated  that  payment  on  mine-run  basis 
was  inaugurated  to  do  away  with  contentions  incident  to 
the  use  of  screens,  and  the  miners'  organization  promises 
full  cooperation  and  insistence  on  skilled  workmanship. 
The  amount  and  kind  of  powder  used  is  determined  by  a 
commission  of  skilled  men  selected  from  the  operators  and 
miners,  which  rests  its  decision  on  the  favorable  results  to 
be  obtained  for  miner  and  operator  alike.  This  is  quite  a 
r'oparture  from  the  days  when  the  operator  charged  the 
miner  extortionate  prices  and  forced  him  to  pay  on  pen- 
alty of  losing  his  job. 

The  mere  enumeration  of  some  of  the  main  headings  of 
the  agreement  shows  the  complexity  of  the  industry  and 
why  it  is  that  labor  has  found  it  necessary  to  have  some 
voice  in  deciding  upon  its  working  conditions,  such  as 
equal  turn,  yardage  and  dead  work,  operators  to  keep  places 
dry,  track  laid  by  operator,  rules  for  drivers,  shaft- 
sinking,  use  of  cage  by  employees,  machine  differential, 
emergency  work  and  ordinary  repairs,  responsibility  for 
timbering  and  deadwork,  fatal  accidents  and  funerals, 
operators  to  keep  ambulances,  bandages,  etc.,  inside  and 
outside  day  wage  scale,  overtime,  oil,  blacksmithing,  pay 
days  and  statements  of  account,  definition  of  eight-hour 
day,  etc. 

The  district  and  local  agreements  cover  such  things 
as  headings,  crossroads,  rolls,  miners'  supply  of  household 
coal,  entries,  timbering,  removing  water  from  miners' 
place  of  work,  and  the  diverting  of  smoke  from  the  black- 
smith's fire  into  return  airways. 


184     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 
3.  ADMINISTRATIVE  MACHINERY 

A.  Business  Contracts 

The  machinery  for  working  out  the  agreement  after  it 
is  made  deserves  the  most  extended  treatment.  The  state 
conference  has  provided  this  machinery  and  it  is  one  of 
the  principal  provisions  applied  over  the  whole  State,  It 
is  fairly  easy  for  the  leaders  on  both  sides  to  formulate 
some  sort  of  an  agreement,  but  the  problem  is  to  provide 
effective  methods  for  carrying  out  the  agreement.  One  of 
the  foremost  obstacles  encountered  is  the  fact  that  the 
mine  boss  and  average  workman  do  not  themselves  under- 
stand the  agreement.  They  did  not  make  it,  and  most  of 
the  trouble  which  comes  up  is  due  to  the  interpretation 
of  the  agreement.  Not  only  the  workmen  and  mine  boss, 
but  the  operators'  and  miners'  officials  all  along  the  line 
need  enlightenment.  In  fact,  the  agreements  are  business 
contracts  which  have  grown  up  gradually,  and  the  changes 
made  from  year  to  year  are  not  revolutionary.  The  will- 
ingness of  both  parties  to  meet  each  other  and  settle 
questions  fairly,  and  the  machinery  by  which  this  is  ac- 
complished, are  the  chief  contributions  of  the  conciliation 
movement. 

B.  The  Steps  in  Conciliation 

On  the  part  of  the  miners  in  the  local  mine  there  is  a 
pit  committee  of  three  members  chosen  from  the  rank  and 
file.  Their  chief  duty  is  to  adjust  any  difficulty  which  may 
arise  between  the  pit  boss  and  any  member  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  working  in  or  about  the  mine.  In  case 
they  cannot  settle  it,  the  miners'  local  president,  the  pit 
committee,  and  the  pit  boss  get  together.  In  case  these 
fail  to  agree,  the  questions  at  issue  are  referred  to  the 
superintendent  of  the  mine  and  the  miners'  president  of 
the  subdistrict.    In  case  of  their  disagreement,  it  is  re- 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  185 

ferred  in  writing  to  the  officers  of  the  operators'  associa- 
tion and  commission  and  to  the  state  officials  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers.  These  officials,  having  a  written  state- 
ment from  both  sides  and  the  names  of  witnesses  who  are 
able  to  substantiate  the  facts,  give  a  hearing  to  the  local 
representatives  in  dispute  and  to  any  of  the  witnesses 
mentioned  in  their  statements  who  can  be  produced.  After 
hearing  the  case  the  officials  retire  and  if  they  reach  an 
agreement,  render  a  decision  in  writing.  If  they  fail  to 
agree,  they  must  make  a  written  statement  of  the  essential 
facts  which  govern  the  case.  If  they  cannot  agree  on  the 
essential  facts,  they  must  submit  such  facts  as  they  do 
agree  on,  the  facts  in  dispute,  and  their  reasons  for  fail- 
ing to  agree.  The  joint  executive  boards  of  the  two  organ- 
izations then  take  up  the  case,  and  if  they  fail  to  agree, 
it  is  arbitrated  at  the  discretion  of  the  joint  executive 
boards.  Decisions  reached  under  this  system  govern  like 
cases  during  the  life  of  the  agreement  and  the  life  of 
''future  contracts  with  like  provisions,  unless  otherwise 
stipulated  in  writing  in  the  decision,  or,  except  as  pro- 
tested, as  herein  provided."  Neither  party  can  appeal 
from  any  joint  decision  reached  in  accordance  with  this 
system.  But  any  "decision  may  be  set  aside  by  joint 
action  of  the  two  executive  boards,  and  either  executive 
board  may  require  a  reviewal  of  a  decision  by  the  joint 
executive  boards,  and  if  not  set  aside  when  so  reviewed, 
either  executive  board  may  protest  it  as  a  precedent." 
The  intent  of  these  provisions  is  to  "  obviate  the  necessity 
of  independent  action  by  either  party  and  to  avoid  the 
delay  in  disposing  of  disputes  existing  in  the  past."^ 
While  a  case  is  in  dispute  work  continues  without  inter- 
ruption. If  any  "day  men"^  refuse  to  work  while  the 
decision  is  being  reached  and  such  action  threatens  to 
close  the  mine,  the  United  Mine  Workers  are  obliged  to 
furnish  men  to  take  their  places. 

1  Illinois  Agreement,  1910,  p.  22.  2  p^ij  i,y  tin,  jay. 


186     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

C.  The  Pit  Committee 

The  pit  committee  is  not  allowed  to  go  about  the  mine 
unless  called  upon  by  a  miner  or  the  pit  boss  to  settle  a 
dispute,  and  pit  committeemen  who  are  employed  as  day 
men  must  have  the  permission  of  the  operator,  unless  a 
case  has  arisen  which  has  stopped  the  mine.  A  pit  com- 
mitteeman who  tries  to  put  in  force  any  provision  which 
violates  the  contract,  or  does  not  advise  against  a  shut- 
down (which  violates  the  contract),  may  be  deposed  from 
his  position.  These  provisions  are  not  to  hinder  them 
from  looking  after  membership  dues,  initiations,  etc.  The 
functioning  of  the  pit  committee  has  shown  that  there 
are  certain  matters  in  connection  with  working  conditions 
about  which  the  worker  should  and  must  have  some  say 
without  conflicting  with  the  employer's  duty  of  "  running 
his  own  business."  Furthermore,  it  places  the  worker  in  a 
position  of  greater  equality  in  bargaining. 

D.  Method  of  Investigating  Disputes 

Every  effort  is  made  in  formulating  the  agreement  to 
avoid  all  chance  of  differences  and  disputes  and  to  make 
both  parties  realize  that  it  is  an  inviolable  contract. 
Operators  are  forming  the  practice  of  calling  together 
their  men  who  have  authority  and  discussing  and  ex- 
plaining the  agreement.^  In  spite  of  this,  unlooked-for 
exigencies  are  constantly  arising  which  make  necessary 
interpretation  of  the  agreement,  and  the  mere  bringing 
together  of  the  disputants  gives  opportunities  for  impress- 
ing a  better  understanding  of  the  agreement  upon  both 
parties.  Every  effort  is  made  to  settle  disputes  promptly, 
and  the  mine  manager  is  prevailed  upon  so  far  as  possi- 
ble to  settle  with  the  local  officials.  An  important  work 
of  the  commissioner  and  the  miners'  officials  is  to  get 
the  mine  manager  to  realize  that  "A  soft  answer  turneth 
^  Report  of  Illinois  State  Conference,  1908,  p.  115. 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  187 

away  wrath,"  and  the  miner  that  "A  polite  request  will 
obtain  tenfold  more  than  a  rude  demand."  When  the 
commissioner  and  union  officials  set  a  date  for  a  hearing, 
the  parties  are  summoned,  accompanied  by  witnesses,  and 
the  witnesses  are  encouraged  to  speak  freely.  Every 
effort  is  made  to  get  at  the  truth,  and  the  attempts  to 
confuse  witnesses,  so  common  in  legal  proceedings,  are 
not  allowed.  If  necessary  all  the  parties  go  down  into  the 
mine  and  investigate  actual  conditions.* 

A.    THE   DANVILLE    CASE 

An  interesting  settlement  of  a  Danville  subdistrict 
case  took  place  in  1901.  It  was  referred  to  Mr.  Herman 
Justi,  commissioner  of  the  Illinois  Association,  and  to 
Mr.  John  Mitchell,  national  president  of  the  miners.^ 
The  Danville  operators  claimed  that  the  run-of-mine  sys- 
tem had  saddled  such  a  large  amount  of  deadwork  upon 
them,  due  to  the  careless  shooting  of  coal  and  timbering 
of  the  mines,  that  they  could  not  see  their  way  clear  to 
accede  to  the  agreement  unless  some  relief  was  afforded 
them.  The  operators  showed  statements  where  the  cost  of 
deadwork  had  increased  from  85  cents  per  ton  to  12  cents, 
which  pointed  to  a  danger  of  permanent  idleness  and  loss 
to  all  parties  concerned.  The  section  in  dispute  had  been 
inserted  in  the  agreement  with  the  expectation  that  more 
careful  mining  would  result.  The  decision  of  the  arbiters 
was  arrived  at  after  first-hand  investigation  of  the  mines, 
and  they  had  to  admit  that  they  had  found  evidences  of 
improper  shooting  and  timbering.  The  following  is  the 
substance  of  the  rules  which  they  recommended  and  de- 
cided should  be  in  force  :  — 

1.  Each  party  should  remember  the  spirit  of  the  sec- 
tion and  exercise  "  mutual  fairness  and  conciliation." 

^  Jnsti,  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  Publications ;  Plans  of  Cow 
dliation  and  Arbitration,  p.  15. 

^  Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  voL  12,  p.  095. 


188     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

2.  The  miners  should  exercise  good  judgment  in  shoot- 
ing coal  in  order  to  reduce  the  number  of  props  blown 
out. 

3.  The  miner  should  use  sufficient  timbers  to  prevent 
falling  of  roofs. 

4.  Whenever  it  was  shown  that  props  had  been  blown 
out  as  the  result  of  improper  shooting,  the  rock  should  be 
cleaned  up  at  the  expense  of  the  miner. 

5.  When  unusual  conditions  like  rocks  and  faults  ex- 
isted and  abnormal  falls  of  rock  resulted,  the  miner 
should  receive  extra  compensation  or  the  company's  men 
should  clean  it  up.  When  an  unusual  fall  resulted,  the 
miner  should  consult  the  mine  foreman  immediately,  and, 
if  decided  unavoidable,  the  compensation  for  removing  it 
should  be  fixed  in  advance. 

6.  If  the  miner  and  foreman  failed  to  agree,  the  pit 
committee  should  try  to  settle  it.  If  they  were  unsuccess- 
ful, it  should  be  referred  to  the  subdistrict  president  and 
the  commissioner  of  the  operators. 

7.  Miners  should  shoot  their  coal  so  as  to  produce  as 
large  a  percentage  of  marketable  coal  as  possible. 

8.  The  mine  foreman  should  supply  proper  timbers  so 
as  not  to  entail  extra  work  on  the  part  of  the  miner. 

9  and  10.  Where  falls  take  place  as  the  result  of  con- 
ditions over  which  the  miner  has  no  control,  the  company 
should  stand  the  expense. 

Also  they  recommended  that  mine  foremen  and  pit  com- 
mittee treat  each  other  courteously  and  try  to  reach  an 
equitable  and  just  decision.  And  further,  both  parties 
were  asked  to  apply  the  decision  in  a  "  friendly  and  busi- 
nesslike manner,  and  thus  avoid  friction  which  in  the 
past  has  been  so  disastrous  to  the  interests  of  both  mine 
owners  and  workers." 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  189 

B.    THE    CASE    OF   THE    ATHENS    LOCAL   UNION 

The  case  of  the  miners'  local  union  at  Athens,  Illinois, 
in  1901  is  an  example  of  the  difficulties  under  which  the 
miners'  organization  labors  in  holding  its  members  up  to 
the  agreement,  and  of  the  disciplinary  measures  used.  The 
miners'  local  had  not  only  broken  the  agreement,  but 
they  had  defied  their  own  state  organization.  Their  case 
had  been  investigated  by  a  joint  committee  of  miners  and 
operators,  which  gave  a  unanimous  vote  against  the  con- 
duct of  the  miners  in  violating  the  agreement  and  their 
treatment  of  the  mine  manager.  The  report  of  this  joint 
board  was  approved  by  the  state  joint  conference,  and  the 
state  executive  board  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  sus- 
pended the  local  for  an  indefinite  period.  This  action 
made  it  impossible  for  them  to  get  work,  for  they  were  re- 
fused membership  or  transfer  cards  to  other  locals  and 
mines.  At  the  end  of  eight  weeks  the  miners  were  con- 
vinced that  they  had  made  a  mistake  and  applied  for  read- 
mission  to  the  union.  This  the  union  refused  to  grant 
until  the  consent  of  the  operators  was  given.  The  opera- 
tors agreed  to  reinstate  them,  and  work  was  resumed,  but 
the  operators  had  been  the  losers  and  something  had  to 
be  done  to  make  the  men  stick  to  their  contract. 

E.  Coercion  by  Fines 

This  with  other  instances  brought  the  operators  to  the 
point  where  they  demanded  that  the  miners'  organization 
stand  losses  due  to  breach  of  the  contract  by  the  miners, 
as  is  done  by  the  International  Longshoremen's  Associa- 
tion.^ The  nearest  approach  to  this  is  the  fine  on  the  in- 
dividual member,  and  various  decisions  show  that  the 
operators  are  rather  lenient  in  not  insisting  on  its  strict 
enforcement.  Decisions  in  the  monthly  bulletin  show  the 

^  Jasti,  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  Publications ;  Conciliation 
and  Arbitration,  p.  25. 


190     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

common  practice  of  granting  an  alternative  proposition 
or  holding  the  fine  in  abeyance  pending  good  behavior 
and  until  the  miners  are  guilty  of  another  offense.  The 
agreement  of  1908  provided  for  a  ten-dollar  fine  on  each 
miner  who  suspended  work  and  violated  the  contract,  but 
in  1910  the  fine  was  fixed  at  five  dollars.  Whether  this 
will  be  high  enough  will  depend  largely  on  increased  will- 
ingness to  settle  by  peaceful  means  and  the  development 
of  tact  by  both  parties.  Too  often  the  men  regard  a  sus- 
pension of  work  as  the  only  effective  means  of  forcing  a 
quick  adjustment,  and  the  miners'  state  officials  follow 
the  same  course  in  threatening  "  independent  action " 
unless  a  prompt  settlement  is  made.  Often  an  attempt 
to  get  at  the  real  core  of  the  trouble  is  made  by  discharg- 
ing, fining,  or  deposing  the  local  president  and  the  pit 
committee.^  How  far  the  local  and  state  miners'  organi- 
zations are  guilty  of  misuse  of  power  in  assuming  an  ar- 
bitrary position  in  refusing  to  inflict  the  penal  clauses  of 
the  agreement  is  hard  to  determine  from  reading  the  de- 
cisions of  the  cases.  Both  parties  are  probably  guilty  of 
this  offense  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  and  improvement 
in  this  respect  will  undoubtedly  take  place  as  they  grow 
confident  that  real  justice  will  be  meted  out  by  the  sys- 
tem which  they  have  built  up. 

F.  The  Monthly  Bulletin  of  Decisions 

In  connection  with  the  agreement  of  1908,  when  the 
system  of  making  the  joint  executive  board  a  court  of  last 
resort  was  established,  the  policy  was  adopted  of  publish- 
ing a  monthly  bulletin  containing  decisions  handed  down. 
When  a  dispute  arises  it  is  listed  with  a  case  and  file  number. 
If  the  case  is  settled  during  the  month  by  the  local  officers, 
the  decision  is  recorded.  If  it  has  to  pass  through  the 
hands  of  the  operators'  special  agent  and  a  miners'  board 

1  Illinois  Coal  Operators^  Association  Bulletins,  December,  1909,  p.  10; 
March,  1909,  p.  73. 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  191 

member  to  a  joint  group  board  and  then  to  the  joint  execu- 
tive board,  the  history  of  the  case  is  traced  each  month  by 
its  case  and  file  number  to  a  final  settlement.  The  decisions 
reached  are  regarded  in  most  instances  as  precedents  in 
deciding  similar  cases,  but,  according  to  the  agreement, 
either  side  may  protest  the  decision  as  a  precedent  and  con- 
sider it  applicable  only  to  the  particular  case  cited.  The 
importance  of  this  latter  point  cannot  be  too  highly  estima- 
ted. Mr.  Henry  Crompton,  when  writing  of  the  English 
coal  industry  in  1876,  referred  to  the  emphasis  put  upon 
awards  as  precedents  thus :  "  The  error  of  this  legal  concep- 
tion consists  in  the  failure  to  see  that  these  arbitrations  are 
only  temporary  expedients,  to  enable  industry  to  emerge 
from  a  chronic  state  of  war,  and  that  giving  systematic 
and  permanent  form  to  the  continual  succession  of  arbi- 
tration struggles  is  a  danger  as  formidable  as  the  system 
of  strikes.  If  each  arbitration  is  to  be  governed  by  the  accu- 
mulated results  of  former  awards,  we  shall  have  a  series  of 
decisions  gradually  forming  a  voluminous  and  unintelligi- 
ble library  of  case  law,  and  a  system  of  refined  advocacy."  ^ 

4.  THE  SYSTEM  IN  THE  SOUTHWEST 

In  the  southwestern  field  the  system  of  settling  disputes 
is  nearly  as  elaborate  as  in  Illinois.  The  pit  committee 
functions  in  the  same  manner  in  the  Southwest,  but  if 
trouble  arises  in  a  mine  and  the  pit  committee  and  foreman 
cannot  settle  it,  the  case  goes  before  the  superintendent 
and  the  district  president  of  the  United  Mine  Workers. 
If  they  cannot  settle  it,  the  case  goes  before  the  commis- 
sioner of  the  operators'  association  and  the  district  presi- 
dent or  such  persons  as  they  may  designate.  Usually  the 
district  president  and  the  commissioner  can  settle  the 
matter,  but  if  not,  a  permanent  arbitrator,  mutually  se- 
lected, settles  the  controversy .^  In  the  mean  time  the  mine 

^  Crompton,  Industrial  Conciliation,  pp.  26-27. 

2  Southwestern  Joint  Interstate  Agreement,  1912,  p.  1. 


192     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

continues  in  operation.  If  there  is  a  question  of  whether 
the  case  should  be  arbitrated,  it  must  be  decided  by  an 
appeal  board  composed  of  one  operator,  one  miner,  and  a 
third  party  selected  jointly  in  each  district.  If  either  party 
to  an  award  feels  that  the  decision  has  set  aside  the  written 
terms  of  the  contract,  they  may  appeal  to  the  appeal  board, 
and  the  board  after  hearing  the  facts  may  remand  the 
case  to  the  arbitrator  for  a  rehearing.^  The  decisions  that 
are  handed  down  as  a  result  of  this  process  are  preserved 
and  serve  as  precedents  in  deciding  upon  similar  cases 
under  similar  circumstances. 

Up  to  1908  cases  were  appealed  from  the  commissioner 
and  district  president  to  a  reference  board  composed  of 
three  operators  and  the  three  district  presidents.  From 
1908  to  1910,  appeal  was  taken  to  the  president  of  the 
operators'  association  and  the  national  president  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers,  but  in  the  latter  year  the  practice 
was  inaugurated  of  having  an  arbiter  selected  beforehand 
whose  expenses  are  divided  between  both  parties.^  His 
decisions  are  printed  and  distributed  to  both  factions. 

5.  THE  SYSTEM  A  GROWTH 

All  this  sounds  very  complicated,  and  we  can  hear  the 
average  employer  in  most  industries  exclaim  with  impa- 
tience at  the  time  and  trouble  involved.  But  we  must  re- 
member that  this  system  is  not  something  conceived  by  the 
brain  of  one  man  at  a  single  stroke  and  put  in  operation 
to  see  by  how  devious  a  route  a  settlement  of  differences 
can  be  reached.  It  has  had  basic,  complex  conditions  in 
the  industry  which  has  caused  its  growth^  and  we  may 
depend  upon  it  that  it  is  there  because  it  takes  less  time 
and  trouble  and  costs  less  than  would  might  and  force. 
It  occurs  to  but  few  employers  that  strikes  finally  have 
to  be  settled  by  talking  the  trouble  over  and  reaching  an 

1  Southwestern  Joint  Interstate  Agreement,  1912,  p.  3. 

2  Official  correspondence. 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  193 

agreement,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  the  talking  should 
not  be  done  before  the  strike.  Some  employers  think  that 
they  can  ultimately  get  more  after  a  fight.  In  that  case 
might  and  not  justice  is  the  criterion,  and  they  must  also 
be  of  the  opinion  that  they  can  stem  the  tide  of  a  social 
movement  which  has  forced  its  way  to  its  present  position 
under  the  most  adverse  circumstances  and  in  spite  of  the 
most  determined  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  employers. 
The  employers  in  the  coal  industry  have  had  to  learn  by 
hard  experience  that  the  only  way  to  meet  the  problems 
before  them  is  to  present  a  solid  front  to  the  insistent 
growth  of  this  movement. 

6.  THE  OPERATORS  ASK  FOR  A  "CLOSED  SHOP" 

In  fact,  selfish  interests  and  competition  between  them 
have  proven  very  disrupting  forces  even  after  they  have 
recognized  this  need.  If  anybody  had  said  to  the  Illinois 
operators  fifteen  or  twenty  years  ago  that  they  would  see 
the  day  when  they  would  be  asking  the  union  to  establish 
the  "  closed  shop,"  he  would  have  been  considered  insane. 
And  yet  that  is  what  they  have  come  to.  This  request  has 
its  basis  in  the  recognition  that  capital  must  be  united  in 
coping  with  the  problems  of  the  industry.  Not  consolida- 
tion, but  unity  in  interests  and  aims  on  fundamental  poli- 
cies of  the  industry  is  needed.  In  fact  they  are  trying  to 
resist  consolidation  of  ownership.  They  also  are  trying  to 
establish  a  weapon  by  which  they  can  curb  the  tendency 
to  selfishness  and  undue  individualism,  which  conflicts 
with  the  general  welfare  of  both  operators  and  miners  as 
well  as  of  the  industry  in  general.  Indeed,  the  operators 
have  learned  that  there  can  be  such  an  individual  as  a 
"  scab "  on  the  side  of  capital  as  well  as  on  the  side  of 
labor,  and  are  coming  to  see  his  disrupting  force  just  as 
labor  has  seen  it. 


194     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

A.   The  Operators'  Offer 

In  the  Illinois  State  Conference  of  1908  the  operatora 
brought  forth  this  proposition  for  the  consideration  of  the 
miners :  — 

The  members  of  the  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  agree 
that  they  wiU  not  employ  any  man  for  a  position  for  which  a 
scale  is  made,  who  shall  refuse  to  promptly  become  a  member 
of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America ;  .  .  .  and  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America  agree  that  the  members  of  the  organ- 
ization will  not  accept  employment  at  any  mine,  .  .  .  unless  the 
operator  is  a  member  of  the  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Associa- 
tion. 

The  foregoing  provisions  shall  be  effective  not  only  during 
the  life  of  this  agreement,  but  also  in  case  a  new  agreement  is 
not  made  before  the  expiration  of  this  one ;  then  these  provi- 
sions shall  remain  effective  for  an  additional  period  of  thirty 
days,  and  for  a  period  of  fifteen  days  after  the  termination  of 
negotiations ;  provided  that  if  after  the  expiration  of  this  contract 
western  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  are  idle,  or  if 
each  thereof,  except  Illinois,  is  at  work,  then  after  a  hearing  to 
the  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  before  said  national  or- 
ganization, the  United  Mine  Workers  of  Illinois  may  obey  a 
mandate  of  the  said  national  organization  in  conflict  with  this 
clause. 

B.  The  Need  for  the  Closed  Shop 

The  operators  frankly  admitted  that  their  association 
was  in  a  critical  condition  and  that  this  request  was  largely 
for  the  purpose  of  helping  them  to  maintain  the  integrity 
of  their  organization.  The  miners  fully  recognized  the 
benefit  of  the  closed  shop  and  considered  that  the  agree- 
ment would  make  a  "  perfect  form  of  joint  bargaining." 
But  the  question  of  cost  immediately  arose.  When  the 
miners  were  idle  their  organization  was  under  obligation 
to  pay  the  men  five  dollars  per  week,  and  they  figured 
that  they  would  be  under  an  expense  of  at  least  $200,000 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  195 

a  year  in  coercing  delinquent  operators.  The  operators  re- 
minded the  miners  that  their  association  was  subjected  to 
similar  conditions  when  the  miners  threw  an  operator's 
mine  into  idleness  and  their  expenses  under  such  circum- 
stances were  not  light.  The  miners  were  of  the  opinion 
that  the  task  of  disciplining  a  tenacious  operator  would 
be  a  much  more  expensive  process  than  that  of  bringing 
a  few  miners  with  small  resources  into  line.  The  proposi- 
tion would  have  sounded  much  more  favorable  to  them  if 
the  operators  had  been  willing  to  bear  part  of  the  ex- 
pense. 

The  operators  felt  sure  that  no  operator  in  the  associa- 
tion would  dare  to  leave  the  association  and  fight  both 
organizations.  Furthermore,  they  were  convinced  that 
operators  outside  of  the  association  would  come  in  when 
this  agreement  went  into  effect.  The  miners  virtually  had 
a  closed  shop,  and  they  argued  that  what  was  fair  for  one 
side  was  fair  for  the  other.  Besides,  it  was  necessary  if 
the  provisions  of  the  contract  were  to  be  enforced.  Further- 
more, individuality  of  ownership  of  coal  mines  was  at  stake. 
The  ownership  of  mines  was  coming  more  and  more  into 
the  hands  of  a  few  powerful  organizations,  and  with  this 
change  it  would  become  more  difficult  for  the  miners  to 
maintain  the  relation  which  they  had  thus  far  been  able 
to  establish  with  their  employers.  When  it  came  to  a 
regime  of  concentrated  ownership,  the  miners  would  find 
that  the  costs  for  coercion  would  greatly  exceed  the  costs 
under  this  arrangement.  It  was  also  very  questionable 
whether  the  miners  could  bring  to  terms  a  few  big  cor- 
porations which  proposed  to  operate  their  mines  with  non- 
union labor. 

C.  The  Legality  of  the  Closed  Shop 

The  miners  raised  the  question  of  the  legality  of  such 
an  agreement  and  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  courts 
would  render  an  unfavorable  decision.    Judging  from  the 


190     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

unfavorable  decisions  rendered  against  labor  in  past  years, 
they  were  convinced  that  an  operator  who  wished  to  with- 
draw from  the  association  would  have  little  trouble  in  get- 
ting help  from  "corporation  judges,"  who  would  jump  at 
the  chance  to  take  all  the  money  the  miners  had  in  their 
treasury.  They  were  sorry  to  admit  that  "  it  [had]  come 
to  such  a  pass  that  few  members  of  organized  labor  [had] 
any  respect  for  the  courts."  They  cited  a  case  in  which 
the  brickmakers  and  bricklayers  had  formed  a  similar 
agreement  and  the  court  had  ruled  adversely.  Because  of 
a  decision  rendered  against  some  operators  in  the  north- 
ern part  of  the  State  who  had  entered  into  an  agreement 
which  regulated  prices  and  was  in  restraint  of  trade,  they 
were  fortified  still  more  in  their  hesitancy.  The  operators 
were  ready  with  the  citation  of  a  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Minnesota.^  They  had  been  informed  by  counsel 
that  this  was  the  only  case  which  bore  on  their  proposed 
agreement. 

The  operators  and  miners  did  not  propose  to  interfere 
with  the  business  of  any  miner  or  operator  outside  of  the 
agreement,  and  the  operators  were  of  the  opinion  that  un- 
less they  entered  into  a  combination  to  fix  prices  or  pre- 
vent an  operator  from  getting  any  labor  whatever,  they 
were  within  their  rights.  At  any  rate,  the  agreement  could 
only  be  declared  "  unlawful  and  void  "  and  not  "  crim- 
inal," since  no  conspiracy  was  attempted.  The  operators 
pointed  out  that  the  press  in  the  West  had  commented 
favorably  on  their  suggestion  of  a  closed  shop,  but  it  met 
with  condemnation  from  the  press  in  the  East  and  from 
"Wall  Street,  which  condemns  "our  dealing  with  union 
labor  at  all."  They  thought  that  as  a  last  resort  the  State 
would  pass  a  law  making  it  legal,  since  "  What  is  best  for 
the  coal  industry  of  Illinois  is  best  for  the  State."  The 
clause  in  the  contract  as  finally  agreed  on  read,  "  This 

1  Bohn  Manufacturing  Co.  ts.  Northwestern  Lumberman's  Assoc,  54  Minn. 
223. 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  197 

contract  applies  and  is  effective  only  between  the  Illinois 
Coal  Operators'  Association  and  the  United  Mine  Workers 
of  America."^ 

This  phase  of  the  subject  brings  out  clearly  some  of 
the  complications  which  confront  the  capitalist,  laborer, 
and  public.  Mr.  Herman  Justi,  as  commissioner  of  the 
operators'  association,  did  much  to  instill  in  both  parties 
the  concept  that  these  agreements  were  business  contracts 
between  labor  and  capital,  and  that  they  should  be  carried 
out  in  a  businesslike  way.  A  situation  like  this  was  only 
the  logical  outcome  of  such  a  policy.  If  strong  individual- 
ism or  powerful  corporate  growth  threatens  the  system  of 
settling  by  peaceful  means,  adjustments  must  be  made  to 
counteract  this  tendency.  On  the  side  of  cost  to  the  miners' 
organization,  the  miners  should  have  been  willing  to  try 
the  experiment  as  a  protective  measure  in  maintaining  the 
integrity  of  their  own  organization  and  as  a  check  on  cha- 
otic conditions  affecting  the  other  party  to  the  contract. 
If  it  proved  too  costly,  they  could  retrench,  but  the  chances 
were  just  as  good  that  the  operators  judged  the  situation 
rightly ;  the  agreement  would  hold  members  of  the  oper- 
ators' association  in  line  and  bring  in  those  outside.  The 
element  among  the  operators  which  needed  coercion  in- 
cluded those  who  resort  to  "  subterfuges  to  gain  their 
object,  [refuse]  to  bear  their  share  of  the  burdens,  [do]  not 
hesitate  to  take  advantage  of  labor,  to  betray  a  colleague, 
or  rob  a  client."  It  was  the  spirit  manifested  by  this  ele- 
ment which,  given  free  play,  was  responsible  for  the  period 
of  unscrupulous  dealings  with  miners  and  among  operators 
before  the  beginning  of  the  joint  conference.  Miners  and 
operators  suffered  alike  under  such  a  regime,  and  it  be- 
hooves the  better  element  among  both  parties  to  devise 
methods  which  will  not  allow  resort  to  force  and  violence. 

1  Bq)ort  of  State  Joint  Convention  of  Illinois,  1908,  p.  309^ 


198     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

7.  THE   PROBLEM   BEFORE   THE   PUBLIC 

On  the  side  of  the  public,  the  near  future  will  demand 
adjustments  in  our  judicial  and  administrative  machinery 
which  will  allow  capital  and  labor  to  cope  with  the  new 
conditions  arising  and  yet  see  that  the  interests  of  the 
public  are  kept  in  sight.  American  conditions  of  life  and 
industry  seem  to  favor  a  policy  of  license  and  liberty  that 
will  enable  the  parties  immediately  concerned  with  the 
development  of  complex  problems  to  make  regulations 
which  can  be  better  arrived  at  through  first-hand  negotia- 
tion than  through  absolute  paternal  control.  Yet  the  fear 
of  paternalism  should  not  be  exaggerated.  Development  of 
our  administrative  functions  is  always  far  behind  the  needs 
of  complex  conditions.  New  departments  are  needed  and 
they  should  be  given  sufficient  power  to  protect  public 
welfare. 

In  summary  we  may  say  that  it  is  this  complex  situation 
which  has  greatly  aided  the  growth  of  organization  among 
the  miners  and  operators  and  brought  them  together  in 
interstate  joint  conferences  to  adjust  difficulties  which  are 
of  universal  application.  They  have  done  something  for 
themselves  which  government  could  not  do  as  satisfac- 
torily for  both  parties  and  yet  leave  room  for  innova- 
tions. How  far  complex  machinery  for  conciliation  is 
needed  in  the  various  industries  depends  on  the  extent  of 
the  industry,  the  universality  of  the  market,  the  diversity 
of  conditions  within  the  industry,  and  the  amount  of  strife 
due  to  oppression  and  cutthroat  competition. 

Parts  of  this  complex  method  of  conciliation  can  be  used 
in  the  smallest  local  industry  if  the  employer  is  willing  to 
meet  his  men  on  a  fair  basis.  The  employers  in  the  bitu- 
minous coal  industry  have  learned  that  the  labor  problem 
is  of  sufficient  importance  to  demand  a  department  for  the 
adjustment  of  labor  conditions,  and  that  it  is  just  as  valu- 
able as  the  sales,  financial,  or  construction  departments. 


THE  STATE  CONFERENCE  199 

It  has  lessened  strikes,  brought  greater  uniformity  of  cost, 
and  added  stability  to  the  industry.  Capital  here  is  or- 
ganizing in  anticipation  of  the  growing  strength  of  trade 
unionism.  If  a  little  over  ten  per  cent  of  the  workers  can 
create  the  furor  they  already  have  by  organizing,  what  may 
be  expected  from  a  further  growth  of  this  movement  ?  Cap- 
ital here  is  constructive  by  reason  of  its  purpose  to  deal  fairly, 
conciliate,  preserve  peace,  secure  stability,  resist  tenden- 
cies to  inconsiderate  economic  adjustment,  and  punish 
those  who  discredit  honest  business.  Besides,  this  method, 
when  substituted  for  force,  will  cost  less.  Figuring  $300 
as  the  minimum  average  loss  per  day  for  closing  a  mine, 
conciliation  saves  the  operators  and  miners  at  least  $250,- 
000  a  year.i  Carroll  D.  Wright,  in  speaking  on  this  point, 
said  that  the  "ethical  effects  of  friendly  settlement  far 
transcend  any  financial  results  which  can  be  considered," 
and  that  "  the  harmonious  relations  of  laborers  and  capi- 
talists are  worth  more  than  the  success  or  estimated  losses 
of  any  or  all  strikes."  ^  Arbitration  is  a  secondary  matter 
in  this  system  of  settling  disputes,  but  there  are  some  points 
which  both  sides  refuse  to  yield,  and  therefore  an  unprej- 
udiced outsider  must  allow  something  to  each.  The  sys- 
tem is  far  from  perfect,  as  is  admitted  by  both  parties,  but 
it  is  growing,  and  the  parties  themselves  are  coming  closer 
to  each  other  with  an  understanding  of  opposing  view- 
points. Organized  labor  makes  its  mistakes,  but  the  em- 
ployer and  laborer  can  hardly  do  better,  when  expect- 
ing perfectibility,  than  to  remember  Mr.  Herman  Justi's 
words : — 

If  labor  in  recent  years  has  too  often  practiced  forms  of  tyr- 
anny and  has  committed  acts  of  lawlessness,  if  it  has  forced 
conditions  upon  the  employer  that  are  oppressive,  and  has  made 
contracts,  as  often  charged,  simply  to  violate  them,  and  if  all 

^  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  Publications  ;  Conciliation  and  Ar- 
bitration in  the  Coal  Mining  Industry,  p.  18. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  33. 


200     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

these  combined  evils  have  become  so  great  that  they  now  seem 
to  call  for  the  intervention  of  courts  and  the  protection  of  the 
strong  arm  of  the  Government,  let  us  not  forget  that  in  times 
past  it  was  the  arrogance  and  selfishness  so  often  practiced  by 
the  rich  and  well-to-do  that  in  due  course  brought  on  the  pres- 
ent conflict  between  labor  and  capital.  Now  exalted  public  spirit 
and  wise  unselfishness  to  be  practiced  by  the  same  class  must 
restore  peaceful  relations  and  just  conditions,  at  the  same  time 
that  labor  takes  heed  lest  it  add  crime  to  folly  by  seeking  re- 
venge for  wrongs,  both  real  and  fancied,  instead  of  following 
such  a  policy  of  repression,  conciliation,  and  wise  business 
sagacity  as  the  higher  dictates  of  their  better  natures  would  sug- 
gest, and  as  all  law-abiding  and  justice-loving  fellow  citizens 
would  approve. 

We  have  confined  our  attention  to  the  bituminous  field 
in  studying  the  system  of  peaceful  adjustment,  because 
there  the  development  has  gone  steadily  on,  whereas  its 
growth  was  retarded  in  the  anthracite  field  until  1902. 
The  factors  which  prevented  the  growth  of  conciliation  and 
arbitration  in  the  anthracite  region  and  hindered  the  ex- 
tension of  the  methods  used  in  the  bituminous  fields  must 
now  engage  our  interest. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION  IN  THE 
ANTHRACITE  FIELD 

INTRODUCTION 

A.    CAUSES   DEFERRING    PEACEFUL   ADJUSTMENT 

As  we  leave  the  bituminous  and  turn  to  consider  the  an- 
thracite field,  we  find  that  the  early  attempts  to  introduce 
conciliation  and  arbitration,  which  seemed  so  promising, 
met  with  unsurmountable  obstacles.  The  compactness  of 
the  anthracite  coal  field  furnished  an  environment  for 
capital  which  made  concentration  and  monopoly  control 
much  easier  than  was  possible  in  the  bituminous  field.  The 
free  rein  which  was  given  to  corporations  was  an  added 
element  in  hastening  concentration.  Capital  thus  acquired 
a  unified  policy.  After  wealth  is  once  concentrated  it  can 
afford  to  stand  large  losses  in  oi'der  to  win  a  battle,  since 
it  can  rapidly  recuperate.  Besides,  those  in  possession  of 
a  storehouse  of  wealth  have  but  little  conception  of  the 
precarious  position  of  the  man  for  whom  a  few  weeks' 
idleness  or  sickness  means  hunger  and  starvation.  This 
element,  which  enabled  the  capitalist  to  look  upon  the 
future  with  little  concern  and  furnished  common  ground 
in  a  battle  with  labor,  was  for  the  laborer  a  disrupting 
force  which  long  prevented  social  cohesion.  In  conjunc- 
tion with  all  these  odds  the  capitalist  was  in  a  position  to 
manipulate  all  the  industrial  and  political  machinery  for 
replacing  English-speaking  laborers  with  Slavs  and  Ital- 
ians. Cooperation  from  steamship  companies  easily  brought 
alien  laborers  here,  and,  once  here,  transportation  facil- 
ities were  at  hand  to  rush  them  to  points  where  they  were 


202     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

needed.  If  capital  could  not  prevent  the  passage  of  laws 
making  contract  labor  illegal,  its  lobbyists  or  henchmen 
readily  saw  to  it  that  the  laws  were  so  inadequate  as  to  be 
ineffective.  Moreover,  court  interpretations  and  decisions 
often  nullified  the  plain  intent  of  the  law.  With  all  this 
there  is  no  special  blame  to  be  attached  to  capital.  It  is 
just  plain,  selfish  human  nature  given  free  play.  It  played 
a  big  game  without  rules  or  else  easily  brushed  aside  the 
inadequate  rules  that  were  made.  Individualism  ran  riot 
while  waiting  for  the  evolution  of  social  policy  and  the 
solidarity  of  labor. 


1.  FROM  THE  FORMATION  OF  BATES'S  UNION  IN  1849 
TO   THE   CLOSE   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

The  effects  of  the  panic  of  1837  lasted  into  the  early 
forties,  but  the  decade  of  the  forties  saw  a  rise  in  the  trend 
of  wages.  This  tendency  was  further  accentuated  in  the 
anthracite  field  by  the  use  of  anthracite  coal  as  a  smelting 
fuel.^  In  1849,  Bates,  an  English  miner,  took  advantage  of 
these  conditions  to  organize  a  union  to  secure  better  wages, 
and  to  correct  abuses  such  as  the  company  store.  Evi- 
dently he  was  not  able  to  endure  the  continued  prosperity 
due  to  the  introduction  of  railroads  into  the  coal  fields 
and  further  expansion  of  trade,  for  after  the  failure  of  his 
union  in  a  strike  he  absconded  with  the  union  funds. 

We  hear  of  no  other  organization  until  1860.  In  the 
late  fifties  wages  had  declined  and  the  introduction  of  old 
and  new  abuses  caused  "  a  degree  of  suffering  and  bitter- 
ness never  before  known  in  the  region."  ^  In  the  next  dec- 
ade changes  took  place  which  revolutionized  the  industry. 
An  increased  demand  for  coal  during  the  war  attracted 
larger  amounts  of  capital.  This  enabled  firms  to  seek  coal 
at  greater  depths  and  to  use  machinery  for  mining  and 

^  Virtne,  Bulletin  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  no.  13,  November,  1897,  p.  730. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  730. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  203 

preparing  the  coal  for  market.  Along  with  this  there  de- 
veloped a  consolidated  ownership  of  coal  lands  and  rail- 
roads. The  checking  of  immigration  and  the  demand  for 
men  in  the  war  lessened  the  labor  supply.  The  inflated 
currency,  along  with  the  natural  demand,  enabled  the 
operator  to  get  big  prices  and  pay  contract  miners'  rates, 
which  brought  them  from  il50  to  $250  per  month.^ 

Under  such  conditions  the  miners  would  not  require  a 
very  strong  organization  in  order  to  make  the  demand  for 
more  wages  heard.  But  the  miners  had  made  a  beginning 
at  organization  in  1860.  In  that  year  the  employees  of  the 
Forestville  Improvement  Company  formed  a  union  which 
held  together  till  1864.2  During  the  years  of  the  Civil 
War  several  local  unions  were  formed,  and  they  were  ac- 
tive in  gaining  increases  in  wages  to  offset  the  high  prices 
of  that  period. 

2.  BEGINNING  OF  ARBITRATION,  1869  TO  1875 

A.  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Association 

With  the  falling  off  of  demand  at  the  close  of  the  war, 
the  return  of  men  from  the  armies,  and  the  fall  in  prices, 
these  local  unions  were  brought  together  in  an  effort  to 
resist  the  arbitrary  reductions  of  the  operators.  Pressure 
by  the  workingmen  of  Pennsylvania  on  the  legislature  of 
1867  brought  a  law  making  eight  hours  a  legal  day's 
work.  But  the  employers  had  been  able  to  enforce  the  in- 
sertion of  a  provision  making  the  law  applicable  only  in 
cases  where  there  was  no  agreement  to  the  contrary.  The 
law  went  into  effect  July  1, 1868,  and  the  miners  were  de- 
termined that  it  should  really  be  effective.  They  called  a 
convention  in  the  early  part  of  1868  to  create  sentiment 
and  to  form  an  organization  which  should  lend  its  in- 
fluence to  the  enforcement  of  the  law.  The  organization 

1  Virtue,  JiuUetin  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  no.  13,  November,  1897,  p.  731. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  732. 


20t     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

effected  at  this  convention  was  known  as  the  Working- 
men's  Benevolent  Association,  and  its  constitution  pro- 
vided for  a  sick  benefit  of  five  dollars  per  week  and  thirty 
dollars  for  the  burial  of  a  member.^ 

A  strike  was  inaugurated  to  resist  reductions  and  to 
make  this  law  effective.  The  proviso  that  the  law  should 
be  inoperative  if  the  contracting  parties  agreed  to  other 
regulations  necessitated  concerted  action  on  the  part  of 
the  workers.  The  eight-hour  law  was  no  great  boon  to  the 
contract  miners,  for  they  spent  eight  hours  or  less  in  min- 
ing enough  coal  to  keep  the  loaders  and  other  workers 
busy  ten  hours.  But  its  chief  importance  would  be  to 
limit  the  overproduction  somewhat  and  to  distribute  the 
work  over  the  year  to  a  greater  extent.  The  strike  was 
unsuccessful,  but  the  suspension  from  July  to  September 
depleted  the  market  to  such  an  extent  that  the  miners 
were  able  to  resume  work  at  their  old  rates.^  By  the 
autumn  of  1869  the  union  was  said  to  have  enlisted  30,- 
000  members  out  of  the  35,000  anthracite  workers.^ 

B.  The  Anthracite  Board  of  Trade 

It  was  definitely  recognized  by  1867  that  the  operators 
were  organizing  into  associations,  and  by  1869  they  be- 
came known  as  the  Anthracite  Board  of  Trade.^  The 
same  year  the  operators'  association  proposed  a  reduction  of 
wages  to  the  union,  but  the  miners  had  learned  something 
from  the  strike  of  1868.  Instead  of  acceding  to  the  reduc- 
tion the  miners  proposed  by  the  use  of  suspensions  to  keep 
the  market  steady  and  healthy  and  enable  the  operator 
to  get  a  "  fair  interest  on  investments  and  at  the  same 
time  receive  for  our  share  a  fair  day's  wages  for  a  fair 
day's  work."  ^  The  suspensions  became  general  from  April 

1  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  77. 

2  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1881,  p.  286. 
A  reprint  of  the  Report  of  1872. 

3  Roberts,  The  Anthracite  Coal  Industry,  p.  176.     *  Virtue,  op.  cit.,  p.  732. 
^  Virtue,  op.  cit.,  p.  7135,  quotes  an  order  to  resume  work. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  205 

to  September,  but  the  good  effects  to  the  market  were  less- 
ened somewhat  by  the  continued  production  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania Coal  Company  and  the  Delaware,  Lackawanna, 
and  Western  Coal  Company.  These  companies  by  offering 
liberal  wages  succeeded  in  getting  their  men  to  break  faith 
with  the  union.^  This  policy  of  suspensions  met  with  con- 
siderable public  criticism.  The  order  to  resume  work,  be- 
sides embodying  an  explanation  of  the  intentions  of  the 
union,  called  attention  to  the  risk  and  danger  of  the  occu- 
pation and  the  resulting  strikes  and  distress  which  arose 
from  overproduction.  The  operators'  association  raised 
but  little  objection  to  this  policy,  because  they  recognized 
that  too  much  coal  was  being  mined.  But  later,  when  the 
occasion  suited  them,  they  pointed  to  the  policy  of  the 
union  as  an  act  of  tyranny  and  the  occasion  of  great  loss 
to  them.^ 

C.   The  Sliding  Scale 

In  May,  1869,  the  General  Council  of  the  Working- 
men's  Benevolent  Association  proposed  to  the  Anthracite 
Board  of  Trade  that  wages  be  governed  by  the  selling 
price  of  coal.^  This  would  involve  the  formation  of  a  slid- 
ing scale  providing  that  wages  fluctuate  automatically 
with  prices.  It  was  hoped  that  this  arrangement  would 
remove  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  friction  between  em- 
ployer and  employee.  The  adoption  of  a  scale  in  the  Le- 
high region  provided  that  an  average  selling  price  of  five 
dollars  per  ton  at  Elizabethport  (tidewater)  should  form 
a  basis.  For  every  dollar  advance  in  the  price  of  coal  the 
wage-earner  received  fifteen  per  cent  increase  in  wages. 
With  the  advance  of  a  fractional  part  of  a  dollar  the 
workers  received  a  corresponding  fractional  part  of  the 
fifteen  per  cent.    The  basis  for  the  Schuylkill  region  was 

1  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1881,  p.  287. 

2  Virtue,  op.  ctt.,  p.  735. 

^  Weeks,  Massachusetts  Report  on  Statistics  of  Labor,  1881,  p.  24. 


20C     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

three  dollars,  i.e.,  the  average  selling  price  of  coal  at  Port 
Carbon  on  the  Schnylkill  Kiver,  The  difference  of  two 
dollars  in  the  basing  points  was  to  allow  for  freight  rates.^ 
Wages  increased  five  per  cent  in  the  Schnylkill  with 
every  advance  of  twenty-five  cents  in  the  selling  price  of 
coal.  In  both  cases  there  was  to  be  no  rednction  of  wages 
when  the  selling  price  went  below  the  basis.  The  basic 
prices  for  day  labor  were  :  "  outside  labor,"  $11  per  week ; 
"  inside  labor,"  $12  ;  and  <|14  per  week  for  miners  when 
not  engaged  in  contract  work.  The  miners  of  the  northern 
field  did  not  have  sufficient  strength  to  secure  the  slid- 
ing scale. 

Hardly  had  the  scale  been  put  into  operation  before 
the  fundamental  question  of  the  justice  of  the  basis  arose. 
And  with  dissatisfaction  over  that  matter  the  whole  ques- 
tion of  wage  adjustment  was  again  open.  Those  who  had 
expected  great  things  of  the  sliding  scale  were  sadly  dis- 
appointed. The  operators  were  the  first  to  exjDress  dissat- 
isfaction, and  in  December,  1869,  offered  as  a  basis  two 
dollars  per  ton  at  Port  Carbon  ^  with  a  corresponding  de- 
crease in  day  wages.  This  action,  along  with  the  attitude 
of  the  operators  in  a  recent  prosecution  of  members  of 
the  union  under  the  conspiracy  laws,  was  regarded  by  the 
miners  as  an  open  declaration  of  war.  The  union  refused 
to  consider  such  a  heavy  reduction,  and  after  several 
months'  suspension,  President  Gowan,  of  the  Reading 
Railroad,  induced  the  operators  to  accept  a  compromise. 
The  three  dollar  per  ton  basis  was  retained,  but  the  union 
made  the  mistake  of  accepting  a  provision  allowing  the 
scale  to  slide  below  the  basis  as  well  as  above.  With  the 
minimum  wage  gone,  the  miners  had  to  bear  the  brunt  of 
overproduction  and  competition. 

^  Weeks,  Massachusetts  Report  on  Statistics  of  Labor,  1881,  p.  24. 

2  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1881,  p.  291. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  207 

D.  The  Keading  Eailroad  attempts  to  stop  the 
Struggle 

During  the  suspension  in  the  Lehigh  and  Schuylkill 
regions  the  operators  of  the  northern  field  had  been  able 
to  keep  their  men  at  work  by  their  old  tactics  of  increased 
wages.  When  the  other  fields  began  producing  to  their 
full  capacity,  the  northern  operators  demanded  a  thirty 
per  cent  reduction  in  wages  to  enable  them  to  meet  the 
competition.  The  president  of  the  Delaware  and  Hudson 
Canal  Company  defined  the  issue  thus  to  a  committee 
of  the  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Association :  "The  only 
question  involved  in  the  issue  is  whether  the  property 
shall  be  controlled  and  the  policy  of  the  company  deter- 
mined by  the  owners,  or  whether  it  shall  be  committed  to 
the  care  and  direction  of  an  irresponsible  organization, 
and  in  determining  this  question  the  managers  are  strong 
in  the  belief  that  the  stockholders  can  have  but  one  opin- 
ion," 1  The  northern  miners  struck  and  appealed  for  aid 
to  the  other  fields,  which  they  had  betrayed.  Neverthe- 
less, the  Lehigh  and  Schuylkill  miners,  recognizing  the 
need  for  united  action  over  all  the  fields,  decided  to  sus- 
pend work  in  order  to  bring  about  a  general  agreement. 
The  northern  fields,  instead  of  insisting  on  a  general 
agreement,  went  to  work  at  the  company's  terms  ^  after 
suspending  from  January  (1871)  to  May. 

This  practically  put  an  end  to  the  union  in  the  northern 
fields.  Meanwhile  the  southern  fields  after  a  month's  sus- 
pension had  brought  some  of  the  operators  to  the  point 
of  conceding  the  three-dollar  basis.  But  when  the  coal 
of  these  operators  was  offered  for  shipment,  it  was  found 
that  freight  rates  had  risen  to  such  an  extent  that  it  was 
impossible  to  carry  on  business  at  the  market  prices.  In 
fact  the  advance  was  so  great  that  coal  could  not  have 

^  Roberts,  The  Anthracite  Coal  Industry,  p.  179. 

*  Ueport  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1881,  p.  296. 


208     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

been  sold  for  less  than  twelve  dollars  per  ton.^  The  Read- 
ing Railroad  was  supposed  by  some  to  be  animated  purely 
by  the  desire  to  regulate  the  trade  and  secure  steadiness 
in  the  market.^  By  others  it  was  pointed  out  that  the 
railroad  had  been  buying  heavily  in  coal  lands  and  pro- 
posed to  use  the  occasion  to  force  out  of  business  certain 
operators  and  secure  profits  by  increased  prices.  The  ex- 
ample of  the  Reading  was  followed  by  other  roads  and 
their  action  caused  such  a  storm  of  protest  among  both 
operators  and  miners  that  the  legislature  proceeded  to  in- 
vestigate conditions.  The  investigating  committee  found 
that  they  were  prohibited  from  any  action  because  the 
State  Supreme  Court  had  decided  ^  that "  tolls,"  the  term 
used  in  the  charter  of  the  railroad,  referred  to  carrying' 
passengers  and  not  to  freight.  Therefore  no  restrictions 
could  be  placed  upon  freight.  Perhaps  some  of  the  mo- 
tives prompting  President  Gowen  may  be  explained  in  his 
words  to  the  legislative  committee.  After  describing  the 
conditions  of  overproduction  and  surplus  labor  since  the 
Civil  War,  he  makes  the  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Asso- 
ciation entirely  responsible  for  the  lack  of  proper  adjust- 
ment of  the  whole  situation :  — 

We,  who  thought  we  understood  something  of  the  laws  of 
trade,  and  knew  that  natural  causes  would  soon  bring  relief, 
remonstrated  with  the  leaders  of  the  organization  in  vain.  The 
law  of  supply  and  demand  and  every  sound  maxim  which  the 
experience  of  trade  has  demonstrated  to  be  correct,  were  thrown 
to  the  winds ;  and  from  the  bowels  of  the  earth  there  came 
swarming  up  a  new  school  of  political  economists,  who  professed 
to  be  able  during  the  leisure  hours  of  their  short  working  day, 
to  regulate  a  great  industry  and  restore  it  to  vigor  and  health. 
In  the  wildest  flights  of  imagination  of  the  most  pretentious 

^  Lloyd,  Lords  of  Industry,  p.  234,  quotes  investigation  of  State  Senate 
of  Pennsylvania,  1871. 

^  Report  of  Secretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1881,  p.  296. 

3  Boyle  V8.  The  Philadelphia  and  Reading  Railroad  Company,  4  P.  F. 
Smith,  310. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  209 

charlatan  there  never  was  conceived  such  a  cure  for  the  ilia 
with  which  we  were  afflicted  as  was  suggested  by  these  new 
doctors.  In  their  hands,  however,  we  were  powerless,  and  with 
the  eagerness  of  a  student  and  the  assurance  of  a  quack,  they 
seized  upon  the  body  of  a  healthy  trade,  and  have  so  doctored 
it  and  physicked  it  that  it  is  now  reduced  to  the  ghost  of  the 
shadow  of  an  attenuation.^ 

It  was  suggested  at  the  time  that  the  railroad  did  not 
propose  to  pay  the  wages  in  its  collieries  which  the  other 
operators  were  willing  to  pay.^  Perhaps  it  also  occurred 
to  Mr.  Gowen  that  one  of  the  best  ways  of  avoiding  such 
a  contingency  would  be  to  start  a  campaign  for  ultimately 
crushing  the  union.  Of  this  we  shall  see  more  later. 

E.  Settlement  by  Arbitration 

While  the  legislative  investigation  was  in  progress  some 
of  the  operators  had  ignored  the  union  officials  and  sought 
to  make  a  direct  settlement  with  their  men.  This  brought 
no  response  and  the  continued  deadlock  aroused  the  pub- 
lic to  demand  some  form  of  peaceful  settlement.  The  in- 
itiative was  taken  by  Mr.  E.  B.  Coxe,  an  operator  who 
had  published  a  series  of  articles  on  arbitration  in  the 
"  Anthracite  Monitor,"  the  miners'  paper.^  Mr.  Coxe's 
efforts  and  the  general  pressure  of  public  opinion  brought 
together  a  joint  board  of  operators  and  miners  represent- 
ing all  of  the  anthracite  counties,  April  17,  1871.  Judge 
William  Elwell  was  selected  to  act  as  arbiter  in  the  case 
of  a  disagreement.  His  services  were  soon  called  for  to 
settle  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  union  had  a  right  to 
interfere  with  the  working  of  the  mine,  its  policy  toward 
non-union  men,  and  the  treatment  accorded  to  the  union 
by  the  operators.  The  rule  of  exclusive  control  and  man- 
agement by  the  operator  was  laid  down,  and  the  refusal 
of  the  union  to  work  with  non-union  men  or  members  of 

1  Quoted  in  the  Nation,  May  25,  1871,  p.  352.         2  /j/j,^  p  255. 
8  Roy,  op.  ctt.,  p.  92. 


210     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

the  uuiou  who  would  not  pay  their  dues  was  decided  as 
'*  eontraiy  to  the  policy  of  the  law,  and  subversive  of  the 
best  interests  of  the  miners  and  their  employers."  It  was 
stated  that  "  operators  ought  not  in  any  manner  to  com- 
bine against  persons"  who  belonged  to  the  union  and  that 
no  member  ^'' ought  to  be  deprived  of  his  work"  because 
of  his  official  duties  in  the  union.  The  operator  who  was 
guilty  of  these  practices  would  "  thereby  give  good  grounds 
for  censure,  and  for  other  members  to  refuse  to  work  for 
him."  ^  This  policy  would  no  doubt  work  admirably,  if 
the  operator  felt  inclined  to  pursue  it. 

The  question  of  wages  had  been  deferred  because  some 
of  the  miners'  representatives  had  not  been  granted  the 
power  to  settle  upon  it.  The  attempt  of  the  operators 
again  to  ignore  the  officials  implied  that  they  thought  the 
blame  for  further  suspension  lay  with  them.  But  the  of- 
ficials were  more  conservative  than  their  followers  and 
they  had  difficulty  in  directing  them  along  reasonable 
lines.  However,  another  joint  conference  concerning  wages 
and  the  sliding  scale  referred  matters  to  the  arbiter.  He 
split  the  difference  in  the  demands  and  included  a  pro- 
vision for  district  boards  of  arbitration  which  should  settle 
all  disputes  arising  under  the  scale.  It  was  also  provided 
that  there  should  be  no  suspension  of  work  while  settle- 
ment was  going  on.  The  establishment  of  the  basis  price 
was  arrived  at  each  month  by  selecting  the  average  sell- 
ing prices  of  five  operators.  Two  operators  and  two  min- 
ers made  the  selection  from  the  entire  list  of  operators  by 
casting  lots.^ 

r.  The  Bkeak-up  of  the  Union 

A.    THE    INADEQUACY    OF   ARBITRATION 

The  award  had  provided  that  a  basis  of  $2.75  per  ton 
at  Port  Carbon  should  mark  the  point  at  which  wages 

1  Decision  quoted  by  Weeks,  op.  cit.,  p.  36.    Italics  mine. 

2  Weeks,  op.  cit.,  p.  39. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  211 

were  to  begin  to  increase  and  they  should  decrease  until 
coal  sold  at  $2.25.  After  this  point  was  reached  there 
should  be  no  further  reduction  in  wages.  The  general 
feeling  of  satisfaction  over  the  settlement  was  soon  turned 
to  chagrin  by  a  dispute  which  arose  at  the  Thomas  Coal 
Company's  colliery.  Coal  had  fallen  in  price  and  the 
miners'  leaders,  in  violation  of  the  award,  refused  to  ac- 
cept a  reduction  below  the  $2.75  basis.  The  demands  of 
the  men  were  promptly  granted  and  this  concession  led 
the  miners  at  other  collieries  to  seek  similar  terms.  The 
other  operators  granted  concessions,  and  the  men  over  the 
whole  field  felt  that  arbitration  had  not  established  a  just 
basis.  The  efforts  of  the  union  officers  and  the  officials  of 
the  Anthracite  Board  of  Trade  to  hold  their  respective  par- 
ties to  the  award  were  fruitless. 

B.    CONCENTRATION    OF    OWNERSHIP 

There  were  several  other  factors  besides  the  inadequacy 
of  arbitration  which  led  to  the  break-up  of  the  union.  The 
united  force  of  concentrated  wealth,  though  this  was  just 
beginning,  proved  to  be  a  stronger  power  than  the  union 
was  able  to  cope  with.  An  agreement  was  arrived  at  in 
1872  with  difficulty,  for  each  party  had  lost  faith  in  the 
intention  of  the  other  to  abide  by  the  contract.  Yet  in 
this  year  and  in  1873  a  settlement  was  finally  reached 
through  the  acceptance  of  reductions  by  the  miners.  But 
for  some  time  influences  had  been  at  work  which  were  to 
put  the  railroads  in  absolute  control  of  the  anthracite  sup- 
ply. The  charter  of  the  Reading  Railroad  prohibited  it 
from  legally  carrying  on  mining.  President  Gowen  deter- 
mined to  get  around  this  handicap  and  procured  for  the 
Laurel  Run  Improvement  Company,  May,  1871,  a  charter 
permitting  its  stock  to  be  held  by  a  railroad.^  Later  by  a 
court  decree  the  name  of  the  company  was  changed  to  the 

^  Rfqjort  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  50th  Congreas,  2d 
Sesaiou,  Ilouae  Report  uo.  4147,  p.  buii. 


212     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Company.  The  entire  stock  was 
owned  by  the  railroad  and  by  1872  through  its  instru- 
mentality the  railroad  had  acquired  80,000  acres  of  coal 
lauds.  By  1873  the  lands  in  the  Lackawanna  Basin  were 
owned  mainly  by  the  Pennsylvania  Coal  Company  and  the 
Delaware,  Lackawanna,  and  Western  Railroad  Company. 
In  the  Wyoming  basin  the  Wilkesbarre  Coal  and  Iron 
Company  was  fast  absorbing  the  coal  lands.  The  buying 
of  coal  lands  by  the  railroads  had  gone  on  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  the  new  state  constitution  of  1874  prohibited 
common  carriers  from  engaging  in  mining  or  manufactur- 
ing or  acquiring  lands  in  freehold  or  by  lease  other  than 
was  necessary  for  carrying  on  their  business  as  carriers. 

C.    FORMATION    OF   POOLS 

Furthermore,  by  the  formation  of  pools  in  1873  and 
1874,  the  railroads  were  able  to  restrict  production,  main- 
tain selling  prices,  and  deal  arbitrarily  with  labor  and 
thus  bring  on  a  disastrous  struggle.  Evidently  Mr.  Gowen 
had  been  converted  to  the  doctrine  of  the  new  economists 
which  he  so  greatly  deprecated  before  the  legislature  in 
1871.  These  pools  succeeded  so  well  that  prices  were  well 
supported  in  spite  of  the  panic  and  general  depression  in 
business.^ 

D.   THE   "long   strike"    IN   1875 

By  1875  concerted  action  on  the  part  of  the  combina- 
tion forced  a  reduction  of  wages  from  ten  to  twenty  per 
cent  and  deprived  the  day  laborer  of  any  benefit  from  the 
sliding  scale.  Again  the  operators  of  the  northern  field 
were  able  to  keep  their  men  at  work  and  take  advantage 
of  the  so-called  "  long  strike,"  which  lasted  from  January 
to  July.  The  men  of  the  Lehigh  and  Schuylkill  regions 
were  aware  that  a  determined  attempt  was  to  be  made 
to  break  up  their  union,  and  the  struggle  was  correspond- 

1  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  op.  cit.,  p.  xlvii. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  213 

ingly  resolute.  "  In  the  closing  weeks  of  the  contest  there 
were  exhibited  scenes  of  woe  and  want  and  uncomplaining 
suffering  seldom  surpassed.  Hundreds  of  families  arose  in 
the  morning  to  breakfast  on  a  crust  of  bread  and  a  glass 
of  water,  who  did  not  know  where  a  bite  of  dinner  was 
to  come  from.  Day  after  day,  men,  women  and  children 
went  to  the  adjoining  woods  to  dig  roots  and  pick  herbs 
to  keep  body  and  soul  together,  and  still  the  strike  went 
on  with  no  visible  sign  of  surrender.  But  workingmen 
must  work  that  they  may  eat,  and  must  eat  that  they  may 
work,  while  capital  can  wait.  The  end  came  at  last  in  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  miners.  The  force  of  na- 
ture could  go  no  further."  ^  This  statement  from  a  reliable 
man  who  knew  the  real  situation  makes  one  question 
President  Gowen's  explanation  that  it  was  all  the  work  of 
a  few  demagogic  labor  leaders.^  These  demagogues  must 
have  had  unusual  powers  to  make  a  people  endure  such 
suffering  for  a  cause  unless  there  was  some  real  and  press- 
ing economic  stress  behind  it  all. 

E.    PERIOD    OF    THE    "  MOLLY    MAGUIRES  " 

Another  force  which  helped  to  break  up  the  union  was 
the  lawlessness  of  the  rougher  element.  This  was  during 
the  period  of  the  "  Molly  Maguires,"  a  secret  organization 
which  was  ready  to  inspire  terror  or  do  murder  in  return 
for  an  injury.  The  wildness  of  the  region  gave  full  oppor- 
tunity for  secret  murders.  The  fact  that  some  of  the 
"Mollies"  were  members  of  the  union  was  quite  sufficient 
to  bring  all  the  opprobrium  of  their  deeds  upon  the  union- 
ists. But  it  has  since  been  generally  recognized  that  the 
deeds  of  the  Mollies  are  not  to  be  associated  with  the 
policies  or  programme  of  the  union. 

^  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  90. 

^  Engineering  and  Mining  Journal,  August  14,  1875. 


214     AllBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

F.   THE    CONTRIBUTION    OF   THE   WORKINGMEN's 
BENEVOLENT    ASSOCIATION 

Primarily  the  union  stood  for  collective  bargaining.  To 
make  collective  bargaining  effective  they  persuaded  all 
miners  to  join  the  organization  and  refused  to  work  with 
non-unionists,  who  were  stubborn  about  joining.  The 
unionist  can  see  no  good  reason  why  a  man  who  automat- 
ically receives  a  higher  wage  through  the  collective  effort 
of  his  fellows  should  not  support  the  union.  But  to  make 
the  union  still  more  attractive  sick  and  death  benefits  and 
payments  to  widows  and  orphans  were  established.  The 
organization  was  a  strong  force  in  uniting  the  various 
nationalities  then  employed.  Though  they  were  mostly 
English-speaking  peoples,  the  differences  in  nationality 
and  custom  were  added  obstacles  to  overcome  when  seek- 
ing collective  action.  This  had  been  accomplished  to  thb 
extent  of  making  a  body  of  men  suffer  for  six  months  to 
bring  about  better  conditions.  Cooperative  stores  were 
started,  but  were  not  very  successful.  A  miners'  newspa- 
per helped  to  encourage  unity.  The  first  mine-inspection 
law  was  enacted  through  the  efforts  of  the  union,^  also  a 
law  requiring  the  weighing  of  coal.^  With  the  surrender 
of  the  men  they  were  compelled,  as  a  condition  of  obtain- 
ing work,  to  sign  away  the  right  of  having  their  coal 
weighed.  The  sliding  scale  continued  in  operation,  but  the 
determination  of  the  basis  and  the  prices  paid  to  labor 
were  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  operators  till  the  strike 
of  1900. 

3.  HISTORY  OF  CONSOLIDATION 

We  have  referred  to  the  beginnings  of  concentration  of 
wealth  and  ownership  in  the  anthracite  region  as  one  of 

^  Roy,  op.  cit.,  p.  87. 

2  This  was  ineffective  because  of  the  proviso  permitting  the  parties  to 
contract  on  another  basis. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  215 

the  causes  of  the  break-up  of  the  union.  The  force  of  this 
factor  increased  to  such  an  extent  as  not  only  to  prevent 
the  growth  of  the  union,  but  practically  to  control  the 
industrial,  social,  and  political  welfare  of  the  region. 
Leaving  out  of  consideration  the  selfishness  and  greed 
that  may  have  animated  the  operators,  the  complex  con- 
ditions with  which  capitalists  and  legislators  had  to  deal 
made  it  difficult  for  them  to  understand  the  real  situation. 
They  were  too  close  to  it.  Mighty  and  rapid  changes  were 
taking  place  in  industry.  Large  combinations  of  capital 
not  only  assumed  all  the  arrogance  of  individual  owner- 
ship, but,  because  they  were  conducting  large  enterprises 
which  could  not  be  carried  on  without  immense  capital, 
they  believed  themselves  entitled  to  greater  consideration 
than  the  small  owners.  The  suspicion  with  which  the  mo- 
nopolistic tendencies  of  large  corporations  were  regarded 
led  their  representatives  before  the  legislature  to  empha- 
size the  favors  which  large  organizations  conferred  ujDon 
the  Commonwealth  and  to  overawe  the  simple  legislative 
mind  with  their  mighty  projects.  In  this  way  the  capital- 
ists and  legislators  were  led  far  away  from  the  consid- 
eration of  changing  social  conditions.  These  factors  are 
fully  emphasized  in  the  legislative  investigation  of  1875, 
wherein  the  Reading  Railroad  was  accused  of  pooling, 
discrimination,  and  monopoly  control.^  We  need  only  to 
turn  to  a  consideration  of  the  legal  situation  and  to  the 
inadequate  way  in  which  the  legislature  met  its  responsi- 
bilities to  understand  the  ease  with  which  the  process  of 
concentration  could  be  carried  on. 

A.  Legal  Background 

A.    CONSTITUTIONAL    PROVISIONS,  1874 

We  have  referred  ^  to  the  provision  in  the  new  state 
constitution  of  1874  which  prohibited  railroads  from  en- 

1  Emjineering  and  Mining  Journal,  August  14,  1875.      '^  See  ante,  p.  212. 


216     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

gaging  in  mining  and  manufacturing.  The  same  article  ^ 
prohibited  railroads  from  consolidation  with  other  rail- 
roads by  purchase  of  stock,  franchises,  or  property.  Nor 
could  they  attain  the  same  ends  by  lease  or  tlirough  owner- 
ship by  officials.  By  section  7  they  were  prohibited  from 
discriminating  and  rebating,  and  they  were  not  to  have 
"  the  benefit  of  any  future  legislation  by  general  or  special 
laws,  except  on  condition  of  complete  acceptance  of  this 
article." 

B.    ACTS    OF   1874 

The  party  in  power  was  pledged  to  supplement  these 
provisions  by  legal  enactments.  The  extent  to  which  this 
was  effected  may  be  judged  by  the  following  laws.  The 
act  of  April  29,  1874,  regulating  corporations,  permitted 
iron  and  steel  companies  to  mine  and  sell  coal,  but  pro- 
hibited the  ownership  or  lease  of  more  than  10,000  acres 
of  land.  Section  39,  clause  1,  of  the  same  act  limited  the 
capital  stock  of  mining  companies  to  $5,000,000.  By  an 
act  of  April  20,  1874,  the  officers  of  dissolved  corpora- 
tions were  permitted  to  convey  real  estate  held  by  such 
corporations,  and  further  allowed  to  consummate  almost 
any  kind  of  a  deal  if  it  were  approved  by  the  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  of  the  county  in  which  the  property  was 
located.  An  act  of  May  11,  1874,  validated  charters  of 
"  certain  corporations  "  previously  granted  that  "  are  de- 
fective in  validity "  because  of  "  technical  defects  and 
other  causes,"  provided  the  corporations  should  hold  their 
charters  subject  to  the  state  constitution.  There  was  noth- 
ing about  these  laws  seriously  to  disturb  the  relationship 
of  the  Reading  Railroad  with  the  Reading  Coal  and  Iron 
Company  (or  other  railroads  with  similar  companies)  or 
to  prevent  easy  adjustment  of  future  business  arrange- 
ments.  Furthermore,  the  railroads  claimed,  according  to 

*  Article  17,  sec.  4. 


m  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  217 

the  Dartmouth  College  decision  in  1819,^  that  the  pur- 
chases of  coal  lands  acquired  previous  to  1874  under  their 
charters  could  not  be  invalidated  by  the  legislature. 

C.     COAL    LAND    ACTS    OF    THE    EIGHTIES    AND   THEIR 
AMENDMENTS 

By  1883  the  legislature  decided  to  pass  an  act  prohib- 
iting discrimination  and  rebating  by  railroads,  made  it 
a  misdemeanor,  and  attached  a  fine  not  exceeding  $2000 
and  a  maximum  of  two  years'  imprisonment.^  With  the 
agitation  for  national  regulation  of  railroads  it  was  evi- 
dently considered  discreet  to  further  protect  the  railroads 
in  their  holdings  of  stocks  and  property.  Moreover,  in  the 
case  of  the  Reading  Railroad  vs.  Patent,^  in  1886,  the 
State  Supreme  Court  had  decided  that  the  railroad  was 
subject  to  all  the  provisions  of  the  constitution.  An  appeal 
was  taken  to  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  which  re- 
mained on  the  docket  till  January,  1889,  when  it  was  dis- 
missed on  the  motion  of  the  Reading's  counsel.*  In  the 
mean  time  an  act  of  June  2,  1887,^  provided  that  no  real 
or  personal  property  held  by  a  corporation  should  be  es- 
cheated to  the  Commonwealth,  whether  or  not  the  "  bene- 
ficial ownership"  of  such  property  was  in  the  hands  of 
residents  of  the  State  or  outsiders.  Transportation  com- 
panies could  not  have  the  benefit  of  this  act  for  more 
than  five  years  unless  they  filed  with  the  Secretary  of  State 
a  certificate  stating  that  the  stockholders  and  directors 
accepted  all  the  provisions  of  article  17  of  the  constitution 
which  pertained  to  railroads.  This  law  was  further  supple- 
mented by  an  act  in  the  same  year  providing  that "  convey- 
ances of  real  estate  "  by  foreign  and  domestic  corporations 

1  Dartmouth  College  vs.  Woodward,  4  Wheaton,  518. 

2  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1883,  p.  72. 

*  Reading  Railroad  vs.  Patent,  2  Central  Reporter,  554. 

*  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887-88,  op.  cit,, 
p.  ziii. 

fi  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1887,  p.  302. 


218     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

"  to  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  or  domestic  cor- 
porations authorized  to  hold  real  estate  could  be  con- 
veyed indefeasibly  as  to  any  right  of  escheat  in  this  Com- 
monwealth, by  reason  of  such  real  estate  having  been 
held  by  an  alien  or  corporation  not  authorized  to  hold  the 
same  by  the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth."  ^  This  act  was 
amended  in  1891  so  as  to  permit  conveyances  "  by  the 
officers  of  any  such  corporation  after  dissolution  or  ex- 
piration of  charter."  ^  It  was  amended  in  1897  so  as 
to  legalize  transfers  of  property  made  since  1891,  and 
amended  in  1903  to  validate  transfers  made  since  1897. 

D.    EFFECTS    OF   JUDICIAL    INTERPRETATION 

By  1901,  section  4  of  article  17,  prohibiting  consolida- 
tion of  stock,  franchises,  and  property,  had  been  so  mal- 
treated by  judicial  interpretation  ^  that  the  legislature 
passed  an  act  frankly  permitting  corporations  to  purchase 
or  sell  "  the  shares  of  capital  stock  of,  or  any  bonds,  secu- 
rities, or  evidences  of  indebtedness  created  by,  any  other 
corporation."  ^  This  supplemented  a  judicial  decision  in 
1897  which  applied  to  section  5  (prohibiting  railroads 
from  engaging  in  mining  and  manufacturing),  wherein 
the  court  had  decided  that  the  section  did  not  apply  to 
ownership  by  a  railroad  of  stock  in  a  mining  company.^ 

E.    RESULTS    OF    INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION 
INVESTIGATION    OF    1907 

Since  the  information  obtained  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  in  1907  showed  that  the  ownership  of 
coal  properties  and  stock  in  coal  companies  by  officers 
of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  resulted  in  grave  abuses 
in  discrimination  and  distribution  of  cars,  the  legislature 

1  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1887,  p.  350.  2  j^j^^  JSOI,  p.  249. 

^  See  Purdon^s  Digest,  13th  edition,  vol.  1,  p.  215,  for  cases. 
*  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1901,  p.  603. 
^  Pardon,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1,  p.  215. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  219 

sought  to  remedy  this  matter.  An  act  was  passed  for- 
bidding "  officers,  employers,  or  agents  .  .  .  who  have 
charge,  directly  or  indirectly,  of  the  distribution  of  cars 
to  own,  or  have  an  interest,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  any 
operated  coal  property,  or  in  the  stock  of  any  mining  or 
manufacturing  company,  along  the  line  of  such  railroad."  ^ 
A  small  fine  and  a  short  term  of  imprisonment  were  at- 
tached as  a  penalty.  In  the  same  year  a  law  created  a 
railroad  commission  with  powers  of  investigation  and 
regulation  and  provided  it  with  accountants,  inspectors, 
clerks,  and  full  working  equipment.^  May  31, 1907,  a  law 
was  approved  which  provided,  "  That  an  incorporated 
company  doing  the  business  of  a  common  carrier  shall 
not,  directly  or  indirectly,  engage  in  any  other  business 
than  that  of  common  carriers,  or  hold  or  acquire  lands, 
freehold  or  leasehold  directly  or  indirectly,  excejJt  such  as 
shall  he  necessary  for  carrying  on  its  husiness."  ^  Action 
for  violation  must  be  brought  by  the  attorney-general,  and 
the  offenders  are  subjected  to  a  fine  of  $1000.  Another 
act  of  the  same  year  prohibited  discrimination  and  re- 
batinof  and  has  the  same  method  of  enforcement  and  fine 
as  the  former  law.^  Still  another  act  of  the  same  year 
prohibits  further  consolidation  after  1908  through  owner- 
ship of  stock  franchises  and  property.  It  must  be  on- 
forced  by  the  attorney-general,  and  the  offenders  are  sub- 
ject to  a  fine  of  llOOO.f^ 

F.    ACTS    TO    "  QUIET    THE    TITLE    OF   REAL   ESTATE  " 

Evidently  these  simple  provisions  had  "  disquieted " 
somebody,  for  in  1909  an  act  was  passed  "  to  quiet  the 
title  of  real  estate,  and  to  enable  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  corporations  chartered  under  the  laws  of  this 

1  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1907,  p.  359.  2  jjjj.^  1007,  p.  337. 

^  Und.,  1907,  p.  352.  How  this  may  be  interpreted  is  another  matter. 
Italics  mine. 
*  Ibid.,  1907,  p.  352.  6  Ibid.,  1907,  p.  353. 


220      AllBITllATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Commonwealth,  and  authorized  to  hold  real  estate  therein, 
to  hold  and  convey  title  to  real  estate,  which  has  been 
formerly  held  by  corporations  not  authorized  by  law  to 
hold  real  estate  in  Pennsylvania."  ^  These  lands  shall  be 
held  and  conveyed  "•  indefeasibly  to  any  right  of  escheat  in 
this  Commonwealth."  Somebody  must  have  required  con- 
siderable "  quieting"  for  this  identical  act,  which  had  been 
approved  by  Governor  Stuart  April  23,  1909,  was  again 
enacted  and  approved  by  Governor  Tener  March  7, 1911,^ 
and  reenacted  and  approved  by  the  same  governor  June 
15,  1911.^  Evidently  it  was  thought  a  necessary  precau- 
tion to  pass  the  act  every  time  transfers  of  property  were 
made. 

We  have  given  this  brief  resume  of  the  legal  back- 
ground simply  to  demonstrate  the  practically  unlimited 
sway  held  by  capital  in  the  anthracite  region  and  how  lit- 
tle consideration  of  the  law  was  necessary  before  con- 
summating the  deals  which  took  place  between  1874  and 
1911. 

B.  Ownership  of  Lands 

We  have  referred  *  to  the  extent  of  the  ownership  of 
lands  in  1872  and  1873.  The  Reading  Railroad  made 
good  use  of  the  time,  so  that  when  the  constitution  went 
into  effect  in  1874  it  was  in  possession  of  100,000  acres. 
As  we  have  seen,  from  a  legal  standpoint  there  was  not 
much  to  hinder  further  purchases,  and  by  1887  the  Read- 
ing owned  165,189  acres  of  coal  and  agricultural  lands 
which  had  a  bonded  indebtedness  of  1160,000,000.5  After 
the  passage  of  the  laws  of  1887,  to  which  we  referred  on 
page  217,  the  railroads  extended  their  mining  operations 
and  increased  their  purchases  of  lands.^  By  1896  it  was 

1  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1909,  p.  172.  2  jjj^f^  jgn^  p  13 

8  Ibid.,  1911,  p.  955.  *  See  ante,  p.  211. 

5  Report  on  Labor   Troubles  in   the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit., 

p.  XV. 

8  Ibid.,  1887,  p.  xiii. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  221 

estimated  that  96.29  per  cent  of  the  coal  lands  was  con- 
trolled directly  or  indirectly  by  the  railroads,^  and  90  per 
cent  was  controlled  by  five  out  of  the  eleven  roads  reach- 
ing the  anthracite  fields.  In  the  order  of  their  importance 
they  are  —  Philadelphia  and  Reading,  42.25  per  cent ; 
Central  Railroad  of  New  Jersey,  17.30  per  cent ;  Lehigh 
Valley,  16.87  per  cent;  Delaware,  Lackawanna,  and 
Western,  6.55  per  cent ;  and  the  Pennsylvania,  6.24  per 
cent.  As  we  have  seen,  laws  were  passed  in  1897  and 
1903  to  legalize  transfers  that  had  been  made  since  1896. 

C.  Atteivipt  to  Control  Production  by  Pools 

A.    EARLY   ATTEMPTS 

The  first  attempt  of  the  operators  to  limit  production 
and  fix  prices  was  in  1849  when  Bates's  union  was  in  its 
heydey.^  During  the  fifties  and  sixties  further  attempts 
were  made,  but  with  small  success.  The  prime  movers  in 
these  efforts  were  "  independent "  operators,  but  compe- 
tition and  transportation  rates  were  forces  too  disrupt- 
ing for  them  to  attain  cohesion  and  uniformity.  With 
the  rise  of  the  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Association 
sufficient  impetus  was  given  to  bring  together  operators 
and  transportation  companies  with  greater  attending  suc- 
cess and  control.  We  have  called  attention  to  the  pools 
in  1873-75  and  the  opposition  to  the  union  which  re- 
sulted in  its  overthrow.^ 

B.    combination    of    operators   and    CARRIERS 

In  1874  and  1875  allotted  tonnage  and  graduated 
prices  were  agreed  upon.  Tlie  proportioning  of  tonnage 
limited  production  and  steadied  the  market,  while  the  in- 
creasing prices  encouraged  buyers  to  purchase  their  coal 
early  and  distributed  production  more  evenly  over  the 

1  Roberts,  op.  cit.,  p.  65,  quotes  Griffiths,  mining  engineer. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  70-71.  8  See  ante,  p.  212. 


222     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

year.  A  committee  of  six  was  appointed  in  1876  to  estab- 
lish monthly  prices,  to  })rovide  for  increase  or  curtailment 
of  tonnage,  to  collect  funds,  and  to  employ  an  account- 
ant who  was  to  keep  tonnage  accounts.  The  tonnage  ac- 
counts were  to  be  open  to  inspection  at  all  times,  and 
roads  which  exceeded  their  tonnage  were  to  pay  il.50 
for  each  ton  in  excess  of  their  allotments.  Only  competi- 
tive tonnage  was  subject  to  the  control  of  the  committee, 
and  each  road  had  full  control  of  its  local  trade.  But  each 
company  was  held  responsible  for  enforcing  the  regula- 
tions on  "  independent "  operators  along  its  lines.^  This 
pool  went  to  pieces  in  August  of  1876,  and  the  remainder 
of  the  year  and  the  following  year  was  a  period  of  im- 
mense tonnages  and  low  prices,  which  extended  the  use 
of  anthracite  more  widely  in  Western  markets.  A  pool  in 
1878  reduced  the  tonnage  to  three  and  a  half  million  tons 
less  than  that  of  1873,  but  the  absence  of  a  pool  in  1879 
allowed  the  production  to  increase  over  eight  and  a  half 
million  tons.  From  1880  to,  1887,  with  the  exception  of 
1883,  production  was  well  controlled  and  the  roads  suc- 
ceeded in  "  disciplining  "  the  independent  operators  into 
a  "  faithful  adherence  to  the  pool  regulations." 

C.    THE  "  MORGAN   POOL,"   1886 

But  in  1885  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  was  dissatisfied 
with  its  allotment  of  tonnage  and  was  ready  to  expend 
$20,000,000  as  a  war  measure  against  the  Reading  road 
to  push  its  lines  into  Reading  territory  and  get  busi- 
ness.2  This  situation  resulted  in  the  "  Morgan  Pool "  of 
1886.  The  presidents  of  the  various  railroads  and  large 
coal  companies  met  at  Mr.  J.  P.  Morgan's  house,  estimated 
the  necessary  output  for  the  coming  year,  fixed  a  penalty 
of  fifty  cents  per  ton  for  exceeding  tonnage,  raised  the 

^  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
xlvii-xlviii.  Reprint  of  agreement. 

2  Engineering  and  Mining  Journal,  January  23,  1886. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  223 

price  of  coal  twenty-five  cents  a  ton,  and  appointed  a  com- 
mittee to  fix  allotments.  The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  was 
mollified  by  concessions  of  percentages  on  the  part  of  the 
Reading  and  Lehigh  roads. 

Since  1887  a  "  community  of  interest "  in  connection 
with  a  policy  of  centralization  by  stock  ownership  and  in- 
terlocking directorates  has  enabled  the  roads  to  conduct 
their  affairs  by  a  "  gentleman's  agreement." 

D.    EFFECTS    ON    PRICES 

With  the  formation  of  the  pool  in  1873  there  was  an 
increase  in  average  prices  of  fifty-three  cents  per  ton,  with 
a  still  further  increase  of  twenty-eight  cents  the  following 
year.  In  1876,  with  the  breaking  of  the  pool  in  August, 
the  average  price  nearly  approached  the  mark  of  1872, 
and  with  the  entire  abandonment  of  the  pool  in  1877  the 
average  price  dropped  $1.28  per  ton.  The  effective  pool 
of  1880  raised  the  price  11.83  per  ton  over  the  price  of 
1879  when  no  pool  existed.  From  1880  to  1895  the  pool 
prices  vary  very  little,  but  reflect  the  troubles  of  1886  by 
a  drop  of  fifty  cents  per  ton.^  Using  the  average  pool  price 
of  84  for  1886,  which  is  still  above  the  years  of  competi- 
tion, it  is  estimated  that  an  extra  charge  of  879,767,477 
was  put  upon  the  public  from  1880  to  1884,^  Although 
the  regulations  of  the  pools  were  not  strictly  adhered  to, 
yet  the  growing  recognition  of  "  community  interest "  and 
centralization  of  control  had  made  an  "  understanding " 
more  and  more  effective. 

D.  Lease  of  Jersey  Central  by  the  Reading 
Railroad,  1883 

The  Reading  road  inaugurated  the  policy  of  leasing  in 
1883.    The  inability  thoroughly  to  control  allotments  and 

1  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit.,  p.  xlix ; 
reprint  from  Sa ward's  The  Coal  Trade,  the  accepted  authority  of  the  opera- 
tors and  carriers.  "  Ibid.,  p.  1. 


224     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

prices  by  pooling  made  more  definite  control  necessary. 
The  lease  of  the  Jersey  Central  for  999  years  was  iu  effect 
from  1883  to  1887.  In  the  latter  year  the  Reading  found 
itself  unable  to  fulfill  the  terms  of  the  lease,  and  its  affairs 
were  put  in  the  hands  of  receivers.^  However,  close  com- 
munity of  interests  was  maintained  and  was  extended  to 
the  Lehigh  Valley  road  through  the  stockholders  of  the 
Lehigh  who  also  owned  stock  in  the  Jersey  Central.  Down 
to  1890  business  was  carried  on  through  tacit  or  informal 
agreements. 

E.  The  Jersey  Centeal  and  Lehigh  Valley 
Leases,  1890-1893 

Since  the  leasing  of  the  Jersey  Central  in  1883,  a  New 
Jersey  law  had  been  passed  ^  requiring  foreign  corpora- 
tions to  obtain  special  legislative  consent  when  leasing 
domestic  corporations.  As  the  Reading  was  a  Pennsyl- 
vania corporation,  it  had  to  run  the  risk  of  being  thwarted 
by  legislative  action  or  find  a  way  to  evade  the  law.  It 
chose  the  latter.  Six  officers  of  the  Philadelphia  and  Read- 
ing Railroad  organized  the  Port  Reading  Railroad  Com- 
pany, in  November,  1890,  with  a  capital  of  12,000,000. 
They  projected  a  twenty-mile  railroad  to  connect  with  the 
Delaware  and  Bound  Brook  Railroad  and  have  terminals 
at  a  point  on  the  Arthur  Kill  opposite  Staten  Island.^  At 
the  same  time  the  Port  Reading  Construction  Company 
contracted  to  build  the  railroad  for  $1,500,000  in  mort- 
gage bonds  and  all  but  four  hundred  shares  of  the  capital 
stock.  By  January  12,  1892,  only  a  few  miles  of  the  road 
had  been  built,  but  on  this  date  the  Central  Railroad  of 
New  Jersey  leased  its  main  lines  and  forty  tributary  rail- 
roads for  999  years  to  the  Port  Reading  Railroad.  In  re- 

1  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit,,  p.  Ix. 

2  Laws  of  New  Jersey,  1885,  p.  324. 

^  Report  on  the  Alleged  Coal  Combination,  1893, 52d  Congress,  2d  Session, 
House  Report  no.  2278,  p.  211. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  225 

turn  the  Port  Reading  Railroad  agreed  to  pay  all  operating 
expenses,  seven  per  cent  dividends,  and  fifty  per  cent  of 
the  earnings  above  these  dividends.  At  the  same  time  a 
tripartite  agreement  was  made  between  the  Jersey  Central, 
Port  Reading,  and  Philadelphia  and  Reading,  whereby 
the  latter  railroad  guaranteed  the  fulfillment  of  the  Port 
Reading's  covenants  and  promised  to  direct  increased  traf- 
fic in  such  a  way  that  the  expected  earnings  would  be 
realized.^  The  Lehigh  Valley  Railroad  was  leased  Febru- 
ary 11, 1892,  in  order  to  acquire  control  of  its  coal  proper- 
ties and  to  gain  access  for  the  combination's  product  to 
the  Lake  ports.  The  combination  was  further  strength- 
ened through  the  acquisition  of  stock  by  the  President  of 
the  Jersey  Central  in  the  Lackawanna  road,  while  the  pres- 
ident of  the  latter  road  became  a  director  of  the  Jersey 
Central.  By  the  increase  of  percentage  contracts  from 
fifty-five  to  sixty  per  cent,  the  good  will  of  the  independent 
operators  was  gained.^ 

Public  hostility  was  at  once  aroused  by  the  project.  In- 
vestigations were  ordered  by  Congress  and  the  New  York 
Legislature.  The  leases  were  attacked  in  the  Chancery 
Court  of  New  Jersey  and  declared  illegal.  The  purchase 
of  a  controlling  interest  in  the  Boston  and  Maine  Railroad 
by  President  McLeod,  of  the  Reading,  in  an  attempt  to 
compete  in  the  New  England  trade,  ran  counter  to  the 
Morgan  interests.  This  fact,  in  connection  with  the  dis- 
trust aroused  among  investors,  and  the  events  leading  to 
the  panic  of  1893,  made  it  hard  to  get  funds.^  This  com- 
bination of  circumstances  prevented  the  consummation  of 
the  deal. 

^  Report  on  the  Alleged  Coal  Combination,  1893, 52d  Congress,  2d  Session, 
Honse  Report  no.  2278,  p.  213. 

2  Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  1902,  vol.  19,  p.  456. 
8  Ibid.,  vol.  19,  p.  45G. 


2^G      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

F.   The  Temple  Iron  Company  Deal,  1898 

In  1898  the  independent  operators  in  the  Wyoming  or 
northern  field  became  dissatisfied  with  freight  rates  and 
the  conditions  under  which  they  were  obliged  to  sell  their 
coal.  The  percentage  contracts  which  had  formerly  been 
made  were  expiring.  This  furnished  a  good  opportunity 
to  project  the  New  York,  Wyoming,  and  Western  Rail- 
road. Chief  among  the  independent  operators  of  this  re- 
gion was  the  firm  of  Simpson  and  Watkins,  who  owned 
eight  collieries  and  produced  over  one  million  tons  a  year. 

The  first  step  taken  to  break  up  the  potential  competi- 
tion of  this  project  was  the  purchase  of  the  capital  stock 
($240,000)  of  the  Temple  Iron  Company.  This  company 
was  operating  a  small  furnace  near  Reading,  but  its  chief 
asset  was  the  possession  of  a  charter  which  permitted  it 
to  engage  in  almost  any  sort  of  business.^  President  Baer 
of  the  Reading,  and  the  firm  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.  di- 
rected the  financial  manipulation.  The  capital  stock  of  the 
Temple  Iron  Company  was  increased  to  $2,500,000  and 
bonds  aggregating  $3,500,000  were  issued.  Simpson  and 
Watkins  agreed  to  sell  out  for  $2,260,000  in  stock  and 
$3,500,000  in  bonds  of  the  Temple  Iron  Company.  They 
then  deposited  their  stock  and  $2,100,000  of  the  bonds 
with  the  Guaranty  Trust  Company  of  New  York  as  trustee 
and  received  "  $3,288,896.66  in  money  and  $1,000,000  in 
certificates  of  beneficial  interest  in  the  stock  of  the  Temple 
Iron  Company."  The  stock  thus  deposited  was  taken  by 
the  various  railroad  companies  "  in  proportions  based  on 
the  percentage  of  the  total  anthracite  tonnage  carried  an- 
nually," and  the  bonds  were  guaranteed  by  J.  P.  Morgan, 
William  Rockefeller,  the  Guaranty  Trust  Company,  and 
others.^ 

^  United  States  vs.  Reading  Co.  et  ah,  Supreme  Court  Reporter,  vol.  33, 
no.  4,  p.  95. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  96. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  227 

If  the  projected  railroad  had  gone  through,  the  Erie, 
the  Lehigh,  and  the  Lackawanna  would  have  been  chiefly 
affected,  yet  the  "  community  of  interest"  in  maintaining 
the  monopoly  was  sufficient  to  involve  all  the  roads. 

G.  The  Purchase  of  the  Pennsylvania  Coal 
Company,  1899 

For  several  years  the  independent  operators  had  main- 
tained an  association  called  "  The  Anthracite  Coal  Oper- 
ators' Association,"  and  through  its  instrumentality  sought 
to  improve  their  condition.  They  did  not  propose  to  meet 
defeat  so  easily,  and  in  November,  1899,  a  project  was 
started  for  a  new  railroad.  The  largest  independent  com- 
pany was  the  Pennsylvania  Coal  Company,  which  pro- 
duced about  2,000,000  tons  and  controlled  a  coal-gathering 
road  of  its  own,  the  Erie  and  Wyoming  Valley  Railroad. 
The  strongest  support  was  expected  from  this  company  in 
making  the  newly  projected  Delaware  Valley  and  King- 
ston Railroad  a  success.  The  firm  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co. 
was  sent  out  to  "bag  "  the  Pennsylvania  Coal  Company. 
This  was  no  small  task,  for  the  company  was  capitalized 
at  85,000,000,  had  been  paying  sixteen  per  cent  dividends, 
and  had  an  accumulated  surplus  of  twice  its  capitalized 
value.  The  agents  of  the  banking  house  traversed  the 
northeastern  regions  of  Pennsylvania  and  paid  the  prices 
necessary  to  obtain  the  stock.  It  is  said  the  average  price 
per  share  was  1552.^  The  purchase  was  made  for  the  Erie 
Railroad,  which  received  the  coal  property  in  return  for 
§32,000,000  four  per  cent  fifty-year  collateral  trust  bonds, 
which  were  secured  by  the  coal  property  and  the  assets 
of  the  New  York,  Susquehanna,  and  Western  Railroad.^ 
With  this  purchase  the  hope  of  the  independent  opera- 
tors was  lost. 

^  Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  vol.  19,  p.  459. 
2  Ibid.,  vol.  19,  p.  459. 


228     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.\X  INDUSTRY 
H.  Railroad  Consolidation 

A.    THE   ERIE    PURCHASES 

Since  the  policy  of  leasing  railroads  had  proven  a  fail- 
ure, control  was  sought  through  purchase  of  a  majority 
of  the  stock.  In  1898  the  Erie  road  gained  control  of  the 
New  York,  Susquehanna,  and  Western  Railroad  in  this 
manner,  and  by  its  purchase  of  the  Pennsylvania  Coal 
Company  obtained  the  Erie  and  Wyoming  Valley  Rail- 
road and  all  rights  in  connection  with  the  projected  Dela- 
ware Valley  and  Kingston  Railroad. 

B.  THE   READING  OBTAINS   THE  JERSEY    CENTRAL,  1901 

The  Reading  had  too  much  at  stake  to  be  thwarted  by 
its  failure  to  lease  the  Jersey  Central.  Obtaining  the  con- 
trol of  the  Jersey  Central's  nineteen  per  cent  of  the  total 
unmined  area  would  give  the  Reading  sixty-three  per  cent, 
and  a  close  "  community  of  interest "  with  the  Lehigh 
Valley  would  bring  it  up  to  about  eighty  per  cent.^  Accord- 
ingly in  1901  the  Reading,  through  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co., 
obtained  145,000  shares  out  of  a  total  272,138  Jersey 
Central  shares  at  8160,  the  highest  price  ever  paid  for 
the  stock. 

From  the  time  of  the  Temple  Iron  Company  deal  up 
to  the  recent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  control 
of  the  anthracite  production  and  policy  was  in  the  hands 
of  a  few  men  who  represented  the  various  companies. 
The  decision  simply  abolished  the  Temple  Iron  Company 
as  a  holding  company  and  canceled  the  sixty-five  per 
cent  contracts.  As  the  situation  now  stands  we  may  say  in 
summary  that  the  Reading  owns  the  entire  capital  stock 
of  the  Philadelphia  and  Reading  Railroad,  the  Reading 
Coal  and  Iron  Company,  and  the  majority  stock  control 
of  the  Jersey  Central  and  its  subsidiary  coal  and  railroad 

^  33  Supreme  Court  Reporter,  no.  4,  p.  92. 


m  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  229 

companies.  The  Lehigh  Valley  owns  the  Lehigh  Valley 
Coal  Company  and  is  closely  associated  with  the  Reading. 
The  Erie  owns  the  Pennsylvania  Coal  Company  and  its  rail- 
road, the  Hillside  Coal  Company,  the  New  York,  Susque- 
hanna, and  Western  Railroad  Company  and  its  coal  com- 
pany. The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  operates  through  the 
agency  of  the  Scranton  Coal  Company  and  controls  6.24 
per  cent  of  the  unmined  coal.  The  charter  of  the  Delaware, 
Lackawanna,  and  Western  Railroad  has  always  permitted 
it  to  mine  coal,  and  it  controls  6.55  per  cent  of  the  unmined 
coal.  This  leaves  but  3.71  per  cent  to  be  controlled  by  in- 
dependents. A  "  gentleman's  agreement  "  will  probably 
continue  to  control  the  industry. 

This  survey  enables  us  better  to  appreciate  the  magni- 
tude of  the  forces  with  which  labor  has  had  to  contend 
in  the  anthracite  field  from  1875  to  the  present  time.  An 
understanding  of  these  forces,  combined  with  their  ability 
to  utilize  immigration  and  to  manipulate  political  and  so- 
cial policies,  will  help  us  to  grasp  the  problems  still  before 
us  in  the  anthracite  field. 

4.  IMMIGRATION 

A.  Its  Importance 

Before  we  can  understand  why  the  sporadic  attempts  at 
unionism  during  the  seventies  and  the  eighties  were  not 
more  successful,  we  must  take  into  account  the  effect  of 
immigration  and  the  way  it  coordinated  with  the  policy  of 
concentrated  capital.  In  connection  with  the  description 
of  the  increase  of  immigration  and  its  change  in  character 
the  figures  are  carried  up  to  1910  in  order  to  show  the 
growing  heterogeneity  in  the  mining  population  and  its 
influence  in  preventing  solidarity  among  the  workers.  We 
can  most  profitably  approach  the  subject  of  immigration 
as  it  affected  the  anthracite  mining  industry  by  a  consider- 
ation of  the  influences  which  centered  around  "  contract 


230     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

labor,"  the  conditions  which  brought  its  prohibition,  and 
the  ineffectiveness  of  regulations  to  protect  the  American 
laborer. 

B.  Contract  Labor 

A.    LEGAL    BACKGROUND 

In  1864  Congress  passed  a  law  for  the  purpose  of 
encouraging  immigration.  This  bill  emanated  from  the 
House  committee  on  agriculture  and  was  prompted  by  the 
need  for  agricultural  workers.  It  served  a  worthy  pur- 
pose as  a  war  measure  when  labor  was  scarce  and  men 
were  needed  for  the  army.  The  laborer  made  a  contract 
to  repay  his  transportation  expenses  from  his  wages,  and 
a  commissioner  of  immigration  made  a  contract  with  the 
railroads  for  his  transportation.^  It  was  thought  neces- 
sary, however,  to  provide  that  no  commissioner  should 
hold  office  who  was  interested  in  land  or  in  corporate 
enterprises. 

With  the  close  of  the  war  labor  was  supplied  by  the 
return  of  the  soldiers,  and  the  contract  labor  law  was 
repealed  in  1868.  The  remarkable  industrial  development 
during  the  seventies  and  eighties  furnished  sufficient  in- 
centive to  keep  the  stream  of  immigration  flowing.  By 
1885  the  influx  of  immigrants  was  pressing  with  sufficient 
force  on  American  labor  to  bring  about  the  enactment  of 
a  law  prohibiting  contract  labor.  Moreover,  the  natural 
flow  was  considered  sufficient  without  any  artificial  stimu- 
lation. The  act  was  reinforced  in  1887  and  1888,  but,  in 
1889,  a  report  by  a  congressional  committee  for  investi- 
gating the  contract  labor  conditions  informs  us  that  the 
law  was  being  evaded  because  of  inadequate  administra- 
tive equipment.  The  act  of  1891  provided  for  a  superin- 
tendent of  immigration  and  inspection.  But  in  1893  the 
superintendent  appealed  to  Congress  to  revise  and  make 
the  law  more  explicit  and  comprehensive  and  to  provide 
^  38th  Congress,  1st  Session,  House  Report  no.  56 ;  April,  1864. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  231 

for  additional  means  of  enforcement.  Similar  appeals  have 
been  made  from  then  on  to  the  present. 

B.    JUDICIAL    INTERPRETATION 

However,  the  commissioner  was  not  long  in  discover- 
ing: that  other  difficulties  besides  those  of  administration 
stood  in  the  way  of  proper  enforcement.  In  1900,  he  says, 
"  the  rulings  of  the  courts  have  greatly  narrowed  the  use- 
fulness of  these  laws  [alien  contract  labor]  by  limiting 
their  application  to  certain  classes  of  labor,  and  this  well- 
nigh  repealed  their  penal  feature  as  applied  to  employers 
violating  their  provisions."^  The  court  rulings  had  also 
made  it  necessary  for  the  laborers  to  have  escaped  the 
vigilance  of  the  officers  and  to  have  been  landed  before 
the  employers  were  subjected  to  penalty.  Furthermore, 
the  terms  "  labor  or  service  of  any  kind  "  were  limited  to 
"  manual "  labor.^  Full  court  dockets,  overworked  district 
attorneys,  and  evasions  of  the  law  through  technicalities 
are  additional  elements  that  have  made  the  contract  labor 
law  a  farce. 

C.    AGENCIES   ENCOURAGING   EVASION 

The  easy  evasion  of  the  law  gave  the  agencies  for  en- 
couraging immigration  full  sway.  The  inspections  made 
by  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  have  determined  beyond  a 
doubt  the  existence  of  unscrupulous  agencies,  encouraged 
by  steamship  companies,  which  make  a  business  of  ex- 
ploiting the  ignorant  immigrant  and  encouraging  him  to 
come  here.  Evidence  shows  that  deported  immigrants 
were  deflected  to  other  places  instead  of  their  native  vil- 
lages in  order  not  to  hurt  the  business  of  the  agencies. 
There  is  also  plenty  of  evidence  of  wholesale  shipment  of 
contract  labor  which  was  thoroughly  instructed  in  the 
proper  answers  to  make  to  official  questions.  If  they  failed 

^  Report  of  Commissioner-General  of  Immigration,  1900,  p.  39. 
2  Ibid.,  1901,  p.  31. 


232     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

in  their  instructions  the  steamship  companies  did  not, 
however,  reject  them.^  Italy  regards  the  United  States  as 
a  safety  valve  for  surplus  population,  and  restrictions  on 
immigration  would  cut  off  the  prosperity  of  whole  vil- 
lages which  are  supported  by  money  sent  from  America. 
Though  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  for  the  steamship  com- 
panies to  get  business,  the  United  States  must  be  protected 
from  "  an  energy  that  knows  no  rest  and  a  singleness  of 
purpose  which  considers  no  results  except  those  of  a  finan- 
cial nature." 

C.  Immigration  from  Southern  Europe 

With  such  a  legal  situation,  with  the  cooperation  of 
such  agencies  as  are  described  above,  and  with  full  com- 
mand of  transportation  facilities,  the  railroads  had  no  dif- 
ficulty in  getting  all  the  cheap  labor  they  wanted.  The 
concrete  figures  of  population  in  the  anthracite  counties 
tell  the  story. 


Immigrant 

Races  in  the  Anthracite 

Region  ^ 

1870 

1880 

1890 

1900 

1910 

Total  foreign-born 
Slav  and  Italian      .     . 
English-speaking    .     . 

108,000 

306 

105,000 

109,000 

1,925 

103,000 

171,000 

43,000 

124,000 

194,000 

89,000 

100,000 

267,000 

178.000 

82,000 

The  Germans  are  included  in  the  enumeration  of  the 
English-speaking  foreign-born  because  their  standard  of 
living  is  on  the  same  level  and  they  are  readily  assimi- 
lated. From  this  table  it  is  evident  that  up  to  1880  the 
competition  between  the  races  for  a  chance  to  work  had 
not  begun.  It  was  the  chance  to  profit  by  this  competition 
that  gave  the  corporations  a  powerful  weapon  in  addition 
to  the  strength  of  concentrated  wealth. 

^  Report  of  Commissioner-Gkneral  of  Immigration,  1903,  pp.  86-96. 
2  Wame,  The  Immigrant  Invasion,  p.  161. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  233 

Then,  again,  the  influx  of  Slavs  and  Italians  became 
a  constantly  increasing  factor  during  the  nineties  in  pre- 
venting the  growth  of  organization.  Alongside  this  phe- 
nomenal growth  up  to  1910  there  stands  an  element  quite 
as  striking  —  the  decrease  in  English-speaking  peoples. 
This  points  to  two  other  considerations.  Not  only  have 
the  English-speaking  stopped  coming,  but  a  considerable 
percentage  have  migrated.  The  full  import  of  this  is  easily 
appreciated  when  we  consider  the  effect  of  taking  those 
with  union  ideals  out  of  the  industry  altogether.  Not  only 
would  it  hinder  the  development  of  a  common  feeling, 
but  the  introduction  of  heterogeneous  elements  makes  it 
just  so  much  harder  to  hold  the  men  to  faithful  support  of 
an  organization.  That  the  influx  of  foreigners  is  still  a 
powerful  factor  in  preventing  unity,  and  that  it  is  so  felt 
by  the  organization,  is  exemplified  by  the  recent  state- 
ment of  the  miners' president,  —  "There  are  thousands 
of  men  who  seek  our  shores  every  year  and  are  unloaded 
into  these  coal  fields.  I  am  now  trying  to  enlist  the  serv- 
ices of  the  government  to  prevent  the  agents  of  coal  com- 
panies meeting  men  at  the  ports  of  entry  and  rushing  them 
into  the  coal  fields.  For  what  ?  To  defeat  the  aims  and 
efforts  of  men  who  desire  to  better  their  conditions."^ 
With  the  perspective  of  the  importance  of  the  consolida- 
tion of  capital  and  of  the  influx  of  a  heterogeneous  popu- 
lation before  our  minds,  we  are  in  a  position  to  appreciate 
the  handicaps  under  which  the  union  movement  in  the 
anthracite  region  labored  during  the  eighties  and  nineties. 
That  we  do  not  find  the  same  development  here  as  took 
place  in  the  bitiiminous  field  is  to  be  expected,  since  we 
know  these  disruptive  forces  were  growing  constantly 
more  powerful.  We  shall  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of 
the  sporadic  attempts  at  organization  in  the  late  seven- 
ties and  eighties  and  sec  the  effectiveness  of  concen- 
trated capital  and  immigration  in  overthrowing  the  most 

^  Spooch  before  the  Wilkesbarre  Conveiilioii,  May  10,  1012. 


234     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

promising  attempt  to  build  up  a  union  during  the  strike 
of  1887-88. 

5.  THE   LABOR   TROUBLES   OF  1887-88 

A.  The  Causes 

In  1877  the  miners  of  the  northern  fiehls  had  engaged 
in  a  three  months'  strike,  using  the  occasion  of  the  great 
railroad  strike  of  the  same  year  as  an  opportune  moment 
to  express  their  grievances.  They  failed  to  gain  any  con- 
cessions, and  no  further  serious  disturbances  took  place 
until  1887.  Although  the  sliding  scale  was  still  in  opera- 
tion, the  miners  had  no  representation  on  the  board  which 
determined  the  average  selling  price  and  no  way  of  know- 
ing whether  the  returns  were  true  or  false.  Furthermore, 
the  men  pointed  out  that  the  increase  in  prices  was  ab- 
sorbed by  the  increased  freight  rates  of  the  railroads. 
When  the  rise  in  prices  occurred,  the  freight  rates  were 
raised  and  the  prices  at  the  basis  points  held  to  the  same 
level.^  The  miners  claimed  that  though  there  had  been  no 
material  change  in  the  rate  for  mining,  yet  the  increase 
in  the  size  of  the  car,  unfair  "dockage"  for  stone  or  other 
waste  in  the  coal,  exorbitant  charges  for  powder,  fuses, 
etc.,  and  abuses  in  connection  with  the  company  store  had 
greatly  decreased  real  wages. 

B.  Rise  of  the  Knights  of  Labor  and  the  Miners' 
AND  Laborers'  Amalgamated  Association 

As  early  as  1878  the  Knights  of  Labor  had  gained 
15,000  adherents  in  the  neighborhood  of  Scranton,^  and 
the  Miners'  and  Laborers'  Amalgamated  Association  was 
organized  the  following  year.  The  latter  organization  ac- 
quired considerable  strength  in  the  middle  and  southern 
fields.  In  1885  the  unions  sought  without  avail  to  obtain  a 

1  Eeport  on  Labor  TroMes  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  eit., 
p.  Ixxxiii. 

2  Virtue,  op.  cit.,  p.  746. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  Q35 

conference  with  the  operators  in  order  to  revise  the  scale. 
The  following  year  they  were  refused  general  recognition, 
but  the  frank  statement  of  a  committee  to  the  Reading 
Company  that  they  thought  they  were  not  getting  the 
wages  due  them,  considering  the  market  price  of  coal, 
brought  an  advance  in  wages.^  Another  attempt  in  1887 
to  gain  a  general  conference  in  order  to  change  the  basis 
of  the  scale  and  give  the  miners  representation  on  the 
board  which  determined  average  prices  was  met  by  a  flat  re- 
fusal from  the  Lehigh  operators  to  consider  these  demands 
or  to  submit  the  matter  to  arbitration.^  The  Reading 
Company,  however,  met  the  miners'  committee  and  prom- 
ised to  grant  an  increase  from  September  1, 1887,  to  Jan- 
uary 1, 1888.  At  the  latter  date  the  Reading  Company  was 
to  go  out  of  the  hands  of  the  receivers,  and  the  officials 
would  not  extend  the  agreement  beyond  the  first  of  the 
year.  During  these  years  the  unions  (as  in  the  bituminous 
field)  were  merely  local  organizations  without  even  an  ap- 
proximation at  federation  equal  to  the  National  Federation 
of  Miners  of  1885  in  the  bituminous  regions. 

A.    LNAUGURATION    OF   THE    STRIKE 

With  the  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Lehigh  operators 
to  consider  their  demands  or  to  arbitrate,  a  strike  was  de- 
clared (September  10)  by  the  miners  of  that  district,  and 
10,000  men  became  idle.  The  Reading  Company  in  its 
agreement  with  its  employees  had  further  stipulated  that 
it  could  not  pay  higher  wages  after  Januaiy  1, 1888,  than 
the  Lehigh  operators  were  paying.  The  Reading  miners 
assented  to  this  proposition,  but  determined  to  do  all  they 
could  to  help  the  Lehigh  miners  win  in  order  to  bring  up 
the  general  level  of  wages.  To  this  end  the  miners  con- 
tributed and  the  Reading  railway  employees  were  led  to 

^  Virtue,  op.  cit.,  p.  747. 

*  Report  on  Labor   Trouhles  in  the.  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  ofJ.  cit.,  p. 
Ixzziii. 


23G      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

vote  a  day's  wages  on  the  basis  of  loyalty  to  the  Eeading 
Company.  The  men  were  told  by  the  company's  officials 
that  the  strike  in  the  Lehigh  district  would  be  of  great 
benefit  to  the  Heading  Company  because  of  the  increased 
business  it  would  bring  in  coal  and  traffic.^  In  fact,  this 
result  was  attained.  The  company  was  able  to  profit  by  the 
rise  in  prices,  and  it  was  able  to  get  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  receivers. 

B.  THE   READING   COMPANY    FURNISHES  THE   LEHIGH 

OPERATORS    WITH    COAL 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  not  to  the  interest  of  the 
Heading  Company  to  have  the  Lehigh  strikers  win  the 
strike,  raise  wages,  and  strengthen  the  union.  Nor  could 
the  company  afford  to  enter  into  an  extended  war  with 
the  Lehigh.  The  men  discovered  that  the  Reading  Com- 
pany was  supplying  coal  to  the  Lehigh  selling  agencies 
and  the  records  of  shipments  showed  that  a  larger  and 
larger  percentage  of  coal  was  diverted  to  other  points  than 
Port  Richmond,  the  Reading  receiving  point.^ 

C.  EXTENSION   OF    THE   STRIKE  TO  THE   SCHUYLKILL 

REGION 

Ascertainment  of  these  facts  brought  together  a  conven- 
tion of  representative  miners  and  railway  men  at  Potts- 
ville,  November  22, 1887,  to  discuss  the  situation.  Itdecided 
that  if  the  Reading  Company  was  allowed  to  supply  the 
Lehigh  operators  with  coal,  the  Lehigh  miners  would  be 
starved  into  submission  in  spite  of  the  support  rendered 
by  the  Reading  employees.  In  the  latter  part  of  Decem- 
ber an  attempt  was  made  to  force  some  Reading  employees 
to  load  a  coal  boat  of  a  Lehigh  operator.  The  men  refused, 
and  were  discharged.  Shortly  afterward  several  switching 

^  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit.,  p.  cii. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  eiii. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  237 

crews  were  discharged  for  refusing  to  move  cars.  This 
brought  the  railroad  men  out.  The  trouble  was  settled 
within  two  days  by  the  union  leaders  and  the  order  given 
to  go  to  work.  But  the  concessions  made  by  the  union  of- 
ficers were  interpreted  as  weakness  by  the  railroad  officials. 
The  company  had  given  an  order  that  men  who  did  not 
report  for  duty  on  December  27  would  be  discharged. 
Through  the  delay  of  telegrams  ordering  a  return  to  work, 
over  6000  railroad  men  were  discharged,  and  on  January 
1,  1888,  due  to  a  failure  to  reach  an  agreement,  22,000 
Eeading  miners  went  out. 

D.    FINDINGS    OF    THE    CONGRESSIONAL    COMMITTEE 

OF  1888 

The  congressional  committee  appointed  to  investigate 
the  trouble  thought  the  evidence  showed  that  the  delayed 
telegrams  were  a  part  of  a  scheme  to  precipitate  a  strike. 
Its  reasons  for  so  thinking  were  based  on  the  following 
facts :  The  Reading  had  mined  its  full  quota  of  coal.  The 
increased  business  had  sometimes  kept  the  men  on  duty 
eighty  hours  at  a  stretch.  With  the  first  of  the  year  the 
demand  for  coal  would  fall  off,  traffic  would  decline,  and 
a  surplus  of  labor  would  exist.  A  strike  would  give  the 
company  an  excuse  for  raising  the  price  of  coal  and  for 
getting  rid  of  surplus  men  on  the  railroad  and  in  the 
mines.  Furthermore,  the  company  was  convinced  that 
the  union  was  growing  altogether  too  strong  and  that  the 
time  had  come  to  crush  it.^  The  company  was  sure  of  a 
single  force  that  would  accomplish  this  task.  When  the 
superintendent  of  the  road  was  asked  why  he  was  so  sure 
the  striking  men  would  finally  go  to  work  at  the  com- 
pany's terms  he  replied,  "Their  necessities."  Asked  if 
he  meant  "starved  out,"  he  replied  that  the  company  did 
not  propose  to  keep  the  men  out  till  they  starved,  but 

^  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
vii,  cv. 


238      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY] 

reminded  the  committee  that  "it  [was]  a  necessity  for 
everybody  who  works  that  they  get  work." 

The  committee  found  evidence  that  when  the  payment 
was  made  by  the  "  wagon,"  there  was  great  variation  in 
size.  Where  payment  was  made  by  the  "  yard,"  it  meant 
anywhere  from  thirty-five  to  forty-eight  cubic  feet.  Among 
other  abuses  there  were  "dockage,"  company  houses, com- 
pany stores,  company  butchers,  and  company  doctors.  The 
committee  were  exasperated  at  the  unlimited  authority 
given  to  corporations  in  the  hiring  and  use  of  company 
police,  and  thought  it  questionable  "  whether  the  Shenan- 
doah '  riot '  was  not  intentionally  provoked  by  the  com- 
pany for  the  purpose  of  placing  the  strikers  in  the  posi- 
tion of  offenders,  and  of  thus  influencing  public  opinion 
in  favor  of  the  company. "  ^ 

The  committee  was  convinced  that  the  syndicate  con- 
trolled, directly  or  indirectly,  all  the  tidewater  lines  from 
the  Schuylkill  and  Lehigh  regions  except  the  Pennsylva- 
nia Railroad.  The  evidence  showed  that  competition  in 
rates  was  eliminated ;  that  production  was  restricted  and 
prices  fixed  ;  that  wages  were  arbitrarily  fixed  ;  that  the 
independent  operators  surrendered  thirty-eight  per  cent 
of  the  price  of  coal  for  freight ;  that  Philadelphia  coal 
was  fifty  cents  a  ton  higher  than  the  price  at  competitive 
points  farther  from  the  mines,  and  it  was  estimated  that 
this  amounted  to  an  annual  excess  to  Philadelphia  on  coal 
consumed  of  11,495,000  ;  "  and  that  the  Southern  buyer 
[paid]  a  greater  freight  rate  than  the  New  England 
buyer."  The  committee  concluded  that  "  it  [was]  difficult 
to  imagine  how  the  common  carrier  could  commit  greater 
depredations  upon  national  commerce,  more  flagrant  vio- 
lations of  the  law,  or  greater  abuses  of  individual  and 
public  rights."  2 

^  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit.,  p.  xciv. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  Ixii. 


IN  THE  ANTHKACITE  FIELD  239 

B.  THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  STRIKE 

The  operators  refused  all  offers  of  arbitration  that  In- 
volved the  recognition  of  the  union,  but  the  Reading  met 
committees  of  their  own  employees.  The  miners  remained 
out  until  March  and  then  went  to  work  at  the  terms 
offered  by  the  companies.  The  union  organizations  were 
crushed,  and  those  who  looked  into  conditions  i*ecognized 
the  part  immigration  was  playing  in  the  industrial  situa- 
tion. 

F.    EFFECTS    OF    IMMIGRATION    ON    THE    STRIKE 

That  such  an  absolute  defeat  should  have  been  admin- 
istered and  should  have  prevented  an  organization  from 
rising  for  over  a  decade  points  to  strongly  opposing  forces. 
Besides  the  conditions  described  above,  the  congressional 
committee  of  1888  saw  evidence  of  the  force  which  was 
to  accomplish  this  result  and  referred  to  it  thus,  "  There 
is,  as  before  mentioned,  a  superabundance  of  labor 
throughout  the  anthracite  regions.  Tramps  are  to  be  seen 
on  every  hand  ;  vagabond  squads  of  Italians,  Poles,  and 
Huns  .  .  .  throng  the  mines  to  compete  with  Americans 
for  work ;  hence  the  wages  of  the  miners  tend  downward 
all  the  time  while  the  price  of  anthracite  moves  upward, 
or  at  least  remains  at  the  monopoly  figure  which  the  seven 
joint  carrying  and  mining  companies  have  been  exacting 
for  it  of  late  years."  ^  How  large  a  factor  this  was  in  mak- 
ing the  strike  of  1887  unsuccessful  is  hard  to  tell,  but 
there  were  43,000  Slavs  and  Italians  in  the  labor  market 
of  the  region.  They  had  a  lower  standard  of  living,  were 
willing  to  work  for  less  wages,  and  stood  ready  to  suj> 
plant  the  unskilled  and  rapidly  to  acquire  the  places  of 
the  skilled  men.  Perhaps  the  enumeration  of  the  Reading 
mine  employees  is  as  good  a  criterion  as  any.  There  we 

*  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887,  op.  cit., 
p.  viii. 


240     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

find  6839  Slavs  and  Italians  out  of  a  total  24,734  mine 
employees.^ 

6.  THE  STRIKE  OF  1900 

From  the  time  of  the  struggle  in  1887-88  until  1900, 
we  hear  of  no  further  attempts  to  unite  for  better  work- 
ing conditions.  In  the  mean  time  the  momentum  of  the 
forces  of  concentrated  wealth  and  immigration  which  had 
broken  up  unionism  in  the  seventies  and  eighties  was  in- 
creasing. The  natural  evolution  from  local  to  national 
organization  found  no  chance  for  expression  because  there 
was  not  enough  local  solidarity  to  build  on.  In  fact  the 
regime  of  individual  bargaining  which  was  in  full  sway 
was  aggravated  to  such  an  extent  by  the  introduction  of 
an  ever-increasing  foreign  element  with  different  lan- 
guages, customs,  and  ideals,  that  even  the  common  sym- 
pathy necessary  to  local  organization  was  wanting.  Not 
until  adverse  working  conditions  had  forced  the  recogni- 
tion of  a  common  lot  and  made  the  many  nationalities 
receptive  to  the  teachings  of  the  United  Mine  Workers 
did  there  appear  sufficient  unity  to  warrant  a  struggle. 

A.  The  Work  of  the  United  Mine  Workers 

When  we  consider  the  factors  that  have  entered  into 
the  situation  since  1875,  the  wonder  is  that  anything  ef- 
fective was  accomplished  in  the  strike  of  1900.  That  suf- 
ficient homogeneity  was  attained  to  enable  the  men  to 
stand  together  for  any  length  of  time  points  to  a  stronger 
influence  than  a  common  feeling  attained  as  the  result  of 
social  contact  or  through  political  or  educational  institu- 
tions. 

The  United  Mine  Workers  of  the  bituminous  field  had 
felt  the  effects  of  the  anthracite  coming  into  their  mar- 
kets during  their  early  struggles,  and  this,  without  doubt, 
was  one  impelling  force  which  drove  them  to  organize  the 
^  Wame,  The  Slav  Invasion,  p.  63. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  241 

anthracite  miners.  During  the  early  and  middle  nineties, 
however,  their  desultory  efforts  had  brought  only  ninety- 
four  locals  into  the  fold.  In  1899  the  problem  was  at- 
tacked with  greater  vim.  National  organizers  and  mem- 
bers of  the  executive  board  were  permanently  stationed 
in  the  anthracite  field,  and  the  region  was  organized  into 
three  districts  with  the  regular  local  officials  to  direct  the 
work.  In  spite  of  this  well-laid  campaign  only  8000  out 
of  the  142,000  workers  were  brought  into  the  organization 
before  the  strike.^ 

B.  Disrupting  Factors 

There  were  many  factors  which  made  greater  results 
impossible.  In  the  first  place  there  were  fourteen  nation- 
alities with  different  languages  and  different  standards 
of  living,  different  customs,  and  different  religious.  The 
distrust  and  jealousies  that  accompany  such  factors  were 
almost  insurmountable.  The  living  participants  in  past 
strikes  sounded  the  warning  of  past  failures.  The  fear  of 
arousing  the  wrath  of  the  employer  and  the  relentless 
blacklist  made  the  bravest  hesitate,  especially  those  who 
had  family  obligations  and  permanent  domiciles.  The 
ghost  of  surplus  labor  stalked  near  and  brought  distrust 
among  fellow  workmen  even  of  the  same  nationality,  for 
there  is  no  force  so  disrupting  as  the  dread  of  hunger  and 
starvation. 

C.  Economic  Pressure 

That  142,000  men  did  respond  when  the  strike  order 
was  given  shows  the  pressure  of  adverse  working  con- 
ditions. This  pressure  was  strong  enough  to  overbalance 
the  disruptive  factors  which  would  naturally  make  united 
action  impossible  in  a  heterogeneous  population.  In  the 
middle  and  southern  fields,  where  the  sliding  scale  was  in 
operation,  out  of  153  drawings  ^  since  January  1,  1888, 

1  Mitchell,  The  Independent,  toI.  52,  p.  2G14.  "  See  ante,  p.  230. 


242     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

to  establish  wages,  "  8  resulted  in  payment  of  basis  wages, 
44  in  advance  upon  that  rate,  and  101  in  a  reduction 
therefrom."  ^  The  miners,  having  no  voice  in  making  the 
scale,  had  lost  all  confidence  in  its  working  justice,  and 
they  demanded  its  abolition.  The  items  in  the  miners'  de- 
mands point  to  other  pressing  factors.  An  increase  of  twenty 
per  cent  was  asked  for  those  laborers  receiving  less  than 
fl.50  per  day;  fifteen  per  cent  for  those  receiving  $1.50 
to  $1.75  per  day;  and  ten  per  cent  for  those  receiving 
more  than  $1.75.  Besides  the  necessity  for  this  increase 
in  money  wages  and  adjustment  to  meet  increased  cost  of 
living,  there  were  other  factors  affecting  real  wages  which 
needed  attention.  It  was  of  considerable  importance  to 
them  that  2240  pounds  instead  of  3360  pounds  should  be 
considered  a  ton.  To  see  that  this  was  brought  about,  it 
was  necessary  for  them  to  employ  a  checkweighman  who 
was  also  to  see  that  the  amount  of  "  dockage  "  for  impuri- 
ties was  fair. 2  A  reduction  in  the  price  of  powder  from 
$2.75  to  $1.50  a  keg  was  demanded.  This  would  enable 
the  operator  to  supply  the  men  and  obtain  a  proper  return 
on  his  investment,  since  it  only  cost  from  90  cents  to  $1 
per  keg.  The  existence  of  the  company  store,  deductions 
for  the  company  doctor,^  and  compliance  with  the  state 
law  which  required  semimonthly  payment  in  cash,  all 
affected  real  wages.  Here  was  the  driving  force  which 
acted  upon  all  nationalities.  It  only  needed  harnessing. 

D.  Negotiations  for  Settlement 

In  1900  the  miners  of  the  northern  field  petitioned 
President  Mitchell  to  call  a  strike.  After  conferring  with 
leaders  of  the  other  districts  he  decided  that  the  time  was 

^  Virtue,  Journal  of  Political  Economy^  vol.  9,  p.  7. 

2  The  miners  were  still  suffering  from  the  -want  of  such  regulations  in 
the  face  of  the  fact  that  the  state  laws  permitted  them. 

8  One  firm  is  quoted  as  making  $16,000  profit  a  year  through  de- 
ductions for  the  company  doctor.  Mitchell,  The  Independent,  vol.  52, 
p.  2014. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  243 

not  opportune.  A  convention  of  delegates  from  all  three 
districts  was  caUed  on  August  13  which  formulated  the 
miners'  grievances  and  invited  the  operators  to  meet  them 
in  joint  conference  on  August  27.  The  operators  paid  no 
attention  to  this  request,  and  the  convention  sought  per- 
mission of  the  national  executive  board  to  strike  if  the 
leaders  were  not  able  to  negotiate  a  settlement  within  ten 
days.  From  the  time  of  the  convention  till  September  12, 
every  honorable  means,  including  an  offer  to  arbitrate, 
was  used  to  effect  a  settlement.  Pressure  from  political 
sources  and  the  expressions  of  the  press  were  without  avail. 
The  operators  thought  that  not  more  than  ten  per  cent  of 
the  men  would  respond  to  a  strike  order.  On  September 
17,  the  day  the  strike  went  into  effect,  112,000  employees 
struck,  and  at  the  time  of  the  settlement,  October  29, 
140,000  men  were  idle.  The  operators  refused  to  recog- 
nize the  United  Mine  Workers  as  an  organization,  claim- 
ing that  it  was  a  bituminous  organization  whose  officers 
were  not  acquainted  with  the  anthracite  industry  and  whose 
superior  number  shoidd  not  be  allowed  to  control  the  an- 
thracite policy.  But  President  Mitchell  pointed  out  to  them 
that  the  anthracite  members  had  become  numerically 
stronger  than  the  bituminous  membership,  and  further 
offered  to  let  the  negotiations  take  place  between  the 
operators  and  committees  of  their  own  men,  provided  that 
they  met  in  the  same  city,  at  the  same  time,  so  that 
general  conditions  could  be  established.^ 

E.  Settlement  of  the  Strike 

The  operators  did  not  take  advantage  of  any  such  ar- 
rangement. They  did  not  propose  to  recognize  the  union. 
Notices  were  posted  at  all  the  most  important  collieries 
stating  that  an  increase  of  ten  per  cent  would  be  granted 
and  powder  would  be  reduced  from  $2.75  to  $1.50  per 

^  United  Mine  Workers^  Journal,  September  27,  1900.  Reprint  of  state- 
ment to  the  public. 


244     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

keg  in  the  northern  and  middle  fields.^  Since  1,372,691 
kegs  were  used  in  1899,  this  was  rather  an  important  con- 
cession. The  sliding  scale  was  abolished  in  the  middle  and 
southern  districts,^  but  the  other  abuses  that  affected  real 
wages  remained.  Since  the  state  laws  were  ineffective,  the 
concerted  action  of  the  union  was  necessary  to  bring  about 
the  abolition  of  the  abuses. 

7.  THE  STRIKE   OF   1902 

A.  Preparation  for  Another  Struggle 

The  settlement  of  the  strike  of  1900  had  left  both  par- 
ties with  the  feeling  that  a  truce  had  been  declared  on  the 
real  issues.  The  operators,  in  anticipation  of  another  strug- 
gle, began  the  erection  of  stockades,  storage  houses  for 
coal,  and  washeries.  They  felt  that  the  "  union  was  nothing 
but  a  fighting  machine  to  be  fought,  and  the  demands  of 
the  union  nothing  but  an  increase  in  wages  and  a  reduction 
in  dividends.  .  .  .  They  understood  the  art  of  obtaining 
low  wages,  but  they  utterly  failed  to  comprehend  the  new 
spirit  which  would  resist  oppression  at  no  matter  what 
cost  in  suffering  and  privations."  ^  In  some  cases  the 
companies  who  had  a  large  number  of  non-union  men  who 
remained  at  work,  blacklisted  union  men  after  the  strike, 
and  those  who  had  few  non-unionists  discharged  them. 
Agents  in  the  employ  of  the  companies  circulated  among 
the  unionists  and  kept  their  employers  informed.  A  cam- 
paign was  on  foot  to  bring  the  United  Mine  Workers  to 
the  same  fate  which  the  previous  unions  had  met. 

In  1901,  through  the  mediation  of  Senator  Hanna,  sev- 
eral of  the  railroad  presidents,  Mr.  Mitchell,  and  the  dis- 
trict presidents  were  brought  together.   In  this  conference 

1  Powder  had  been  reduced  to  $1.50  by  the  Reading  Company  shortly 
after  the  congressional  investigation  of  1887-88. 

^  The  sliding  scale  had  never  been  used  in  the  northern  field. 
^  Mitchell,  Organized  Labor,  p.  369. 


IN  THE  ANTHIL^.CITE  FIELD  245 

it  was  agreed  that  the  settlement  of  1900  should  continue 
for  another  year,  and  the  union  leaders  left  the  meeting 
hoping  that  another  year  would  find  the  operators  in  a 
frame  of  mind  to  grant  recognition  to  the  union  and  nego- 
tiate with  its  leaders. 

B.  Negotiations  of  1902 
A.  operators'  attitude  toward  a  joint 

CONFERENCE 

In  response  to  an  invitation  to  take  part  in  a  joint  con- 
ference at  Scranton,  March  12,  the  operators  declined  by 
formal  letters.  The  burden  of  the  replies  centered  around 
their  unwillingness  to  do  more  than  adjust  grievances  with 
committees  of  their  own  employees.  They  thought  it  im- 
practicable to  form  a  wage  scale  for  the  whole  anthracite 
region  because  of  variability  in  working  conditions  and 
costs  of  mining.  Furthermore  they  objected  to  having  their 
relations  with  their  employees  disturbed  every  year  for,  so 
far  as  they  were  aware,  their  employees  were  "  well  satis- 
fied with  their  present  rates  of  wages,  their  hours  of  work, 
and  the  general  conditions  under  which  they  perform  their 
work  for  us."  ^  Neither  could  there  be  "  two  masters  in  the 
management  of  business,"  and  the  adjustment  of  wages 
and  working  conditions  did  "  not  call  for  the  intervention 
of  the  organization  which  you,  Mr.  Mitchell,  represent." 
These  statements  show  how  far  the  operators  were  from 
an  understanding  of  the  principles  of  conciliation  and  the 
place  it  has  in  industry. 

B.    MEETINGS  ARRANGED   BY   THE   CIVIC   FEDERATION 

From  March  18  to  24  the  miners  hold  a  convention  at 
Shamokin,  Pennsylvania,  and  formulated  their  demands. 
They  asked  for  recognition  of  the  union,  an  increase  in 

^  Report  of  Anthracite  Strike  Commission,  Bulletin  of  Bureau  of  Labor, 
no.  46,  p.  21'J. 


246     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

wages,  tbo  weighing  of  coal,  and  a  uniform  scale,  and 
they  appealed  to  the  National  Civic  Federation  for  its 
mediation.  At  a  conference  arranged  by  the  Civic  Federa- 
tion the  operators  stated  their  position  in  three  proposi- 
tions. They  promised  not  to  discriminate  against  unionists, 
and  insisted  that  union  men  should  not  refuse  to  work 
with  non-unionists.  There  should  be  no  deterioration  in 
quality  of  work  or  restriction  in  quantity  of  product. 
Since  varying  conditions  rendered  uniformity  impossible, 
each  mine  should  "  arrange  either  individually  or  through 
its  committees  with  the  superintendents  or  managers  any 
questions  affecting  wages  or  grievances."  ^  After  discuss- 
ing at  great  length  the  general  relations  of  labor  and  cap- 
ital, the  conference  adjourned  for  thirty  days,  and  another 
meeting  at  the  end  of  that  time  brought  no  further  re- 
sults. A  subcommittee  consisting  of  the  presidents  of  the 
Lehigh,  Lackawanna,  and  Reading  companies,  the  three 
anthracite  district  presidents,  and  Mr.  Mitchell,  debated 
the  question  further  for  two  full  days,  but  reached  no 
settlement. 

C.    THE   FIRST    OFFER    TO    ARBITRATE 

The  union  officials  during  these  conferences,  as  a  last 
resort,  and  to  avert  the  suffering  attendant  upon  a  strike, 
had  offered  to  reduce  their  demands  to  a  ten  per  cent  in- 
crease in  wages  and  a  nine-hour  instead  of  an  eight-hour 
day.  But  this  was  mistaken  for  weakness  and  cowardice, 
and  "  one  of  the  railway  presidents  predicted  that,  come 
what  might,  the  men  would  not  strike,  but  would  submit 
to  any  rebuff."  ^  This  idea  was  probably  encouraged  by 
the  offer  to  arbitrate  which  was  extended  by  the  union 
officials.  They  offered  to  accept  a  board  of  live  selected  by 
the  National  Civic  Federation  to  settle  upon  the  questions 
in  dispute,  or  to  trust  the  fairness  of  their  demands  to  a 

^  Report  of  Anthracite  Strike  Commission,  op.  cit.,  p.  33. 
2  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  p.  373. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  247 

committee  consisting  of  Archbisliop  Ireland,  Bishop  Potter, 
and  the  two  to  select  a  third.  If  the  committee  should  de- 
cide "  that  the  average  annual  wages  received  by  anthra- 
cite mine  workers  are  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  live, 
maintain  and  educate  their  families  in  a  manner  conform- 
able to  established  American  standards  and  consistent 
with  American  citizenship,  we  agree  to  withdraw  our 
claims  for  higher  wages  and  more  equitable  conditions  of 
employment,  providing  that  the  anthracite  mine  operators 
agree  to  comply  with  any  recommendations  the  above 
committee  may  make  affecting  the  earnings  and  con- 
ditions of  labor  of  their  employees."  ^  In  reply  most  of 
the  operators  stated  that  they  had  posted  notices  promis- 
ing to  continue  to  pay  the  wages  granted  in  1900,  and  one 
operator  reminded  the  union  leaders  that  "  anthracite 
mining  is  a  business,  and  not  a  religious,  sentimental,  or 
academic  proposition."  Furthermore,  since  the  business 
management  of  the  company  was  supposed  to  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  president  and  directors,  "  I  could  not  if 
I  would  delegate  this  business  management  to  even  so 
highly  respectable  a  body  as  the  Civic  Federation,  nor  can 
I  call  to  my  aid  as  experts  in  the  mixed  problem  of  busi- 
ness and  philanthropy  the  eminent  prelates  you  have 
named."  ^ 

D.    ORDER    FOR    TEMPORARY   SUSPENSION 

When  the  union  officers  saw  that  peaceful  overtures 
had  failed,  an  order  for  a  temporary  suspension  was  issued 
to  take  effect  on  May  12.  A  convention  was  called  for 
May  15,  and  at  that  meeting  the  delegates  voted  to  con- 
tinue the  suspension  in  spite  of  the  advice  of  their  presi- 
dent to  wait  till  autumn,  which  would  save  the  miners 
and  the  public  from  the  hardships  of  a  protracted  conflict.^ 

^  Rf.pr/rt  of  Anlhracite  Strike,  Commission^  op.  cit.,  p.  34.       ^  //jjc/.,  p.  35, 
^  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  p.  ;!7.'>.   Ho  "  was  even  in  hopes  tliat  by  that  time  tlie 
opuratorB  wuuld  see  the  folly  of  their  course  and  luuke  concessions." 


218     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

In  obedience  to  the  strike  order  147,000  employees  ceased 
work.  The  engineers,  firemen,  and  pumpmen  who  keep  the 
mines  iu  working  order  were  not  called  out.  But  by  June 
2,  they  had  not  been  able  to  get  any  modification  of  their 
wages  or  long  working  day  ^  and  they  were  called  out  at 
their  own  request. 

Efforts  at  mediation  were  continued  by  the  Civic  Fed- 
eration, and  in  June,  with  the  rise  in  prices  and  the  com- 
plaints of  the  public,  Carroll  D.  Wright,  Commissioner 
of  Labor,  was  delegated  by  President  Roosevelt  to  inquire 
into  the  situation.  His  report  justified  the  demands  of  the 
men  in  part,  but  no  action  was  taken,  nor  was  it  made 
public  until  much  later. 

C.  The  Speciai,  Bituminous  Convention 

The  anthracite  miners  had  expected  help  from  the  bitu- 
minous field,  and  as  the  strike  held  on  into  July  a  consider- 
able demand  for  a  sympathetic  strike  was  heard.  With  a 
request  from  five  districts,  President  Mitchell  was  obliged 
to  call  a  national  convention,  and  in  response  to  the  call 
a  special  convention  assembled  at  Indianapolis  July  17  to 
consider  the  anthracite  situation.  With  the  increasing  dis- 
tress in  the  anthracite  field  and  the  knowledge  that  a  gen- 
eral coal  strike  would  deprive  the  railroads  of  fuel  and 
soon  bring  them  to  terms,  the  union  officials  had  no  small 
task  on  their  hands  to  thwart  the  movement  for  a  sympa- 
thetic strike.  The  wiser  and  stronger  officials  saw  in  the 
contractual  system  that  they  had  been  building  up  in  the 
bituminous  field  something  which  should  not  be  thrown 
aside  lightly.  They  had  just  made  a  contract  which  ex- 
tended till  April,  1903,  and  both  operators  and  miners 
had  preached  the  inviolability  of  contracts  to  tlieir  follow- 
ers. Over  against  this  the  argument  of  self-preservation 
was  placed,  and  its  adherents  predicted  the  destruction  of 
the  organization  in  the  bituminous  field  if  failure  was  met 
^  Twelve  hours  and  on  alternate  Sundays  twenty-four  hours. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  249 

with  in  the  anthracite  regions.  President  Mitchell  in  his 
address  to  the  convention  answered  this  argument  by  re- 
minding his  followers  that "  a  disregard  of  the  sacredness 
of  contracts  strikes  at  the  very  vitals  of  organized  labor. 
The  effect  of  such  action  would  be  to  destroy  confidence,  to 
array  in  open  hostility  to  our  cause  all  forces  of  society, 
and  to  crystallize  public  sentiment  in  opposition  to  our 
movement."  ^ 

Instead  of  entering  upon  a  questionable  policy,  the 
miners  decided  to  do  the  practical  thing.  From  an  au- 
thorized appropriation  out  of  the  national  treasury  and 
gifts  from  state  organizations,  $110,000  was  put  into  the 
hands  of  the  anthracite  district  presidents  for  immediate 
relief  work.  The  districts,  subdistricts,  and  locals  were 
asked  for  donations  from  their  treasuries.  An  assessment 
of  ten  per  cent  of  the  gross  earnings  of  all  members  who 
were  working  and  twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  officers'  sal- 
aries was  levied.  Local  committees  were  appointed  to  aid 
the  anthracite  men  to  get  work  and  solicit  local  contribu- 
tions. An  address  was  issued  to  the  public  setting  forth 
the  inviolability  of  contracts,  appealing  for  aid,  and  re- 
minding the  people  of  the  power  of  public  opinion.  "  No 
class  of  men  realizes  more  than  we  do  the  great  power  of 
public  opinion.  Its  influence  is  potent  for  good  or  evil  in 
accordance  with  the  manner  in  which  it  is  used.  No  right 
can  be  secured  and  maintained  without  its  support,  and 
no  wrong  can  long  exist  that  meets  with  its  concentrated 
opposition." 

D.  Misunderstanding  and  Discontent 

Through  an  overestimate  by  the  newspapers  of  the 
amount  of  money  that  would  be  contributed  by  the  vote 
of  the  convention  and  the  time  of  its  payment,  a  basis  was 
laid  for  discontent  and  brought  about  a  very  critical  situ- 
ation in  the  month  of  August.  The  miners  received  their 

*  Minutes  of  Special  Convention  to  consider  the  Anthracite  Strike,  p.  39. 


250     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

pay  semimonthly  and  the  money  earned  in  the  last  half  of 
July  would  not  be  paid  until  August  15.  These  circum- 
stances led  the  anthracite  miners  to  believe  they  would  get 
more  than  they  did  per  week,  made  the  public  slow  in 
contributing,  and  gave  the  agents  of  the  operators  a  chance 
to  sow  discontent  by  intimating  that  the  money  was  with- 
held. ^  Mr.  Mitchell  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
strike  would  have  collapsed  at  that  time  if  the  operators 
had  opened  the  mines.  But  explanation  of  the  circum- 
stances from  the  ojSicials,  accompanied  by  advice  to  main- 
tain the  peace,  held  the  men  in  line  till  the  contributions 
began  to  come  in. 

E.   Conference  called  by  President  Koosevelt 

As  the  strike  held  on  through  September,  and  the  suf- 
fering of  the  poor  through  the  rise  of  prices  became  more 
apparent,  every  influence  was  brought  to  bear  to  effect  a 
settlement.  The  operators  maintained  that  they  had  noth- 
ing to  arbitrate  and  that  they  were  prevented  from  con- 
ducting their  business  by  the  terrorism  and  violence  of 
the  miners.  No  effort  seemed  to  be  effective  until  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  invited  both  parties  to  a  conference  at  the 
White  House  on  October  3.  The  President  placed  before 
the  miners  and  operators  a  statement  that  a  third  party, 
the  public,  was  deeply  concerned  with  the  situation.  He 
disclaimed  legal  right  to  call  them  together,  but  appealed 
to  their  patriotism  and  their  sense  of  responsibility  to  the 
public.  This  was  met  on  the  part  of  the  miners  by  an 
offer  to  submit  their  claims  to  a  tribunal  named  by  the 
President  and  abide  by  the  award  even  if  it  went  against 
them. 

The  operators  reiterated  their  claim  that  the  violence 

and  terrorism  practiced  by  the  miners  made  it  impossible 

to  mine  coal.  They  reminded  the  President  that  "the 

constitution  of  Pennsylvania  guarantees  protection  to  life 

*  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  p.  380. 


m  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  251 

and  property.  In  express  terms  it  declares  the  right  of 
acquiring,  possessing,  and  defending  property  to  be  in- 
alienable." Furthermore,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  President 
"  to  reestablish  the  reign  of  law  "  and  "  to  suppress  do- 
mestic violence.  You  see  there  is  a  lawful  way  to  secure 
coal  for  the  public.  The  duty  of  the  hour  is  not  to  waste 
time  negotiating  with  the  fomenters  of  this  anarchy  and 
insolent  defiance  of  law,  but  to  do  as  was  done  in  the  war 
of  the  rebellion,  restore  the  majesty  of  law,  the  only  guard- 
ian of  a  free  people,  and  to  reestablish  order  and  peace  at 
any  cost.''^  Furthermore,  the  civil  branch  of  the  United 
States  Government  should  "  institute  proceedings  against 
the  illegal  organization  known  as  the  United  Mine  Work- 
ers' Association,"  and  prosecute  it  under  the  Sherman 
Anti-Trust  Law.^ 

F.  The  President  appoints  a  Commission 

The  attitude  of  the  operators  called  forth  a  storm  of 
indignation  which  they  had  not  foreseen.  It  was  further 
encouraged  by  the  fact  that  a  few  days  after  the  confer- 
ence the  miners  assembled  in  mass  meeting  to  vote  on  the 
question  of  returning  to  work,  and  although  the  Governor 
of  Pennsylvania  had  thrown  10,000  soldiers  into  the  an- 
thracite region  to  make  it  possible  for  those  who  wished 
to  return  to  work  to  do  so,  150,000  voted  to  continue  the 
strike  until  their  demands  were  considered.^ 

On  October  6,  President  Roosevelt,  through  the  Hon- 
orable C.  D.  Wright,  asked  Mr.  Mitchell  to  induce  the  men 
to  return  to  work,  promising  that  a  commission  should  be 
appointed  to  investigate  conditions  and  that  every  influ- 
ence should  be  brought  to  induce  the  operators  to  accept 
its  findings.^    Mr.  Mitchell  concluded  that  this  course 

1  Report  of  Conference  between  the  President,  the  Anthracite  Operators,  and 
the  Representatives  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  p.  G.  Reprint  of  written 
BtatenriPnts. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  11,  15. 

8  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  p.  389.  *   Ibid. 


252     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

would  be  inadvisable,  since  the  operators  had  not  promised 
to  accept  the  findings  and  the  President  had  no  legal 
authority  to  enforce  them. 

JSIeanwhile  efforts  were  made  to  bring  the  operators  to 
terms.  Mr.  Hoot,  Secretary  of  War,  was  sent  to  inter- 
view Mr.  J.  P.  Morgan,  and  as  a  result  of  tliis  interview 
Mr.  Morgan  called  on  the  President  on  October  13  and 
submitted  the  following  proposition.  The  President  should 
appoint  a  commission  of  five  to  be  composed  of  an  officer 
of  the  United  States  Engineering  Corps,  an  expert  min- 
ing engineer,  one  of  the  judges  of  the  United  States 
Courts  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania,  a  sociol- 
ogist, and  a  man  who  had  engaged  in  mining  and  selling 
coal.  As  soon  as  the  commission  was  appointed  the  men 
were  to  return  to  work  pending  the  award.  This  proved 
acceptable  to  the  miners  except  that  they  insisted  that 
labor  be  recognized  and  asked  to  have  the  number  on  the 
commission  increased  to  seven.  This  would  afford  an  op- 
portunity to  give  labor  recognition  and  appoint  a  Catholic 
prelate  as  a  member.  The  addition  of  the  latter  would  in- 
crease the  confidence  of  the  men  (most  of  whom  were 
Catholics)  in  the  award.  With  these  preliminaries  agreed 
on,  the  proposition  was  submitted  to  the  miners'  conven- 
tion, and  ratified,  and  the  men  reported  for  work  Octo- 
ber 23. 

G.   The  Award  of  the  Commission 

After  an  extended  investigation  of  actual  working  con- 
ditions and  examination  of  558  witnesses  the  commission 
rendered  the  following  award. 

The  contract  miners  were  granted  a  ten  per  cent  in- 
crease in  the  rates  for  "  cutting  coal,  yardage,  and  other 
work  for  which  standard  rates  or  allowances  existed." 
The  men  had  asked  for  a  twenty  per  cent  increase.  Cor- 
responding to  this  the  union  had  asked  for  a  decrease 
from  ten  to  eight  working  hours,  which  would  be  equiva- 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  253 

lent  to  a  twenty  per  cent  increase  to  men  employed  by  the 
day.  In  response  to  this  request  the  day  men  were  given 
a  nine-hour  day  with  the  same  pay,  which  was  equivalent 
to  ten  per  cent  increase. 

The  commission  found  that  the  state  laws  providing  for 
payment  by  weight  had  been  ineffective,  and  it  declined 
to  impose  this  method  of  payment  or  to  fix  a  uniform 
number  of  pounds  to  the  ton.  In  some  mines  payment 
was  made  by  the  yard  and  in  others  by  the  wagon  or  car. 
Payment  by  weight  was  to  be  effective  only  by  mutual 
agreement.  But  in  examining  the  statistics  from  certain 
mines  the  commission  discovered  that  the  presence  of 
checkweighmen  and  check  docking  bosses  had  saved  the 
miners  fifty  per  cent  in  dockage.^  Accordingly  it  awarded 
contract  miners  the  right  to  elect  and  pay  checkweighmen 
and  check  docking  bosses  to  look  after  their  interests. 

The  commission  recommended  that  the  distribution  of 
cars  be  equitable,  and  that  discrimination,  lawlessness, 
boycotting,  and  blacklisting  be  done  away  with.  It  de- 
cided that  payment  to  contract  miners'  helpers  should  be 
directed  to  the  helper  and  not  through  the  miner.  Fixing 
the  wages  paid  under  the  award  as  a  minimum,  the  com- 
mission reestablished  the  sliding  scale.  The  basis  price  of 
coal  was  fixed  at  $4.50  at  tidewater.  When  the  average 
price  increased  five  cents  above  this  basis,  the  employees 
were  to  get  an  increase  of  one  per  cent  in  wages,  and  so 
on  with  every  increase  of  five  cents.  The  average  prices 
were  to  be  computed  by  an  accountant  who  was  to  be 
named  and  have  his  compensation  fixed  by  one  of  the  cir- 
cuit judges  of  the  Third  Judicial  Circuit.  His  salary  was 
to  be  apportioned  among  the  operators  in  proportion  to 
their  tonnage. 

The  operators  refused  from  the  beginning  of  the  inves- 
tigation to  recognize  the  United  Mine  Workers  as  an 
organization,  and  insisted  that  Mr.  Mitchell  appeared  as  a 
*  Report  of  Anthracite  Strike  Commission,  op.  cit.,  p.  09. 


254     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

representative  of  their  employees  and  not  in  his  official 
capacity.  The  operators  claimed  that  they  objected  to  the 
miners'  organization  chieliy  because  the  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  union  were  employed  in  the  bituminous 
field  which  they  considered  a  rival  industry.  They  be- 
lieved that  it  was  to  the  interest  of  the  bituminous  oper- 
ators and  miners  alike  to  encourage  strife  in  the  anthra- 
cite field.  To  this  Mr.  Mitchell  responded  :  — 

That  this  objection  is  neither  valid  nor  consistent  is  clearly 
demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  many  of  the  railroads  officered 
by  the  same  men  who  control  the  anthracite  coal  mines  enter  into 
agreements  with  railroad  organizations,  a  majority  of  whose 
members  are  employed  upon  other  and  competing  roads.  It 
would  be  as  logical  to  refuse  recognition  of  the  brotherhoods  of 
locomotive  engineers,  firemen,  conductors,  or  brakemen  because 
a  majority  of  the  membership  of  these  organizations  is  not  em- 
ployed directly  by  the  anthracite-carrying  railroads  as  it  is  to 
refuse  to  make  an  agreement  with  the  United  Mine  Workers  of 
America  because  a  part  of  the  membership  is  employed  in  the 
bituminous  fields.^ 

The  operators  objected  to  boys  over  sixteen  years  of 
age  being  allowed  one  half  of  a  vote,  and  the  commission 
agreed  that  this  was  "  unwise  and  impolitic."  Further, 
the  commission  thought  that  strikes  should  be  declared 
only  by  a  two-thirds  vote. 

In  spite  of  these  objections  the  commission  felt  called 
upon  to  include  in  its  award  some  method  of  peaceful 
adjustment  of  disputes.  Accordingly  it  created  an  arbi- 
tration board  of  six  members,  to  settle  disputes  that  could 
not  be  adjusted  by  mine  officials  "  and  the  miner  or  min- 
ers directly  interested."  Three  of  the  board  were  to  be 
appointed  by  the  operators  and  three  by  the  employees. 
An  award  made  by  a  majority  vote  was  to  be  final.  In 
case  the  board  could  not  agree,  the  disputed  questions  were 

^  United  Mine  Workers^  Journal,  November  20,  1902.  Reprint  of  open- 
ing address  to  the  commission. 


EN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  255 

to  be  referred  to  an  arbiter  who  should  be  selected  by  one 
of  the  circuit  judges  of  the  Third  Judicial  Circuit  of  the 
United  States.  The  membership  of  the  board  was  at  all 
times  to  be  kept  complete  and  there  was  to  be  no  suspen- 
sion of  work  pending  a  decision.  The  award  of  the  com- 
mission continued  in  force  until  March  31,  1906. 

8.    ADJUSTMENTS  SINCE  1902 

A.   Formation  of  the  Conciliation  and 
Arbitration  Board 

Hardly  had  the  men  returned  to  their  work  when  there 
arose  plenty  of  cases  which  needed  the  attention  of  the 
board.  Discrimination,  blacklisting,  refusal  to  make  de- 
ductions from  wages  to  pay  checkweighmen  and  docking 
bosses,  the  reckoning  of  increase  of  wages  on  the  basis  of 
gross  or  net  earnings,  were  all  fruitful  sources  of  dispute. 
Shortly  after  the  award  was  rendered,  a  dispute  arose 
among  the  Reading  employees  over  the  interpretation  of 
the  statement  regarding  hours.  A  strike  involving  30,000 
men  demanded  immediate  attention.  President  Mitchell 
ordered  the  men  back  to  work  to  await  the  decision  of  the 
board.  This  trouble  occurred  the  latter  part  of  April,  but 
the  board  was  not  ready  for  work  until  June  25  because 
of  the  refusal  of  the  operators'  representatives  to  meet  the 
representatives  of  the  miners  till  they  had  been  duly 
appointed  by  a  convention.  The  three  district  presidents 
of  the  United  Mine  Workers  had  been  appointed  as  a 
matter  of  course,  but  recognizing  them  without  the  sanc- 
tion of  a  convention  looked  too  much  like  recognizing  the 
union.  The  miners  pertinently  reminded  the  operators' 
representatives  that  they  had  not  been  appointed  by  the 
stockholders.  In  the  mean  time  feeling  ran  high  and  the 
leaders  had  difficulty  in  keeping  the  men  from  another 
strike.^ 

1  Mitchell,  op.  cit.,  p.  390. 


i56     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 


A.    RULES    OF   THE    BOARD 

These  circumstances  did  not  give  the  board  a  very  pro- 
pitious inauguration,  but  the  board  proceeded  at  once  to 
the  formation  of  a  set  of  rules  to  govern  the  consideration 
of  cases.  If  a  dispute  arose,  the  person  or  persons  "  di- 
rectly interested  or  a  committee  of  the  same  "  were  to  at- 
tempt to  settle  matters  with  the  mine  officials.  In  case  of 
failure  to  agree  or  to  get  an  interview,  the  causes  of  the 
dispute  were  to  be  put  in  writing  and  referred  to  the 
members  of  the  conciliation  board  from  that  district.  The 
board  members  were  then  to  try  to  settle  the  trouble  or 
obtain  an  interview  for  the  workers.  If  there  was  a  fail- 
ure to  reach  an  adjustment,  the  board  was  then  to  require 
a  statement  from  the  employer  or  summon  him  to  appear 
in  person.  Complaints  by  the  employers  regarding  em- 
ployees were  to  follow  the  same  course.  Furthermore,  the 
board  was  to  consider  no  case  unless  work  was  continued 
while  awaiting  a  decision.^  This  latter  rule  was  supple- 
mented by  making  the  decision  retroactive,  i.e.,  the  award 
went  into  effect  from  the  time  the  complaint  was  made 
and  not  from  the  time  of  the  board's  decision. 

B.  The  Cases  before  the  Board 

From  1903  to  1912  two  hundred  cases  were  brought 
before  the  board  for  action.  One  hundred  and  fifty  arose 
in  the  first  three  years  of  the  board's  existence,  twenty- 
three  in  the  years  1906-09,  and  twenty-nine  from  1909 
to  1912.  Two  cases  were  still  before  the  board  in  the 
early  part  of  1912  when  Mr.  Shelby  M.  Harrison  made 
an  extended  investigation  of  the  cases  that  had  come  be- 
fore the  board.2  Out  of  a  classification  of  193  cases  it  was 
found  that  181  had  been  brought  by  the  workers  against 

*  United  Mine  Workers^  Journal,  July  2, 1903.  Reprint  of  the  rules. 
2  Harrison,  The  Survey,  April  20,  1912.  These  figures  are  taken  from 
his  report. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  257 

the  employers.  Of  these  "  15  were  sustained,  34  were  not 
sustained,  32  were  settled  by  mutual  agreement,  32  were 
partly  sustained,  53  were  withdrawn,  9  were  held  to  be 
beyond  the  board's  jurisdiction,  4  resulted  in  a  tie  vote 
with  no  further  action,  and  2  [were]  still  pending.  Of 
the  11  grievances  brought  by  the  employers  2  were  sus- 
tained, 2  were  settled,  6  withdrawn,  and  1  was  decided  to 
be  beyond  the  board's  jurisdiction."  In  these  figures  the 
comparatively  large  number  of  cases  that  were  withdrawn 
or  settled  by  mutual  agreement  is  worthy  of  note.  More- 
over, "  it  is  reliably  estimated  that  from  two  to  three 
times  as  many  cases  have  been  settled  by  the  district 
members  of  the  board  as  have  formally  come  before  the 
whole  body."  The  board  could  not  agree  on  25  cases  and 
they  were  submitted  to  an  umpire. 

C.  Attitude  of  Both  Parties  toward  the  Board 

A.  the  operators'  position 

From  the  attitude  taken  by  the  operators  in  1902  toward 
conciliation  and  arbitration  we  are  justified  in  inferring  that 
they  did  not  look  upon  the  project  with  any  great  favor. 
Strangely  enough  they  are  now  strongly  for  the  board, 
and  they  have  resisted  every  effort  made  by  the  miners 
to  supplement  the  activities  of  the  board  by  arrangements 
which  the  miners  feel  will  facilitate  the  work  of  the  board 
and  come  nearer  to  rendering  justice.  The  operators  have 
found  that  the  system  they  now  have  tends  to  prevent  in- 
terruptions of  work,  brings  the  men  back  to  work  when 
a  local  strike  occurs,  and  protects  them  from  extravagant 
and  impossible  demands.  The  services  of  the  union  lead- 
ers have  been  very  welcome  in  settling  disputes  in  in- 
stances where  the  men  were  unorganized  and  in  cases 
where  a  spontaneous  strike  has  occurred  in  protest  against 
abuses.  A  service  of  this  kind  was  rendered  in  August, 
1911,  when  13,000  employees  of  the  Pennsylvania  Coal 


258      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Company  (mostly  Italians)  went  on  a  strike.  It  is  said  that 
the  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World  stirred  the  men  to 
action,  but  the  union  leaders  went  among  them,  held  meet- 
ings, and  explained  to  them  the  necessity  of  formulating 
their  demands  before  they  could  get  them  before  the  arbi- 
tration board.  Out  of  the  sixty  grievances  formulated  all 
but  two  were  settled  by^  the  district  representatives  of  the 
board. ^  Among  these  13,000  there  were  not  100  union 
men,  yet  it  is  said  there  is  some  restlessness  among  the 
operators  because  "  the  unions  do  not  in  all  cases  hold  the 
men  in  line,  pending  the  settlement  of  grievances,  but  this 
is  doubtless  regarded  as  a  lesser  evil  than  a  super-power- 
ful union."  2  The  mine  officials  recognize  that  a  settlement 
of  disputes  must  be  on  a  broader  basis  than  in  the  days 
of  purely  individual  bargaining.  Some  of  them  take  pride 
in  not  having  any  grievances  before  the  board,  and  others 
are  learning  that  it  hurts  their  standing  with  corporation 
officials  if  they  have  to  be  called  before  the  board  often 
to  answer  complaints  of  their  men.  In  answer  to  the  min- 
ers' demands  in  1912  that  "  a  more  convenient  and  uni- 
form system  of  adjusting  local  grievances  within  a  reason- 
able time  limit "  be  granted,  the  operators  replied  that 
"  of  all  the  arrangements  effected  by  the  Strike  Commis- 
sion, none  has  worked  out  better  results  than  the  concilia- 
tion board."  ^  They  maintained  further  that  it  furnished 
a  means  of  "prompt  and  free  adjustment";  that  its  deci- 
sions were  rendered  more  promptly  than  those  of  civil 
courts  and  were  retroactive ;  and  that  the  eases  coming 
before  it  had  steadily  diminished  from  107  cases  in  1907 
to  5  in  1911. 

B.    THE    miners'  POSITION 

In  reply  to  this  praise  of  the  board  the  miners  declared 
flatly  that  as  a  method  of  adjusting  grievances  it  was  very 
unsatisfactory. 

^  Harrison,  ap.  cit.,-p.  145.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  145. 

8  Negotiations  of  Anthracite  Operators  and  Anthracite  Miners,  1912,  p.  5. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  259 

You  lay  stress  upon  the  fact  that  the  number  of  complaints 
submitted  to  the  board  has  steadily  diminished.  .  .  .  Instead 
of  this  proving  its  value,  it  strikingly  illustrates  its  failure  as 
a  practical  working  method  for  the  adjustment  of  disputes.  In 
1903  the  miners  hoped  it  would  prove  to  be  of  real  value,  so 
they  submitted  thereto  their  grievances.  They  soon  discovered 
that  they  were  wrong.  The  red  tape  and  technicalities  incident 
to  the  handling  and  consideration  of  disputes  make  it  impracti- 
cal. This  accounts  for  the  decrease.  The  number  of  grievances 
among  the  men  have  increased  rather  than  decreased,  but  they 
suffer  under  these  wrongs  rather  than  submit  them  to  the  board. 
It  is  not  a  working  arrangement ;  it  exists  in  name  only. 

There  are  several  circumstances  which  should  be  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  this  strong  position  which  the 
miners  have  taken.  Upon  the  miners'  organization  rests 
the  responsibility  for  keeping  strikes  in  check  and  yet 
their  organization  receives  no  recognition  by  the  opera- 
tors. The  employers  treat  with  men  who  are  known  sim- 
ply as  representatives  of  the  employees  of  the  anthracite 
region.  Moreover,  the  whole  plan  of  conciliation  and  arbi- 
tration is  predicated  upon  effective  organization  which  will 
enable  the  enforcement  of  agreements.  The  union  bears 
one  half  of  the  expense  of  the  board,  although  only  29,225 
out  of  170,000  employees  were  paid-up  members  of  the  or- 
ganization in  1912.  The  great  mass  of  the  workers  appre- 
ciate the  benefits  of  organization  when  a  new  agreement  is 
to  be  negotiated  and  they  lay  off  to  a  man.  But  the  spirit 
of  tax-dodging  exists  here  as  elsewhere,  and  it  is  only  by 
the  introduction  of  proper  administrative  machinery  that 
taxes  can  be  collected  and  agreements  and  contracts  en- 
forced after  they  are  made.  The  non-union  man  gets  the 
benefit  of  general  betterment  of  conditions  without  con- 
tributing anything  to  maintain  them. 

Again,  the  individual  worker  is  at  a  disadvantage  in 
dealing  with  the  mine  officials.  The  board  up  to  1912 
received  complaints  only  from  "  interested  "  persons,  and 


2G0     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

without  a  pit  committee  backed  by  the  entire  organization 
the  worker  is  on  the  basis  of  iudividiuil  bargaining  when 
it  comes  to  performing  the  various  classes  of  work  which 
the  changing  conditions  in  the  mines  are  constantly  requir- 
ing. In  such  cases  he  must  accept  whatever  the  official 
imposes  upon  him  or  quit,  and  his  financial  condition  is 
generally  too  precarious  to  warrant  his  surrendering  his 
job  lightly.  These  conditions  were  further  supplemented 
by  the  absolute  right  of  discharge  which  was  rendered  in 
a  decision  of  Arbiter  Wright,  and  this  right  was  easily 
used  to  root  out  the  men  who  dared  to  express  their  griev- 
ances. The  organizers  or  board  members  could  not  go  to 
a  mine  to  protect  a  union  man  from  retaliation,  and  the 
whole  situation  militated  against  organized  labor  and  made 
membership  a  very  questionable  proposition  to  the  average 
worker. 

Also  the  miners  were  not  satisfied  with  the  powers  dele- 
gated to  the  board  for  dealing  with  vital  questions,  nor  the 
scope  over  which  it  might  extend  those  powers.  In  the 
first  place,  the  award  of  the  commission  has  been  set  up 
as  a  sort  of  constitution  which  will  bear  interpretation  but 
not  radical  revision.  For  example,  in  the  matter  of  wages 
they  are  still  founded  on  custom  and  the  reported  wage 
schedules  of  the  operators  to  the  commission.  The  com- 
mission did  not  attempt  to  formulate  a  wage  schedule  clas- 
sified on  the  basis  of  varying  conditions  and  the  nature 
of  the  work  done,  but  contented  itself  merely  by  add- 
ing on  ten  per  cent  to  the  existing  schedules.  Cases  have 
arisen  where  the  employers  claimed  that  they  were  not 
parties  in  the  disputes  submitted  to  the  commission  and 
did  not  promise  to  abide  by  the  award.  The  board  decided 
that  disputes  with  such  parties  had  no  standing  before  the 
board. 

Again,  Mr.  Wright  as  umpire  said  that  "the  anthracite 
commission  did  not  undertake  to  deal  with  the  character 
of  the  work  performed,  this  being  left  to  adjustment  in 


IN  THE  ANTHILVCITE  FIELD  261 

each  colliery  in  accordance  with  the  prevailing  conditions." 
Where  satisfactory  adjustments  have  not  been  made  in 
the  collieries,  the  complainants  have  carried  their  griev- 
ances to  the  board  only  to  find  that  the  board  claimed  to 
have  no  jurisdiction.  These  are  some  of  the  conditions 
which  prompted  the  miners  to  call  the  board  an  ineffective 
instrument  in  dealing  with  the  real  problems  of  concilia- 
tion and  in  keeping  pace  with  changing  conditions. 

9.    THE  NEGOTIATIONS  OF  1912 

A.  Peeliminaet  Negotiations  in  1906  and  1909 

In  1906  the  miners  signed  an  agreement  to  continue 
under  the  award  of  1903,  with  the  feeling  that,  if  they 
had  accomplished  nothing  more,  they  had  at  least  got  the 
operators  to  do  a  little  negotiating.  The  miners  hoped  that 
by  1909  the  operators  would  be  ready  to  meet  them  frankly 
in  joint  conference  and  discuss  the  real  conditions  of  the 
industry.  But  again,  in  1909,  they  got  no  further  than 
signing  an  agreement  to  work  under  the  award  of  1903 
till  1912,  and  adding  a  few  clauses  providing  that  pay- 
ment for  new  work  should  not  be  less  than  the  rates  paid 
under  the  award;  that  the  arrangements  and  decisions  of 
the  conciliation  board  permitting  of  dues  on  company 
property  should  continue ;  and  that  an  employee  dis- 
charo^ed  for  beins:  a  unionist  should  have  the  ric;ht  of 
appeal  to  the  board  for  final  adjustment.^ 

B.   The  Miners'  Demands 

On  November  8,  1911,  the  Tri-District  Convention  of 
the  anthracite  miners  met  and  formulated  the  following 
demands.  The  most  important  was  the  demand  for  recog- 
nition of  the  United  Mine  Workers  as  a  party  in  nego- 
tiating a  wage  contract  for  one  year,  with  the  right  to 
provide  a  suitable  method  for  collecting  revenue  for  the 
*  Report  of  Htcretary  of  Internal  Affairs  of  Pennsylvania,  1909,  p.  277. 


2C2     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

organization.  An  advance  of  twenty  per  cent  in  wages,  an 
eight-hour  working  day,  and  a  better  system  of  adjusting 
local  grievances  were  next  in  importance.  It  was  further 
demanded  "  that  the  rights  of  checkweighmen  and  check- 
docking  bosses  shall  be  recognized  ;  that  they  shall  not  be 
interfered  with  in  the  proper  performance  of  their  work ; 
that  all  coal  shall  be  mined  and  paid  for  by  the  ton  of 
2240  pounds  wherever  practicable  " ;  and  that  the  system 
of  allowing  contract  miners  to  have  more  than  one  work- 
ing place  and  employing  more  than  two  laborers  should 
be  abolished. 

C.   The  Joint  Confeeence 

A.     THE    operators'    REPLY 

These  demands  were  presented  to  the  operators  Febru- 
ary 27,  at  a  joint  conference  which  was  adjourned  till 
March  13, 1912,  to  give  the  operators  a  chance  to  consider 
them.  On  the  latter  date  the  conference  met  and  the  oper- 
ators presented  a  written  statement  in  reply  to  the  de- 
mands. Harking  back  to  the  award  of  the  commission, 
they  reminded  the  miners  that  "  the  award  they  rendered 
stands  recognized  as  the  most  just  and  sound  solution  of 
labor  difficulties  ever  secured  in  the  country.  ...  It  should 
be  conclusive  as  to  all  facts  and  issues  which  it  covered 
and  these  have  not  since  been  changed."  All  the  old  argu- 
ments against  recognition  of  the  union  were  advanced,  and 
the  operators  concluded  that  the  demand  for  "  check-off  " 
for  collecting  dues  would  lead  to  the  "  closed  shop."  They 
also  called  to  mind  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  grant 
this  because  there  was  a  state  statute  requiring  that  the 
full  amount  of  wages  be  paid  in  cash.^  In  response  to  the 
request  to  establish  equal  opportunity  among  contract 
miners  they  refused  "  to  limit  the  ability  and  ambition  of 
industrious  men  by  arbitrarily  agreeing  to  restrict  their 
^  This  law  had  been  aimed  at  the  company  store. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD  263 

opportunities  to  earn  increased  remuneration."  Further- 
more, they  disclaimed  any  interference  with  checkweigh- 
men  and  check-docking  bosses.  For  them  to  grant  the 
eight-hour  day  would  be  seriously  to  curtail  production, 
and  to  concede  an  advance  of  twenty  per  cent  was  not  to 
be  thought  of  because,  by  the  ten  per  cent  advances  of 
1900  and  1902  and  the  4.6  per  cent  increase  as  the  result 
of  the  sliding  scale,  the  miners  had  received  a  total  ad- 
vance of  24,6  per  cent.  Since  the  sliding  scale  went  into 
effect  the  miners  had  received  a  total  bonus  of  $30,000,000. 
If  the  twenty  per  cent  increase  were  granted,  it  would 
mean  an  increase  in  wages  of  $28,000,000,  annually,  which 
would  have  to  be  borne  by  the  domestic  sizes  of  coal  and 
would  increase  the  price  of  coal  sixty-seven  cents  per  ton. 
The  estimate  was  "  based  upon  the  cost  sheets  of  a  num- 
ber of  collieries  in  all  three  regions."  Furthermore,  coal 
was  being  produced  at  an  increasing  cost,  and  since  the 
cost  of  fuel  was  "  such  an  important  element"  to  individ- 
ual and  industrial  consumers  it  would  not  be  fair  to  ad- 
vance the  cost  of  mining  and  thus  advance  the  price  of 
coal.  The  operators  hoped  that  the  prosperity  which  had 
80  long  obtained  in  the  industry  would  not  "  be  arbitrarily 
and  unnecessarily  disturbed."  If  it  were,  the  responsibility 
would  be  with  the  miners.^ 

B.    THE   miners'    REBUTTAL 

After  the  statement  of  the  operators  was  read  the 
miners  were  informed  that  it  was  final,  and  the  confer- 
ence adjourned  for  two  days,  when  the  miners  made  the 
following  reply.  They  regretted  the  "  positive  position  " 
the  operators  had  taken  and  had  hoped  that  they  would 
recognize  the  change  in  conditions  that  had  taken  place 
since  the  commission  made  its  award.  Further,  the  com- 
mission had  not  intended  that  the  award  should  "con- 
tinue in  effect  for  all  time."  Also,  the  increased  cost  of 

^  Negotiations  of  Anthracite  Operators  and  Anthracite  Miners,  1912,  p.  9. 


2G1     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

living  had  reduced  the  purchasing  power  of  wages,  and 
in  the  matter  of  working  hours  there  was  no  reason  why 
the  anthracite  miner  should  have  to  work  longer  hours 
than  the  bituminous  miner.  Unless  the  union  were  recog- 
nized, they  were  thoroughly  convinced  that  they  could  not 
"  protect  their  interests  "  under  the  terms  of  any  con- 
tract. They  thought  their  demands  were  worthy  of  the 
most  serious  consideration,  and  felt  that  the  answer  to 
them  should  have  "  at  least  permitted  the  fullest  and 
freest  discussion."  They  had  renewed  the  award  twice  in 
nine  years  and  had  complied  with  its  provisions,  and  felt 
that  "  as  public-spirited  citizens  "  they  had  done  their 
full  duty.  Since  the  operators  had  enjoyed  "unprec- 
edented prosperity"  during  this  time,  a  "discriminating 
public"  would  be  able  to  place  the  responsibility  for  the 
failure  to  reach  an  agreement  in  the  light  of  the  present 
conditions.^ 

This  reply  seems  rather  tame,  but  the  miners  felt  that 
it  was  useless  "  to  submit  their  testimony  to  a  jury  that 
had  already  rendered  a  verdict."  With  the  adjournment 
of  the  conference  both  parties  issued  statements  to  the 
public  in  order  to  win  support  if  trouble  arose.  An  auto- 
matic suspension  of  work  took  place  April  1  with  the 
expiration  of  the  contract,  and  approximately  170,000 
employees  ceased  work.  The  miners  requested  another 
meeting,  and  the  conference  met  in  Philadelphia,  April 
10.  At  this  meeting  the  miners  were  most  aggressive  in 
their  statements.  In  regard  to  the  finality  of  the  com- 
mission's award,  the  miners  frankly  stated  that  there 
could  be  no  genuine  and  lasting  peace  until  the  operators 
recognized  the  miners'  organization  and  entered  into  a 
direct  joint  agreement.  Following  this  came  their  flat 
statement  regarding  the  conciliation  board  quoted  on 
page  259.  They  then  analyzed  the  130,000,000  bonus  paid 

^  Negotiations  of  Anthracite  Operators  and  Anthracite  Miners,  1912, 
p.  11. 


m  THE  ANTHEACITE  FIELD  265 

in  the  nine  years,  and  showed  that  it  averaged  but  $17.60 
per  year  for  each  employee.  At  the  same  time  the  miners 
were  getting  this  munificent  sum,  the  operators  were  get- 
ting prices  that  ranged  as  high  as  forty  cents  per  ton 
above  the  basis  price  of  i4.50.  They  felt  justified  in  con- 
cluding that  the  operators  were  making  a  good  profit  at 
$4.50,  at  which  point  the  miners  got  nothing.  Added  to 
this  was  the  increased  profit  that  had  come  whenever  any 
of  the  600,000,000  tons  (mined  during  the  nine  years) 
had  sold  above  the  basis  price.  The  operators  offered  to 
submit  the  issues  to  the  strike  commission,  but  the  miners 
wanted  "  no  more  of  the  Anthracite  Strike  Commission 
or  its  award."  The  demands  were  then  submitted  to  a 
joint  subcommittee  of  four  members  on  each  side. 

C.  THE  AGREEMENT 

This  subcommittee  continued  its  sessions  until  April  24 
and  brought  forth  the  following  agreement :  The  agree- 
ment was  to  extend  four  years,  ending  March  31, 1916. 
This  will  bring  the  contracts  to  an  end  simultaneously  in 
the  bituminous  and  anthracite  fields.  Contract  rates  and 
wage  scales  for  all  employees  were  increased  ten  per  cent, 
and  the  sliding  scale  was  abolished.  It  was  agreed  that 
there  should  be  an  equitable  division  of  mine  cars,  and 
contract  miners  should  elect  checkweighmeu  and  check- 
docking  bosses  in  formal  meeting.  The  mine  foreman 
should  be  informed  of  the  results  of  that  election.  At 
each  mine  should  be  a  grievance  committee  of  not  more 
than  three  persons.  This  committee,  it  was  agreed,  should 
settle  grievances  with  the  mine  officials  and  it  should  be 
allowed  the  services  of  the  district  member  of  the  board 
of  conciliation  "  elected  by  the  Mine  Workers'  Associa- 
tion." In  case  of  failure  to  agree,  the  dispute  should  go 
before  the  miners'  and  operators'  district  representatives 
of  the  conciliation  board.  If  they  failed  to  agree,  the  case 
should  go  before  the  board.  As  an  aid  in  carrying  into 


260     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

effect  the  ten  per  cent  increase  and  "  facilitating  the  ad- 
justment of  grievances,  company  officials  at  each  mine 
shall  meet  with  the  grievance  committee  of  employees  and 
prepare  a  statement  setting  forth  the  rates  of  compensa- 
tion paid  for  each  item  of  work  April  1,  1902,  together 
with  the  rates  paid  under  the  provisions  of  the  agreement, 
and  certify  the  same  to  the  Board  of  Conciliation  within 
sixty  days  after  the  date  of  this  agreement."  ^ 

The  miners  are  well  pleased  with  the  new  features  for 
settling  disputes,  but  they  regard  the  system  as  incomplete 
until  the  organization  is  recognized  and  they  are  per- 
mitted to  use  the  "check-off."  On  the  other  hand,  the 
operators  look  upon  the  check-off  as  preliminary  to  the 
"  closed  shop,"  a  huge  fund  in  the  union  treasury,  and 
future  encroachments.  They  are  afraid  of  the  ignorant, 
heterogeneous  masses  and  the  great  danger  to  the  trade 
if  " '  this  heterogeneous  mass  were  to  secure  a  strength 
that  would  come  with  a  larger  membership  and  treasury.' 
On  this  point  the  answer  of  the  mine  workers'  leaders  is 
clearly  put :  that  conservatism  comes  with  strength  ;  that 
experience  in  organization  is  the  surest  safeguard  against 
sporadic  action  on  the  part  of  massed  men ;  and  that  the 
insurrection  of  the  12,000  employees  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Company  .  .  .  was  provoked  by  the  speakers  of  an  out- 
side organization  which  stands  for  neither  collective  bar- 
gaining  nor  time  agreements  —  the  Industrial  Workers  of 
the  World."  ^  However,  the  new  features  will  encourage 
the  growth  of  the  union  because  the  men  will  be  made  to 
feel  that  the  organization  is  able  to  do  effective  work  in 
other  ways  than  merely  the  making  of  an  agreement.  The 
miners  also  felt  that  they  had  made  a  good  bargain  in  abol- 
ishing the  sliding  scale  and  obtaining  a  flat  increase  of  10 
per  cent.  Under  the  sliding  scale  the  highest  increase  had 

^  Negotiations  of  the  Anthracite  Operators  and  Anthracite  Miners,  1912, 
p.  29. 

2  Harrison,  op.  cit.,  p.  150. 


IN  THE  ANTHRACITE  FIELD 


267 


been  8  per  cent  and  the  average  was  4.17  per  cent.  Further- 
more, they  had  not  been  satisfied  that  they  were  getting 
all  that  the  sliding  scale  was  supposed  to  guarantee.  The 
statistician  who  figured  the  average  prices  had  told  one 
of  the  leaders  that  to  obtain  the  average  price,  he  took 
the  total  receipts  for  coal  at  tidewater  reported  by  the 
operators  and  divided  it  by  the  total  number  of  tons. 
The  union  leaders  pertinently  asked,  "  What  assurance 
have  we  that  the  operators  reported  all  the  dollars  they 
received  ?  "  ^ 


Comparison  in  percentages  of  total  tuages  to  total  value  of  coal 
at  the  mine  prodticed  in  the  following  years  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Ohio? 


Tear. 

Pennsylvania. 

Anthracite. 

Bituminous. 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

1909 

1911 

57.2 
51.4 
65.7 
61.6 
61.8 
59.3 
59.9 

59.9 
61.1 
71.9 

73.8 
53.2 
68.2 
71.6 

66.1 
67.9 

75.7 
75.5 
72.4 
76.4 
75.9 

The  miners'  contention  that  they  were  not  profiting  by 
the  general  prosperity  of  the  industry  seems  to  be  sup- 
ported by  the  table  above.  When  we  compare  the  per- 
centages of  total  wages  to  the  total  value  of  coal  at  the 
mines,  the  miners  in  the  anthracite  fields  certainly  had 
not  benefited  to  the  same  extent  as  had  the  miners  in  the 
bituminous  fields,  where  collective  bargaining  was  effective. 
This  comparison  is  as  fair  for  one  field  as  for  another  and 
eliminates  the  element  of  monopoly  control.  The  authra- 

'   Negotiations  of  Anthracite  Operators  and  Anthracite  Miners,  1912,  p.  60. 
-  Ohio  was  the  only  ytiito  having  collective  bargainiu^f  in  which  the 
figures  of  total  wages  wore  available  for  comparison  with  Pennsylvania. 


268     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

cite  field  compares  unfavorably  even  with  the  bituminous 
fields  of  Pennsylvania,  a  large  portion  of  which  are  still 
subjected  to  individual  bargaining.  Another  factor  worthy 
of  note  is  the  immediate  drop  in  the  percentages  in  the 
bituminous  fields  with  the  break-up  of  the  joint  confer- 
ence in  1906.  In  Ohio  and  Illinois,  where  the  union  is 
stronger  than  in  the  bituminous  fields  of  Pennsylvania, 
the  percentages  were  held  up  pretty  well.  In  Illinois,  in 
1899,  the  percentage  of  the  total  wages  to  the  total  value 
of  the  coal  at  mine  was  79.4.  In  the  other  years  the  total 
wages  for  Illinois  were  not  obtainable,  but  the  available 
figures  show  that  the  wages  of  the  miners,  exclusive  of  the 
wages  for  day  labor,  ranged  from  46.7  to  61.1  per  cent. 
The  total  wages  would  bring  the  percentage  up  as  high  as 
or  higher  than  the  Ohio  percentages. 

There  seems  good  ground  for  the  hope  that  this  first 
step  in  real  conciliation  in  the  anthracite  field  will  lead  to 
a  better  understanding  between  capital  and  labor  and  to  a 
real  democratization  of  this  important  branch  of  the  coal 
industry.  Time  should  bring  about  a  greater  elaboration 
of  the  system,  and  under  it  both  parties  must  develop  a 
clearer  perception  of  what  is  demanded  by  fairness  to  each 
other  and  by  consideration  for  the  public. 

Before  we  turn  our  attention  to  a  consideration  of  the 
relation  of  this  system  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  to 
the  whole  coal  industry,  the  part  it  has  in  a  constructive 
public  policy,  and  the  developments  that  are  likely  to  take 
place  in  regard  to  legal  enactment  and  political  action  by 
the  unions,  we  may  profitably  consider  the  developments 
that  have  taken  place  in  the  British  coal  industry. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

CONCILIATION    AND    ARBITRATION    IN    THE 
BRITISH  COAL  INDUSTRY 

INTRODUCTION 

If  we  desire  to  profit  by  the  experience  of  others,  we  can- 
not do  better  than  to  turn  to  Great  Britain  from  whence 
sprang  most  of  the  ideas  and  methods  that  have  been 
utilized  in  effective  industrial  adjustments  in  the  mining 
industry  of  this  country.  We  have  adapted  them  to  suit 
our  needs  and  in  some  respects  improved  upon  them,  per- 
haps, but  we  certainly  owe  the  initial  impulse  toward 
practical  adjustment  to  the  British  workers  who  had  been 
trained  in  an  industrial  environment  where  the  folly  of 
strikes  and  the  futility  of  strong-arm  methods  had  been 
learned  by  hard  experience.  Industrial  development,  ho- 
mogeneity of  population,  and  the  growth  of  unity  among 
the  workers  have  brought  developments  in  the  British 
coal  trade  that  we  have  not  as  yet  approached.  A  consid- 
eration of  these  developments  is  full  of  suggestions  for 
the  students  of  American  problems.  They  are  of  interest 
not  merely  as  showing  the  evolution  in  methods  of  volun- 
tary conciliation  and  arbitration,  but  we  see  there  the  im- 
portant part  that  government  has  had  to  take  in  smoothing 
out  the  process  of  obtaining  industrial  democracy.  With 
the  growing  ability  of  the  unions  to  bring  economic  and 
political  pressure,  the  necessity  has  been  shown  for  le- 
gal enactment  and  governmental  interference  and  par- 
ticipation in  the  industrial  struggle.  The  evolution  of 
labor  representation  in  Parliament  to  supplement  the  ef- 
forts made  for  peaceful  adjustment  in  conciliation  boards 


970     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

points  to  a  development  which  we  shall  see  has  made  a 
good  beginning  in  the  United  States.  The  struggle  for  the 
minimum  wage  involving  both  economic  and  political 
pressure  is  suggestive  of  the  situation  we  may  have  to 
meet  in  this  country  if  both  anthracite  and  bituminous 
miners  make  a  united  stand.  The  nationalization  of  mines, 
which  will  be  the  next  big  move  in  the  British  mining  in- 
dustry, has  already  found  influential  advocates  here. 

1.  THE  RISE  OF  THE  MINERS'   UNIONS 
A.  Early  Conditions 

"When  we  remember  that  it  was  not  until  1799  ^  that 
the  Scottish  miners  were  freed  from  a  condition  of  semi- 
serfdom,  we  gain  some  perspective  for  considering  the  full 
import  of  the  remarkable  developments  of  industrial  de- 
mocracy that  have  since  taken  place  in  the  British  coal 
industry.  Moreover,  a  "yearly  bond"  system  kept  the 
miners  of  England  practically  in  a  state  of  peonage  much 
beyond  that  date.  In  spite  of  forceful  measures  taken  to 
maintain  these  conditions  the  industry  was  subject  to  vio- 
lent strikes,  and  in  the  great  strike  of  1810  in  the  north 
of  England  we  first  hear  of  "  an  oath-bound  confederacy 
recruited  by  the  practice  of  '  brothering,'  so  named  be- 
cause the  members  of  the  union  bound  themselves  by  a 
most  solemn  oath  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  brotherhood, 
under  penalty  of  being  stabbed  through  the  heart  or  of 
having  their  bowels  ripped  up."  ^ 

The  turbulence  and  attempts  at  unity  seem  to  have  made 
small  progress  in  competition  with  the  existing  arbitrari- 
ness of  individual  ownership,  the  respect  for  aristocracy, 
and  a  government  controlled  by,  and  solely  for  the  benefit 
of,  the  ruling  classes.   In  1844,  Lord  Londonderry,  "  in 

^  The  act  which  provided  for  gradual  emancipation  was  passed  in  1775. 
See  Jeans,  Conciliation  and  Arbitration,  p.  56. 
2  Webb,  History  of  Trade  Unionism,  p.  79. 


IN   GREAT  BRITAIN  271 

his  dual  capacity  as  mine  owner  and  Lord  Lieutenant  of 
Durham  County,"  was  not  only  able  to  answer  a  demand 
for  better  wages  by  evictions  and  the  replacement  of  the 
strikers  by  Irishmen,  but  "  he  peremptorily  orders  the 
resident  traders  in  '  his  town  of  Seaham,'  on  pain  of  for- 
feiting his  custom  and  protection,  to  refuse  to  supply  pro- 
visions to  the  workmen  engaged  in  what  he  deems  '  an 
unjust  and  senseless  warfare  against  their  proprietors  and 
masters.^ "  ^ 

B.  Formation  of  the  Mesters'  Association  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  1841 

The  county  unions  which  had  grown  up  in  Northumber- 
land, Durham,  Lancashire,  and  Yorkshire  had  entered  into 
a  federation  in  1841  and  employed  a  solicitor  to  represent 
their  organization  in  the  numerous  prosecutions  to  which 
they  were  subjected  under  the  law  of  master  and  servant. 
W.  P.  Roberts,  the  "  miners'  attorney-general "  was  so 
active  on  behalf  of  the  miners  that  he  was  "  soon  retained 
in  all  Trade  Union  cases."  ^ 

*  Webb,  History  of  Trade  Unionism,  p.  150. 

2-  Ibid.,  p.  165. 

The  recital  of  his  experience  as  a  pioneer  advocate  of  the  -workingmen 
before  the  courts  has  a  modern  note  in  it.  "  After  explaining'  the  law, 
as  he  understood  it  (when  writing  to  the  Flint  Glass  Makers'  Friendly  So- 
ciety), he  proceeds  as  follows  :  '  But  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  induce 
those  of  the  class  opposed  to  you  to  take  this  view  of  things.  I  do  not  say 
this  sarcastically,  but  as  a  fact  learned  by  long  and  observant  experience. 
There  are,  indeed,  men  on  the  bench  who  are  honest  enough,  and  desirous 
of  doing  their  duty,  but  all  their  tendencies  and  circumstances  are  against 
you.  They  listen  to  your  opponents,  not  only  often,  but  cheerfully  —  so 
they  know  more  fully  the  case  against  you  than  in  your  favour.  To  you 
they  listen  too  —  but  in  a  sort  of  temper  of  Prisoner  at  the  Bar,  you  are 
entitled  to  make  any  statement  you  think  fit,  and  the  Court  is  bound  to 
hear  you  ;  but  mind,  whatever  you  say,  etc.,  etc.  In  the  one  case  you  ob- 
serve the  hearty  smile  of  good  will ;  in  the  other  the  derisive  sneer,  though 
sometimes  a  ghastly  sort  of  kindliness  in  it.  Then  there  is  the  knowledge 
of  your  overwhelming  power  when  acting  unitedly,  and  this  begets  natu- 
rally a  corresponding  desire  to  resist  you  at  all  hazards.  And  there  are  hun- 
dreds of  other  considerations  all  acting  the  same  way  —  meetings,  political 


272      .VRBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

In  their  national  conference  held  at  Glasgow  in  1844  the 
miners  voted  to  go  on  a  strike.  The  men  demanded  a  six 
months'  engagement  instead  of  a  yearly  "  bond  " ;  five  days' 
work  a  week  with  at  least  three  shillings  per  day ;  a  rec- 
ord of  their  earnings  and  the  deductions  made  therefrom ; 
an  eight-hour  day ;  a  benefit  of  ten  shillings  per  week  in 
case  of  accident;  provision  for  arbitration;  and  "a  week's 
prior  notice  with  the  specification  of  the  charges  to  be 
brought  against  them  in  case  of  being  summoned  before 
the  magistrate."  ^ 

The  Federation  is  said  to  have  had  a  membership  of 
100,000,  and  this  conference  expressed  the  sentiments  of 
70,000.  It  is  little  wonder  that  the  strike  came  to  a  disas- 
trous end  after  several  months  of  fighting  when  we  remem- 
ber that  they  had  to  contend  with  conditions  of  which 
Lord  Londonderry's  treatment  was  representative.  The 
loss  of  this  strike  was  a  large  factor  in  breaking  up  the 
federation,  and  by  1848  it  had  ceased  to  exist. 

C.  The  Miners'  National  Union,  1863 

In  the  next  seven  years  even  local  unions  had  almost 
died  out,  but  in  1856  a  man  came  to  the  front  as  an  ad- 
vocate of  the  miners,  "Alexander  Macdonald,  to  whose 
lifelong  devotion  the  miners  owe  their  present  position  in 
the  Trade  Union  world."  ^  While  working  as  a  miner  he 
prepared  himself  for  Glasgow  University  and  partially 
supported  himself  during  his  residence  at  the  univer- 
sity by  summer  work  in  the  mines.   He  started  a  cam- 

conncils,  intermarriages,  hopes  from  wills,  etc.  I  do  not  say  that  all  occu- 
pants of  the  bench  are  thus  influenced,  nor  to  the  same  extent ;  but  it  cer- 
tainly is  at  the  best  an  uphUJ  game  to  contend  in  favour  of  a  workingman 
in  a  question  which  admits  of  any  doubt  against  him.  It  never  happened 
to  me  to  meet  a  magistrate  who  considered  that  an  agreement  among  mas- 
ters not  to  employ  any  particular  "  troublesome  fellow  "  was  an  unlawful 
act ;  reverse  the  case,  however,  and  it  immediately  becomes  a  formidable 
conspiracy  which  must  be  put  down  by  the  strong  arm  of  the  law.' " 

1  Jeans,  Conciliation  and  Arbitration,  p.  59. 

2  Webb,  op.  cit.,  p.  285. 


IN   GREAT  BRITAIN  273 

paign  for  legal  enactments  to  provide  for  mine  inspec- 
tion, proper  weighing,  restriction  of  the  age  of  child 
workers  in  the  mines  to  twelve  years,  an  eight-hour  day, 
weekly  payment  of  wages,  abolition  of  payment  in  truck, 
and  the  correction  of  various  other  abuses. 

By  an  effective  system  of  correspondence  with  local  pit 
clubs  the  growth  of  district  organizations  was  encouraged, 
and  by  1863  they  were  welded  into  a  Miners'  National 
Union. 

At  a  conference  held  the  same  year  Macdonald  was  able 
to  organize  the  meeting  into  sections  on  law,  grievances, 
and  social  organization,  and  to  secure  the  adoption  of  his 
programme  of  measures  which  were  essential  to  the  better- 
ment of  the  miners' working  and  living  conditions.  "In 
contradistinction  to  the  view  which  would  make  wages 
depend  upon  prices,  the  principle  of  controlling  industry 
in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent  encroachments  on  the  work- 
man's standard  of  maintenance  is  clearly  foreshadowed. 
*  Overtoil,'  says  the  report  [of  the  conference] ,  '  produces 
oversupply  ;  low  prices  and  low  wages  follow  ;  bad  habits 
and  bad  health  follow,  of  course ;  and  then  diminished 
production  and  profits  are  inevitable.  Reduction  of  toil 
and  consequent  improved  bodily  health  increases  produc- 
tion in  the  sense  of  profit;  and  limits  it  so  as  to  avoid 
overstocking ;  better  wages  induce  better  habits  and  econ- 
omy of  working  follows.  .  .  .  The  evil  of  overtoil  and 
oversupply  upon  wages,  and  ujDon  the  labourer,  is  there- 
fore a  fair  subject  of  complaint ;  we  submit,  as  far  as  these 
are  human  by  conventional  arrangements,  [they]  are  a 
fair  and  proper  subject  of  regulation.  Regulation  must  of 
course  be  twofold.  Part  can  be  legislated  for  by  compul- 
sory laws ;  but  the  principle  \_sic'\  must  be  the  subject  of 
voluntary  agreements.' "  ^ 

*  Webb,  op.  cit.,  p.  288.  Quotation  from  report. 


271      ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

A.    REGULATORY    MEASURES 

The  advocacy  of  an  eight-hour  day  was  limited  (for 
the  time)  to  boys,  but  this  demand  immediately  brought 
a  line  of  cleavage  between  Durham  and  Northumberland 
and  the  other  districts.  Durham  and  Northumberland 
wished  to  keep  the  boys  working  ten  hours  and  the  men 
in  two  shifts  of  six  hours  each.  The  first  shift  of  men  went 
to  work  two  hours  before  the  boys,  and  thus  mined  enough 
coal  to  keep  the  boys  busy  loading.  The  second  shift  by 
working  six  hours  brought  the  working  day  of  the  boys 
u])  to  ten  hours.  This  diversity  of  opinion  and  opposition 
within  the  ranks  of  the  miners  was  the  chief  cause  that 
deferred  the  passage  of  an  eight-hour  act  till  1908. 

By  a  series  of  struggles  beginning  in  1859  the  miners 
succeeded  in  getting  permission  to  have  checkweighmen 
at  the  scales  in  a  few  collieries.  But  the  attempt  to  insert 
such  a  provision  in  the  Mines  Regulation  Act  of  1860  was 
severely  contested  in  Parliament,  and,  although  finally  in- 
corporated, it  was  evaded  by  refusing  the  checkweighman 
access  to  the  mouth  of  the  pit  and  hampering  him  in  his 
work  by  fencing  up  the  weights  or  disputing  his  calcula- 
tions. The  Act  of  1860  had  to  be  strengthened  by  the 
Acts  of  1872  and  1889  before  it  was  clearly  established 
that  a  checkweighman  had  a  legal  right  to  keep  a  record 
of  each  man's  work,  and  that  though  elected  by  a  majority 
of  the  miners  all  the  men  had  to  contribute  to  his  salary .^ 

The  leaders  of  the  miners  were  active  with  other  trade 
union  leaders  from  1864  to  1867  in  obtaining  the  Master 
and  Servant  Act  of  the  latter  year.  The  old  master  and 
servant  acts  had  permitted  an  official  armed  with  a  war- 
rant from  a  justice  of  the  peace  to  drag  a  workman  out  of 
his  bed  in  the  middle  of  the  night  and  subject  him  to 
three  months'  imprisonment  if  it  could  be  shown  that  he 

1  Webb,  op.  cit.,  p.  291.  In  the  Americau  antliracite  field  this  expense 
has  to  be  met  by  the  contract  miners. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  275 

had  broken  his  contract  of  service  or  absented  himself 
from  his  work  without  leave  from  his  employer.  Nor  could 
the  worker  testif}'^  in  his  own  favor,  or  pay  a  fine  in  lieu 
of  imprisonment.  The  justice  of  the  peace  was  often  an 
employer  of  labor  and  in  full  sympathy  with  harsh  pro- 
cedure. No  matter  how  arbitrary  his  decision,  the  workman 
was  allowed  no  appeal.  The  extent  of  the  abuses  under 
this  law  was  finally  realized  when  it  was  discovered  that 
"  10,339  cases  of  breach  of  contract  of  service  came  be- 
fore the  courts  in  a  single  year."  ^  The  Act  of  1867  rem- 
edied the  worst  features  of  the  old  laws,  and  the  Webbs 
regard  it  as  "  the  first  positive  success  of  the  Trade  Unions 
in  the  legislative  field,"  and  believe  that  it  "  did  much  to 
increase  their  confidence  in  parliamentary  agitation."  But 
it  was  not  until  the  passage  of  the  Employers'  and  Work- 
men's Act  of  1875  that  imprisonment  for  breach  of  con- 
tract was  finally  abolished  and  the  unions  given  legal  recog- 
nition. 

D.  Formation  of  the  Miners'  Federation  of 
Great  Britain,  1889 

Another  fact,  besides  the  disagreement  about  legal  regu- 
lation of  hours  of  labor,  that  caused  further  dissension  in 
the  ranks  of  the  miners  during  the  later  sixties  and  the 
seventies,  was  a  divergence  of  opinion  over  the  use  of 
the  sliding  scale.  Durham  and  Northumberland  favored  the 
sliding  scale  and  the  attending  dependence  of  wages  on 
prices.  But  in  the  Midland  counties  there  grew  up  a  feel- 
ing that  the  miner,  who  had  no  control  over  prices  and 
competition,  ought  not  to  bear  the  brunt  of  depression 
brought  on  by  the  mismanagement  of  the  owners.  The 
Midland  unions  either  abolished  the  sliding  scale  or  in- 
sisted that  it  be  accompanied  by  a  minimum  below  which 
wages  should  not  fall.  Furthermore,  they  were  ready  to 
supplement  this  action  by  the  regulation  of  production. 
1  Webb,  op.  cit.,  p.  235. 


276     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

During  the  early  and  middle  eighties  the  contests  in  miners' 
conferences  and  in  Parliament  grew  more  bitter,  until  in 
1889  the  climax  was  reached  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  Mid- 
land associations  and  their  organization  into  the  Miners' 
Federation  of  Great  Britain.  While  the  National  Union 
gradually  fell  off  in  membership  until  it  included  merely 
Durham  and  Northumberland,  the  Federation  grew  until 
it  took  in  all  the  federations  and  associations  in  the  other 
counties  of  England,  North  and  South  Wales,  and  Scot- 
land. In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Durham  and  Northum- 
berland kept  persistently  by  themselves,  they  responded 
to  invitations  to  special  conferences  which  affected  the 
industry  as  a  whole.  Finally,  in  1908-09,  we  find  them 
both  in  the  Federation  and  presenting  a  united  front  with 
the  other  fields  in  obtaining  and  enforcing  the  Eight-Hour 
Act  of  1908.  In  the  annual  conference  of  the  Federation 
in  1911,  a  membership  of  608,200  was  represented  and 
stood  united  in  their  determination  to  secure  a  minimum 
■wage.^ 

The  Federation  leaves  local  and  district  matters  under 
the  control  of  local  and  district  organizations.  The  dis- 
tricts, which  are  also  a  federation  of  smaller  units,  are 
held  responsible  for  the  financial  support  of  the  Federa- 
tion, and  these  unite  in  lending  moral  support  and  ma- 
terial aid  in  all  matters  which  are  of  national  importance 
to  the  industry.  But  the  federation  of  federated  districts 
would  not  present  a  strong  industrial  unity  equal  to  the 
solidarity  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  were 
it  not  for  the  homogeneity  within  the  British  industry  and 
the  hard  lessons  that  the  various  district  federations  learned 
of  the  futility  of  independent  sectional  fighting.  Although 
these  two  factors  of  homogeneity  and  experience  are  strong 
in  their  welding  force,  yet  the  federation  of  federations 
would  easily  permit  of  independent  action  and  withdrawal 

^  Report  of  Annual  Conference  of  the  Miners^  Federation  of  Great  Britain, 
1911,  p.  182. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  277 

with  the  rise  of  factional  strife.  From  the  standpoint  of 
enabling  the  organization  to  keep  a  heterogeneous  mem- 
bership loyal  and  to  deal  with  complex  conditions  such  as 
we  have  in  this  country,  the  United  Mine  Workers  would 
seem  to  be  superior. 

2.    METHODS  OF  INDUSTRIAL  ADJUSTMENT 
A.   Aebitration 

The  period  from  the  early  forties  to  the  early  seventies 
was  one  of  evolution  in  the  acceptance  of  trade  unions,  the 
formation  of  employers'  associations  to  meet  their  grow- 
ing power,  and  the  development  of  irregular  negotiations 
carried  on  largely  by  means  of  strikes.  These  negotiations 
finally  led  to  formal  arbitration  proceedings.  The  current 
ideas  that  lay  in  the  background  of  arbitration  proceed- 
ings, and  probably  constituted  a  large  element  among  the 
causes  which  led  later  to  a  more  satisfactory  method  of 
adjustment,  are  illustrated  by  a  Northumberland  arbitra- 
tion case  of  1875. 

The  case  was  argued  by  means  of  written  statements 
which  were  discussed  by  the  representatives  of  both  par- 
ties in  the  presence  of  the  arbitrator.  On  the  submission 
of  the  case  to  the  arbitrator  each  party  was  allowed  to  file 
written  statements  to  strengthen  its  side,  but  was  not  per- 
mitted to  introduce  new  evidence.  Accountants  submitted 
information  reduced  to  percentages,  drawn  from  the  books 
of  the  operators.  The  labor  costs  and  selling  prices  of  1871 
were  accepted  as  a  basis  of  comparison  to  decide  whether 
the  operators'  demand  for  a  reduction  of  twenty  per  cent 
was  justifiable. 

The  miners  pointed  out  that  the  operators  wanted  them 
to  bear  the  full  effects  of  adverse  conditions  in  assuming 
that  profits  were  fair  in  1871  and  that  the  price  of  coal 
had  to  rise  "  in  exactly  the  same  ratio  with  wages  in  order 
that  the  profits  of  coal  owners  may  remain  the  same  "  ; 


278     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

and,  further,  "  it  is  also  assumed  that  the  great  increased 
percentage,  mentioned  in  the  owners'  case,  has  been  paid 
in  the  shape  of  increased  wages." 

The  umpire  in  his  decision  set  forth  factors  which  had 
increased  the  cost  of  production,  such  as  the  increase 
of  fifty  per  cent  in  wages  between  1871  and  1875,  the 
shortening  of  hours  without  proportionate  increase  in  the 
per  hour  output,  and  certain  requirements  of  the  Mines 
Regulation  Act  of  1872  which  interfered  with  economical 
production.  But  the  umpire  thought  that  the  chief  reason 
why  wages  should  be  reduced  lay  in  the  fact  that  the 
number  of  men  in  the  industry  had  increased,  and  he  gives 
us  an  interesting  sidelight  on  the  influence  of  the  wages 
fund  doctrine.  Where  there  had  been  formerly  ten  men 
there  were  in  1875  fourteen  men,  and  therefore  from  "  the 
total  wages  fund  "  each  man  could  only  expect  one  four- 
teenth instead  of  one  tenth.  And  he  concludes  "  that  the 
restoration  of  economy  in  production  cannot  be  brought 
about  by  abating  the  rate  of  wages  only,  or  indeed, 
mainly,  but  must  be  accomplished  by  reducing  the  num- 
ber of  men."  The  men  were  awarded  a  reduction  which 
varied  from  ten  to  twelve  and  a  half  per  cent.^ 

B.    The  Era  of  Sliding  Scales 

It  was  not  long  before  both  parties  found  themselves 
dissatisfied  with  arbitration  and  looked  upon  it  only  as  a 
measure  of  last  resort.  With  the  acceptance  by  both  par- 
ties of  the  principle  that  wages  should  be  determined  by 
prices,  the  sliding  scale  was  utilized  to  accomplish  this  end. 
The  sliding  scale  was  first  introduced  in  the  South  Staf- 
fordshii-e  field  in  1874,  and  by  1880  had  spread  to  most 
of  the  other  fields.  The  question  of  a  proper  basis  and  the 
ratio  of  increase  and  decrease  in  wages  according  to  the 
rise  and  fall  in  prices  occasioned  many  revisions  and  nu- 

^  Miners'  National  Record,  vol.  1,  no.  7,  pp.  107-09.  Reprint  of  the 
Northumberland  proceedings. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  279 

merous  resorts  to  arbitration.  The  demand  for  changes 
came  from  both  parties.  Another  factor  which  caused 
much  dissatisfaction  was  the  failure  in  most  instances  to 
incorporate  a  minimum  in  the  scales.  Again,  the  slow- 
ness in  response  of  wages  to  changes  in  prices  was  an 
aggravation  to  both  parties,  according  to  whether  or  not 
it  was  a  period  of  depression  or  prosperity. 

With  the  rise  of  the  Miners'  Federation  in  1888-89, 
the  principle  of  a  living  or  minimum  wage  found  advo- 
cates, and  the  demand  was  advanced  that  wages  should 
be  considered  a  first  charge  on  the  industry .^  Nor  did 
the  advocates  of  these  policies  see  any  reason  why  prices 
should  not  be  adjusted  to  wages  instead  of  wages  follow- 
ing prices.  The  Federation  rapidly  gained  a  following  for 
its  new  doctrine,  and  by  1893  the  sliding  scale  remained 
in  operation  only  in  South  Wales,  South  Staffordshire, 
and  the  Forest  of  Dean.^ 

C.    The  Big  Strikes  of  the  Nineties 

Following  the  abandonment  of  the  sliding  scale,  there 
took  place  a  series  of  struggles  which  were  to  inaugurate 
a  new  era  in  the  British  coal  industry.  The  strike  in  the 
Midland  counties  in  1890,  which  involved  151  collieries 
and  107,484  mine  workers,  was  the  largest  ever  recorded 
in  the  United  Kingdom  up  to  that  time.^  It  brought  the 
men  an  advance  of  five  per  cent  instead  of  the  ten  per  cent 
they  had  asked  for.  In  1892  the  Federation  of  Durham 
County  was  involved  in  a  strike  to  resist  a  reduction  of 
ten  per  cent.  It  affected  150  mining  establishments  and 
75,000  mine  workers,  and  was  finally  settled,  through  the 
mediation  of  the  Bishop  of  Durham,  by  the  acceptance  of 
the  reduction  and  an  agreement  to  submit  future  disputes 
to  a  conciliation  committee. 

1  Ashley,  The  Adjustment  of  Wages,  p.  40.         ^  'Webb,  op.  cit.,  p.  486. 
^  Special  Report  of  Commission  of  Labor,  Coal  Mine  Labor  in  Europe, 
1905,  p.  476. 


280     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

A.    THE    STRIKE   OF    1893 

The  next  year  was  the  most  momentous  which  had  been 
known  in  the  British  coal  industry.  There  were  139  strikes 
and  lockouts  involving  503,061  mine  workers.^  Of  these 
the  strike  of  the  Miners'  Federation,  involving  1500  es- 
tablishments and  300,000  men,  occupied  the  center  of  the 
stasre.  This  strike  was  called  to  resist  a  demand  for  a 
twenty-five  per  cent  reduction  in  wages  and  lasted  from 
July  28  to  November  17. 

Between  1888  and  1893  the  miners  had  succeeded  in 
advancing  their  wages  forty  per  cent,  and  the  owners 
claimed  that  they  must  now  reduce  wages  to  be  able  to 
compete  with  the  other  districts  in  which  the  men  had  ac- 
cepted reductions.  At  a  joint  conference  the  union  leaders 
stuck  to  their  principle  of  a  living  wage  and  denied  that 
their  present  wage  allowed  any  margin  for  reduction. 
Their  request  for  a  month's  time  to  put  the  owners'  de- 
mands before  the  men  and  return  an  answer  was  met  by 
a  refusal  and  by  the  posting  of  notices  which  terminated 
contracts  within  a  month.  The  men  had  refused  to  accept 
arbitration,  but  they  concluded  from  this  action  that  the 
owners  were  bent  upon  forcing  a  reduction  in  violation  of 
the  terms  of  the  last  agreement,  which  had  provided  that 
"  before  any  public  action  is  taken  with  respect  to  notices 
the  men's  case  shall  be  laid  before  a  committee  of  the  col- 
liery owners  .  .  .  and  that  the  results  be  made  known  to 
the  workmen." 

During  August  negotiations  continued,  but  with  no 
results  other  than  a  referendum  vote  (September  1)  on 
the  question  of  the  acceptance  of  the  twenty-five  per  cent 
reduction,  the  owners'  offer  to  arbitrate,  and  the  resump- 
tion of  work  by  those  who  could  do  so  at  the  old  rate  of 
wages.  There  was  practically  a  unanimous  vote  against  the 

^  Special  Report  of  Commission  of  Labor,  Coal  Mine  Labor  in  Europe^ 
1905,  p.  482. 


IN   GREAT  BRITAIN  281 

first  two  propositions  and  a  majority  o£  30,750  against 
the  last.  The  great  demand  for  coal  by  October  2  prompted 
the  mayors  of  six  cities  to  arrange  a  joint  conference 
which  was  attended  by  both  parties.  The  mayors'  propo- 
sition that  the  men  be  allowed  to  return  to  work  at  the 
old  wages,  but  submit  to  a  reduction  of  ten  per  cent  six 
weeks  later,  was  acceptable  to  neither  party. 

By  October  25  the  owners  expi-essed  their  willingness 
to  meet  the  miners  "to  discuss  the  whole  question,  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  position  of  either  party."  Accordingly 
at  a  meeting  on  November  3  and  4,  the  owners  advanced 
the  offer  to  form  a  board  of  conciliation  to  settle  the  whole 
question  of  reductions  and  to  start  the  mines  at  once. 
While  their  offer  was  being  submitted  to  the  miners,  Mr. 
Gladstone  invited  both  parties  to  a  joint  meeting  under 
the  chairmanship  of  Lord  Rosebery,  who  was  to  act  as  an 
adviser  and  not  as  an  umpire  or  arbiter.  This  invitation 
was  promptly  accepted,  and  on  November  17  a  conference 
of  a  few  hours  resulted  in  the  following  agreement :  (1) 
A  board  of  conciliation  to  consist  of  fourteen  representa- 
tives of  each  side  should,  before  the  first  meeting,  elect  a 
chairman,  who  should  have  a  casting  vote.  If  they  could 
not  agree  on  a  chairman,  he  should  be  appointed  by 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  board  should 
meet  on  December  13,  1893,  and  should  have  the  power 
to  determine  the  rate  of  wages,  beginning  with  February 
1,  1894.  (2)  In  the  mean  time  the  men  should  resume 
work  at  once  and  continue  at  the  old  rate  of  wages  until 
February  1, 1894.  All  collieries  shoidd  be  opened  and  "  no 
impediment  be  placed  in  the  way  of  a  return  of  the  men 
to  work." 

The  Speaker  had  to  appoint  a  chairman.  The  prelimi- 
nary meetings  brought  forth  nothing  other  than  the  refusal 
of  the  chairman  to  allow  the  incorporation  of  a  provision 
for  a  minimum  wage  in  the  constitution  of  the  board,  and 
no  action  was  taken  on  the  proposal  to  reduce  wages.   lu 


2S^     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

July,  1894,  the  board  came  to  an  agreement  which  re- 
duced wages  ten  per  cent  until  January  1,  1896,  estab- 
lished a  niiuimum  of  thirty  per  cent,  and  a  maximum  of 
forty-five  per  cent,  above  the  rates  of  1888,  and  gave  the 
board  the  privilege  of  establishing  wages  within  these 
limits  from  January  1,  1896,  to  August  1,  1896.^ 

In  1894  the  Scotch  miners  were  engaged  in  a  struggle 
which  involved  500  establishments  and  70,000  employees, 
while  a  strike  in  South  AVales  in  1898  involved  100,000 
men.  All  of  these  struggles  arose  through  disputes  over 
wages.  Three  were  settled  by  conciliation  boards,  and  in 
two  the  miners  failed  to  obtain  any  concessions. 

D.  The  Koyal  Commission  on  Labour 

These  industrial  struggles  convinced  the  Government 
that  it  needed  to  inaugurate  preventive  and  conciliatory 
measures.  It  was  during  the  unrest  of  the  early  nineties 
that  the  Royal  Commission  on  Labour  was  making  its  in- 
vestigations, and  its  final  report  in  1894  embodied  recom- 
mendations for  the  functioning  of  the  local  and  central 
governments  in  connection  with  labor  disputes.  The  ma- 
jority report  suggested  that  municipal  and  county  councils 
be  empowered  to  establish  industrial  courts  to  decide  ques- 
tions arising  out  of  existing  contracts,  and  that  the  central 
government  should  have  power  to  obtain  and  circulate  in- 
formation regarding  conciliation  boards.  The  central  gov- 
ernment should  also  have  the  power  to  advise  and  to  pro- 
mote their  establishment  by  appointing  chairmen  to  boards 
or  arbiters  upon  application  of  the  parties.  The  minority 
were  willing  to  go  a  step  further  on  the  publicity  side  and 
empower  the  central  government  to  obtain  the  fullest  pos- 
sible information  concerning  each  dispute,  the  net  wages, 
the  cost  of  living,  prices,  cost  of  production,  salaries,  in- 
terest, profits,  etc. 

^  Special  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Labor,  op.  cit.,  p.  489. 


IN  GREAT  BRIT.UN  283 

E.   The  Conciliation  Act  of  1896 

In  1893  the  Board  of  Trade  began  an  inquiry  which 
sought  to  determine  the  legislation  necessary  to  meet 
modern  social  and  industrial  conditions.  As  a  result  of 
this  investigation  the  Conciliation  Act  of  1896  was  en- 
acted. The  Master  and  Workmen  Arbitration  Act  of 
1824,  which  authorized  justices  of  the  peace  to  appoint 
arbiters  with  extensive  powers,  the  Councils  of  Concilia- 
tion Act  of  1867,  which  confirmed  the  Act  of  1824  and 
added  provisions  for  conciliation  councils,  and  the  Arbi- 
tration Act  of  1872,  which  enlarged  upon  the  provisions 
of  the  two  former  acts,  were  repealed  as  so  much  useless 
timber.  Their  only  recognized  virtue  was  that  they  were 
harmless  when  not  enforced. 

The  act  provided  further  for  registration  of  conciliation 
boards  and  gave  the  Board  of  Trade  power  (a)  to  inquire 
into  the  causes  of  the  trouble,  (6)  to  take  steps  to  bring 
the  parties  together  under  a  chairman  mutually  agreed 
upon  or  nominated  by  the  board,  (c)  upon  application  of 
either  party  to  appoint  a  conciliator  or  board  of  concilia- 
tion, ((7)  and  upon  application  of  both  parties  to  appoint 
an  arbitrator.  Furthermore,  if  it  appeared  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  that  in  any  district  or  trade  adequate  provisions 
for  conciliation  did  not  exist,  it  was  empowered  to  inquire 
into  the  conditions  of  the  trade  or  district,  confer  with  the 
employees,  employers,  and  local  authorities,  and  seek  to 
establish  a  conciliation  board. 

A.     RESULTS    UNDER   THE    ACT 

That  this  enactment  has  proved  an  effective  measure  is 
shown  by  the  work  of  the  Board  of  Trade  between  1896 
and  1910.  In  that  time  the  board  intervened  directly  in 
432  cases,  201  of  which  involved  stoppage  of  work  and 
231  of  which  did  not.  In  the  earlier  years  there  were  few 
applications,  and  they  came  mainly  from  the  workingmen ; 


284     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.VL  INDUSTRY 

but  in  the  later  years,  beginning  witb  1907,  a  year  of  de- 
pression, a  marked  increase  in  the  number  of  cases  took 
place.  Along  with  the  increase  in  the  number  of  cases  has 
gone  a  distinct  expression  of  confidence  in  the  board  indi- 
cated by  the  great  increase  in  joint  applications  for  the 
services  of  the  board,  there  being  278  such  instances  out 
of  the  total  of  432  cases.^  A  further  expression  of  appre- 
ciation of  the  board's  services  is  the  increasing  number  of 
cases  wherein  the  parties  do  not  wait  for  an  open  breach, 
but  apply  to  the  board  to  prevent  strikes.  It  has  also  been 
a  strong  factor  in  encouraging  voluntary  conciliation  boards 
and  lending  dignity  and  importance  to  the  whole  concilia- 
tory movement. 

B.     THE    COURT    OF    ARBITRATION 

Further  to  supplement  its  activities  the  board  has  added 
two  devices.  In  1908  it  established  a  permanent  court  of 
arbitration  consisting  of  three  panels :  *'  persons  of  emi- 
nence and  impartiality,"  employers,  and  labor  leaders.  A 
court  may  consist  of  three  or  five  members,  according  to 
the  importance  of  the  case,  and  an  award  is  made  upon  a 
majority  vote.  In  1909  and  1910  the  court  handled  six- 
teen cases,  eight  of  which  were  settled  before  a  rupture 
had  occurred  and  eight  not  until  after  a  strike.^ 

C.     THE    INDUSTRIAL    COUNCIL 

The  labor  troubles  of  1911  led  the  board  to  add  another 
device  to  enable  it  to  meet  the  increasing  demands  for  its 
services.  An  "  Industrial  Council,"  consisting  of  thirteen 
representative  employers  and  thirteen  labor  leaders,  was 
created.  In  advocating  this  addition  the  president  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  pointed  out  that  one  disadvantage  of  the 
existing  system  had  been  to  bring  into  prominence  the  par- 
liamentary head  of  the  Board  of  Trade  in  matters  which 

1  Bulletin  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  no.  98,  January,  1912,  p.  133. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  124. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  285 

should  be  purely  industrial,  and  expressed  the  opinion 
that  if  the  action  of  the  department  was  still  further  re- 
moved from  politics  the  parties  would  more  willingly  seek 
the  assistance  of  the  board.  Furthermore,  with  the  in- 
creasing concentration  in  industry  and  the  federation  of 
labor,  a  national  conciliation  council,  which  might  have 
been  considered  premature  a  few  years  ago,  "is  really 
now  essential  so  that  these  matters  can  be  considered  as  a 
whole."! 

Regular  meetings  are  held  in  February,  June,  and  No- 
vember and  special  meetings  may  be  called  at  any  time  by 
the  chairman.  The  members  are  supposed  to  act  in  a  judi- 
cial capacity,  not  as  advocates,  and  may  consider  the  fol- 
lowing classes  of  cases:  (1)  Cases  in  connection  with  which 
the  parties  are  merely  asking  for  an  impartial  opinion 
concerning  the  facts  about  which  there  is  no  dispute; 
(2)  cases  in  which  the  parties  desire  the  facts  to  be  im- 
partially ascertained  and  submitted  with  recommendations 
which  shall  not  be  binding  or  made  public ;  (3)  cases  in 
which  the  parties  agree  beforehand  that  the  recommenda- 
tions shall  be  made  public ;  (4)  cases  in  which  the  parties 
decide  to  accept  a  decision  of  the  council  as  final ;  (5)  spe- 
cial cases  submitted  by  the  Board  of  Trade ;  (6)  matters 
apart  from  disputes  upon  which  the  board  may  want  a 
representative  opinion.^  Thus  the  board  will  be  able  to 
allow  the  council  to  take  over  a  large  part  of  its  activities. 

F.  Modern  Conciliation  Boards  in  the  Coal 

Industry 

Of  the  432  cases  dealt  with  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  only 
54  were  among  the  mining  and  quarrying  industries.  This 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  in  the  coal  mining  industry  there 
are  nineteen  permanent  voluntary  conciliation  boards  which 
have  complete  automatic  machinery  for  settling  disputes. 

1  Bulletin  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  no.  98,  January,  1912,  p.  120. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  127. 


28G      AKBITRATION   IN  THE    COAL  INDUSTRY 

There  are  two  classes  of  conciliation  boards  in  the  coal 
industry.  The  first  deals  with  the  adjustmeut  of  wages 
and  working  conditions  which  are  applicable  to  a  district 
or  a  federation  of  districts.  The  second  is  termed  a  joint 
committee  and  concerns  itself  with  all  local  matters  which 
do  not  conHict  with  the  county  or  district  agreement  and 
which  do  not  demand  the  attention  of  the  conciliation 
board. 

The  Board  of  Conciliation  for  the  Coal  Trade  of  the 
Federated  Districts,  which  includes  representatives  from 
Lancashire,  Cheshire,  Yorkshire,  Staffordshire,  Warwick- 
shire, Derbyshire,  Nottinghamshire,  North  Wales,  Can- 
nock Chase,  etc.,  may  be  taken  as  representative  of  the 
first  type.  The  board  must  settle  upon  wages  for  these 
districts,  but  "  the  rate  of  wages  shall  not  be  below  37^ 
per  cent  above  the  rate  of  wages  of  1888  nor  more  than 
60  per  cent  above  the  rate  of  wages  of  1888,  and  no  altera- 
tion in  the  rate  of  wages  exceeding  5  per  cent  shall  be 
made  at  any  one  time."^ 

The  board  agrees  "  upon  a  selling  price  of  coal  as  being 
proportionate  to  a  certain  rate  of  wages,"  but  the  selling 
price  is  not  the  only  determining  factor.  It  is  considered 
as  "  one  factor  only,  and  either  side  shall  be  entitled  to 
bring  forward  any  reason  why,  notwithstanding  an  altera- 
tion in  the  selling  price,  there  should  be  no  alteration  in 
the  rate  of  wages."  Not  merely  the  present  state  of  trade 
is  considered,  but  the  indications  which  point  to  the  future 
trend  in  prices  are  strong  factors  in  determining  an  agree- 
ment. For  instance,  in  reply  to  a  demand  for  a  reduction 
in  1909  the  miners  refused  to  lower  their  rates,  but  prom- 
ised not  to  ask  for  a  raise  until  a  certain  time  in  order  that 
on  the  rising  market  the  owners  might  recoup  themselves 
for  adverse  conditions  during  a  period  of  falling  prices.^ 

^  Second  Report  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  1910,  on  Bules  of  Voluntary  Con- 
ciliation and  Arbitration  Boards  and  Joint  Committees,  p.  114. 

2  Proceedings  of  Federated  Coal  Owners  and  Miners^  Federation,  Septem- 
ber 3,  1909,  p.  8. 


IN  GREAT   BRITAIN  287 

The  board  consists  of  an  equal  number  of  representa- 
tives elected  by  the  Federated  Coal  Owners  and  the 
Miners'  Federation,  and  a  neutral  chairman  who  has  a 
casting  vote.  In  case  the  parties  cannot  agree  on  a  chair- 
man he  is  appointed  by  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Commons. 

The  board  has  four  stated  meetings  during  a  year  and 
as  many  more  as  may  be  necessary.  All  questions  are  sub- 
mitted in  writing,  but  they  may  be  supplemented  by  such 
verbal  and  documentary  evidence  as  the  parties  may  de- 
sire, subject  to  the  approval  of  the  board.  If  the  parties 
cannot  agree,  the  board  is  adjourned  for  a  period  not  ex- 
ceeding twenty-one  days,  which  gives  each  side  time  for 
further  discussion  with  its  constituents.  The  chairman  is 
then  called  in,  and  after  hearing  both  sides  of  the  case 
may  give  his  casting  vote  or  subsequently  communicate 
his  decision  to  the  secretaries  of  both  federations.  He  is 
not  allowed  to  render  decisions  which  split  the  difference. 
He  may  also  refer  questions  back  to  the  board  for  re- 
consideration without  expressing  his  opinion  upon  them. 
This  process  goes  on  till  the  parties  have  reached  a  work- 
ing agreement,  and  in  the  mean  time  the  men  remain  at 
work. 

Each  party  pays  the  expenses  of  its  own  officials  and 
representatives,  and  the  common  costs,  such  as  the  ex- 
penses of  the  chairman  and  the  general  expenses  of  the 
board,  the  parties  bear  in  equal  shares. 

In  the  Durham,  Northumberland,  and  Cumberland  dis- 
tricts, besides  a  general  conciliation  board,  joint  commit- 
tees are  appointed  to  look  after  local  disputes  and  adjust 
rates  of  payment  for  altered  methods  of  working.  In  the 
other  districts  of  England,  Wales,  and  Scotland  joint 
committees  are  formed  for  special  occasions.  Also  there 
are  local  "  agents "  of  the  miners,  who,  if  they  cannot 
settle  local  disputes,  carry  the  cases  to  the  joint  commit- 
tees or  the  general  conciliation  board. 


288     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

The  joint  committee  in  Durham  consists  of  six  members 
on  each  side  with  an  impartial  chainuan  chosen  annually. 
The  county  is  divided  into  three  districts,  "  and  the  de- 
cisions of  the  committee  in  all  cases  shall  be  such  as  to 
bring  practices,  hours,  or  wages  as  nearly  as  may  be  into 
accord  with  the  recognized  county  standards."  ^  Both  par- 
ties before  the  committee  are  represented  by  their  agents 
and  bring  such  witnesses  as  they  deem  necessary.  During 
the  hearing  of  the  case  argumentation  and  discussion  are 
not  allowed,  "  the  examination  of  witnesses  being  confined 
to  putting  the  committee  into  possession  of  the  facts  bear- 
ing on  the  case."  When  the  evidence  is  all  in,  the  com- 
mittee discusses  it  and  endeavors  to  arrive  at  a  decision. 
Unless  they  reach  a  unanimous  decision,  individual  mem- 
bers are  allowed  to  introduce  motions  which  they  think 
will  settle  the  case  justly.  When  the  votes  are  equal,  the 
chairman  may  himself  decide  the  question  or  submit  it  to 
arbitration,  but  "  the  committee  shall  in  all  cases,  where 
it  is  possible,  determine  the  questions  submitted  to  its 
consideration  without  calling  upon  the  chairman  for  his 
casting  vote."  While  the  committee  is  arriving  at  a  set- 
tlement the  men  continue  at  work  and  the  decision  is  re- 
troactive. 

3.  THE  POLICY  OF  LEGAL  ENACTMENT 

A.  Labor  Representation 

As  we  have  seen,^  the  miners  early  became  aware  of  the 
necessity  for  and  the  superiority  of  legal  enactment  to  at- 
tain certain  fundamental  regulations  which  could  not  be 
got  by  conciliation  and  arbitration.  However,  the  adher- 
ents of  conciliation  and  arbitration  expected  to  bring 
about  universality  more  and  more  as  unionism  spread  and 

1  Bulletin  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  no.  98,  January,  1912,  p.  147.  Reprint 
of  revised  rules  of  the  Durham  Joint  Committee,  June,  1911. 

2  See  supra,  p.  274. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  289 

as  the  conciliation  boards  grew  in  representation  and  in- 
fluence. Undoubtedly  this  has  been  accomplished  in  re- 
spect to  many  minor  working  conditions,  and  such  a  fun- 
damental and  universal  regulation  as  the  eight-hour  day 
was  not  thought  to  be  too  great  an  accomplishment.  It  is 
natural  that  this  should  not  have  been  regarded  as  too 
hard  a  task,  since  it  had  already  been  accomplished  in 
America.  But,  as  was  the  case  in  America,  it  would  prob- 
ably necessitate  a  general  strike,  and  with  increasing 
strength  and  realization  of  power  came  a  healthy  conserv- 
atism that  led  to  peaceful  measures  to  obtain  the  eight- 
hour  day. 

In  the  middle  seventies  trade  unionism  in  general  be- 
came aware  that  the  old  Liberal  and  Tory  parties  were 
not  deeply  concerned  about  furthering  the  laborers'  inter- 
ests, and  consequently  they  determined  to  have  their  own 
men  in  Parliament.  In  1874  the  miners,  ironworkers,  and 
other  societies  voted  money  for  parliamentary  candida- 
tures, and  in  the  general  election  that  followed,  Alexander 
Macdonald  and  Thomas  Burt,  who  were  officials  of  the 
National  Union  of  Miners,  became  the  first  "  Labour  mem- 
bers "  in  Parliament.! 

A.    THE    "labour    REPRESENTATION    SCHEME" 

Almost  at  the  beginning  of  labor  representation  the 
miners'  representatives  from  Durham  and  Northumber- 
land in  Parliament  were  found  on  the  side  opposite  to  the 
representatives  of  the  miners  from  the  other  coal  fields  in 
the  matter  of  a  legal  enactment  of  an  eight-hour  day. 
This  circumstance,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  the  Labor 
men  held  to  old  party  affiliations,  tended  to  lessen  their 
force  as  distinctly  labor  representatives. 

In  1893  a  group  of  labor  delegates  formed  the  "In- 
dependent Labour  Party,"  with  the  hope  of  establishing 
a  connecting  link  between  the  Socialists  and  the  labor 
1  Webb,  op.  cU.,  p.  273. 


290     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

unions.  Of  the  twenty-nine  candidates  put  in  the  race  for 
parliamentary  membership  in  that  year,  only  five  were 
elected.  By  1899  it  was  found  necessary  to  seek  closer 
relationship  with  the  trade  unions  in  order  to  increase  the 
labor  representation  in  Parliament.  This  was  to  be  ac- 
complished by  the  formation  of  a  "  Labour  Representa- 
tive Committee."  The  Liberal  and  Conservative  labor 
representatives  of  the  Trade-Union  Congress  were  out- 
voted on  the  question  of  the  formation  of  this  committee, 
and  when  it  was  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  unions  the 
affirmative  vote  was  only  546,000  as  against  a  negative 
vote  of  434,000.1  xhe  action  of  the  Taff  Vale  Railway 
Company,  brought  against  the  Amalgamated  Society  of 
Railway  Servants,  resulted  in  a  decision  (in  1901)  sub- 
jecting the  unions  to  the  payment  of  damages  for  engag- 
ing in  picketing  which  caused  the  railway  employees  to 
break  their  contractual  relations.  This  aroused  all  the 
unions  to  political  action  to  obtain  a  law  that  would  se- 
cure their  funds  from  such  attacks.  By  1901  the  sense  of 
the  importance  of  the  functions  of  labor  representatives 
had  assumed  proportions  which  warranted  the  executive 
committee  of  the  Miners'  Federation  in  drawing  up  a 
scheme  for  the  further  encouragement  of  the  policy  of 
electing  and  supporting  Labor  members  in  Parliament. 

The  plan  for  the  purpose  was  known  as  the  "  Miners* 
Federation  of  Great  Britain  Labour  Fund  Scheme."  The 
fund  was  built  up  by  the  payment  of  threepence  per  quar- 
ter per  member  or  one  shilling  per  year.  A  district  which 
failed  to  pay  this  amount  per  member  was  not  eligible  to 
nominate  candidates  at  "  Bye  and  General  Elections"  and 
could  not  receive  returning  officers'  fees  or  other  election 
costs.  All  districts  which  had  a  membership  under  10,000 
were  allowed  one  candidate,  and  those  having  more  than 
10,000  were  allowed  another  candidate  for  every  10,000 
"  fiuaucial "  members- 

^  Orth,  Socialism  and  Democracy  in  Europe,  p.  223. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  291 

There  were  several  qualifications  necessary  before  a  man 
could  be  eligible  as  a  "  Federation  Candidate."  He  bad  to 
be  adopted  by  the  Federation  and  Federation  executive 
board,  which  decided  whether  there  was  a  "  reasonable 
hope  "  of  the  seat  being  won.  Furthermore,  the  candidate 
had  to  be  a  "  financial  "  member  of  the  Federation,  and 
either  "working  in  or  about  the  mines  or  [be]  a  Miners' 
Kepresentative  [official]  within  the  Federation  area."  ^ 
Nor  could  officials  from  other  districts  be  selected,  but  a 
candidate  must  be  "selected  by  and  in  his  own  District." 
When  elected,  the  representative  was  paid  X350  per  year 
and  given  a  first-class  railway  pass  "  covering  the  sitting 
of  Parliament  in  each  year." 

The  scheme  was  not  established  "  for  the  purpose  of 
wrecking  any  political  party,"  nor  did  it  prevent  a  can- 
didate from  running  under  any  name  he  wished,  provided 
he  was  adopted  by  the  executive  board  as  a  candidate. 
Furthermore,  the  board  rendered  a  final  decision  on  "  all 
questions  arising  out  of  payments  into  and  out  of  the 
Labour  Election  Fund."  So  the  board  was  in  a  position 
to  compel  honest  representation  of  labor  as  a  primary 
requisite. 

B.    MEMBERSHIP    IN   THE    "  LABOUR    PARTY  " 

The  scheme  was  adopted  by  the  Annual  Conference  in 
1902,  and  two  years  later  the  miners'  annual  conference, 
in  the  following  resolution,  instructed  its  representative 
in  Parliament  to  join  the  labor  group  :  — 

We  hereby  express  our  belief  in  the  principle  of  political 
independence  of  all  Labour  Members  in  Parliament,  and  that 
those  members  who  may  be  returned  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Federation  be  instructed  to  do  everything  possible  to  initiate  or 
8U])port  a  movement  for  the  formation  of  a  Labour  Group  in  the 
House  of  Commons. 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Miners^  Federation  of  Great  Britain,  1001. 


292     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO^VL  INDUSTRY 

The  "  Labour  Representative  Committee,"  after  the 
Taff  Vale  decision  in  1901,  adopted  the  name  of  "  Labour 
Party,"  and  the  thirty-two  Labor  members  in  the  House 
of  Commons  constituted  themselves  as  a  separate  organ- 
ization. In  1909  the  affiliation  fees,  and  contributions  were 
paid  by  the  Miners'  Federation,  and  its  representatives 
in  Parliament  became  members  of  the  Labor  party.^  We 
must  remember  that  the  forty-two  votes  of  the  Labor 
members  in  Parliament  are  far  more  significant  than  their 
number  would  naturally  indicate.  They  represent  a  vast 
economical  as  well  as  political  pressure.  Moreover,  there 
are  hundreds  of  thousands  of  labor  votes  outside  of  the 
Labor  party  upon  which  other  party  representatives  in 
Parliament  are  dependent,  and  which  may  easily  throw 
their  influence  for  policies  which  are  distinctly  favorable 
to  labor.  We  shall  see  the  force  of  this  in  1911  during  the 
struggle  for  the  minimum  wage. 

C.    THE    STEELE    CASE,    1907 

The  year  1907  brought  about  developments  which 
threatened  seriously  to  disturb  the  whole  labor  representa- 
tion scheme.  A  Welsh  miner  brought  suit  to  recover  four 
shillings  which  had  been  levied  upon  him  for  the  labor 
representation  fund,  and  he  sought  an  injunction  which 
should  restrain  the  Federation  from  making  further  con- 
tributions from  its  funds  to  support  labor  members.^  The 
miner  had  joined  the  Federation  in  1900,  and  in  1901  the 
rules  had  been  altered  so  as  to  provide  funds  for  returning 
and  maintaining  representatives  in  Parliament.  The  plain- 
tiff held  that  he  was  compelled  to  pay  contributions  to  sup- 
port members  of  Parliament  who  held  views  entirely  op- 
posite to  his  own.  The  plaintiff  was  not  successful  in  the 

^  Proceedings  of  Annual  Conference  of  Miners'  Federation  of  Great  Britain, 
1909,  p.  10. 

'  Steele  v.  The  South  Wales  Miners'  Federation  and  Others.  Reprint  in  Pro- 
ceedings of  Annual  Conference  of  Miners'  Federation  of  Great  Britain,  1907. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  293 

county  court  nor  upon  appeal  to  the  King's  Bench  Divi- 
vision  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  for  the  court  held  that 
"  It  was  intended  by  these  miners,  when  they  associated, 
that  there  should  be  a  power,  amongst  others,  if  it  was 
thought  fit,  to  raise  by  levy  sums  of  money  to  support  and 
maintain  a  Representative  in  Parliament,  and  that  all 
the  organs  of  the  body  have  agreed  that  this  should  be 
done." 

D.    THE  OSBORNE    CASE,    1909 

The  next  year  a  similar  case  was  started  which  affected 
the  whole  trade-union  world.  It  found  its  way  finally  to 
the  Chancery  Division  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice  and 
there  met  a  different  fate  from  the  Steele  case.  W.  V.  Os- 
borne,^ a  foreman  porter  and  a  member  of  the  Amalga- 
mated Society  of  Railway  Servants,  brought  suit  to  recover 
his  contributions  to  the  parliamentary  fund  and  to  obtain 
an  injunction  against  further  use  of  the  society's  funds 
to  support  the  Labor  party  representatives.  He  entered  his 
plea  on  the  same  grounds  as  in  the  case  of  Steele,  i.e., 
against  compulsion  to  support  representatives  with  oppo- 
site political  views. 

The  lower  court  decided  for  the  society,  and  the  Justice 
based  his  decision  on  previous  decisions  of  the  High  Court 
of  Justice.  When  it  came  before  the  Chancery  Division,  the 
court  held  that  the  rules  of  the  society  providing  for  labor 
representation  were  outside  the  scope  of  trade-union  activi- 
ties as  defined  in  the  Trade-Union  Acts  of  1871  and  1876. 
A  further  objection  was  expressed  that "  rules  designed  to 
procure  the  election  of  members  of  Parliament  who  should 
be  bound  to  vote  in  a  prescribed  manner,  and  the  expendi- 
ture of  funds  for  their  maintenance  in  consideration  of 
a  pledge  to  vote  in  that  manner,  were  contrary  to  public 
policy." 

The  society  appealed  to  the  House  of  Lords,  and  the 
*  Osborne  v.  Amalyamated  Society  uf  Railway  Servants  (1910,  A.  C  87). 


294     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Law  Lords  unanimously  upheld  the  High  Court  of  Justice. 
This  decision  was  rendered  in  December,  1909,  and  by  July, 
1911,  only  200,000  of  the  600,000  members  of  the  Federa- 
tion were  free  from  injunction.  Tlie  Annual  Conference 
of  the  Miners'  Federation  in  1910  passed  a  resolution 
strongly  protesting  against  the  decision,  commanding  the 
parliamentary  members  to  "  support  all  possible  legislation 
with  a  view  to  giving  relief  in  this  direction  "  and  urging 
cooperation  on  the  part  of  all  the  various  executive  com- 
mittees having  the  matter  in  charge.  In  the  mean  time 
every  effort  was  made  to  keep  up  the  parliamentary  fund 
by  voluntary  arrangements.  We  might  conclude  from  this 
peaceful  way  of  dealing  with  the  matter  that  the  Federa- 
tion did  not  realize  the  full  force  of  the  decision  on  the 
trade-union  future.  In  fact,  this  sort  of  procedure  was  far 
from  the  liking  of  the  radical  members,  who  were  dis- 
gusted with  the  "  lying-down  "  way  in  which  the  Federa- 
tion had  taken  it,  and  thought  the  Labor  members  ought 
to  have  walked  out  of  Parliament,  gone  back  to  their  con- 
stituencies, and  started  a  revolution. 

E.    GOVERNMENT    PAYMENT    OF    PARLIAMENTARY 
MEMBERS,    1911 

But  the  wiser  heads  in  the  Federation  had  learned  to 
work  through  the  ordinary  channels  and,  finding  response 
in  the  political  mechanism,  were  able  to  reach  a  better 
solution  of  the  problem  than  had  existed  under  the  old 
regime.  By  a  bill  passed  in  August,  1911,  payment  of 
members  of  the  House  of  Commons  by  the  Government 
was  inaugurated,  each  member  (except  officers  of  the 
House,  ministers,  and  officers  of  the  King's  household) 
recei^ang  X400  a  year. 

Although  the  Act  of  1911  assured  the  trade-unionists 
of  parliamentary  representation,  the  Osborne  decision  still 
governed  the  use  of  union  funds  for  political  purposes. 
To  offset  this  handicap  the  Labor  members  succeeded  in 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  295 

getting  an  act  passed  in  1913^  which  permits  the  unions 
to  use  their  funds  for  paying  the  expenses  of  their  can- 
didates, for  holding  political  meetings,  for  distributing 
campaign  literature,  and  for  the  support  of  their  mem- 
bers holding  any  public  office.  Any  trade-unionist  who 
objects  to  contributing  to  a  political  fund  may  be  ex- 
empted by  giving  notice  of  his  objection.  Such  a  member 
is  protected  from  persecution  and  discrimination  by  his 
privilege  of  appeal  to  the  Registrar  of  Friendly  Societies, 
who  has  full  power  to  remedy  such  a  breach  of  trade- 
union  rules. 

B.  The  Eight-Hour  Law,  1908 

A.    DIFFICULTY    OF    OBTAINING    THE    ACT 

In  connection  with  the  way  the  miners  obtained  the 
eight-hour  law  we  have  a  good  illustration  of  the  interplay 
of  conciliatory  methods  with  the  method  of  legal  enact- 
ment. We  have  seen  that  Alexander  Macdonald  had  the 
eight-hour  law  on  his  programme  in  the  sixties.  Moreover, 
we  saw  that  the  opposition  on  the  part  of  Durham  and 
Northumberland  was  the  disrupting  force  among  the 
miners  which  prevented  unity  of  action  on  this  measure 
in  Parliament.  In  1901,  we  find  Durham  still  holding 
tenaciously  to  her  position  that  "  there  must  be  some  men 

—  if  the  work  is  to  be  carried  on  safely  and  regularly  — 
who  must  work  more  than  eight  hours  ;  there  are  men  who 
must  go  down  before  the  hewers  [miners]  go  down,  and 
there  are  men  who  must  remain  after  the  hewers  come  up 

—  we  cannot  make  a  rigid  rule  all  round."  ^ 

The  bill  before  Parliament  failed  to  pass  and  a  special 
conference  of  the  Federation  in  July,  1902,  resolved  to 
use  trade-union  action  to  force  the  measure,  "  seeing  the 

1  Trade-Union  Act,  1013,  2  &  3  Geo.  5,  chap.  30. 

2  Mines  Eight-Hour  Bill  in  Committee,  3 nnG  12,  1911,  p.  7.  Reprint  in 
Proceedings  of  Annual  Conference  of  Miners'  Federation  of  Great  Britain^ 
lUll. 


29G     ARBITILVTION  IN  TIIE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

Government  will  not  allow  a  legal  eiglit-liours  day,  and 
also  that  the  coal  owners  urge  on  every  occasion  that  the 
eight-hours  day  be  got  by  Trade-Union  effort."  The  con- 
ference accordingly  resolved  to  have  a  meeting  with  the 
coal  owners.  But  instead  of  devising  means  by  which  the 
regulations  could  be  made  universal,  the  owners  spent 
their  time  in  framing  objections.  In  the  first  place,  they 
considered  such  a  measure  as  "an  unjustifiable  interference 
with  the  freedom  of  the  subject."  They  were  convinced 
from  the  statistics  they  had  collected  that  the  output 
would  be  reduced  from  eleven  to  fifty  per  cent,  according 
as  the  mine  was  favorably  or  unfavorably  situated.  An 
increased  cost  ranging  from  Qd.  to  Is.  Qd.  per  ton  would 
accompany  this  reduced  output  and  necessarily  raise  the 
selling  price  of  coal.  The  hewers  who  mine  coal  at  a  cer- 
tain price  per  ton  could  not  expect  increased  rates,  and 
shorter  hours  would  lessen  their  wages.  The  men  who 
were  working  by  the  day  certainly  could  not  expect  to 
receive  the  same  wage,  since  "  it  would  be  unfair  to  the 
employer  that  he  should  be  required  to  pay  the  same 
wages  for  less  work."  Moreover,  decreased  output  and 
increased  cost  of  fuel  would  seriously  handicap  the  more 
important  industries  which  were  subject  to  keen  compe- 
tition from  other  countries.  Finally,  it  would  work  great 
hardship  on  the  older  men,  and  the  increased  hurry  would 
increase  the  number  of  accidents. 

These  were  the  stock  arguments  which  the  miners  had 
heard  from  the  time  the  subject  of  the  eight-hour  day 
was  first  broached,  but  on  previous  occasions  they  had 
not  been  advanced  in  a  national  conference  nor  so  im- 
pressively presented.  Evidently  there  were  hard  facts  in 
the  everyday  life  of  the  rank  and  file  that  required 
stronger  arguments  than  these  to  offset  them  satisfac- 
torily. AVhen  the  miners  saw  that  they  could  not  obtain 
the  eight-hour  day  peacefully  through  conciliation,  they 
again  turned  to  legal  enactment. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  297 

Northumberland  had  experienced  a  change  of  heart  in 
1907  and  Durham  in  1908,  and  during  the  struggle  for 
the  eight-hour  bill  of  the  latter  year  they  were  within  the 
Federation  and  were  fighting  for  the  measure.  The  bill 
met  with  strong  opposition  at  every  stage  in  its  passage. 
On  the  committee  that  considered  the  bill  were  twelve 
Labor  members,  eight  of  whom  were  miners,  yet  it  in- 
volved a  fight  of  twelve  days  before  the  committee  could 
bring  the  bill  forth.  The  opposition  consumed  as  much 
time  as  possible,  and  as  the  end  of  the  session  was  draw- 
ing near,  "the  Federation  did  all  they  could  to  sup- 
port the  Government  to  carry  the  bill.  Their  members  in 
the  House  of  Commons  sat  for  hours  like  dumb  dogs, 
almost  bursting  to  speak,  as  the  temptation  to  reply  to 
the  opposition  was  very  great  at  times."  ^ 

B.    PROVISIONS    OF    THE    ACT 

The  act  ^  provides  that  no  "  workman  shall  be  below 
ground  in  a  mine  for  the  purpose  of  his  work,  and  of 
going  to  and  from  his  work,  for  more  than  eight  hours 
during  any  consecutive  twenty-four  hours."  But  it  is  not 
considered  a  contravention  of  the  act  when  a  workman  is 
below  ground  for  a  longer  period  to  render  assistance  in 
the  case  of  accident,  to  meet  any  danger  or  apprehended 
danger,  or  to  deal  "  with  any  emergency  work  uncom- 
pleted through  unforeseen  circumstances  which  requires  to 
be  dealt  with  without  interruption  in  order  to  avoid  seri- 
ous interference  with  ordinary  work  in  the  mine,  etc." 

The  owner  or  manager  may  fix  the  time  at  which  the 
lowering  of  the  men  into  the  mine  shall  begin  and  end 
for  each  shift,  also  for  raising  the  men.  These  regula- 
tions must  be  embodied  in  a  notice  which  shall  be  posted 
in  a  conspicuous  place,  and  they  are  subject  to  a  revision 

^  Quarterly  Report  of  International  Miners^  Federation,  March,  1909, 
P.O. 

2  Coal  Mines  Regulation  Act,  October,  1908. 


298     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

by  the  government  mine  inspector,  if  a  reasonable  time  is 
not  allowed.  Furthermore,  the  owner  or  manager  is  re- 
quired to  keep  a  register  containing  particulars  regarding 
the  i-aising  and  lowering  of  men  "  and  the  cases  in  which 
any  man  is  below  ground  for  more  than  the  time  fixed  by 
the  Act,  and  the  cause  thereof,  and  the  register  shall  be 
open  to  inspection  by  the  inspector."  The  workmen  may 
appoint  their  checkweigher  or  any  official  to  see  that 
these  regulations  are  carried  out,  and  false  entries  in  the 
register  subject  the  ofifender  to  a  fine  of  five  pounds  for 
each  offense. 

The  owner  or  manager  may  extend  the  working  hours 
"  on  not  more  than  sixty  days  in  any  calendar  year  by 
not  more  than  one  hour  a  day,  and  on  any  day  in  which 
an  extension  of  time  is  made  in  accordance  with  the  sec- 
tion as  respects  any  mine,  the  time  as  so  extended  must 
be  kept  in  a  register  as  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  subject  to  inspection  by  the  inspector."  The  King 
may  "  in  the  event  of  war  or  of  imminent  national  dan- 
ger or  great  emergency,  or  in  the  event  of  any  grave 
economic  disturbance  due  to  the  demand  of  coal  exceed- 
ing the  supply  available  at  the  time,  by  Order  in  Council 
suspend  the  operation  of  this  Act  to  such  extent  and  for 
such  period  as  may  be  named  in  the  Order,  either  as  re- 
spects all  coal  mines  or  any  class  of  coal  mines." 

In  the  event  of  contravention  of  or  non-compliance 
with  the  act,  the  owner  is  subject  to  a  fine  of  two  pounds 
and  a  workman  to  a  fine  of  ten  shillings.  The  owner  is 
not  subject  to  the  penalty  if  he  can  prove  "  that  he  has 
taken  all  reasonable  means  by  making,  publishing,  and 
to  the  best  of  his  ability  enforcing,  regulations  for  se- 
curing compliance  "  with  the  act.  The  workman  is  not 
guilty  of  an  offense  if  he  can  prove  that  he  was  pre- 
vented from  returning  to  the  surface  within  the  time 
limit  "  owing  to  means  not  being  available  for  the  pur- 
pose." 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


C.    AMENDMENTS 


In  1909  the  law  was  amended  so  as  to  provide  that  an 
eight-hour  period  of  work  should  be  "  during  any  period 
of  twenty-four  hours,  reckoned  from  midnight  to  mid- 
night," and  in  1910  further  provision  was  made  to  re- 
strict the  hours  of  surface  workmen,  who  have  to  work 
seven  days  a  week,  to  eight  hours. 

When  the  act  went  into  effect  considerable  friction  arose 
over  reduction  of  wages,  the  sixty-hour  clause,  the  num- 
ber of  shafts  to  be  worked,  and  the  number  of  workmen 
in  a  working  "  place."  But  the  miners  showed  a  disposi- 
tion to  bring  a  national  stoppage  rather  than  to  yield  any 
of  the  important  benefits  from  the  act,  and  the  minor 
ones  were  adjusted  by  conciliation.  The  difficulty  of  ob- 
taining this  act  and  its  detailed  regulations  stand  in  great 
contrast  to  the  inauguration  and  enforcement  of  the 
eight-hour  day  in  America  by  strikes  or  conciliatory 
methods.  The  only  advantage  of  the  British  law  is  that 
it  compels  universal  compliance  and  places  all  on  an 
equality  that  is  much  harder  to  obtain  by  conciliation. 
Legal  enactment  with  all  its  rigidity  will  naturally  fol- 
low where  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  regulations  by  agree- 
ment between  the  industrial  parties. 

C.  The  Minimum  Wage  Act,  1912 

A.    GROWTH    OF   THE   MINIMUM    WAGE   DEMAND 

Before  the  eight-hour  regulation  had  been  attained  a 
movement  had  already  been  started  which  was  to  lead 
to  the  struggle  for  the  minimum  wage.  In  February  of 
1907,  at  a  special  miners'  conference  held  to  discuss  the 
proposed  export  tax  on  coal,  a  resolution  was  introduced 
"having  for  its  object  the  raising  of  the  basis  rate  of 
wages  in  all  coa]-j)roducing  districts  of  the  United  King- 
dom."   In  the    same    year    the    miners    ajiproachcd  the 


300     ARBITRATION  IN  TIIE  COAL   INDUSTRY 

owners  "  with  a  view  to  substituting  for  the  1879  or  1888 
rate  of  wages,  a  basis  rate  iuchiding  not  less  than  thirty 
per  cent  of  the  present  percentages,  upon  which  all  fu- 
ture advances  in  wages  shall  be  calculated."  They  failed 
to  gain  any  satisfaction  from  the  owners,  but  they  ap- 
pointed a  joint  committee  to  "collect  information  and 
watch  developments  with  a  view  of  assistance  being  ren- 
dered to  any  district,  in  order  to  secure  this  object." 

The  following  year  was  taken  up  with  the  struggle  for 
the  eight-hour  law,  but  in  1909  the  district  of  Yorkshire 
introduced  a  resolution  which  should  provide  measures  to 
obtain  a  minimum  wage  of  eight  shillings  per  day  and  the 
resolution  was  carried  by  the  conference.  During  the  same 
year  the  Scottish  coal  owners  sought  to  reduce  the  wages 
of  the  Scottish  federation  twelve  and  a  half  per  cent,  but 
the  miners  served  notice  upon  them  that  "  they  would  re- 
sist any  attempt  to  reduce  miners'  wages  below  an  average 
of  six  shillings  per  day,  or  in  other  words,  fifty  per  cent 
on  the  average  standard  rate  of  1888."  The  miners  of  the 
other  districts  expressed  their  determination,  by  a  major- 
ity of  over  400,000,  to  support  the  Scots  in  their  struggle, 
but  special  conferences  aided  by  mediation  from  the  Gov- 
ernment narrowly  averted  a  national  strike.  A  new  con- 
ciliation board  was  formed  for  Scotland,  the  rules  of  which 
incorporated  the  new  basis  and  conceded  the  minimum 
wage. 

B.  ABNOEMAL  "  PLACES  " 

In  1910  the  miners  made  their  resolution  more  specific 
and  I'esolved  to  meet  the  owners  in  each  district  in  order 
to  seek  "  an  individual  minimum  day  wage  for  all  men 
and  boys  who  are  now  paid  by  the  ton,  yard,  etc."  How 
much  the  day  wage  should  be  was  left  to  the  district. 
The  impelling  force  behind  this  resolution  was  a  sense  of 
injustice  in  connection  with  the  treatment  of  men  who 
had  to  work  in  abnormal  places.   The  miners  had  proved 


IN   GREAT  BRITAIN  301 

to  their  satisfaction  that  the  excessively  low  wages  some 
men  were  getting  were  due  to  the  unfavorable  conditions 
under  which  they  were  working.  When  first-class  miners 
who  earned  high  wages  under  normal  conditions  were 
placed  at  work  in  abnormal  places,  their  wages  fell  to  the 
level  of  the  other  unfortunates.  The  practice  of  the  owners 
in  the  past  had  been  to  dole  out  a  few  extra  shillings  to 
men  who  were  working  in  such  abnormal  places.  But  this 
was  a  discouraging,  unsatisfactory,  and  degrading  process, 
and  the  miners'  officials  were  constantly  called  upon  to  go 
to  the  owner  or  manager  and  plead  for  a  few  shillings  for 
such  men.  Moreover,  failure  to  get  aid  from  the  owner  in 
many  cases  made  the  unfortunate  a  serious  burden  on  the 
local  miners'  federation.  The  miners  concluded  that  the 
individual  worker  should  not  be  made  to  suffer  for  una- 
voidable conditions  in  the  industry,  but  rather  that  losses 
due  to  abnormal  places  should  be  a  charge  upon  the  en- 
tire production  of  coal.  The  only  way  to  accomplish  this 
was  through  a  minimum  wage  to  the  man  who  did  a  fair 
day's  work  under  difficult  conditions. 

Supplementary  to  the  abnormal  working  conditions 
which  caused  dissatisfaction  were  the  overcrowding  of  the 
mines  with  men,  the  forcing  of  extra  timbering  on  the 
men,  and  various  other  duties  which  took  their  time  and 
lessened  the  wages  of  the  piece-workers. 

C.    PRELIMINARY   NEGOTIATIONS 

The  miners  sought  to  settle  these  matters  with  the 
owners  by  districts,  but  were  met  by  the  argument  that 
the  varying  capacity  of  the  men,  the  necessity  which  it 
would  involve  of  discharging  the  old  men,  and  the  indis- 
position of  some  men  to  earn  what  they  could  would  make 
a  minimum  wage  impossible.  "  It  is  always  the  men  who 
are  abnormal,  not  the  places,"  said  one  miner.  Some  of  the 
owners  were  willing  to  grant  the  minimum  wage  (but  they 
were  looked  upon  as  "  blacklegs  "  among  the  owners  in 


802     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

general),  and  others  stated  that  it  was  a  national  question 
and  should  be  settled  on  a  national  basis. 

Accordingly  the  miners  sought  a  national  meeting  of 
coal  owners  and  miners.  At  a  national  joint  conference 
on  September  29,  1911,  the  ownei's  showed  that  they  were 
not  ready  for  national  action,  and  submitted  a  statement 
in  which  they  recognized  the  right  of  workmen  working 
in  abnormal  places  "  to  receive  wages  commensurate  with 
the  work  performed  ";  but  they  concluded  that  conditions 
between  districts  varied  too  greatly  to  permit  of  their  set- 
tling the  matter  on  a  national  basis.  Therefore  they  sug- 
gested district  settlements. 

The  miners  again  attempted  to  settle  by  districts,  and 
the  owners  in  the  districts  associated  with  the  English 
Conciliation  Board  (the  Midland  counties)  agreed  to  the 
principle  of  the  minimum  wage,^  but  the  other  district 
owners  had  not  changed  their  attitude.  The  miners  again 
sought  a  national  conference,  but  by  this  time  the  repre- 
sentative owners  in  the  Midland  counties  had  changed 
their  attitude,  as  their  constituencies  in  "  their  own  dis- 
tricts had  repudiated  their  suggestions  [and]  they  were 
without  authority  "  to  put  the  minimum  wage  into  effect. 

D.    THE    STRIKE   BALLOT 

At  a  special  conference  on  December  20, 1911,  the  min- 
ers decided,  as  a  last  resort,  to  take  a  ballot,  and,  in 
case  the  vote  was  favorable,  to  give  notice  of  their  inten- 
tion to  strike  so  that  agreements  should  terminate  by  the 
end  of  February,  1912.  The  results  of  the  ballot  on  Jan- 
uary 10-12,  1912,  showed  a  majority  of  330,080  votes 
in  favor  of  a  strike,  and  by  February  26  upwards  of 
800,000  miners  were  idle.^ 

In  the  mean  time  there  had  been  no  relaxation  of  the 
effort  to  settle  the  dispute  before  the  agreements  should 

*  Miners^  Special  Conference,  November  14,  1911,  p.  46. 
2  HazelVs  Annual,  1913,  p.  568. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  303 

terminate.  In  the  further  negotiations  carried  on  by  the 
miners  and  owners  the  miners  had  framed  a  schedule  of 
minimum  wages  which  ranged  from  4s.  10c?.  for  the  For- 
est of  Dean  to  7s.  6d.  for  Yorkshire.  It  was  uudei-stood 
by  the  public  in  general  that  the  miners  demanded  a  min- 
imum of  five  shillings  for  men  and  of  two  shillings  for 
boys. 

E.    INTERVENTION    BY   THE    GOVERNMENT 

The  prolonged  negotiations  of  the  miners  and  owners 
having  met  with  no  success,  the  Prime  Minister  intervened. 
He  brought  about  a  joint  conference  of  the  parties  at  the 
Foreign  Office  on  March  8,  which  was  without  results,  and 
on  the  15th  he  announced  in  the  House  of  Commons  the 
introduction  of  a  Minimum  Wage  Bill.  When  the  owners 
became  aware  that  wages  were  to  be  made  a  subject  of 
legislation,  they  protested  vigorously.  "  It  was  confiscation. 
It  was  flying  in  the  face  of  economic  laws."  And  the 
owners  persisted  so  long  in  their  opposition  that  the  Prime 
Minister  revealed  to  them  that  the  King  was  in  favor 
of  the  proposition.  "The  coal  magnates  of  South  Wales 
were  dumbfounded.  They  had  supposed,  as  the  Paris 
*  Matin '  says,  that  a  king  is  always  on  the  side  of  vested 
interests.  The  coal  owners  who  held  out  were  told  that  if 
their  attitude  remained  unmodified,  they  might  be  sum- 
moned to  Buckingham  Palace,  there  to  be  confronted  by 
the  spokesman  for  the  miners.  This  seems  to  have  brought 
the  most  obstinate  to  terms."  ^ 

It  is  estimated  that  by  March  8  a  million  and  a  half 
of  workers  were  idle  and  many  industries  had  suspended 
operations  through  lack  of  coal.  The  extent  of  the  strike 
was  greater  than  that  of  the  big  strike  of  1893,  and  the 
rapidity  with  which  other  industries  were  affected  caused 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  to  be  quickly  realized  by  the 
whole  nation.  A  coal  famine  came  about  in  spite  of  tho 
^  Current  Literature,  vol.  52,  p.  386. 


not     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

fact  that  the  owners  had  anticipated  the  strike  and  had  a 
hirge  amount  of  coal  in  storage. 

F.    THE    PROVISIONS    OF    THE    ACT 

As  soon  as  it  was  evident  that  the  Minimum  Wage  Bill 
would  be  jjassed,  the  strike  was  declared  off  and  the  men 
returned  to  work.  On  March  29  a  Minimum  Wage  Bill 
with  the  following  provisions  was  enacted :  — 

The  rates  of  five  shillings  for  men  and  two  shillings 
for  boys  which  the  Prime  Minister  considered  "  obviously 
just "  were  not  inserted  in  the  bill,  although  the  Govern- 
ment had  offered  to  include  them  during  the  early  stages 
of  the  negotiations.  Attached  to  this  offer  was  a  provision 
that  "  the  5s.  and  2s.  rates  should  be  settled  by  arbitration 
on  a  national  basis.  If  the  arbitrators  found  that  the  5s. 
and  2s.  were,  to  use  Mr.  Asquith's  words, '  obviously  just,' 
then  these  rates  would  have  applied  to  every  mine  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  Incredible  though  it  may  seem,  the  min- 
ers'leaders  positively  refused  to  entertain  this  proposal."^ 
It  would  not  seem  so  incredible  if  this  provision  carried 
with  it  the  possibility  of  having  the  minimum  which  had 
been  obtained  by  conciliation,  and  which  was  higher  than 
five  shillings  in  most  districts,  reduced  to  a  lower  level. 
However,  the  law  provided  that  settlement  of  the  minimum 
wage  should  be  made  by  districts  and  by  district  boards, 
with  the  further  provision  "  that  the  employer  shall  pay 
to  that  workman  [any  workman  under  ground]  wages  at 
not  less  than  the  minimum  rate  settled  under  this  Act  and 
applicable  to  that  workman."  ^  This  would  seem  to  have 
simply  insured  a  certain  minimum  which  might  be  settled 
upon  for  work  in  abnormal  places.  But  it  did  not  necessa- 
rily include  any  provision  for  a  basic  minimum  wage  which 
would  apply  all  over  the  United  Kingdom  and  insure  every 
underground  worker  a  certain  standard  of  living.  On  the 

1  Markham,  Quarterly  Review,  vol.  216,  p.  570. 

2  Coal  Mines  Minimum  Wage  Act,  1912. 


IN   GREAT  BRITAIN  305 

contrary,  the  principle  was  maintained  of  permitting  the 
districts  with  superior  advantages  and  resources  to  con- 
tinue to  profit  by  these  circumstances. 

The  joint  district  board  may  lay  down  rules  providing 
for  the  exckision  of  aged,  infirm,  and  disabled  workmen 
from  their  right  to  wages  at  the  minimum  rate,  and  it  may 
"  lay  down  conditions  with  respect  to  the  regularity  and 
efficiency  of  the  work  to  be  performed  by  the  workmen, 
and  with  respect  to  the  time  for  which  a  workman  is  to  be 
paid  in  the  event  of  any  interruption  of  work  due  to  an 
emergency."  If  the  workman  does  not  comply  with  these 
rules  he  forfeits  the  right  to  wages  at  the  minimum  rate, 
"  except  in  cases  where  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  con- 
ditions is  due  to  some  cause  over  which  he  has  no  control." 
The  rules  shall  state  also  the  persons  by  whom  and  the 
method  by  which  applicability  is  to  be  determined,  and 
under  what  conditions  a  workman  shall  be  judged  as  not 
having  complied  with  them. 

The  act  went  into  effect  immediately,  and  a  workman 
could  recover  his  wages  at  whatever  rate  was  settled  upon, 
but  the  operation  of  the  regulations  under  the  act  must 
not  interfere  with  any  other  customs  or  agreements  by 
which  the  workmen  were  paid  a  rate  higher  than  the  mini- 
mum. In  settling  the  minimum  rate  the  board  must  "have 
regard  to  the  average  daily  rate  of  wages  in  the  district 
paid  to  the  workmen  of  the  class  for  which  the  minimum 
rate  is  settled." 

The  Board  of  Trade  is  empowered  to  recognize  the  joint 
district  boards  that  are  already  in  existence,  or  any  body 
of  persons  with  an  independent  chairman  which  the  Board 
of  Trade  believes  fairly  and  adequately  represents  both 
parties.  If  any  board  does  not  provide  for  equality  of  vot- 
ing power,  the  Board  of  Trade  can  require  it  to  readjust 
such  a  rule  as  a  condition  of  gaining  recognition.  The 
Board  of  Trade  can  appoint  a  person  or  persons  to  settle 
upon  a  minimum  wage  if  within  two  weeks  the  regular 


30G     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

district  boards  have  not  been  recognized  through  failure 
on  the  part  of  either  party  to  appoint  its  representatives. 
If  within  three  weeks  after  the  joint  board  has  been  rec- 
ognized, it  fails  to  settle  upon  a  minimum  wage,  the  chair- 
man of  the  board  may  adjust  the  rates  and  make  the 
rules,  provided  that  the  members  agree  or  the  chairman  of 
the  joint  board  directs  that  a  period  longer  than  three 
weeks  is  necessary. 

The  joint  district  board  settles  upon  general  minimum 
rates  and  general  rules  for  the  whole  district.  In  case  a 
certain  class  or  group  of  mines  requires  different  regida- 
tious,  the  board  may  divide  the  district  into  subdistricts 
and  treat  these  separately.  Or  for  the  purpose  of  settling 
district  rules,  two  or  more  joint  district  boards  may  com- 
bine. The  rates  and  rules  may  be  readjusted  at  any  time 
if  both  parties  agree,  or  after  one  year  has  elapsed  if  there 
seems  to  be  any  considerable  demand  for  readjustment 
from  either  side. 

G.    SETTLEMENT   UNDER    THE    ACT 

The  act  expires  in  three  years  unless  Parliament  shall 
determine  otherwise.  The  minimum  wages  settled  under 
the  act  vary  from  4s.  lOd.  to  7s.  6d.  for  men,  and  the 
wages  for  boys  are  graduated  from  2s.  at  the  age  of  four- 
teen to  as  high  as  5s.  6d.  at  the  age  of  twenty-one.^ 

The  rules  which  have  been  established  by  the  joint 
Yorkshire  district  boards  are  typical  and  include  the  fol- 
lowing provisions :  Aged  and  infirm  men  are  not  entitled 
to  the  minimum  wage,  and  aged  workmen  are  those  over 
sixty-five  "  and  workmen  over  sixty  who  in  the  opinion  of 
the  board  are  unable  to  do  a  fair  day's  work.  Infirm  work- 
men are  those  who  from  bodily  infirmity  or  illness,  or  ac- 
cident, or  disease,  are  unable  to  do  a  fair  day's  work." 
Unless  a  man  works  eighty  per  cent  of  the  time  the  mines 

1  Minimum  Rates  and  District  Rules  of  the  Joint  District  Boards  under 
the  Minimum  Wage  Act. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  S07 

are  operated,  he  forfeits  the  right  to  the  minimum  wage 
except  in  cases  of  sickness  or  accident,  of  which  proper 
notice  must  be  given  to  the  management.  If  a  workman 
becomes  a  party  to  any  arrangement  for  limiting  outjsut, 
he  forfeits  the  minimum  wage.  Nor  is  he  entitled  to  the 
wage  if  when  he  presents  himseK  for  work  he  is  informed 
that  something  has  happened  which  prevents  the  working 
of  the  mine.  In  case  of  accident  or  any  cause  which  neces- 
sitates the  closing  of  the  mine  during  the  regular  working 
hours,  the  workman  is  entitled  to  only  the  percentage  of 
the  minimum  wage  corresponding  to  the  time  worked. 

In  case  a  dispute  arises  as  to  whether  the  minimum  wage 
is  to  apply  to  a  workman  or  as  to  whether  he  has  failed  to 
comply  with  the  regulations,  the  question  may  be  decided 
by  agreement  between  the  workman  and  the  officials  of 
the  mine.  Failure  to  reach  an  agreement  brings  the  case 
before  the  manager  of  the  mine  and  a  person  working  in 
or  about  the  mine  who  may  be  nominated  by  the  work- 
man. If  these  two  fail  to  agree,  the  case  is  brought  before 
a  committee  appointed  by  the  secretaries  of  the  joint  dis- 
trict. When  the  committee  cannot  agree,  the  case  is  de- 
cided by  a  chairman  selected  by  the  parties,  or,  if  they 
cannot  agree  on  a  chairman,  by  a  chairman  selected  by  the 
chairman  of  the  joint  district  board.  The  decision  shall 
not  be  delayed  more  than  twenty-one  days  and  during  that 
time  the  workman's  right  to  receive  the  minimum  wage  is 
reserved. 

When  decisions  have  been  rendered  under  this  system, 
a  certificate  must  be  given  to  the  parties  which  shall  be 
binding,  except  in  cases  where  the  workman  in  dealing 
directly  with  mine  officials  shall  give  notice  within  sixty 
days  after  the  signing  "that  such  certificate  has  been 
obtained  from  him  by  threats,  undue  pressure,  or  other 
unfair  means."  Under  such  circumstances  the  case  is 
opened  anew  and  goes  before  the  committee,  who  may 
cancel  the  certificate. 


308     ARBITRATION  IN  TIIE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

H.    EFFECT    OF    THE    MINIMUM    WAGE 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  provisions  of  the  act  and  the 
working  of  the  same  that  there  is  no  minimum  wage  in 
the  industry  as  a  whole,  but  simply  a  minimum  for  each 
mine,  group  of  mines,  or  district,  as  the  case  may  be.  It 
has  been  prophesied  that  a  real  minimum  wage  on  a  na- 
tional scale  would  necessarily  close  the  poorest  mines  and 
encourage  more  efficient  management.  But  the  act  protects 
the  owners  of  the  poorest  mines  and  yields  to  their  claim 
that  "  they  must  have  cheap  labour  irrespective  of  the  cost 
of  living."  This  lowers  the  standard  of  living  and  gives 
a  subsidy  to  the  owners  of  poorly  managed  mines.  In  the 
words  of  one  who,  though  a  coal  owner,  is  first  of  all  a 
public-minded  citizen  and  interested  in  the  wisest  public 
policy  :  "  The  special  minimum  rate  provided  for  in  the 
act  is,  moreover,  fair  neither  to  owners  nor  to  men,  for  an 
owner  who  starves  his  property  and  spends  all  his  profits 
is  permitted  to  pay  a  lower  minimum  rate  of  wage  than 
another  who  may  spend  half  his  income  on  improving  and 
maintaining  his  mine  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency.  Espe- 
cially is  this  an  injustice  on  the  workman,  for  in  a  well- 
managed  mine  the  men  get  good  clearance  [for  their  coal] . 
In  the  badly  equipped  mine  the  reverse  is  the  case  ;  and 
low  wages  are  paid  because  the  men  are  unable,  through 
bad  roads,  shortness  of  tubs,  out-of-date  haulage,  etc.,  to 
get  clearance ;  for  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
hewers  of  coal  are  invariably  paid  on  the  tonnage  of  coal 
gotten."  1  He  was  further  convinced  that  if  a  universal 
minimum  wage  was  not  sufficient  incentive  to  increased 
efficiency  in  management  which  would  enable  the  owner 
to  keep  his  mine  open,  the  men  would  readily  find  occu- 
pation in  the  better  mines,  and  there  working  under  better 
conditions  would  produce  a  larger  output  than  before. 
^  Markham,  op.  cit.,  p.  566. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  309 

I.    POSSIBILITIES    OF    THE    INDUSTRY    BEARING    A 
MINIMUM    WAGE 

To  those  who  questioned  the  ability  of  the  industry  to 
bear  a  minimum  wage  the  miners  had  a  ready  answer. 
For  five  years  one  of  their  own  number  and  a  firm  of 
chartered  accountants  had  been  busy  in  making  a  study 
of  profits  and  wages  in  the  British  coal  trade.^  Their  study 
included  ninety-two  public  companies  which  represent  one 
third  of  the  British  coal  trade  in  production  and  profits, 
and  they  make  no  pretense  that  their  figures  include  more 
thau  "  the  minimum  (not  maximum)  results  of  the  trade 
in  the  country."  The  conclusions  are  based  on  average 
dividends  paid  on  ordinary  capital  over  a  period  of  thir- 
teen years,  and  the  data  are  not  drawn  from  "  a  selected  set 
of  companies."  Among  these  were  six  companies  who  paid 
no  dividends  at  all  and  many  others  whose  failure  to  pay 
dividends  every  year  brings  their  average  very  low.  Even 
on  this  basis  the  average  return  on  capital  in  the  form  of 
dividends  is  9.6  per  cent,  and  the  shareholders  have  re- 
ceived their  capital  back  one  and  one  fourth  times  in  the 
thirteen  years  "  in  addition  to  which  the  original  capital 
not  only  remains  intact,  but  has  been  added  to  by  various 
appropriations  from  profits  in  some  of  the  many  forms  of 
reserves — visible  or  otherwise."  ^  In  comparing  amounts 
received  in  wages  and  in  dividends  (which  the  authors  do 
not  consider  a  fair  comparison  because  the  full  amount 
received  by  labor  is  visible  while  only  a  portion  of  the 
benefits  accruing  to  capital  is  evident),  a  basis  of  19s. 
9|(Z.  per  week  for  miners  is  used  as  contrasted  with  a 
three  per  cent  return  on  capital.  The  19s.  9|r?.  is  based 
on  the  earnings  of  the  highest  paid  labor  in  the  Durham 
coal  trade,  which  may  be  considered  as  approaching  the 
average  of  the  better  paid  labor  over  the  industry  as  a 

1  Richardson  and  Walbrook,  Pnifits  and  Wages  in  the  British  Coal  Trade. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


310     ARBITILYTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

whole  and  leaves  out  of  account  the  great  mass  of  work- 
men who  are  receiving  much  less.  Three  per  cent  is  con- 
sidered a  fair  basis  for  capital,  since  it  is  the  "  recognized 
economic  return  of  interest  on  capital."  From  this  com- 
parison it  is  found  that,  while  wages  average  45  per  cent 
over  the  basis  taken,  ordinary  dividends  average  220  per 
cent  over  the  basis,  or,  in  other  words,  capital  benefits  in 
the  ratio  of  5  to  1.  In  analyzing  the  comparison  of  wages 
and  dividends  of  a  firm  which  balanced  ,£631,000  paid  in 
wages  over  against  £39,086  paid  in  dividends,  it  was  found 
that  after  including  "debenture  interest," ^  "  visible  re- 
serves," "capital  expenditure"  written  off  out  of  the  year's 
profits,  and  the  income  tax  which  had  already  been  de- 
ducted, "  the  total  known  profits  of  this  concern  .  .  .  ex- 
ceeded X80,000."  Comparing  the  returns  on  this  basis, 
"the  average  amount  received  by  each  employee  is  £QQ 
15s.  lOc?.,  while  the  profits  for  the  year  for  each  share- 
holder average  X68  19s.  3c?." 

But  when  a  comparison  is  made  (for  the  whole  indus- 
try) between  wages  and  total  profits,  which  include  pref- 
erence dividends  and  debenture  interest  besides  ordinary 
dividends,  it  is  found  that  capital  profits  in  the  ratio  of 
6  to  1,  or  293  per  cent  as  against  45  per  cent.  The  in- 
vestigators are  confident  that  the  total  profits  are  the 
minimum  profits,  for  they  were  not  able  to  obtain  the  total 
profits  of  all  the  concerns  and  are  not  sure  that  they  got 
the  total  profits  of  those  firms  which  are  supposed  to  have 
rendered  a  full  report.  But  even  on  this  basis  the  average 
percentage  of  total  profits  on  total  capital  is  11.88  per 
cent.  From  this  investigation  the  authors  concluded  that 
"an  average  of  about  five  shillings  per  week  [could]  be 
added  to  the  miners'  wages  all  around,  and  still  leave  an 
average  return  on  the  total  capital  sunk  in  the  coal  trade 
for  the  whole  period  of  thirteen  years  of  at  least  three  per 
cent  per  annum."  ^   Or  2s.  6 J.  could  be  added  and  still 

^  The  same  as  our  interest  on  bonds. 

^  This  is  exclusive  of  the  income  tax  at  the  source. 


m    GREAT   BRITAIN  311 

give  capital  an  average  9.6  per  cent  dividend,  "  merely  by 
utilizing  undivided  profit  and  without  affecting  the  divi- 
dends which  have  been  paid  by  the  various  companies  in 
the  past  thirteen  years." 

The  developments  in  the  British  coal  industry,  which 
we  have  briefly  described,  should  enable  us  to  anticipate, 
to  some  extent  at  least,  the  trend  of  evolution  which  lies 
before  the  coal  industry  of  America.  Up  to  the  present 
time  trade  unionism  in  the  British  coal  industry  has  not 
had  to  face  a  united  body  of  capitalists  with  a  national 
organization,  yet  it  has  had  a  very  severe  struggle  to  ob- 
tain concessions  by  peaceful  means.  The  growing  realiza- 
tion of  the  power  of  the  miners'  national  organization  may 
cause  British  owners  to  unite  to  meet  the  men  with  a  simi- 
lai'ly  unified  front.  In  fact,  the  miners  were  anxious  to 
have  the  owners  make  a  settlement  on  a  national  scale  of 
the  minimum  wage.  But  concentration  of  ownership  and 
control  has  not  progressed  in  Great  Britain  to  the  degree 
that  it  has  in  our  anthracite  field  and  in  some  portions  of 
our  richest  bituminous  field,  and  the  force  of  competition 
is  still  a  disrupting  factor  among  the  owners. 

The  next  big  issue  in  the  mining  industry  of  Great 
Britain  will  undoubtedly  be  the  nationalization  of  mines. 
This  movement  has  been  on  foot  for  some  years,  and  the 
miners  have  already  taken  definite  parliamentary  action 
looking  to  its  accomplishment.  The  "  way  leaves,"  ^  mine 
royalties,  and  large  profits  of  the  owners  stand  as  a  con- 
stant challenge  to  the  men  who  mine  the  coal.  National 
ownership,  if  it  comes,  will  probably  come  peacefully  be- 
cause the  British  already  have  at  hand  the  social  and  po- 
litical machinery  with  which  to  make  it  effective. 

In  the  process  of  working  out  peaceful  adjustments,  the 
average  individual  develops  to  the  point  where  he  is  fitted 

^  The  cbarg'e  made  upon  every  ton  of  coal  by  a  property  owner  where 
entrance  to  a  mine  lias  been  g-ained  tbroug'h  hia  property.  It  ia  looked  upon 
as  legal  "  blackmail  "  by  owners  and  miners. 


812     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

to  carry  out  bis  part  under  new  conditions.  In  the  anthra- 
cite negotiations  of  1912,  utterance  was  given  to  ideas  that 
will  probably  evolve  in  time  into  a  frank  demand  for 
national  ownership  of  coal  mines.  As  yet  we  have  hardly 
begun  to  take  measures  to  encourage  orderly  development 
and  sanity  on  the  part  of  the  workers  in  the  working-out 
of  industrial  adjustments.  Lack  of  public  policy  or  re- 
pression causes  the  labor  unrest  to  take  the  form  of  syn- 
dicalism and  the  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World.  With 
the  development  of  a  greater  solidarity  among  the  workers 
and  with  the  increasing  economic  pressure  due  to  the  ex- 
haustion of  our  free  land,  we  may  expect  a  demand  for 
social  and  political  action  which  will  put  a  severe  strain  on 
our  rigid  constitutional  system.  Even  in  Britain,  where 
political  institutions  are  more  elastic  and  where  pressing 
demands  can  be  met  more  readily  by  legislative  action,  it 
is  only  after  a  struggle  that  adjustments  are  made  to 
fit  the  needs  resulting  from  economic  and  social  pressure. 
There  the  workers  are  now  met  by  a  frank,  conciliatory 
policy  that  ramifies  through  all  industry.  But  what  of  the 
future  in  this  country  if  in  1916,  when  the  present  agree- 
ments in  both  the  bituminous  and  anthracite  fields  expire 
simultaneously,  either  party  assumes  an  arbitrary  and  un- 
yielding position  ? 


CHAPTER  IX 
OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE 

1.    RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  A  CONCILIATORY 

SYSTEM,   PRICES   OF  COAL,   AND   A 

REGULATORY   POLICY 

When  we  ask,  "  What  of  the  public  ?  "  it  would  seem  that 
this  question  has  at  least  two  aspects.  The  public  has  been 
made  to  feel  that  there  is  very  close  connection  between 
a  system  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  and  the  price  it 
pays  for  coal.  Furthermore,  we  have  seen  that  on  several 
occasions  the  public  has  found  its  whole  supply  of  coal 
cut  off  because  of  the  lack  of  a  system  of  peaceful  settle- 
ment which  would  permit  the  parties  producing  coal  to 
come  to  an  honorable  and  fair  adjustment  of  their  diffi- 
culties. 

Shortly  after  the  last  anthracite  agreement  in  1912, 
consumers  were  informed  that  they  must  pay  a  higher 
price  for  their  coal  because  wages  had  been  raised.  This 
seemed  a  fairly  reasonable  explanation,  but  it  did  not 
satisfy  everybody  that  the  wage-earners  were  getting  all 
the  increase.  A  resolution  passed  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  July  29,  1912,  directed  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  to  obtain  information  which  would 
show  how  much  "the  coal  miners  were  benefited  by  the 
recent  strike  agreement,  and  how  much  and  for  what  rea- 
sons and  by  what  means  the  cost  of  coal  to  the  general 
consumers  was  at  the  same  time  increased."  ^  As  a  result 
of  this  investigation  it  was  shown  that  seven  companies, 

^  Increase  in  Prices  of  Anthracite  Coal,  62d  Congress,  3d  Session,  House 
Doc.  no.  l-i42,  p.  U. 


314     ARBITILVTION  IN  TIIE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

which  produced  about  seventy  per  cent  of  the  total  sales, 
had  obtained  about  813,450,000  "  more  than  they  would 
have  received  for  the  same  tonnage  at  the  prices  previously 
existing."  ^  Of  this  amount  the  miners  received  about 
$4,000,000.  Since  the  cost  of  labor  constitutes  between 
seventy-five  and  eighty  per  cent  of  the  total  colliery  cost, 
the  consumers  may  well  question  the  extent  to  which  the 
employers  are  to  be  allowed  to  raise  prices  every  time  the 
miners  are  granted  an  increase  in  wages.  Nor  are  the  con- 
sumers protected  by  anything  other  than  the  privilege  of 
substituting  some  other  kind  of  fuel  when  the  prices  of 
coal  become  prohibitive.  This  is  not  possible  without  a 
great  deal  of  trouble  and  expense,  and  there  are  compara- 
tively few  substitutes  to  be  had.  Consumers  will  pay  al- 
most extortion  prices  for  anthracite  rather  than  substitute 
soft  coal  with  Its  disagreeable  qualities,  and  this  fact,  in 
connection  with  the  expense  involved,  gives  us  a  concep- 
tion of  the  margin  the  operators  have  to  play  upon  before 
they  reach  the  maximum  which  the  traffic  will  bear.  Since 
the  domestic  consumers  have  to  pay  for  the  greater  part 
of  this  increase  (the  average  increase  on  domestic  sizes 
was  81.23  cents  per  ton,  while  the  pea  coal  and  steam 
sizes  were  increased  only  16.14  cents  per  ton),^  it  becomes 
evident  that  protection  from  such  a  burden  must  come 
from  the  Government.  Thus  far  under  our  governmental 
policy  of  laissez-faire  in  industry,  the  organized  and  pow- 
erful have  been  able  to  gain  their  purposes  and  the  dis- 
organized consumers  are  left  to  express  their  protests  at 
election  times.  Before  we  can  be  in  a  position  to  appreci- 
ate the  complexity  of  the  problem  before  us  we  shall  have 
to  look  back  upon  the  efforts  that  have  been  made  and  the 
recommendations  suggested  for  dealing  with  the  growing 
coal  monopoly.  In  conjunction  with  a  constructive  policy 
which  would  prohibit  the  operators  from  shifting  upon  the 

^  Increase  in  Prices  of  Anthracite  Coal,  62d  Congress,  3d  Session,  House 
Doc.  no.  1442,  p.  11.  2  jj,j. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  315 

public  an  Increase  greater  than  that  granted  to  the  wage- 
earners,  plus  legitimate  profits,  we  must  have  a  further  ex- 
tension of  the  activities  of  the  Government  into  the  realm 
of  industrial  agreements  which  shall  encourage  within  the 
parties  a  feeling  of  greater  responsibility  to  the  public. 

In  our  efforts  to  prevent  the  growth  of  a  monopoly  con- 
trol and  the  fixing  of  prices  of  coal,  our  public  policy  has 
gone  through  an  evolution  based  on  common  law,  state 
statutes  and  constitutions,  national  laws  in  restraint  of 
trade  with  court  interpretations,  with  barely  a  beginning 
at  a  policy  of  regulation  under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  We  have  clung  tenaciously  to  the  theory  that 
law  'per  se  is  quite  sufficient  and  needs  but  little  coopera- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  administrative  branch  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. We  have  expected  that  the  mere  existence  of 
law  would  be  sufficient  to  counteract  the  influence  of  fun- 
damental economic  forces.  But  these,  as  they  were  bound 
to,  have  worked  themselves  out  without  the  guidance  and 
cooperation  of  the  Government. 

A.  Kecommendations  of  Investigating  Committees 

A.     THE    committee    OF    1888 

With  the  prevalence  of  abuses  in  freight  rates,  increas- 
ing concentration  of  ownership  of  coal  lands,  and  the 
growth  of  labor  struggles  involving  large  numbers,  we 
have  appointed  our  investigating  committees,  but  their 
recommendations  we  have  accepted  slowly  if  at  all.  As 
early  as  1878,  the  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania  recognized 
the  power  of  the  railroads  to  force  concentrated  ownership 
by  discrimination  in  freight  rates,  and  a  joint  resolution 
was  passed  petitioning  Congress  to  legislate  "  for  equity 
in  the  rates  of  freight."  ^  The  congressional  committee  of 
1888  which  investigated  theanthracite  troubles  found  prac- 
tically the  same  conditions  we  have  now  except  that  they 
*  Lloyd,  Lords  of  Industry,  p.  237. 


31G     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

were  not  developed  quite  so  far.  Under  state  remedies  for 
dealing  with  the  situation  they  suggested,  first,  that  the 
state  tax  "  idle  anthracite  lands  on  the  basis  of  their  full 
market  value,"  which  would  foi'ce  the  holders  to  work,  sell, 
or  lease  them.^  By  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent 
domain  the  State  could  take  possession  of  the  lands  at  a 
fair  valuation  and  then  "  throw  them  open  to  free  com- 
petition in  mining  at  a  reasonable  royalty,  sufficient  to 
pay  the  interest  on  the  debt  she  would  thereby  contract." 
Through  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  the  State  could 
fix  a  minimum  freight  rate  and  a  maximum  royalty.  On 
the  side  of  national  remedies  the  committee  suggested  that 
Congress  could  prohibit  interstate  carriers  from  engaging 
in  mining  and  manufacturing.  And  further,  Congress  could 
prohibit  the  consolidation  of  parallel  or  competing  lines 
which  tap  the  anthracite  region. 

B.    THE    COMMITTEE    OF   1893 

The  congressional  committee  of  1893  concluded  that 
the  railroad  companies  had  entered  into  a  combination  to 
control  output  and  fix  prices.  They  were  fortified  in  this 
conclusion  by  evidence  of  monthly  meetings  of  railroad 
representatives  in  whicli,  as  the  result  of  tacit  understand- 
ing, the  industry  was  regulated.  The  railroads  forced  re- 
calcitrant operators  to  limit  their  output  by  withholding 
cars  from  them.  These  monthly  meetings  explained  why 
the  annual  output  of  coal  was  about  10,000,000  tons  less 
than  the  capacity  of  the  mines  would  warrant.  The  manip- 
ulation of  freight  rates  was  also  used  to  hold  the  inde- 
pendent operator  in  line.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission had  determined,  in  the  case  of  Coxe  Brothers  and 
Company  versus  the  Lehigh  Valley  Railroad,  in  1888,  that 
the  railroad  was  charging  fifty  cents  per  ton  above  what 
the  commission  regarded  as  a  fair  rate.   Yet  the  commis- 

^  Report  on  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887-88,  op.  ci'f., 
p.  xri. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  317 

sion  had  at  that  time  no  power  to  fix  rates.  Because  of 
these  conditions  the  committee  centered  their  recommen- 
dations about  features  which  would  give  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  adequate  powers  to  deal  with  the 
situation,  and  suggested  that  state  and  national  Govern- 
ments take  united  action  in  divorcing  the  business  of 
transportation  from  mining  and  manufacturing.^ 

C.    THE    INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 
INVESTIGATION,  1907 

The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in  1907,  after  in- 
quiring into  the  ownership  of  coal  lands,  stock  ownership 
in  coal  companies  by  railroads,  and  other  factors  which 
might  give  monopoly  control  of  the  bituminous  coal  in 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Virginia,  and  West  Virginia,  set 
forth  the  following  facts  which  it  regarded  as  contributory 
to  discrimination  and  monopoly  power. 

The  first  great  factor  which  permitted  unfair  car  dis- 
tribution was  "want  of  publicity  on  the  part  of  the  car- 
riers in  their  dealings  with  shippers."  If  there  was  any 
system  to  the  car  distribution  it  was  hard  for  the  shipper 
to  find  out  what  it  was  and  whether  it  was  faithfully 
carried  out. 

The  method  of  rating  mines  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining proper  distribution  of  cars  was  another  important 
factor.  "If  capacity  of  mines  is  to  govern  in  the  rating 
for  car  distribution,  the  persons  or  companies  owning  the 
mines  should  be  fairly  represented  when  such  a  rating  is 
made."  The  importance  of  this  factor  is  exemplified  by 
the  practice  of  companies  (which  own  several  mines)  in 
utilizing  their  entire  car  allotment  to  alternately  run  up 
the  capacity  of  their  mines.  This  is  accomplished  by  the 
way  they  distribute  their  cars  to  certain  mines  and  shut 
down  others. 

The   Commission    was   of   the   opinion  also   that   the 

^  Report  on  Alleged  Coal  Combination,  1893,  op.  cit.,  p.  viii. 


818     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

ownership  by  the  Pennsylvania  and  the  New  York  Central 
Railroads  of  stock  in  other  roads  tended  to  eliminate  com- 
petition in  rates,  although  the  railroads  justified  this  own- 
ership by  pointing  to  it  as  "  the  real  cause  for  the  cessation 
in  rebates." 

Another  important  element  entering  into  the  situation 
was  the  ownership  of  "  individual  cars  "  which  made  it 
possible  for  the  large  operators  to  get  a  greater  amount 
of  coal  to  market  and  have  greater  regularity  of  service. 
These  cars  were  sold  or  leased  to  the  individual  operator 
by  the  railroad,  and  the  owner  was  allowed  a  reduction  of 
six  mills  per  mile  on  freight  rates  for  their  use.  Since 
this  allowance  was  insufficient  to  pay  interest  on  the  in- 
vestment, the  amount  of  coal  marketed  and  regularity  of 
service  were  the  important  factors. 

Analogous  to  this  abuse  of  individual  cars  was  the  as- 
signment of  fuel  cars  for  railroad  coal  to  certain  mines  or 
mining  companies  without  counting  them  in  the  regular 
allotment.  This  practice  is  "  frequently  used  by  the  rail- 
road company  to  enable  it  to  get  its  coal  supply  at  less 
than  the  market  price  of  coal." 

To  rectify  these  conditions  the  Commission  recom- 
mended that  common  carriers  be  required  to  make  public 
their  systems  of  car  distribution.  They  should  be  required 
to  publish  them  at  stated  periods,  show  their  effect  on  the 
different  divisions,  and,  when  the  supply  did  not  equal 
the  demand,  explain  how  the  cars  were  divided  among  the 
mines  along  the  road.  If  "  capacity  of  mines  "  were  used 
as  the  basis  of  distribution,  owners  of  mines  should  be 
represented  at  the  rating  thereof.  The  Commission  fur- 
ther recommended  that  "  after  [a]  reasonable  time "  in- 
dividual or  private  cars  should  be  prohibited,  and  that 
carriers  or  their  officers  be  forbidden  to  own  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  any  operated  coal  properties.^ 

1  Report  0/  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  on  Discriminations  and  Mo- 
nopolies in  Coal  and  Oil,  1907,  p.  81. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  819 

These  conditions  in  the  bituminous  fields  and  the  re- 
commendations for  correcting  abuses  show  that  we  have 
the  same  influences,  working  toward  the  same  results,  as 
have  been  noted  in  the  anthracite  field.  Many  unique 
suggestions  have  been  offered  for  dealing  with  our  coal 
monopoly.  We  shall  see  to  what  extremes  advocates  of 
the  common  law  are  willing  to  go. 

B.  The  Common  Law  Remedies 

Supplementary  to  the  principle  permitting  the  State  to 
compel  an  owner  of  purely  private  real  estate  to  conform 
to  state  regulations  is  the  doctrine  that  the  owner  of  prop- 
erty which  has  a  quasi-public  character  is  further  obligated 
to  conform  to  public  needs  and  policy.  This  doctrine  has 
received  the  support  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
in  the  case  known  as  Munn  vs.  Illinois,  94  U.S.  113,  de- 
cided in  1876.  In  this  case  a  firm  owning  and  operating  a 
grain  elevator  refused  to  conform  to  a  state  statute  requir- 
ing grain-elevator  owners  to  take  out  a  license  which  would 
insure  the  faithful  performance  of  their  duties  as  public 
warehousemen.  It  was  decided  that  the  State  had  the  right 
to  require  the  owners  of  property  on  which  the  public  good 
depended  to  conform  to  regulations  necessary  for  accom- 
plishing this  end.  Furthermore,  this  common-law  principle 
of  early  origin  stood  in  support  of  any  constitutional  or 
statutory  provisions.  Not  only  had  the  State  a  right  to 
regulate,  but  also  to  fix,  prices.  If  there  is  no  statute 
in  existence,  and  representative  people  dependent  on  the 
public  services  of  the  property  complain  that  the  owner 
refuses  to  give  the  services  which  the  nature  of  his  public 
ownership  requires,  the  courts  commonly  appoint  agents 
or  receivers  to  operate  the  property  and  see  that  all  par- 
ties are  rendered  justice. 

In  1902,  when  the  railroads  were  refusing  to  arbitrate 
and  thus  make  possible  the  operation  of  tlieir  proper- 
ties, one  advocate  of  common-law  procedure  summed  up 


S20     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

his  argument  and  citation  of  authorities  with  this  state- 
ment :  — 

It  follows  that  since  the  public  have  a  right  in  the  mines  —  a 
right  to  have  coal  forthwith  mined  for  immediate  consumption 
—  and  have  a  right  to  have  that  coal  immediately  transported 
out  of  the  mine  regions  by  the  coal-carrying  roads  —  a  court  of 
equity,  if  no  other  solution  of  the  difficulty  is  open,  has  the  au- 
thority to,  and,  upon  the  application  of  a  representative  portion 
of  the  public,  undoubtedly  would,  appoint  a  receiver  or  receiv- 
ers to  take  into  his  or  their  hands  the  whole  business  now  in 
the  hands  of  the  anthracite  coal  combine,  and  to  run  it  in  their 
place.  This  would  be  neither  nationalism  nor  socialism,  and 
would  introduce  no  unfamihar  principle  of  law  or  of  practice, 
and  would  not  extend  one  whit  the  magnitude  of  the  powers 
heretofore  lately  exercised  by  the  courts  of  justice  in  great  en- 
terprises.^ 

But  so  long  as  the  owners  continued  to  serve  the  public 
there  would  be  no  remedy  from  this  source.  Furthermore, 
in  the  matter  of  combination  and  restraint  of  trade  the 
common  law  operates  merely  in  a  negative  way.  It  pro- 
vides that  covenants  in  restraint  of  trade  are  not  operative 
or  effective,  "  but  it  can  do  little  if  all  within  the  combi- 
nation are  satisfied."  ^  Then  it  is  that  affirmative  statutes 
are  needed. 

C.  The  Inadequacy  of  Decisions  based  on  Laws 
IN  Restraint  of  Trade 

A.    THE    RECENT    ANTHRACITE    DECISION 

Even  when  we  have  the  affirmative  statutes  in  the  form 
of  the  Sherman  Law  and  the  commodity  clause  of  the 
Hepburn  Act,  the  extent  to  which  they  are  prohibitory 
and  really  effective  in  preventing  restraint  of  trade  and 
monopoly  control  is  well  exemplified  by  the  results  of  the 
commodities  case  and  of  the  recent  decision  of  the  Su- 

^  Chaplin,  The  Coal  Mines  and  the  Public,  p.  37. 
2  Wyman,  Control  of  the  Market,  p.  138. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  321 

preme  Court  dealing  with  the  anthracite  situation.  In  this 
latter  decision  the  government  attoi-neys  were  informed 
that  they  had  failed  to  establish  the  fact  that  there  was 
any  general  combination  which  entered  into  a  pooling  ar- 
rangement to  apportion  tonnage.  Yet  the  court  took  cog- 
nizance of  the  Temple  Iron  Company,  which  as  a  holding 
company  was  operating  in  restraint  of  trade  and  was  de- 
clared illegal.  The  very  antecedents  of  the  holding  com- 
pany,^ the  way  it  was  formed,  the  percentages  of  holdings 
in  the  company,  and  the  voting  trust  which  it  entailed  all 
point  to  the  power  to  control  production,  allot  tonnage, 
and  fix  prices.  The  court  admitted  that  the  thwarting  of 
the  projected  New  York,  Wyoming,  and  Western  Rail- 
road, in  order  to  prevent  the  competition  of  independents 
in  the  market,  was  an  illegal  act  in  restraint  of  trade  and 
that  it  was  accomplished  by  the  Temple  Iron  Company  as 
a  holding  company.  But  it  found  no  general  combination 
in  restraint  of  trade.  Furthermore,  "  its  board  of  directors, 
composed  as  it  is  of  men  representing  the  defendants,  sup- 
plies time,  place,  and  occasion  for  the  expression  of  plans 
or  combinations  requiring  or  inviting  concert  of  action. 
Though  as  a  board  it  may  not  dictate  the  activities  of  the 
owning  corporations,  still,  in  view  of  the  relation  of  the 
Temple  Iron  Company  to  the  defendant  carriers  and  their 
respective  coal  mining  companies,  and  of  the  constitution 
of  its  directors,  the  attitude  of  its  board,  as  indicated  by 
the  proceedings  spread  upon  the  corporate  minutes,  is  of 
significance  upon  the  question  of  the  existence  of  any  con- 
certed purpose  to  unite  the  activities  of  its  corporate  own- 
ers to  suppress  competition.  There  are  to  be  found  on  the 
minutes  of  the  Temple  Iron  Company  a  number  of  entries 
which  point  strongly  to  combinations  between  the  defend- 
ants. Thus,  on  June  27,  1899,  a  committee  was  appointed 
to  consider  the  establishment  of  a  statistical  bureau  '  to 
keep  a  record  of  all  matters  of  interest  to  the  anthracite 
^  We  have  already  described  these  on  pp.  226-227,  atite. 


322     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.VL  INDUSTRY 

companies.'  "  ^  The  evidence  was  sufficient  to  warrant  the 
dissolution  of  the  Temple  Iron  Company,  but  not  to  es- 
tablish a  general  combination  in  restraint  of  trade.  The 
court  considered  it  sufficient  to  break  up  the  combination 
into  its  elements,  for  "each  group  in  the  absence  of  any 
agreement  or  combination  j^ossesses  the  poioer  to  compete 
with  every  other  in  the  production,  sale,  and  transporta- 
tion of  coal."  2 

Following  the  consummation  of  the  Temple  Iron  Com- 
pany deal,  the  independents  were  given  sixty-five  per  cent 
contracts  in  order  to  mollify  them.  This  meant  that  they 
would  get  sixty-five  per  cent  of  the  selling  price  of  coal  at 
tidewater,  be  relieved  of  the  expense  of  selling  agencies, 
and  pay  fluctuating  freight  rates  with  the  varying  price  in 
coal.  These  contracts  were  declared  illegal  and  void.  On 
what  grounds  can  such  a  decision  be  justified  as  helping 
either  the  public  by  a  fall  in  prices  or  as  aiding  the  inde- 
pendents in  making  them  freer  and  able  to  get  better 
prices  for  their  coal  ?  The  usual  argument  is  that  it  will 
reestablish  a  certain  amount  of  competition.  Up  to  the 
present,  at  least,  the  independent  has  been  practically  at 
the  mercy  of  the  carriers  as  to  freight  rates,  allotment  of 
cars,  and  discrimination.  The  railroad  can  justify  freight 
rates  by  pointing  to  the  rates  they  charge  their  own  min- 
ing companies,  even  though  they  are  "  robbing  Peter  to 
pay  Paul."  The  independents  will  also  be  put  to  the  ex- 
pense of  establishing  selling  agencies,  which  certainly  will 
not  help  to  reduce  the  selling  price  to  the  consumer.  Last, 
and  more  important  than  all,  the  comparatively  small  ton- 
nage and  control  of  unmined  coal  points  to  one  of  the  ele- 
ments that  make  it "  seem  a  little  mystifying  that  President 
Baer  and  Attorney-General  Wickersham  express  equal 
satisfaction  with  the  opinion."  The  general  understand- 

^  United  States  vs.  Beading  Company^  33  Supreme  Court  Reporter,  no.  4, 
p.  97. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  93.   Italics  mine. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  323 

ing  developed  by  the  Temple  Iron  Company  will  con- 
tinue, and  the  railroads  are  quite  sui-e  that  the  independ- 
ents received  enough  benefit  by  their  sixty -five  per  cent 
contracts,  so  that  they  will  seek  to  save  themselves  trou- 
ble and  expense  by  selling  the  railroads  their  coal.  As 
for  the  Attorney-General,  he  was  probably  deluded  into 
thinking  the  decision  would  accomplish  more  than  it  will. 
So  far  as  the  absorption  of  the  Pennsylvania  Coal 
Company  and  the  New  York,  Susquehanna,  and  Western 
Railroad  by  the  Erie,  and  the  acquisition  by  the  Reading 
of  the  majority  stock  ownership  in  the  Jersey  Central  is 
concerned,  these  deals  are  still  open  to  action  by  the 
Government.  However  we  may  look  upon  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  facts,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  decision 
does  not  mean  that  such  a  combination  did  not  exist,  but 
that  it  has  not  been  proved  to  exist.  There  is  hardly  need 
to  raise  the  question  of  the  efficacy  of  the  courts  in  dealing 
with  the  situation. 


B.    THE    "  COMMODITIES    CASE  " 

The  commodities  clause  of  the  Hepburn  Act,*  which 
prohibits  the  common  carrier  from  transporting  any  arti- 
cle or  commodity  which  it  has  manufactured,  mined,  or 
produced,  "or  which  it  may  own  in  whole  or  in  part,  or  in 
which  it  may  have  any  interest,  direct  or  indirect,"  was 
inoperative  in  this  case  for  two  reasons.  Action  in  the 
anthracite  case  was  begun  in  1907  before  the  Hepburn 
Act  became  effective  (May  1,  1908),  and  on  that  score 
the  Delaware,  Lackawanna,  and  Western  Railroad,  whose 
charter  permitted  it  to  engage  in  mining,  was  not  subject 
to  action  in  this  case.  But  relief  against  a  continuance  of 
the  mining  operations  can  be  sought  in  another  proceed- 
ing. On  the  basis  of  priority  of  action  the  other  roads 

^  "  An  Act  to  regulate  commerce,"  34  Statutes  at  Large,  584,  chap. 
3591. 


354     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

were  also  immune  in  this  case,  but  one  may  wonder  why 
they  are  not  also  subject  to  proceedings  under  the  com- 
modities clause,  since  they  own  and  have  "  an  interest, 
direct  or  indirect,"  in  subsidiary  coal  companies.  In  1908 
a  decision  ^  was  rendered  on  this  same  commodities  clause 
which  ruled  that  "  the  provision  of  the  commodities 
clause  relating  to  interest,  direct  or  indirect,  does  not  em- 
brace an  interest  which  a  carrier  may  have  in  a  producing 
corporation  as  the  result  of  ownership  by  the  carrier  of 
stock  in  such  corporation." 

C.     UNITED    STATES   VS.    LEHIGH   VALLEY   RAILROAD 
COMPANY 

But  the  Supreme  Court  was  soon  called  upon  to  amplify 
its  decision  in  the  United  States  vs.  the  Delaware  and 
Hudson  Company  and  interpret  still  further  the  mean- 
ing it  attached  to  the  commodities  clause.  In  fact,  the 
case  of  the  United  States  vs.  the  Lehigh  Valley  Rail- 
road Company  (1910)  ^  is  a  sequel  to  the  former  case  de- 
cided in  1908.  The  court  had  held  that  the  prohibitions 
of  the  commodities  clause  had  but  a  common  purpose,  to 
disassociate  the  "railroad  companies  prior  to  transporta- 
tion from  articles  or  commodities,  whether  the  association 
resulted  from  manufacture,  mining,  production  or  own- 
ership, or  interest,  direct  or  indirect,"  and  these  provisions 
were  applicable  to  a  "  legal  or  equitable  interest "  which 
could  be  satisfied  by  the  coal  company  being  a  "  distinct 
corporation  "  from  the  railroad.  "  Thus  construed,"  the 
clause  was  held  to  be  "within  the  power  of  Congress  to 
enact." 

The  clause,  bearing  this  interpretation,  was  remanded 
to  the  lower  court  for  further  proceedings.  The  Lehigh 
Valley  Coal  Company  was  charged  with  not  being  a  bona 

^  United  States  ex  rel.  The  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  vs.  Del- 
aware and  Hudson  Company,  213  U.S.  36G. 
2  220  U.S.  257. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  325 

Jide  mining  company,  but  merely  a  department  of  the 
railroad  company.  Further,  the  railroad  used  its  stock 
ownership  in  the  coal  company  to  "buy  up  all  the  coal 
produced  by  other  mining  companies  in  the  area  tributary 
to  the  railroad  and  fix  the  price  at  which  such  coal  was 
bought."  By  this  means  and  by  the  control  of  transpor- 
tation facilities  it  was  able  to  determine  prices  at  sea- 
board. 

The  lower  court  had  refused  to  allow  the  Government 
to  file  an  amended  bill  and  had  dismissed  the  suit.  The 
case  was  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court.  In  reply  to  a 
technical  objection  of  the  railroad  company,  which  claimed 
that  the  action  of  the  lower  court  was  not  susceptible  to 
review,  "  however  germane  that  amendment  may  have 
been  .  .  .  because  the  allowance  of  amendments  to  pro- 
ceedings is  discretionary  with  a  trial  court  .  .  .  unless  a 
gross  abuse  of  discretion  was  committed,"  the  Supreme 
Court  decided  that  "  an  absolute  abuse  of  discretion  "  had 
been  committed  in  refusing  to  allow  the  amendment. 

The  railroads  had  interpreted  the  former  commodities 
decision  to  permit  unlimited  commingling  of  the  affairs  of 
coal  and  railroad  companies,  but  the  court  decreed  that 
they  must  be  bona  fide  separate  corporations,  and  insisted 
that  the  abuses  of  "  such  a  situation  could  not  have  ex- 
isted had  the  fact  that  the  two  corporations  were  separate 
and  distinct  legal  entities  been  regarded  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  affairs  of  the  coal  company."  As  it  now 
stands  the  railroads  can  continue  to  be  interested  in  coal 
companies,  provided  they  keep  up  the  appearance  of  bona 
fide  legal  entities. 

D.  The  Lack  of  Public  Policy 

If  we  can  learn  nothing  else  from  this  resume  of  recom- 
mendations by  committees,  common-law  principles,  and 
court  decisions  under  affirmative  statutes  on  restraint  of 
trade,  one  fact  should  stand  out  plainly  —  the  weakness 


32G     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.VL  INDUSTRY 

and  inadequacy  of  our  public  policy  in  dealing  with  the 
growing  control  of  such  an  important  commodity  as  coal. 
Here  we  have  a  natural  resource  which  can  be  made  avail- 
able to  the  public  only  by  the  use  of  transportation  facili- 
ties. The  development  of  the  mines  and  the  railroads  have 
necessarily  gone  hand  in  hand.  Competition,  glutted  mar- 
kets, and  interruption  of  traffic  early  prompted  the  rail- 
roads to  seek  control  of  the  whole  industry.  As  so  many 
units,  the  railroads  found  that  they  were  not  in  a  much 
better  position  to  regulate  the  industry  than  before  they 
acquired  ownership  of  the  coal  lands.  Responding  to  im- 
mutable economic  pressure  as  well  as  to  any  desire  for 
monopoly  which  may  be  attributed  to  them,  they  learned 
to  develop  a  community  of  interests  in  spite  of  legal  ob- 
stacles. Their  problem  has  been  to  curb  the  individual  or 
company  which  proposed  to  carry  free  competition  to  ex- 
tremes, just  exactly  as  the  labor  union  finds  it  necessary 
to  curb  the  individual  who  is  willing  to  work  for  very  low 
wages.  In  the  mean  time  the  consumer,  as  long  as  he  got 
his  coal  at  a  price  somewhere  within  proportion  to  the 
prevailing  regime  of  prices,  paid  what  he  had  to  pay, 
and  grumbled.  The  level  of  monopoly  prices  would  have 
been  higher  than  it  is  had  we  been  dependent  solely  on 
the  effectiveness  of  our  public  policy.  The  competition 
from  bituminous  coal  and  the  limits  set  by  the  possibility 
of  substitution  and  by  ability  to  consume  have  been  the 
only  regulatory  factors  of  the  anthracite  monopoly. 

With  the  rise  of  a  labor  organization  and  a  system  of 
conciliation  and  arbitration  which  will  extend  itself  over 
the  whole  coal  industry,  it  becomes  a  matter  of  vital  con- 
cern to  the  public  that  the  prices  charged  for  coal  shall 
give  a  just  recompense  to  both  labor  and  capital  and  at 
the  same  time  not  reach  an  extortionate  level.  In  this 
connection  one  naturally  wonders  why  the  administrative 
and  regulatory  powers  of  Government,  through  the  activi- 
ties of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and  other 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  327 

commissions,  have  not  evolved  to  a  point  which  would 
permit  more  effective  governmental  protection  of  con- 
sumers. To  understand  this  we  have  but  to  turn  to  a 
consideration  of  the  factors  which  have  prevented  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission  from  adequately  regulating 
interstate  commerce  through  the  adjustment  of  "reason- 
able "  freight  rates.  Then  we  shall  understand  why  further 
extension  of  regulatory  powers  which  would  permit  a  com- 
mission to  deal  with  the  more  difficult  problem  of  con- 
centrated ownership  of  coal  lands  and  railroads  and  the 
adjustment  of  freight  rates  and  prices  of  coal  has  not 
taken  place. 

E.  The  Work  of  the  Interstate  Cosimerce 
Commission 

A.    COXE    brothers    CASE 

Until  recently  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has 
been  greatly  handicapped  in  its  work.  In  its  first  attempt 
to  deal  with  anthracite  rates  it  learned  that  where  rail- 
roads own  mining  companies  the  only  regulation  practica- 
ble is  the  requirement  making  rates  reasonable.  In  1888, 
Coxe  Brothers  and  Company  brought  action  against  the 
Lehigh  Valley  Railroad  for  charging  unreasonable  rates. 
After  an  investigation  in  which  the  other  railroads  refused 
to  avail  themselves  "  of  the  liberty  to  appear  and  join  in 
the  defense,"  the  Commission  established  rates  varying 
from  $1.05  to  il.50  per  ton,  according  to  the  sizes  of  coal. 
The  Lehigh  refused  to  conform  to  the  rates,  and  when 
haled  into  court  by  the  Commission  denied  that  it  had  vio- 
lated any  provision  of  the  act  regulating  commerce  or  that 
its  rates  were  unreasonable.  Furthermore,  if  the  act  per- 
mitted the  Commission  to  set  up  what  it  regarded  as  rea- 
sonable rates,  the  company  held  it  to  be  unconstitutional 
because  it  interfered  "  with  the  common-law  rights  of  com- 
mon carriers  "  and  violated  the  companies'  charter  rights 


328     .ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

which  permitted  a  charge  of  three  cents  per  ton  per  mile 
for  "  tolls  "  and  "  transportation."  ^ 

The  case  was  brought  before  the  Circuit  Court  of  the 
Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania  in  1891,  but  the  decision 
was  not  handed  down  till  1896.  In  the  mean  time  the  at- 
tempted merger  in  1892-93  had  taken  place,  and  the 
Commission  says  rather  bitterly  that  the  interests  of  the 
complainants  were  probably  "  better  served  by  the  present 
high  prices  enforced  through  the  '  combine '  than  they 
would  be  by  the  lower  transportation  rates  "  which  were 
ordered  for  the  public  good.^  In  1896  the  court  informed 
the  Commission  that  it  declined  to  enforce  its  orders  in 
the  matter  of  freight  rates  because  of  "  an  erroneous  esti- 
mate of  cost  to  the  company  "  and  the  inability  of  the  Com- 
mission to  "  itself  fix  rates."  The  estimate  of  cost  by  the 
Commission  had  been  "  made  upon  the  company's  report 
of  earnings  and  expenses  on  coal  transportation  and  was 
somewhat  lower  than  an  estimate  stated  by  counsel  for 
the  carrier." 

The  case  was  appealed,  but  in  1897  the  Supreme  Court 
decision  on  the  Freight  Bureau  Cases,^  which  denied  the 
authority  of  the  Commission  to  require  carriers  not  to  ex- 
ceed charges  found  reasonable  and  just,  caused  the  Com- 
mission to  drop  the  case.  The  Commission  had  expected 
that  the  courts  would  compel  obedience  to  the  orders  of 
the  Commission  "unless  the  record  of  the  investigation 
which  resulted  in  that  order  disclosed  some  plain  error  of 
fact  or  conclusion  sufficient  to  justify  the  court  in  refusing 
to  take  such  action." 

After  the  Commission  had  made  its  investigation,  issued 
its  orders,  and  appealed  to  the  court  to  enforce  them,  it 
was  often  found  that  the  carrier  had  withheld  evidence, 
and  the  courts  were  required  to  pass  on  evidence  very  dif- 
ferent from  that  submitted  to  the  Commission. 

^  Report  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  1891,  p.  288. 
2  Ibid.,  1892,  p.  27.  3  167  u.S.  479. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  329 

The  Commission  summed  up  the  conditions  thus :  — 

The  special  weakness  of  the  law  as  it  now  stands  is  the  want 
of  finality  and  binding  force  to  the  decisions  of  the  Commission 
though  made  upon  facts  ascertained  after  notice  to  the  carriers 
and  full  opportunity  for  all  interested  parties  to  be  heard.  The 
absence  of  any  conclusive  character  to  our  determinations  de- 
prives them  of  the  weight  and  vigor  which  they  ought  to  pos- 
sess, and  prevents  the  exercise  of  that  authority  which  is  essential 
to  effective  regulation.^ 

B.    THE   BAIRD    CASE 

The  next  case  worthy  of  note  that  arose  in  the  anthra- 
cite field  was  the  result  of  a  complaint  concerning  legality 
of  rates  brought  by  William  R.  Hearst  in  1903  against 
the  Readiug  and  other  railroads.  During  the  investigation 
David  S.  Baird,  Secretary  of  the  Lehigh  Valley  Coal 
Company,  refused  to  produce  the  contracts  entered  into 
between  the  company  and  independent  producers.  The 
officials  of  the  other  coal  and  railroad  companies  also  re- 
fused to  produce  similar  contracts.  These  contracts  had 
been  entered  into  after  January  1,  1901,  and  are  now 
popularly  known  as  the  "  sixty-five  per  cent  contracts." 
Information  regarding  the  fixing  of  prices  of  coal  at  tide- 
water, the  cost  of  producing  coal,  and  the  items  entering 
into  company  reports  under  the  heading  "general  ex- 
penses "  was  also  refused. 

The  Commission  brought  action  in  the  United  States 
Circuit  Court  of  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  to 
compel  the  parties ^  to  answer  questions  and  produce  in- 
formation. The  court  compelled  the  president  of  the  Lack- 
awanna to  answer  the  specific  question  regarding  the  items 
under  general  expenses,  "inasnuich  as  the  documents 
containing  that  item  were  in  evidence  before  the  Com- 
mission,"   But  the  court  held  tliat  the  other  information 

^  Ileport  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commissioti,  189'),  p.  11. 

2  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  vs.  Baird  et  al.,  1^4  U.S.  25. 


330     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.VL  INDUSTRY 

asked  and  the  contracts  called  for  were  not  relevant  to 
the  question  of  reasonable  rates.  The  Commission  be- 
lieved that  this  evidence  had  direct  bearing  upon  rea- 
sonable rates,  whether  or  not  there  were  discriminating 
charges  and  wliether  or  not  the  fixing  of  tidewater  prices 
was  in  violation  of  the  anti-pooling  section  of  the  act  to 
regulate  commerce. 

The  case  was  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court,  which 
reversed  the  decision  of  the  lower  court.  The  railroads 
tried  to  have  the  appeal  dismissed  on  a  technicality  and 
"  insisted  that  the  language  of  the  proviso  [in  the  Elkins 
Act  of  1903  providing  for  the  expediting  of  cases]  applied 
only  to  cases  in  equity,  and  did  not  include  those  of  the 
character  of  an  action  to  compel  the  production  of  books 
and  papers  and  the  giving  of  testimony  by  witnesses  called 
before  the  Commission."  But  the  court  refused  to  inter- 
pret the  proviso  narrowly,  and  took  into  consideration 
other  sections  of  the  act  which  permitted  the  Commission 
to  inquire  into  the  management  of  the  business  of  all 
common  carriers  and  keep  itself  informed  "as  to  the  man- 
ner and  method  in  which  the  same  is  conducted,  with  the 
right  to  obtain  from  such  common  carriers  full  and  com- 
plete information  necessary  to  enable  the  Commission  to 
perform  its  duties  and  carry  out  the  objects  for  which  it 
was  created."  ^ 

This  decision  was  handed  down  in  1904,  but  it  was  not 
till  March  8,  1906,  that  it  was  reopened  for  argument.  It 
was  reargued  on  March  29,  1906,  "  and  since  that  time 
the  case  has  been  placed  on  the  suspense  calendar."  ^ 
Whether  or  not  this  action  was  encouraged  by  the  ex- 
pected passage  of  the  Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  which  gave 
the  Commission  enlarged  powers,  or  the  expected  govern- 
mental prosecution  of  the  roads  under  the  Sherman  Law 
(begun  in  1907),  we  can  only  conjecture.  At  any  rate,  the 

^  Heport  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  1904,  p.  33. 
^  Official  correspondence. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  331 

courts  monopolized  the  field  of  action  from  1907  to  1912 
with  very  ineffective  results. 

C.    THE    POWER    TO    FIX    MAXIMUM    RATES 

The  Hepburn  Act  gave  the  Commission  power  to  fix 
maximum  rates,  and  this  function  was  upheld  by  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  the  Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania  in 
1909.1  -pi^e  decision  also  supported  the  Commission's  con- 
tention that  since  the  passage  of  the  Hepburn  Act  the 
courts  have  no  right  to  review  or  set  aside  its  orders  "  in 
80  far  as  they  involved  the  exercise  of  discretion  or  judg- 
ment," but  that  "  the  courts  might  inquire  whether  the 
formalities  required  by  the  statute  had  been  complied 
with ;  whether  a  proper  complaint  had  been  presented,  a 
full  hearing  had,  an  order  made  in  due  form  and  properly 
served  upon  the  defendant ;  but  if  these  formalities  had 
been  followed,  then  the  order  of  the  Commission  could 
only  be  attacked  upon  the  ground  that  it  violated  some 
constitutional  right  of  the  defendants." 

D.   THE   COMMISSION    HANDICAPPED    BY   THE    COURTS 

The  powers  now  secured  are  those  that  the  Commission 
has  needed  all  the  time.  Without  them  its  efforts  to  func- 
tion as  it  was  intended  to  have  been  handicapped  on  every 
side.  The  courts  have  been  concerned  about  teclmicalities 
and  have  quibbled  over  minor  matters  to  the  exclusion  of 
important  ones.  This  is  well  exemplified  in  the  Chesa- 
peake and  Ohio  coal  case,  in  which  the  Chesapeake  and 
Ohio  Railroad  was  restrained  from  granting  discrimina- 
tory rates  to  the  New  York,  New  Haven,  and  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  but  "  the  court  declined,  however,  to 
enjoin  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  from  further  departing 
from  its  tariff  rates  in  the  transportation  of  coal  or  of  in- 
terstate traffic  generally,  and  that  was,  of  course,  the  ob- 
ject of  the  preceding  commission."  ^ 

^  Eeport  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  1909,  p.  29. 
2  Ibid.,  1904,  p.  78. 


332     ARBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

F.  The  Need  for  an  Accounting  System 

In  fact,  before  the  Commission  can  really  get  at  the 
rate  problem,  where  railroads  own  the  coal  mines,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  make  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  costs 
of  mining.  In  spite  of  the  varying  conditions  in  mining 
and  the  great  differences  in  productivity  between  fields, 
an  effective  system  of  obtaining  costs  is  possible.  That  it 
can  be  accomplished  is  demonstrated  by  the  results  of 
work  done  in  the  mining  industry  of  Germany.^ 

The  work  done  by  the  Department  of  Commerce  and 
Labor  in  1913  in  investigating  costs  and  prices  of  anthra- 
cite coal  is  a  good  beginning.  One  of  the  first  difficulties 
the  bureau  which  had  charge  of  this  investigation  encoun- 
tered was  the  "  widely  different  methods  of  accounting." 
Thus  a  policy  of  regulation  would  involve  a  uniform  sys- 
tem of  accounting  in  mining  similar  to  the  requirements 
placed  upon  the  railroads  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission. 

In  spite  of  this  handicap  the  bureau  obtained  informa- 
tion from  the  records  of  "  railroad  interests  "  which  own 
their  own  mines  or  are  affiliated  through  holding  com- 
panies and  produce  seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  anthracite 
coal.^  The  information  given  was  checked  against  the 
books  of  the  companies  or  their  published  records  by  cer- 
tified public  accountants,  and  no  discrepancies  were  found 
except  in  the  case  of  one  company  whose  records  were  not 
included  in  the  report  of  the  bureau.  Other  information 
was  obtained  from  annual  reports,  "  sworn  statements  in- 
troduced in  judicial  hearings,"  and  by  "  personal  visits  of 
agents  of  the  bureau  to  the  retailers  of  the  cities  covered 
by  the  investigation." 

The  bureau  was  able  to  arrive  at  a  figure  which  repre- 

*  Walker,  Monopolistic  Combinations  in  the  German  Coal  Industry.  Pub- 
lications of  American  Economic  Association,  3d  series,  vol.  5,  pp.  145-59. 
2  Increase  in  Prices  of  Anthracite  Coal,  op,  cit.,  p.  10. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  333 

sented  at  least  the  maximum  increase  in  labor  cost  per 
ton  (9.75  cents),  operating  costs,  fixed  charges,  and  the 
extent  of  depletion  funds  which,  compounded  at  four  per 
cent  for  forty  years,  would  repay  the  companies  for  the  ac- 
tual costs  of  their  coal  lands.  The  causes  which  tend  to 
increase  and  decrease  cost  of  production  can  also  be  ascer- 
tained, and  computations  can  be  made  which  will  allow 
for  both  influences. 

In  this  investigation  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  would 
seem  to  have  been  given  the  companies  in  every  instance, 
and  yet  the  Government  was  able  to  show  the  dispropor- 
tionate share  that  capital  was  getting  out  of  the  increased 
charges.  Furthermore,  we  must  remember  that  this  esti- 
mate of  $13,450,000  increase  is  a  minimum,  for  ability  to 
sell  coal  at  "  premiums  "  for  quick  delivery  during  periods 
of  shortage  makes  a  substantial  addition.  Out  of  this  in- 
crease the  operators  had  to  pay  the  -f  4,000,000  increase  in 
wages  and  the  expenses  attached  to  the  six  weeks'  sus- 
pension of  mine  operation.  Since  the  market  can  be  sup- 
plied by  operating  the  mines  about  225  days  during  the 
year,  the  charge  for  six  weeks'  suspension  reduces  itself 
to  expenses  attached  to  keeping  the  mines  free  from  water 
and  deterioration  of  working  equipment. 

If  the  Government  used  its  powers  to  require  effective 
publicity,  it  ought  not  to  have  to  go  to  the  extent  of  actu- 
ally fixing  prices.  But  to  make  publicity  effective  it  must 
require  a  uniform  system  of  accounting,  separate  account- 
ing for  the  mining  industry,  physical  valuation  of  mining 
equipment,  and  other  regulations  which  will  enable  it  to 
arrive  at  a  fair  approximation  of  the  cost  of  mining  a  ton 
of  coal.  The  public  should  have  this  information  from  an 
authoritative  source  along  with  the  earnings  of  mining 
companies  and  railroad  companies  combined.  The  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission  should  possess  such  in- 
formation as  wouhl  enable  it  to  adjust  railroad  rates  on 
coal  in  relation  purely  to  tlie  cost  of  transportation.    This 


834     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

information  should  be  in  the  hands  of  labor  and  capital 
when  they  meet  for  collective  bargaining,  and  it  would  be 
a  powerful  factor  in  preventing  arbitrary  action  on  the 
part  of  either  party. 

These  recommendations  are  particularly  applicable  to 
the  anthracite  region,  and  are  suggested  by  the  thought 
that  it  will  be  impossible  to  undo  the  work  of  concentra- 
tion of  ownership  which  has  taken  place  or  to  counteract 
the  impelling  economic  factors  which  have  forced  the 
cooperation  necessary  to  put  the  industry  on  a  profitable 
basis. 

G.  The  "Work  of  Concentrated  Capital 

We  cannot  neglect  the  actual  services  which  combina- 
tion and  concentration  of  capital  have  rendered  in  the  coal 
industry.  It  is  estimated  that  the  large  aggregation  of 
capital  has  reduced  the  waste  of  coal  from  one  aud  a  half 
tons  to  one-half  ton  for  every  ton  mined,^  by  making  it 
possible  to  use  better  methods  and  equipment  in  mining. 
As  it  has  been  necessary  to  penetrate  the  earth  more 
deeply,  a  greater  amount  of  capital  has  been  required  to 
open  mines.  When  such  mines  are  opened  there  is  a 
greater  cost  connected  with  keeping  them  open.  A  greater 
amount  of  refuse  has  to  be  hoisted  and  a  greater  amount 
of  water  pumped.  The  concentrated  ownership  of  many 
collieries  has  made  it  possible  to  shut  down  the  exjjensive 
mines  and  keep  the  profitable  mines  running  more  con- 
stantly. The  better  systematization  and  regularity  of  trans- 
portation that  comes  with  large  equipment  and  general 
control  has  enabled  the  common  carrier  to  move  freight 
much  more  cheaply,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  pub- 
lic has  profited  by  this  in  the  reduction  of  anthracite  coal 
rates.    A  similar  saving  is  accomplished  by  the  reduction 

^  Mitchell,  "  Our  Coal  Supply  Today,"  Review  of  Reviews,  vol.  41, 
pp.  193-204.  Mr.  Mitchell  is  Secretary  to  the  Director  of  the  U.S.  Geologi- 
cal Survey. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  335 

and  concentration  of  selling  agencies.  That  centralized 
control  is  necessary  to  keep  the  markets  and  tlie  industry 
healthy  is  recognized  by  capital  and  labor  and  by  the 
economists  who  have  made  a  study  of  the  industry.  That 
the  public  did  not  profit  sufficiently  by  the  good  results  of 
concentrated  ownership  and  unified  policy,  and  that  labor 
did  not  enter  into  its  own  until  it  enforced  collective  bar- 
gaining, does  not  disprove  the  beneficial  features  which 
have  gone  hand  in  hand  with  this  development.  It  rests 
with  constructive  public  policy  to  see  that  the  public  par- 
ticipates in  the  fruits  of  control  and  organization. 

H.  The  Operators  ask  for  a  Comiviission 
In  the  bituminous  field,  although  the  process  of  com- 
bination is  progressing  fast,  competition  is  still  the  con- 
trolling factor.  The  field  is  too  vast  and  varied  and  the 
individual  operators  and  companies  too  many  for  one  to 
expect  that  a  gentlemen's  agreement  could  fix  the  price 
of  coal  in  spite  of  legal  restraints.  But  we  hear  certain 
operators  In  both  the  central  field  and  in  West  Virginia 
frankly  advocate  the  inauguration  of  a  commission  which 
shall  have  the  power  to  say  whether  the  prices  fixed  by 
the  operators  are  reasonable.^  They  are  undoubtedly  im- 
pelled by  other  motives  than  would  move  those  who  advo- 
cate regulation  for  the  anthracite  field.  The  competitive 
race  between  fields  in  the  bituminous  regions  and  the 
crowding  to  the  wall  of  the  smaller  men  by  the  large  com- 
binations of  capital  make  certain  ones  cry  out  for  some 
degree  of  protection.  If  their  cry  is  not  heard  it  may  not 
be  long  before  the  necessity  for  regulation  will  be  for  the 
sake  of  the  public,  as  it  is  in  the  anthracite  field.  At 
any  rate,  the  same  policy  of  effective  publicity  as  ap- 
plied to  the  anthracite  field  would  not  be  a  detriment  to 
the  public.  In  fact,  the  same  necessity  for  authoritative 

^  Ixeport  of  Joint  Conference  of  Central  Field,  1912,  p.  331 ;  also  Report 
of  Senate  Committee  Hearings  in  West  Virginia,  op.  cit.,  part  2,  p.  1GG4. 


336     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO/\L  INDUSTRY 

information  is  present,  both  from  the  standpoint  of  the  pub- 
lic and  for  purposes  of  collective  bargaining.  With  greater 
imity  among  the  laborers  and  greater  combination  of  the 
capitalists,  we  shall  approach  deadlocks  over  fundamental 
questions  just  as  the  English  did  over  the  minimum  wage. 
In  England  we  have  seen  that  the  miners  took  the  initia- 
tive in  determining  whether  the  coal  industry  was  able  to 
pay  a  minimum  wage  that  would  put  the  loss,  which  came 
to  the  individual  miner  from  working  in  abnormal  places, 
upon  the  industry  as  a  whole.  Conclusions  which  are  based 
upon  a  thorough  and  authoritative  system  of  investigation 
and  publicity  will  result  in  greater  justice  to  both  labor 
and  capital  and  give  the  public  a  safe  basis  for  placing 
the  force  of  its  sympathy  with  the  party  which  is  in  the 
right.  The  general  benefits  to  the  public  that  come  from 
actual  and  potential  competition  will  be  just  as  great, 
and  by  publicity  and  regulatory  measures  the  evils  and 
abuses  of  "  cut-throat  "  competition  may  be  thwarted  or 
corrected. 

Under  the  conditions  which  exist  in  the  bituminous 
field  the  operators  who  ask  for  a  commission  to  regulate 
prices  cannot  expect  by  this  means  to  be  relieved  entirely 
of  competition.  A  commission  which  fixed  maximum  prices 
might  protect  the  public  from  extortion,  but  it  would  have 
to  fix  and  enforce  minimum  prices  in  order  to  protect  the 
operators  in  the  fields  which  are  producing  under  the  most 
adverse  circumstances.  In  connection  with  the  fixing  of 
maximum  prices  the  commission  would  have  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  public  because  nobody  is  going  to  pay  more 
for  coal  than  he  has  to ;  but  with  the  attempt  to  fix  mini- 
mum prices  there  would  be  every  incentive  for  consumers 
to  connive  with  the  producer  who  wished  to  sell  his  product 
lower  than  the  minimum  in  order  to  gain  the  market. 

Unless  the  minimum  prices  could  be  enforced,  the  in- 
dependent operators  would  still  be  subjected  to  the  bane- 
ful competition  of  concentrated  capital.  Besides  our  policy 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  337 

of  effective  publicity  we  must  inaugurate  measures  that 
will  leave  room  for  healthy  competition  and  yet  rob  the 
powerful  operator  or  company  of  the  ability  to  exploit 
labor,  utilize  cut-throat  competition  against  the  independ- 
ent, or  entirely  absorb  his  holdings.  The  cheaper  the  rail- 
road and  guerrilla  operators  in  West  Virginia  and  Penn- 
sylvania get  their  labor,  the  greater  will  be  their  profits, 
and  the  more  effective  the  power  which  they  will  possess 
to  continue  their  labor  exploitation,  force  the  independent 
to  the  wall,  and  create  social  and  political  problems. 

I.   Regulatory  Measures 

The  growth  of  the  industry  in  the  bituminous  field  may 
require  capital  to  concentrate  to  obtain  the  greatest  effi- 
ciency ;  nevertheless,  there  are  certain  fundamental  condi- 
tions in  the  industry  which  can  be  established  by  legal  enact- 
ment and  which  will  put  the  large  and  the  small  operator 
on  an  equal  footing  to  a  certain  extent.  Then  evolution  iu 
the  industry  may  take  its  course,  work  more  slowly,  and 
entail  less  hardship. 

The  advocacy  of  effective  publicity  and  regulation  pre- 
supposes that  the  industry  is  to  be  regarded  from  a  na- 
tional standpoint.  The  same  is  true  of  the  measures  which 
follow.  Perhaps  the  reader  is  immediately  struck  with  all 
the  difficulties  of  constitutionality,  of  judicial  interpreta- 
tion, and  of  obtaining  legislative  enactment  that  eternally 
rise  before  the  minds  of  Americans  when  they  attempt  to 
approach  new  problems.  Let  us  grant  that  they  are  ever 
present,  still  we  shall  never  get  very  far  toward  a  solution 
of  problems  so  long  as  we  can  see  nothing  but  difficulties. 
Besides,  there  are  new  forces  at  work  in  our  industrial, 
political,  and  social  life  which  will  make  old  things  new 
and  compel  us  to  exert  ourselves  to  keep  up  with  progress 
rather  than  spend  our  energies  lamenting  inaction. 


SS8     AllBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

A.    THE    EIGHT-HOUR   DAY 

First  among  the  measures  of  a  general  regulatory  nature 
is  the  legal  eight-hour  day.  This  would  be  one  of  the  most 
effective  regulations  with  which  to  bring  up  the  level  of 
working  conditions  and  competition  between  the  organized 
and  unorganized  fields.  The  unorganized  fields  would  then 
have  to  inaugurate  the  eight-hour  day.  In  this  respect  we 
should  simply  be  following  the  line  of  evolution  which  has 
been  found  necessary  in  England.  We  remember  that  the 
British  miners  were  unable  to  obtain  such  a  regulation  by 
conciliatory  means.  Nor  have  the  American  miners  met 
with  better  success  in  our  richest  bituminous  field  where 
large  concentration  of  mining  and  railroad  capital  has 
fought  it.  Furthermore,  since  our  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  the  case  of  Holden  vs.  Hardy  (169  U.S.  366) 
has  shown  itself  liberal  enough  to  uphold  a  state  law  pro- 
viding for  an  eight-hour  day,  we  may  expect  that  our 
evolution  in  this  respect  will  not  be  such  a  remote  possi- 
bility. 

B.    A   LEGAL   TON 

Analogous  to  the  eight-hour  day  in  its  effects  would  be 
a  national  regulation  and  enforcement  of  a  legal  and  uni- 
form ton.  The  miner,  even  though  an  unorganized  worker, 
should  not  be  subjected  to  an  abuse  which  permits  an  em- 
ployer to  regard  considerably  over  3000  pounds  as  a  ton 
when  he  is  paying  his  workmen  and  consider  2240  pounds 
as  a  ton  when  he  sells  his  coal.  National  legislation  should 
be  able  to  excel  state  legislation  by  the  elimination  of 
provisos  or  "  jokers  "  which  make  the  effectiveness  of  the 
act  dependent  upon  the  agreement  of  the  employer  and 
employees,  for  in  unorganized  fields  there  can  be  no  fair 
agreement. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  339 

C.    REGULATION    OF    IMMIGRATION 

We  must  take  more  effective  measures  than  we  have 
taken  as  yet  to  stop  the  manifestly  untrammeled  exploi- 
tation of  labor  made  possible  by  our  lax  immigration 
policy  and  the  use  of  arbitrary  and  barbarous  practices  to 
defeat  collective  bargaining.  While  capital  has  had  pro- 
tection by  the  tariff,  labor  has  been  compelled  to  compete 
with  southern  European  peoples  in  wages  and  standard  of 
living.  As  a  result  of  this  the  unions  have  been  disrupted, 
bargaining  power  has  been  destroyed,  and  the  homogeneity 
and  cohesion  necessary  for  sane  development  through  col- 
lective action  is  absent.  The  system  of  armed  guards  and 
peonage  shown  in  the  recent  West  Virginia  troubles  and 
the  control  of  judicial  and  administrative  machinery  in 
Westmoreland  County,  Pennsylvania,  during  the  strike 
of  1911,  point  to  the  extremes  we  may  expect  when  con- 
centrated capital  is  given  unlimited  opportunity  to  con- 
trol natural  resources  and  exploit  ignorant  labor. 

D.    THE   MINIMUM    WAGE 

A  minimum  wage  equal  to  the  wage  paid  in  the  organ- 
ized districts  would  greatly  supplement  a  policy  of  effec- 
tive restriction  of  immigration.  It  certainly  would  reduce 
the  incentive  the  employer  has  to  cast  off  his  old  workmen 
inconsiderately  when  he  knows  he  has  a  ready  supply  of 
men  with  which  to  break  strikes  and  carry  on  indefinitely 
a  series  of  exploitations  until  the  workmen  rise  in  discon- 
tent. If  capital  in  the  fields  which  are  unionized  can  afford 
to  pay  the  higher  wages  which  go  with  collective  bargain- 
ing, the  operators  in  the  richer  and  unorganized  fields  of 
West  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  not  only  can  afford  to  pay 
a  minimum  wage  equal  to  the  wages  in  the  organized  dis- 
tricts, but  tliey  should  be  forced  to  pay  it.  Even  then  their 
superior  natural  resources  and  concentration  of  capital 
would  give  them  sufficient  advantage  in  competition. 


340     ARBITRATION   IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

In  an  attempt  to  equalize  competition  between  coal 
fields  (or  States),  differences  in  rates  of  wages  are  made 
to  offset  the  difference  in  distance  from  the  market  and 
tlie  attending  extra  expense  in  getting  coal  to  market. 
But  as  between  two  mines  within  the  same  field,  an  at- 
tempt is  made  to  equalize  wages  by  paying  higher  rates 
in  the  thin-vein  mines  than  in  thick  veins  where  working 
conditions  are  easier.  Thus  the  operator  with  the  richest 
mine  profits  by  his  superior  natural  resources  and  is  in  a 
more  advantageous  position  competitively  than  the  opera- 
tor with  a  thin-vein  mine.  These  same  principles  should 
stand  in  dealing  with  the  "  West  Virginia  problem,"  but 
the  differential  which  the  field  should  have  as  compared 
with  the  other  fields  ought  to  be  proportionately  smaller 
because  of  its  superior  natural  advantages.  In  such  an 
adjustment  a  minimum  wage  and  a  compulsory  eight-hour 
day  would  be  other  elements  which  could  be  utilized  in 
connection  with  a  proper  regulation  of  freight  rates  so  as 
to  reduce  destructive  competition  from  the  unorganized 
fields.  The  minimum  wage  may  be  considered  a  measin^e 
of  last  resortj  though  it  may  not  be  more  difficult  to  in- 
augurate than  the  other  measures  advocated  after  consti- 
tutional and  legislative  difficulties  have  been  surmounted. 

J.  Possible  Rise  and  Influence  of  a  Labor  Party 

Although  attainment  of  such  regulatory  measures  may 
seem  impossible,  beginnings  have  already  been  made  which 
will  aid  adjustments  of  this  kind  and  lead  us  along  the 
same  line  of  development  that  has  taken  place  in  Great 
Britain.  We  must  remember  that  of  some  years  we  have 
been  electing  labor  men  to  Congress  and  the  state  legis- 
latures, who,  although  they  nominally  ran  as  Democrats 
or  Republicans,  would  undoubtedly  stand  for  labor  on 
questions  which  would  vitally  affect  its  welfare.  The  Labor 
party  in  Great  Bi-itain  passed  through  this  same  stage  of 
development.  With  the  increase  of  economic  pressure  and 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  341 

inability  to  make  the  existing  political  machinery  respon- 
sive enough,  new  means  necessarily  develop  by  which  the 
I'ising  discontent  can  find  expression  through  peaceful 
adjustment. 

We  now  have  fourteen  labor  men  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives and  one  in  the  United  States  Senate.  These 
men  represent  twelve  different  unions.  Besides,  we  have 
a  labor  man  in  the  Cabinet,  and  this  may  well  be  con- 
sidered quite  as  significant  of  a  new  era  as  the  entrance 
of  John  Burns  into  the  British  Cabinet.  These  men  are, 
of  course,  among  the  most  conservative  in  regard  to  any 
measures  which  would  encourage  the  development  of  class 
struggle,  but  we  may  expect  to  find  them  on  the  side  of 
those  who  see  the  necessity  for  making  our  political  ma- 
chinery more  responsive  to  changing  industrial  and  social 
needs.  Furthermore,  since  we  have  hardly  begun  our  social 
legislation,  with  the  advent  of  definite  issues  we  may  ex- 
pect party  adjustments  on  new  lines. 

The  same  economic  pressure  which  has  brought  the  for- 
mation of  a  Labor  party  in  France,  Germany,  and  Eng- 
land, has  already  found  expression  in  the  form  of  resolu- 
tions for  a  similar  party  in  the  United  States.  At  the 
annual  convention  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor 
in  November,  1913,  the  following  resolution  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  Committee  on  Resolutions  :  — 

Resolved,  That  the  president  of  the  Amevican  Federation  of 
Labor  select  nine  members  of  the  Thirty- third  Animal  Conven- 
tion, with  cards  of  their  respective  unions  in  good  standing,  to 
draft  a  pohtical  platform  to  be  known  as  the  platform  of  the 
American  Labor  Party,  such  platform  to  be  adopted  by  this  con- 
vention. 

Another  more  extended  resolution  with  the  same  pur- 
port contained  a  provision  for  sidimitting  the  proposition 
to  a  vote  of  the;  rank  and  file  of  labor  unionists.  The  com- 
mittee on  resolutions  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  time  was 


S42     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  CO.AL    INDUSTRY 

not  ripe  for  a  "  distinct  labor  political  party,"  but  that 
with  further  maturity  in  political  activity  a  "  new  politi- 
cal party  [would]  be  the  logical  result."  In  the  mean  time 
they  felt  that  labor  should  be  more  fully  organized  and 
that  the  Federation  should  maintain  its  "  non-partisan 
political  position."  ^  The  recommendations  of  the  commit- 
tee were  sustained,  but  during  the  course  of  the  debate  it 
was  fully  brought  out  "  that  it  was  useless  to  organize  in- 
dustrially without  a  strong  political  organization  back  of 
the  industrial  organizations,  and  that  it  was  useless  to  se- 
cure labor  legislation  unless  there  was  a  strong  industrial 
organization  to  see  that  it  was  enforced." 

Although  it  is  evident  by  a  vote  of  193  to  15  that  the 
conservative  element  was  in  the  saddle,  the  radicals  may 
prove  to  have  the  keener  sense  of  the  real  attitude  of  the 
rank  and  file  at  present.  In  January,  1914,  the  United 
Mine  Workers'  Convention  passed  resolutions  favoring 
the  formation  of  a  labor  party  and  government  owner- 
ship of  all  public  utilities,  especially  of  coal  mines.  Even 
though  the  resolutions  contained  no  preparations  for  a 
new  party,  the  formal  expression  of  intention  is  signifi- 
cant. If  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  should  decide, 
in  connection  with  the  Danbury  Hatters'  Case,  that  trade- 
union  funds  are  open  to  attack  under  the  Sherman  Anti- 
Trust  Law,  events  may  move  faster  than  we  anticipate,  in 
quite  the  same  way  as  they  did  in  England.  Not  less  sig- 
nificant is  the  resolution  in  respect  to  the  nationalization 
of  mines,  especially  so  since  two  United  States  Senators  ^ 
have  advocated  a  similar  policy  as  the  solution  of  labor 
problems  in  the  mining  industry. 

All  this,  it  would  seem,  is  indicative  that  we  are  enter- 
ing upon  an  era  of  new  adjustments  which  would  make 

1  Report  of  Annual  Convention  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  No- 
vember, 1913,  p.  315. 

2  Report  of  Senate  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Paint  Creek  Coal 
Fields  of  West  Virginia,  pp.  19  and  21. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  343 

effective  publicity  and  regulation,  an  eight-hour  law,  and 
a  minimum  wage  less  remote  possibilities.  With  the  de- 
velopment of  greater  homogeneity  and  common  sympathy 
among  our  manual  workers  there  must  come  the  develop- 
ment of  a  new  elasticity  in  our  constitutional,  political, 
and  governmental  machinery  that  will  allow  the  masses 
to  give  voice  to  their  needs  and  permit  the  accomplishment 
of  certain  ends  which  can  be  gained  only  through  legal 
enactment.  Furthermore,  the  Government  must  function 
more  readily  when  voluntary  conciliation  and  arbitration 
have  failed  to  function.  This  leads  us  to  a  consideration 
of  the  role  the  Government  should  play  in  a  situation 
like  the  anthracite  strike  of  1902,  or  of  a  general  coal 
strike  which  may  come  with  the  simultaneous  expiration  of 
contracts  in  both  the  anthracite  and  bituminous  fields  in 
1916. 

2.    RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  A  CONCILIATORY 

SYSTEM,  THE   SUPPLY  OF  COAL,  AND 

GOVERNMENTAL   ACTION 

Although  the  United  States  Government  showed  itself 
impotent  in  dealing  with  the  serious  anthracite  strike  of 
1902,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  "suspensions" 
which  have  taken  place  during  the  formation  of  a  new 
agreement  could  easily  have  developed  into  a  protracted 
struggle,  we  still  have  no  legal  provision  which  would 
enable  the  Government  to  function  more  effectively  on 
such  a  momentous  occasion.  That  the  Government  could 
use  its  good  offices  at  such  times  without  interfering  with 
a  system  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  or  taking  away 
the  laborer's  right  to  strike  or  the  employer's  right  to  lock 
out,  is  demonstrated  for  us  by  the  Canadian  Industrial 
Disputes  Investigation  Act.  By  such  an  act  we  can  give 
the  force  of  public  opinion  a  thorough  trial  and  exert  a 
most  salutary  educational  influence  on  capital,  labor,  and 
the  public.    To  be  an  effective  educational  influence  the 


344     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

measure  should  insure  authoritative  information.  With 
this  placed  before  them  the  people  should  be  able  to  ren- 
der a  verdict  on  the  immediate  struggle.  But  a  still  greater 
asset  is  the  leaven  within  the  measure  for  the  encourage- 
ment of  further  evolution  of  public  policy. 

A.  The  Canadian  Industrial  Disputes  Act 

(1)  Application  for  a  hoard 

When  industrial  disputes  have  developed  to  a  point 
where  trouble  is  imminent,  either  party  to  the  dispute 
may  make  application  to  the  Minister  of  Labour  asking 
him  to  appoint  a  board  of  conciliation  and  investigation. 
The  written  application  sets  forth  the  nature  and  cause 
of  the  trouble,  the  demands  made  by  the  parties,  the  num- 
ber of  persons  involved,  and  the  efforts  made  to  adjust 
the  dispute.  The  party  making  the  aj)plication  transmits 
a  copy  to  the  opposing  party.  At  least  ten  employees  must 
be  affected  by  the  dispute  if  the  application  is  to  receive 
consideration.  These  provisions  could  be  adapted  so  that 
a  voluntary  system  of  conciliation  for  the  formation  of 
contracts  and  the  adjustment  of  disputes  thereunder  would 
not  be  interfered  with.  By  refusing  to  grant  an  application 
for  a  board  except  when  one  of  the  parties  arbitrarily  re- 
fuses to  meet  the  opposing  party,  plenty  of  free  play  could 
be  given  all  voluntary  conciliatory  systems.  But  it  is  when 
either  party  is  arbitrary  that  the  Government  can  use  its 
power  most  effectively  to  force  publicity. 

(2)  Composition  of  the  hoard 

A  board  consists  of  three  members,  and  they  are  ap- 
pointed by  the  Minister  of  Labour  from  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  contending  parties.  Each  party  recommends 
its  representative  and  these  two  recommend  a  third.  If 
either  party  tries  to  block  proceedings  by  neglecting  or  re- 
fusing to  appoint  a  representative,  the  Minister  of  Labour 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  345 

selects  a  suitable  person  to  fill  the  place.  The  third  party 
selected  by  the  representatives  is  the  chairman  of  the 
board.  The  members  of  the  board  are  not  to  have  any 
pecuniary  interest  in  the  dispute  and  are  bound  by  an 
oath  to  secrecy  and  faithful  performance  of  their  duties. 
The  remuneration  received  by  each  member  of  the  board 
is  twenty  dollars  per  day  for  each  day  the  board  sits  and 
for  each  day  they  are  necessarily  engaged  in  traveling. 
Besides  this,  their  traveling  exj)enses  are  paid. 

(3)    Conciliation y  investigation,  and  publicity 

The  primary  function  of  the  board  is  to  bring  the  parties 
together  and  induce  them  to  come  to  a  fair  and  amicable 
settlement.  In  cases  where  a  settlement  is  not  reached, 
the  board  makes  a  report  to  the  Minister  of  Labour  which 
"  sets  forth  the  various  proceedings  and  steps  taken  by  the 
Board  for  the  purpose  of  fully  and  carefully  ascertaining 
all  the  facts  and  circumstances,  and  shall  set  forth  such 
facts  and  circumstances,  and  its  findings  therefrom,  in- 
cluding the  cause  of  the  dispute  and  the  Board's  recom- 
mendation for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  according  to 
the  merits  and  substantial  justice  of  the  case."  ^  This  re- 
port shall  avoid  "  as  far  as  possible  all  technicalities  "  and 
set  forth  "  what  in  the  Board's  opinion  ought  or  ought 
not  to  be  done  by  the  respective  parties  concerned."  The 
Minister  of  Labour  files  the  report,  sends  copies  of  it  to 
the  parties,  the  newspapers,  and  "may  distribute  copies 
of  the  report,  and  of  any  minority  report,  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  him  seems  most  desirable  as  a  means  of  securing 
a  compliance  with  the  Board's  recommendation." 

(4)  Powers  of  the  hoard 

To  make  the  report  as  effective  and  authoritative  as 

possible  the  board  has  the  power  to  summon  witnesses  and 

compel  testimony  and  the  production  of  documents.  The 

^  Industrial  Disputes  Investigation  Act,  section  25. 


2iG      AEBITILVTION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

board  is  allowed  clerical  assistance  and  may  employ  ex- 
perts to  whom  it  may  delegate  its  powers.  These  experts 
may  inspect  and  interrogate,  and  any  person  who  hinders 
them  is  guilty  of  an  offense  and  liable  to  a  penalty  of 
$100.  But  the  information  obtained  from  documents  "shall 
not,  except  in  so  far  as  the  Board  deems  it  expedient,  be 
made  public,  and  such  parts  of  the  books,  papers,  or 
other  documents  as  in  the  opinion  of  the  Board  do  not 
relate  to  the  matter  at  issue  may  be  sealed  up." 

The  proceedings  of  the  board  are  public,  unless  other- 
wise ordered,  and  "  No  proceeding  .  .  .  shall  be  deemed 
invalid  by  reason  of  any  defect  of  form  or  technical  ir- 
regularity." All  expenses,  including  payment  of  witnesses, 
experts  and  salaries,  are  borne  by  the  State. 

(5)  Penalties  for  strikes  and  lockouts  during 
investigation 

The  investigation  begins  before  a  strike  or  lockout  has 
taken  place,  and  the  relation  of  the  parties  must  remain 
unchanged  during  the  proceedings  of  the  board.  The  em- 
ployer is  liable  to  a  fine  of  from  -f  100  to  ilOOO  per  day 
fur  each  day  of  a  lockout,  and  the  workman  to  a  fine  of 
from  $10  to  §50  per  day  for  striking.  Furthermore,  a  per- 
son who  incites  or  encourages  the  parties  to  declare  a  lock- 
out or  continue  a  strike  is  liable  to  a  fine  of  from  $50  to 
$1000.  These  penalties  are  enforced  under  the  criminal 
code. 

After  the  investigation  has  been  made  and  the  report 
made  known,  either  party  may  refuse  to  accept  the  rec- 
ommendations, and  declare  hostilities.  The  chief  purpose 
of  the  act  is  to  discourage  strikes  and  lockouts,  relieve  the 
public  of  the  trouble  and  suffering  that  result  from  un- 
warranted acts  by  either  party,  and  to  inform  the  people 
on  how  just  grounds  they  are  deprived  of  a  service  or  a 
commodity. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  347 

(6)  Mesults  from  the  act 

That  the  act  has  been  worth  while  is  shown  by  the  re- 
sults obtained  under  it  during  the  five  years  it  has  been 
in  operation.  Out  of  the  124  cases  of  dispute,  in  only  14 
have  the  parties  refused  to  accept  the  recommendation  of 
the  board  and  declared  hostilities.  In  8  out  of  the  14  cases 
the  parties  finally  resumed  work  on  the  basis  recommended 
by  the  board.  In  4  of  the  remaining  cases  settlement  was 
brought  about  through  negotiation  and  intervention  of  a 
citizens'  committee  and  government  agents.  Two  cases  re- 
mained unsettled  at  the  time  of  the  last  report.-' 

This  act  presupposes  the  right  of  the  men  to  organize, 
and  their  right  of  recognition  and  representation.  An  in- 
vestigations act  in  this  country  would  have  to  incorporate 
these  rights,  for  they  are  far  from  recognized  rights  among 
a  large  class  of  employers.  If  we  had  such  an  act  as  this 
the  public  would  be  able  to  find  out  whether  in  a  situation 
like  the  Westmoreland  County  strike  and  the  West  Vir- 
ginia troubles  the  operators  had  "  nothing  to  arbitrate." 
It  is  a  sad  reflection  on  our  public  policy  that  we  allow 
the  barbarous  methods  of  force  to  continue  in  industry. 
We  have  learned  in  civil  matters  that  it  is  conducive  to 
peace  and  justice  to  compel  parties  to  settle  their  differ- 
ences in  court.  The  same  principle  operates  in  industrial 
matters  where  it  has  been  tried. 

There  would  seem  to  be  no  right  of  either  party  denied 
in  this  act  except  that  of  a  sudden  strike  or  lockout. 
With  the  development  of  voluntary  conciliation  and  the 
appointing  of  stated  times  for  changes  in  wage  contracts, 
such  tactics  ought  not  to  be  used  as  were  used  in  the  days 
when  there  was  little  understanding  between  the  parties 
and  when  they  sought  to  take  quick  advantage  of  each 
other.    If  we  can  accept  the  evolution  in  feeling  in  the 

^  Report  of  Canadian  Registrar  of  Boards  of  Conciliation  and  Investiga- 
tion,  1012,  p.  12. 


348     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

coal  industry  of  Great  Britain  as  any  criterion,  we  might 
expect  the  Government  to  be  looked  upon  simply  as  a 
willing  intermediary.  It  would  stand  ready  to  function  in 
case  of  a  crisis  which  had  driven  the  parties  so  far  asunder 
that  the  occasion  required  the  overwhelming  force  of  pub- 
lic sentiment  to  decide  which  party  was  in  the  right,  after 
a  fair  and  impartial  investigation.  Moreover,  the  mere 
existence  of  a  remedy  would  lessen  the  tendency  to  drift 
so  far  apart  as  to  necessitate  public  action. 

B.  Conclusion 

In  conclusion  we  should  recall  the  economic  and  indus- 
trial conditions  which  brought  about  the  rise  and  extension 
of  the  system  of  conciliation  and  arbitration  in  the  bitu- 
minous field.  The  elaborate  machinery  of  the  interstate 
joint  conference,  state  conferences,  and  the  arrangements 
for  settling  disputes  that  arise  under  agreements  are  only 
made  possible  by  the  effective  organization  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  and  the  operators'  associations. 

It  is  evident  that  the  methods  utilized  in  the  bitumi- 
nous field  have  reached  a  very  high  stage  of  development. 
When  it  was  once  recognized  that  the  old  order  had 
changed  and  that  labor  had  the  right  of  representation  in 
adjusting  its  affairs,  the  parties  were  ready  for  collective 
bargaining.  But  we  have  seen  that  a  realization  of  this 
came  only  after  much  strife  and  bitterness  of  feeling.  As 
an  industry  develops  to  a  stage  where  it  is  possible  by  ill- 
adjusted  production  and  exploitation  to  reduce  the  level 
of  wages  and  profits  to  a  bare  subsistence  for  labor  and 
small  earnings  for  capital,  the  rise  of  a  workers'  organi- 
zation to  better  these  conditions  must  be  expected.  When 
this  occurs,  the  employers  should  organize  to  meet  the 
workers,  and  the  result  should  be  an  adjustment  of  pro- 
duction and  of  working  conditions  making  both  for  higher 
industrial  efficiency  and  greater  regard  for  the  interests 
of  the  workers. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  349 

When  trade  agreements  are  first  inaugurated,  the  par- 
ties must  not  expect  that  everything  will  run  smoothly  at 
once.  It  requires  a  certain  amount  of  experience  and  edu- 
cation to  use  this  piece  of  social  machinery,  just  as  training 
is  necessary  to  the  efficient  utilization  of  a  new  mechanical 
device.  The  important  thing  is  to  profit  as  much  as  pos- 
sible by  the  experience  gained  in  industries  in  which  an 
elaborate  system  of  conciliation  has  slowly  evolved.  Au- 
thorities who  have  investigated  the  workings  of  peaceful 
adjustment  in  various  industries  are  convinced  that  the 
highest  types  of  conciliatory  methods  are  those  which  fur- 
nish a  series  of  opportunities  for  arriving  at  a  settlement. 
Such  a  system  requires  officials  from  both  sides  who  have 
a  wide  outlook  upon  the  industry  as  a  whole  to  give  con- 
sideration to  fundamental  and  deep-seated  grievances. 
When  the  same  honest  effort  is  made  to  solve  the  labor 
problem  that  is  commonly  expended  on  the  selling  of 
products  or  the  improvement  of  methods  of  production, 
we  shall  be  on  the  highroad  to  a  solution  of  our  diffi- 
culties. 

Moreover,  we  have  seen  that  collective  bargaining  soft- 
ens class  antagonism  and  encourages  friendly  relations 
between  employers  and  workers,  while  at  the  same  time 
each  party  becomes  aware  of  the  difficulties  with  which 
the  other  has  to  contend.  The  employers  have  shown  a 
willingness  to  democratize  their  industry,  and  the  work- 
ers, as  their  power  has  increased,  have  demonstrated  a 
sense  of  larger  responsibility  to  the  public. 

Those  who  are  afraid  that  they  will  surrender  some  of 
their  prerogatives,  and  because  of  their  fear  fail  to  see  the 
opportunity  for  utilizing  the  cooperative  force  of  rising 
intelligence,  are  in  reality  a  hindrance  to  themselves  and 
to  society.  Rising  intelligence  and  increasing  efficiency 
properly  directed  should  bring  greater  prosperity  to  wage- 
worker  and  to  capitalist  alike.  It  goes  without  saying  that 
at  least  approximate  justice  must  be  granted  in  order  to 


350     ARBITRATION  IN   THE   CO.\L  INDUSTRY 

bring  coiiperation  and  good  feeling.  Whenever  capital  is 
ready  to  demonstrate  by  authenticated  figures  its  desire 
to  do  justice,  it  lays  the  basis  for  a  cooperative  spirit  on  the 
part  of  labor,  and  one  cause  of  suspicion  is  eradicated.  If 
the  worker  could  possess  a  confidence  (born  of  past  expe- 
rience) that  the  employer  was  giving  him  all  the  wages 
possible  without  depriving  himself  of  a  legitimate  profit, 
he  might  be  expected  patiently  to  await  the  evolution  of 
his  standard  of  living  and  strive  to  build  up  the  industry 
to  the  best  of  his  ability,  just  as  the  employer  works  and 
waits  for  the  growth  of  his  industry.  A  system  of  concili- 
ation founded  on  authentic  figures  should  bring  such  a 
result.  As  yet  conciliation  has  not  been  put  on  a  frank 
business  basis,  but  is  still  in  the  barter  stage.  It  should 
be  supplemented  by  an  efficient  system  of  accounting  that 
will  enable  labor  and  its  representatives  to  know  the  exact 
status  of  the  industry. 

In  the  anthracite  field  we  have  gained  some  conception 
of  the  disrupting  factors  which  have  deferred  the  devel- 
opment of  a  satisfactory  system  of  industrial  adjustment. 
There  conciliation  is  just  making  a  beginning.  The  large 
corporate  ownership  and  the  heterogeneous  population 
may  prove  such  powerful  and  disintegrating  factors  that 
organized  labor  will  be  unable  to  deal  adequately  with  the 
situation.  It  certainly  could  not  if  the  movement  were 
solely  dependent  upon  the  small  band  of  faithful  unionists 
in  the  anthracite  field.  But  the  support  and  encourage- 
ment which  they  receive  from  the  unionists  in  the  bitu- 
minous fields  enable  them  to  array  a  sufficient  fighting 
force  at  the  termination  of  contracts  to  compel  the  opera- 
tors to  give  some  consideration  to  their  demands.  Before 
they  can  have  effective  conciliation  and  settle  wages  on 
an  equitable  basis  the  anthracite  miners  should  be  in  a 
position  to  know  the  costs  of  producing  coal  and  the  ex- 
tent of  the  operators'  earnings. 

An  authoritative  cost  and  accounting  system  is  also  of 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  351 

vital  concern  to  the  public  in  permitting  an  understand- 
ing of  the  justice  of  the  rise  in  prices  of  coal.  The  ad- 
ditional profits  of  $9,450,000  which  the  operators  obtained 
after  the  last  wage  agreement  has  led  the  public  to  think 
that  strikes  may  develop  into  a  profitable  business. 

The  ability  to  control  prices  brings  a  frank  statement 
from  some  quarters  that  the  only  solution  of  the  problem 
is  government  ownership.  The  Boston  "  Journal "  says : 
"  In  the  climax  of  hopelessness  and  measure  of  futility 
against  the  outrage,  it  writes  down  the  plainest  demand 
for  government  ownership  of  coal  mines  which  has  been 
made.  If  the  great  coal  interest  is  so  intrenched  that  it 
can  violate  with  impunity  a  principle  supposed  to  be  writ- 
ten into  the  federal  statutes,  the  need  for  government 
ownership  becomes  exigent  and  imperative." 

If  a  combined  demand  is  made  by  the  miners  and  the 
public  for  government  ownership,  we  shall  be  plunged  into 
the  midst  of  a  struggle  for  which  the  workers  in  the  an- 
thracite region  have  received  no  adequate  preparation 
either  in  peaceful  adjustment  or  in  attempts  to  ameliorate 
their  condition  through  legal  enactment.  Over  against 
this  situation  the  experience  of  the  British  miners  stands 
in  striking  contrast,  and  thoroughly  illustrates  the  folly  of 
a  system  of  government  and  social  adjustment  which  per- 
mits grievances  to  accumulate  without  providing  effective 
devices  by  which  they  can  be  adjusted.  If  the  anthracite 
workers  were  a  homogeneous  population  which  had  come 
through  a  process  of  evolution  in  conciliatory  adjustment 
and  had  had  practice  in  redressing  their  grievances  through 
legal  enactment,  the  situation  could  be  viewed  in  a  differ- 
ent light. 

We  should  remember  that  we  have  a  situation  before  us 
likely  to  prove  more  conducive  to  class  struggle  than  if 
our  constitutional  system  were  less  rigid  and  permitted  us 
to  deal  with  our  problems  on  a  national  basis  when  tliey 
demand  such  treatment.    Moreover,  if  the  miners  felt  that 


852     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

they  could  go  to  Congress  with  the  same  assurance  which 
the  British  niiuer  has  in  approaching  Parliament  to  obtain 
an  eight-hour  day  or  a  minimum  wage  (which  could  not 
be  obtained  by  conciliation),  and  there  present  by  legiti- 
mate argument  and  persuasion  the  necessity  for  ameliora- 
tive measures,  the  whole  industrial  situation  would  have 
a  different  outlook. 

In  contrast  to  British  affairs  it  is  with  great  difficulty 
that  labor  in  the  United  States  can  obtain  betterment  of 
conditions  through  congressional  action,  and  when  a  law 
is  once  enacted,  it  may  easily  be  quashed  as  it  runs  the 
gauntlet  of  the  courts.  Nor  can  the  American  miner  turn 
again  to  Congress  and  obtain  an  enactment  that  will  su- 
persede the  court  decision  with  the  same  facility  that  an 
act  of  pai'liament  overrides  British  court  decisions.  This 
contrast  is  well  illustrated  by  the  readiness  with  which 
the  attempt  to  tie  up  union  funds  and  cut  off  parliamen- 
tary representation  of  labor  was  thwarted  by  bringing  about 
government  payment  of  parliamentary  members. 

Again,  we  have  seen  that  the  British  miner  has  taken 
a  first  step  toward  an  investigation  of  wages  and  profits 
in  the  coal  trade.  This  will  probably  lead  to  a  demand 
for  an  efficient  governmental  system  of  accounting  which 
will  ultimately  redound  to  the  benefit  of  the  miners,  the 
operators,  and  the  public. 

We  are  beginning  to  recognize  that  such  matters  as 
hours  of  labor,  sanitary  and  safe  working  conditions,  child 
labor,  workmen's  compensation,  old-age  pensions,  and  oc- 
cupational diseases  are  proper  matters  for  state  regulation. 
When  we  consider  the  magnitude  of  the  trade-union  prob- 
lem of  limiting  the  hours  of  labor  in  the  many  States  of 
our  Union,  we  are  struck  with  the  manifest  unfairness  of 
leaving  the  task  to  them.  "  If  the  objects  of  trade  unions 
could  find  quiet  and  orderly  expression  in  legislation  and 
enactment,  and  if  their  measures  could  be  submitted  to 
the  examination  and  judgment  of  the  whole  [people]  witji- 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  353 

out  a  sense  of  division  or  warfare,  we  should  have  ideal 
development  of  the  democratic  state."  ^ 

The  preoccupation  of  legislatures  and  courts  with  the 
enactment  and  enforcement  of  laws  that  primarily  pertain 
to  property  rights  as  opposed  to  other  human  rights  has 
been  alienating  the  mass  of  workers  from  that  sense  of 
patriotic  citizenship  which  is  so  essential  to  a  republic. 
The  speed  with  which  governmental  functions  are  applied 
to  thwart  labor's  attempts  to  obtain  rights  through  col- 
lective action  is  bitterly  contrasted  with  the  slowness  with 
which  the  Government  acts  in  upholding  laws  that  are 
intended  to  improve  the  conditions  of  labor. 

The  workingman  sees  the  club  of  the  officer,  the  bayonet  of 
the  militia  directed  against  him  in  defense  of  property,  and  he 
believes  that  the  hand  of  the  law,  strong  in  the  protection  of 
property,  often  drops  listless  whenever  measures  are  proposed 
to  lighten  labor's  heavy  burden.  Occasional  and  imperfect  ex- 
pressions of  the  underlying  feeling  reach  the  surface.  Those 
who  dismiss  them  as  sporadic  assaults  upon  the  judiciary  have 
no  appreciation  of  the  depth  and  breadth  of  the  social  situation. 
There  is  profound  restlessness  among  large  groups  of  labor  who 
feel  that  there  are  no  organic  ways  open  through  which  they 
can  act  collectively  with  respect  to  the  things  that  most  concern 
them  .  .  .  that  they  are  thwarted  when  they  get  together  for 
common  strength  and  when,  not  as  mutual  benefit  societies,  but 
as  aggregations  of  men  they  set  out  to  mind  their  business.  .  .  . 
We  hold  that  the  criminal  court  is  not  a  sufficient  instrument 
through  which  the  democracy  can  address  itself  to  the  economic 
struggle.  The  federal  grand  juries  may  well  concern  themselves 
with  those  who  have  carried  dynamite  across  state  boundaries. 
We  want  light  along  a  more  crucial  boundary  line  —  the  bor- 
derland between  industry  and  democracy.  We  want  light  on 
that  larger  lawlessness  which  is  beyond  the  view  of  the  criminal 
court.  This  is  a  matter  of  public  defense  in  which  we,  as  a  peo- 
])le,  should  if  necessary  invest  as  much  money  as  we  put  into  a 
battleship.   We  appeal  to  tlie  Federal  Government  to  create  a 

1  Jane  Addams,  America/i  Journal  of  Sociology,  vol.  4,  p.  ■109. 


354     ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 

commission,  with  as  great  scientific  competence,  staff  resources, 
and  power  to  compel  testimony  as  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.^ 

This  address,  signed  by  people  from  many  walks  in  life, 
is  a  protest  against  a  public  policy  which  allows  conditions 
to  exist  in  industry  that  encourage  violence.  Whether  it 
comes  as  a  result  of  the  employers'  attempts  to  "  smash  " 
the  union,  as  in  the  McNamara  case,  or  the  sporadic  up- 
rising of  a  disorganized  mass  in  protest  against  grinding 
economic  necessity,  as  in  the  Lawrence  strike,  matters  lit- 
tle in  its  jeopardizing  effect  upon  society.  The  essential 
thinof  is  to  have  enouoch  interest  in  the  facts  of  the  case  to 
encourage  the  development  of  devices  which  shall  keep 
the  public  sufficiently  informed  to  enable  it  to  take  action 
and  bring  about  adjustments  for  the  prevention  of  similar 
occurrences.  Wherever  capital  is  closely  organized  and  la- 
bor entirely  unorganized  there  exists  a  fruitful  field  for 
almost  any  kind  of  industrial  and  social  catastrophe.  Add 
to  this  situation  the  ability  of  capital  to  play  off  one  race 
against  another  in  competition  for  work  and  there  is  hardly 
a  limit  to  the  depths  to  which  labor  may  sink.  Throw  in 
the  elements  of  absentee  ownership,  which  knows  little, 
and  in  many  cases  cares  less,  how  it  gets  its  dividends, 
and  a  political  corruption  which  feeds  on  ignorance  and 
distress,  and  we  lay  a  basis  for  continued  depression  which 
must  end  only  in  a  volcanic  outburst  against  degraded 
human  rights. 

That  there  is  no  necessity  for  such  conditions  is  proved 
by  the  many  examples  in  industries  where  conciliation  has 
been  given  a  fair  trial.  Where  the  parties  fail  to  bring 
about  a  voluntary  conciliation,  the  Government  should  be 
able  to  take  them  through  the  preliminary  stages  and  thus 
show  them  the  benefits  of  peaceful  adjustment.  The  near- 
est approach  to  such  a  provision  is  the  Canadian  Indus- 

1  Address  presented  to  President  Taft,  December  30,  1911,  requesting 
the  appointment  of  an  industrial  commission. 


OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  FUTURE  355 

trial  Disputes  Investigation  Act.  Moreover,  the  public 
learns  which  side  deserves  its  sympathy  and  cultivates  an 
intelligent  interest  in  the  problems  that  affect  the  dispu- 
tants and  the  general  body  politic.  Thus  we  may  seek  to 
anticipate  our  problems  by  effective  publicity  and  the  in- 
auguration of  measures  that  will  supplement  the  efforts  of 
the  parties  to  reach  a  settlement  and  give  them  a  chance 
to  express  and  adjust  their  grievances  when  they  come  to 
a  deadlock.  It  is  hoped  that  this  sketch  of  conciliation 
and  arbitration  in  the  coal  industry  of  America  and  Great 
Britain  will  demonstrate  the  benefits  of  voluntary  concil- 
iation and  the  necessity  for  an  effective,  constructive,  pub- 
lic policy. 


THE   END 


APPENDIX 

STATISTICAL  TABLES 


APPENDIX 


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361 


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362 


APPENDIX 


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APPENDIX 


TABLE  V 

Comparison  op  Wages,  Working  Days,  Hours  per  Year, 
Rates  per  Hour,  of  Pick-Miners 


Year. 


1904 


1905 


1906 


1907 


1908 


1909 


1910 


1911 


Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 
Illinois  .... 
Ohio  ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West  Virginia 


Total  Yearly 

Working 

Hours  per 

Wages.' 

Days.i 

Year.2 

$565.30 

213 

1704 

444.50 

175 

1400 

442.56 

204 

1632 

484.96 

209 

2090 

492.32 

198 

1584 

468.05 

185 

1480 

491.29 

225 

1800 

508.01 

213 

2130 

480.86 

186 

1512 

504.14 

182 

1456 

519.30 

205 

1640 

599.37 

231 

2310 

549.39 

209 

1672 

555.75 

195 

1560 

601.91 

268 

2144 

643.05 

234 

2340 

546.97 

188 

1504 

402.48 

156 

1248 

447.00 

238 

1904 

503.84 

211 

2110 

510.66 

180 

1440 

483.60 

186 

1488 

524.33 

261 

2088 

481.17 

192 

1920 

497.71 

168 

1344 

486.50 

175 

1400 

588.36 

264 

2112 

573.94 

229 

2290 

498.09 

167 

1336 

556.80 

192 

1536 

572.98 

248 

1984 

570.48 

194 

1940 

Cents 

per 
Hour. 


.33 
.32 
.27 
.23 
.31 
.32 
.27 
.24 
.32 
.35 
.32 
.26 
.33 
.36 
.28 
.27 
.36 
.31 
.23 
.24 
.35 
.35 
.25 
.25 
.37 
.35 
.28 
.25 
.37 
.36 
.29 
.29 


'  Obtained  from  State  Reports. 

2  Obtained  by  multiplying  the  working  days  by  eight  or  ten  hours  according  to 
length  of  worldng  day  in  each  state. 


APPENDIX 


365 


TABLE  VI 

Average  Production  per  Mine  and  per  Employee  from 
1850-1902 1 


Average  Product. 
Per  mine  —  tons 
Per  employee  — 
tons  .  .  .  . 


1902 


50,383 
565 


1S89 


53,578 
476 


1880 


21,701 
422 


IS'O 


20,986 
347 


1S60 


23,045 
393 


1850 


12,539 
426 


»  U.S.  Census  Report,  1902,  Mines  and  Quarries,  p.  669. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  SOURCE  MATERIAL 

Canadian  Industrial  Disputes  Investigation  Act,  1907. 

Coal  Mines  Minimum  Wage  Act,  1912,  of  Great  Britain. 

Coal  Mines  Regulation  Act,  1908  (eight  hours),  of  Great  Britain. 

Constitution  of  the  Illinois  Coal  Operators  Association,  1907. 

Constitution  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  1912. 

Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  Bulletins. 

Justi,  H.  (writings),  in  the  Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Publications. 

McBride,  J.,  in  "  The  Labor  Movement,"  edited  by  G.  E.  McNeill, 
1886. 

Miners'  National  Record,  1875-76. 

Negotiations  of  the  Anthracite  Operators  and  Anthracite  Min- 
ers, 1912. 

Proceedings  of  the  Interstate  Joint  Conferences  of  Illinois, 
Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Pennsylvania. 

Proceedings  of  the  Federated  Coal  Owners  and  Miners  of 
Great  Britain. 

Proceedings  of  the  Interstate  Joint  Conferences  of  the  South- 
west Field. 

Reports  of  the  State  Bureaus  of  Labor  Statistics. 

Report  of  the  Special  Commission  on  the  Northern  Illinois  Coal 
Strike,  1889. 

Reports  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

Report  of  the  United  States  Immigration  Commission,  1911. 

Reports  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  United  Mine  Workers'  Annual 
Conventions. 

Reports  of  State  Inspectors  of  Mines. 

Report  of  the  United  States  Industrial  Commission,  1902. 

Report  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  on  the  Inves- 
tigation of  the  Eastern  Bituminous  Coal  Situation,  1907. 
59Lh  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  House  Doc.  no.  501. 

Report  on  the  Miners'  Strike  in  Westmoreland  County,  Penn- 
sylvania, 1910-11.  02d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  House  Doc.  no.  847. 


370  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Report  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Special  United  Mine  Workers' 
Conventions  in  1902  and  1906. 

Reports  of  the  Illinois  State  Joint  Conferences. 

Report  of  the  Illinois  Employers'  Liability  Commission,  1910. 

Report  of  the  Labor  Troubles  in  the  Anthracite  Regions,  1887- 
88,  50th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  House  Rept.  no.  4147. 

Report  on  the  Alleged.  Coal  Combination,  1893,  o2d  Cong.,  2d 
Sess.,  House  Rept.  no.  2278. 

Reports  of  the  Commissioner-General  of  Immigration. 

Report  of  the  Anthracite  Strike  Commission,  1902. 

Report  of  the  Conference  between  the  President,  the  Anthra- 
cite Operators,  and  Representatives  of  the  United  Mine  Work- 
ers, 1902. 

Reports  of  the  Miners'  Federation  of  Great  Britain. 

Report  of  the  Board  of  Trade  of  Great  Britain,  1910,  on  Rules 
of  Voluntary  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  Boards  and  Joint 
Committees. 

Reports  of  the  Canadian  Registrar  of  Boards  of  Conciliation  and 
Investigation. 

Report  of  the  British  Royal  Commission  on  Labour,  1894. 

Report  of  Subcommittee  on  Education  and  Labor  of  the  United 
States  Senate  on  "  Conditions  in  the  Paint  Creek  District, 
West  Virginia,"  63d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pursuant  to  Senate 
Resolution  37. 

Report  of  Commissioner  of  Labor  on  "  Increase  in  Prices  of 
Anthracite  Coal,"  62d  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  House  Doc.  no.  1442. 

Special  Report  of  the  United  States  Commissioner  of  Labor  on 
Coal  Mine  Labor  in  Europe,  1905. 

State  Laws. 

United  Mine  Workers'  Journal. 

United  States  Bulletins  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor. 

United  States  Census  Reports. 

United  States  Statutes  at  Large. 

2.  SECONDARY  MATERIAL 

Ashley,  W.  J.  The  Adjustment  of  Wages,  1903. 
BiGELOW,  M.  M.  The  Law  of  Torts,  1907. 
Chaplln-,  H.  W.  The  Coal  Mines  and  the  Public,  1902. 
Crompton,  H.  Industrial  Conciliation,  1876. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  371 

Drinker,  H.  S.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  2  vols.,  1907. 

Hall,  P.  F.  Immigration,  1906. 

Hexdersox,  F.  The  Labor  Unrest,  1911. 

Jeaks,  J.  S.   Co7iciliation  and  Arbitration,  1894. 

Kxoop,  D.  Industrial  Conciliation  and  Arbitration,  1905. 

Lloyd,  H.  D.  A  Strike  of  Millionaires,  1890. 

Lloyd,  H.  D.   The  Lords  of  Ind^istry,  1910. 

Mitchell,  J.  Organized  Labor,  1903. 

Moore,  H.  L.  Laws  of  Wages,  1911. 

Nearixg,  S.    Wages  in  the  United  States,  1911. 

Price,  L.  L.,  F.  R.  Industrial  Peace,  1887. 

Richardson,  T.,  and  Walbank,  A.  Profits  and  Wages  in  the 

British  Coal  Trade,  1911. 
Roberts,  P.   The  Anthracite  Coal  Industry,  1901. 
Roberts,  P.  Anthracite  Coal  Commtmities,  1904. 
Roy,  a.  History  of  the  Coal  Miners,  1903. 
Saliers,  E.  a.   The  Coal  Miner,  1912. 
Smith,  J.  A.  The  Sjnrit  of  American  Government,  1907. 
Stimsox,  F.  J.  Labor  and  its  Relatioii  to  Law,  1895. 
Warxe,  F.  J.  The  Slav  Invasion,  1904. 
Warne,  F.  J.  The  Immigrant  Invasion,  1913. 
Warxe,  F.  J.  The  Coal  Miners,  1905. 
Webb,  S.  and  B.  The  History  of  Trade  Unionism,  1911. 
Webb,  S.  and  B.  Industrial  Democracy,  1902. 
Wyman  B.,  Control  of  the  3Iarket,  1911. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Absentee  ownership,  74. 

American  Miners'  Association,  5. 

Anthracite  Board  of  Trade,  204!. 

Arbitration,  203,  209;  inauguration 
of,  10;  in  Ohio,  IG;  in  western 
Pennsylvania,  17;  under  state 
laws,  21;  in  England,  277. 

Armed  guards,  75. 

Athens  local  union,  case  of,  189. 

Baird,  case,  329. 
Bates's  Union,  202. 

Canadian  Industrial  Disputes  Act, 

344. 
Capital,  earnings  of,  42. 
Causes  of  conciliation  and  arbitra- 
tion, 1  f. 
Closed  shop,  193. 
Coal  lands,  211;  ownership  of,  80; 

concentration    of    ownership    of, 

220. 
Coal  operators'  associations,  rise  of, 

128;    American    Federation    of, 

129;     Illinois     Coal    Operators' 

Association,  134. 
Collective   bargaining,    results    of, 

170/. 
Colorado  struggle,  60. 
Commodities  case,  323. 
Common-law  remedies,  319. 
Company  stores,  27. 
Conciliation  Act  (England,  1896), 

283, 
Conciliation  and  Arbitration  in  the 

anthracite  field,  2Q1  /._ 
Conciliation  and  Arbitration  Board, 

<i55\  in  England,  285. 
Conclusion,  348. 
Consolidation,  214;  history  of,  214; 

legal  background,   215;  railroad 

consolidation,  228. 
Contract  labor,  230. 
Court  of  Arbitration,  284. 

Danville  case,  188. 


Eight-hour  day,  338. 
Eight-hour  law  (1908),  295. 
Enlargement  of  the  market,  24. 

Hocking  Valley  strike  (1884),  23. 

Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association, 
134;  objects,  134;  membership, 
135;  representation,  136;  officers, 
137;  commission  of,  137;  execu- 
tive board,  138;  defense  fund, 
140. 

Immigration,  73,  229,  232;  regula- 
tion of,  339. 

Increase  in  non-English  speaking 
miners,  36. 

Industrial  Council,  284. 

Injunctions,  and  conspiracy  laws, 
76;  conflict  of  federal  and  state, 
51. 

Interstate  Conference  of  1880,  19. 

Interlocking  directorates,  87. 

Interstate  joint  Conference,  142; 
foundations  of,  142;  "right"  of 
representation,  143;  principles 
formulated,  144;  membership, 
145;  organization  and  rules,  146; 
order  of  business,  148;  inviolable 
contracts,  152;  formation  of 
scales,  153  ff\  new  method  in 
1912,  166. 

Interstate  Joint  Conference  of 
1885,  16;  of  1886,  30. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
investigation  (1907),  80,  218,  317; 
work  of,  327;  maximum  rates 
by,  331. 

Joint  conference  (1885),  16;  (1886), 

30. 
Joint  movement,  extension  of,  46. 

Knights  of  Labor,  234. 

Labor,  direction  of  policy  toward, 
91. 


376 


INDEX 


Labor  Party,  340. 

Labour  Party  (England),  291. 

Labour  representation   (England), 

289. 
Leases,    224;   Jersey   Central   and 

Lehigh  Valley  i-ailroads,  224. 
Legal  enactment,  288. 

Machinery,  efifepts  of,  42. 

Maryland,  attempts  to  organize, 
54. 

Maximum  rates  by  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  331. 

Miners'  National  Association,  7. 

Minimimi  wage,  339. 

Minimum  Wage  Act  (1912),  299, 
304;  effects  of,  308;  ability  of 
industry  to  bear,  309. 

Molly  Maguires,  213. 

Monthly  bulletin  of  decisions,  190. 

National  Federation  of  Miners  and 
Mine  Laborers,  29. 

Negotiations  of  1912  in  the  anthra- 
cite field,  261  ff. ;  the  agreement, 
265. 

Northwest,  organization  of,  59, 

Ohio  Miners'  Amalgamated  As- 
sociation, 20. 

Operators'  tactics,  92. 

Osborne  case  (1909),  293. 

Ownership  of  coal  Lands  and  stock, 
80, 

Parliamentary  members,  294. 
Pools,  212;  formation  of,  212,  221. 
Problem  before  the  public,  198. 
Public  policy,  lack  of,  325. 

Reading  Railroad,  207. 

Reese  case,  52. 

Regulatory  measures,  337;  eight- 
hour  day,  338;  legal  ton,  338; 
of  immigration,  339;  minimum 
wage,  339. 

Restraint  of  trade,  decisions 
against,  320. 

Royal  Commission  of  Labour,  282. 

Rural  worker  and  individualism, 
71. 


Sliding  scales,  205,  278. 

Southwestern  Interstate  Joint  Con- 
ference, 53. 

Southwest  field,  organization  of 
(1899),  50;  system  in,  191  /. 

State  conference,  179;  task  of,  179; 
organization,  181;  fundamentals 
settled,  181;  administration  of 
contracts,  184^. 

State  statutes  vs.  common  law,  77. 

Steele  case  (1907),  292. 

Strikes  — 

Strike  of  1897,  41;  strike  of 
Virden  and  Pana,  47;  strikes  in 
Alabama,  Tennessee,  and  Ken- 
tucky, 56;  strike  of  1912  in  West 
Virginia,  94;  "Long  Strike"  of 
1875,  212;  strike  of  1887-88,  234; 
of  1900,  240;  of  1002,  244;  strikes 
during  the  nineties  in  England, 
279/. 

Suspension  of  1894,  39. 

Temple  Iron  Company  deal  (1898), 

226. 
Trial  of  Siney  and  Parks,  13. 
Traffic  Associations,  86. 

Unions  — 

Miners'  unions  in  England, 
270  ff.;  Miners'  Association  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  (1841), 
271;  Miners'  National  Union 
(1863),  272;  Miners'  Federation 
of  Great  Britain  (1889),  275. 

United  Mine  Workers  of 
America,  formation  of,  33;  in 
1897,  43;  membership,  108;  pur- 
pose, 109;  units  of  organization, 
110;  local  unions.  111;  finances, 
114, 125;  officers,  116;  nominations 
and  elections,  119;  recall,  121; 
conventions,  122;  strikes,  124. 

W^ages,  reduction  in  (1904),  160. 

V/estmoreland  County  strike 
(1910),  91. 

West  Virginia  Problem,  63. 

Workingmen's  Benevolent  Asso- 
ciation, 203. 

Working  Conditions,  25. 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U    .    S    .   A 


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